Militia in Gettysburg Campaign

[Donald Schneider]

To all:

I remember reading somewhere that the governor of Pennsylvania had amassed the seemingly incredible number of 50,000 militia troops in Harrisburg, some lent by governors of other states, as Lee began his invasion. Command of this virtual army was given to General Couch who had recently quit the AoP in disgust, refusing to serve under Hooker any longer. Is this number accurate or even close? Fifty thousand?

If so, why then does it seem that militia was held in such utter disregard and contempt, seemingly both by the enemy and its own side? Why did Lee apparently see no need to dispatch more than a single corps to capture the Pennsylvania capital when defended by such a large number? Why, when he recalled Ewell before he could begin his attack on receiving Harrison's report that AoP was on the march and closing fast, did Lee seem so unconcerned about beginning a battle with the AoP with 50,000 militia so close and to his rear? After the Battle of Gettysburg began, why didn't Couch--a perfectly competent commander--march on Lee's rear?

Apparently, during the Civil War, militia troops were considered all but worthless. Why? Fifty thousand of them, operating in concert with the AoP, couldn't comprise a significant threat to Lee? What was it about militia that led to such disparagement?

I've always wondered about this and don't know the answer. Thus, this is not intended as a debate note--at least on my part. You're free to disagree among yourselves, if you do and like, of course.

Thanks

Don Schneider

[samgrant]

Don,

On June 12, 1863, with the approaching threat of invasion by the ANV, a call was put out to raise an emergency federal militia.

There were problems with this, as the first call was for volunteers who would serve during "the pleasure of the President or the continuance of the war" and with no bounty for enlisting.

This did not entice many volunteers.

So, things were reconsidered, and on June 15, the call went out for 100,000 (from Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland) for a maximum of six months, or until the 'emergency' was over, again with no enlistment bounty.

50,000 was Pennsylvania's quota, and they were to assemble at Harrisburg.

When there was little enthusiasm for this 2nd call, Stanton told Governor Curtin to make whatever appeal that would "operate most effectually on the people of the state".

Curtin on the 16th then called for volunteers "without reference to the six months".

There was lots of bickering, of course, about who would pay for what, if the troops raised could be counted against draft quotas, whether these volunteers would be under Federal or State service, etc.

Finally(?), Stanton authorized Couch on June 25 to furnish arms, ammunition, subsistence, transport, etc. for these volunteers, however he drew the line on uniforms, they could be furnished only to Federal troops!

On June 26,Curtain called for 60,000 men to come "promptly forward' to defend the state for ninety days under which they would be mustered into state, not federal, service.

Lincoln overruled Stanton on the issue of uniforms.

In the end, if I'm not mistaken, they finally raised about 25,000 after all this, and tho they may have been mustered in at Harrisburg, they were subsequently not concentrated in that place, but dispersed to various locations.

In the few engagements in which they participated, they were generally driven back by Lee's forces (didn't have much time for training, obviously).

That's about as much as I know about this issue, and I'd welcome any additional info to complement this, or info to the contrary.



(By the way, most of the info above I got from Coddington, have you ever found the time to get into that book? On a personal note, it's nice to see that your interests have expanded beyond one certain one-legged general .)

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Sam:

Thanks for your input. I forget exactly where I read that, but I distinctly remember the author saying that the governor of Pennsylvania had collected the "incredible" number of 50,000 militia in Harrisburg at that time. It just seemed too "incredible" to me to ever fully credit this assertion. I probably got it from that same horrible book that so besmirched the military reputation of General Sickles; that attributed Spencers to Buford's division; and asserted that Heth had gone to Gettysburg that fateful day to try to confiscate a supply of sauerkraut he had had reports of being there, to fight dysentery amongst the ranks. (The epic Battle of Gettysburg fought over sauerkraut?!)

Anyway, thanks for taking the time to cite from Coddington. I rather more trust his accuracy here.

Don

P.S. I'm glad that our present day National Guard seems to get more--and deservedly so--respect than did the militia of that era. The NG has performed exemplarity service in many wars, including the present one in Iraq. I'm sure we all appreciate their service to our great nation and their sacrifices, as well as those of their families.

[ewc]

Very interesting questions, Donald. I can find precious little on the militia in the Gettysburg Campaign- my fund of knowledge on it consists of snippets from here and there I've read over the years and information on it only seems to want to appear grudgingly.

As to 50,000 troops in Harrisburg at the time of the Confederate presence in Pennsylvania, it does sound a fanciful figure. Surely with numbers like that, one would think that such competent commanders as Generals Couch and Baldy Smith could have done some danger or at least presented a fearful front to Lee as you suggest, being a more real army than the spectral one Lee wanted to create under Beauregard in Central Virginia to trouble the Federal authorities. I am guessing Samgrant is in the ballpark with his estimation of 25,000 troops.

Governor Curtin didn't have much time to assemble his home defense militia, and as has been described, the home folks weren't mobbing Harrisburg to get in on the action of taking potshots at them dangbug invading Rebels. But men did come together and militia units were sent over by neighboring states. What's more, men were diverted to Western Pennsylvania, namely Pittsburgh, in the event Lee turned that way or sent forces thereabouts to see what evil could be done. Conceivably, this number may be part of the proffered 50,000 aggregate.

Men assembled in no extraodinary rush, to be armed, outfitted, organized, officers appointed, training begun- all a huge effort to be undertaken under the auspices of the state facing a veteran victorious and well led foe, with green troops and, aside from its' top commanders, inexperience in its officers, and all the state's best and veteran men already in the armies and unavailable meant that the militia was being formed in far from the best circimstances- they could hardly hope to be much of an effective force for a good while at the very least, but yet here they are to meet urgent circumstance. This could very well be why Lee took little note of them and why the soldiers and leaders on both sides did not consider the use of militia at all meaningful. Early in the war the militia had performed valuable service for both sides. But now the war had past a point anyone had figured at the outset, and militia had lost any meaning to the actual fighting of the war and were relegated to backwaters, home guards, and getting out of combat service. i am supposing too that by mid 1863 the men in the ranks and their leaders had come to regard the militia troops as picnic soldiering.

I have read where Baldy Smith's division of militia joined in the pursuit of Lee; still, it does cause one to wonder if more efficient use of the militia couldn't have been made. I wonder if Meade's newness to command with litte time to pull all his threads together might not have had some part in that.

Again, excellent question, Donald, i am going to continue looking into this. ed

[samgrant]

Just to add some flavor to this thread, I'll copy what I posted on another thread here:

As concern deepened about the Confederate threat to the North in late June 1863, Governor Joel Parker of New Jersey wired Lincoln:

"The people of New Jersey are apprehensive that the invasion of the enemy may extend to their soil ... The people of New Jersey want McClellan at the head of the Army of the Potomac. If that cannot be done, then we ask that he may be put at the head of the New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania troops now in Pennsylvania, defending these Middle States from invasion. If either appointment be made, the people would rise en masse."

Lincoln replied:

"I beg you to be assured that no one out of my position can know so well, as if he were in it, the difficulties and involvements of replacing General McClellan in command, and this aside from any imputations upon him."


Kenneth P. Williams, in Lincoln Finds a General, comments: "The New Jersey troops must have been keeping themselves in hiding until McClellan appeared, for Couch's return for June 30 listed no New Jersey units."

[whitworth]

Several New York National Guard regiments arrived in Harrisburg, prior to the Battle of Gettysburg. One unit, I recall, guarded the bridges on the Susquehanna River, above Harrisburg.

[ewc]

Whitworth, you are right- New York responded to the threat of Lee and his hordes in the North much quicker and with more men, armed and eqipped, than did Pennsylvania- with the toes of the enemy tickling her underbelly as it were. I do not know if that means that the authorities in New York were better prepared militarily than Pennsylvania or just had men available for just such a contingency. But they did have men to send, and without them, General Couch has very little to work with.

[matthew mckeon]

I am in the middle of reading "The Devil's Own Work," about the New York draft riots. One of the contributing factors to the violence was that much of the militia that would have provided riot troops were in Pennsylvania in pursuit of Lee.

[samgrant]

"in pursuit of Lee" - like the mouse in pursuit of the cat?

[ewc]

Well, looks like Devil's Own Work is another must-get-to read. I too am suffering from Ole's disease- my must-read list is growing much faster than my ability to read my must-reads!

So Matthew, as you are reading this work, perhaps you can fill us in if the author believes these troops sent to meet the crisis of Lee in Pennsylvania had been a force assembled under arms at the ready to keep the peace in New York, perhaps to have on hand to suppress just this sort of agitation and unrest presented by the NYC Draft Riots? Or again, was it more a case of the state military authorities being more astute and prepared and at the ready with troops at its' disposal to meet contingencies, two of which happened to pop up so close in time as to not have this force available to meet the second crisis? For myself, I would think the state authorities would want to have on hand a force ready to 'keep the peace' if required in such a bustling, helter-skelter, and frangible place as New York City, jammed with immigrants and a certain degree of lawlessness with a potential to erupt.

Also, the New York troops and Pennsylvania militia, though in no way a force to stop Lee in a determined effort, did give of good account in facing Lee's troops and in being a menace to his plans. Halleck and Stanton were pushing General Couch in Harrisburg to get as many men as he could to Meade to assist in hounding Lee back into Virginia. The idea was a good one, but perhaps their expectation of its' being done was expecting a deal too much of Couch and of these men. As it was, a division under Baldy Smith did join the pursuit and certainly did perform as well as anyone could reasonably expect. Asking these men to undertake days of forced marches on rain-slogged roads is asking for quite alot.

Still, these PA militia troops were not entirely green. A number of them were from recently discharged regiments- certainly enough to leaven the untried men and allow them to at least perform the functions required of soldiers before the foe. However, the vast majority of the volunteers were green and could be expected to perform as such.