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What Lee missed was not so much Stuarts Cavalry, but Stuart himself, or more precisely, timely intelligence of the location and movements of the AoP, from the only source that Lee considered adequately reliable. Apparently, Lee was inclined to discount most other sources of intelligence that did not originate from Stuart.
It is a fact that Gettysburg was the only battle that Lee stumbled into. It is a fact, that Stuart had only 1/3 of his Cavalry with him, the other 2/3's was with Lee. It is a fact that the AoP never march so fast for so far, in its career as it did from Meades accession to command until the 2d day of battle at Gettysburg. It is a fact that Lee was unable to coordinate the actions of his corps commanders during the battle.
P.S. Would Lee have been more favorable to Longstreets plan, if Stuart had been available on the 1st or 2d day of battle, to give Lee his necessary reassuring intelligence on the AoP?
In passing, Stuart actually arrived at Lee's HQ about Noon on July 2, along with a small detachment of cavalry under a Lt. Col. named Black (IIRR) who Lee remembered as a cadet at West Point. Might have been a little later than Noon.
This is too late to have any real effect on the plan. A recon of the Federal left had returned earlier. Somehow they seemed to have wandered down to the Round Tops and back without noticing Sickle's Corps. There may have been good reason Lee didn't trust people other than Stuart on intel.
No one is perfect, we all have faults including Lee and Gettysburg exposed the disadvantage of Lee's natural agressive nature and style, that in other battles stood him in good stead. But without accurate intelligence 'that he had confidence in' this aggressiveness became a liability.
Instead of hesitating or conferring with all his senior commanders at the sudden and unexpected appearance of units of the AoP, he allowed his natural inclinations (without adequate intelligence) to draw him into a major battle, in which he was, for the first time in his tenure as Commanding General of the AoNV, effectively blind.
Although realizing his lack of intelligence, he apparently could not resist the demands of natural instinct.
It was perhaps fortunate for Lee that the war in Va. became a war of attrition and not maneuver after Gettysburg, where the eventual loss of Stuart and the growing ascendency of Union Cavalry would not be as decisive as they would have earlier in the war.
Lee couldn't keep his troops together. Because of supply deficits and forage shortages, Lee had to separate his corps. Once a unit was more than a day's journey away, it could actually be three to four days longer.
The mere fact of allowing Stuart to move into Pennsylvania by another route, than the one taken by Lee, potentially invited disaster from the start.
Stuart wasn't the only unit that did not arrive "on time." Ewell did not attack Cemetery Hill, because one of the reasons was he lacked an entire division, that was still on the road from Carlisle. Ewell was also missing his entire reserve artillery. Ewell only had some 40% of his Corps artillery cannon during the fight of July 1. I've never read these facts in any condemnation of Ewell for not attacking Cemetery Hill immediately?
It's good to keep in mind that two brigades of cavalry were left in the direct command of James Longstreet when Stuart left the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet saw a good use of those brigades being for them to position themselves to shield the ANV's movements. His goal was to bait the Federals after the ANV was north of the Potomac and subsequently to give the ANV more time to get ahead of the AOP. The trick didnt work and when the army needed those troops for recon, they were in Virginia still.
Stuart did have lenient orders, and by reading those, Stuart abided by what he was authorized to do. He never broke the plan that he sent to Lee and was approved to do by both Lee AND Longstreet.
It's a valid point that Lee was in the habit of issuing broad suggestion like orders. I think it's important to keep in mind the effectiveness of this style up to July of 63. Prior to this, Lee had the soldiers who could find victory using this plan. New corps commanders were not used to this and it's notable to see that after the Pennsylvania Campaign, he was much more direct with his orders.
__________________ Ancestors in the 28th, 38th, 46th, 59th and 22nd Btn. Virginia Infantry and 2nd Virginia Cavalry.
Excellent thoughty observations, Brigance. So good, in fact, that you've left no room for discussion. Oh well. Really great stuff.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
your post does leave me with one question. When Genl Lee said : ""He has lost his left arm, I have lost my right", in reference to General Jackson, he clearly realized the impact. My question is this, did he realize what impact would entail? Regarding the Cavalry with the ANV, weren't they guarding supplies, not the passes?
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
...Regarding the Cavalry with the ANV, weren't they guarding supplies, not the passes?
Lee had 7 brigades of cavalry:
a) one was with Ewell up near Harrisburg-Carlilse
b) Stuart took 3 with him
c) Imboden was on the west of Lee's advance gathering supplies and screening
d) 2 brigades were left under the command of Beverly Robertson to screen the army and cover the gaps.
The problem, really, is D.
Robertson was a pre-war Regular cavalryman. Lee and Stuart had moved him out of the ANV after his poor performance at 2nd Manassas. Apparently it was essential for him to leave his combat command and go to NC as a training officer immediately (he was transferred in the few days after 2nd Manassas and before Lee crossed the Potomac on his way to Antietam, so it is pretty clear they didn't want Robertson commanding a cavalry brigade in combat again.)
But in the Old Army game of politics, D. H. Hill in NC was ticked and stuck Lee and Stuart with Robertson again as the price for getting two regiments of cavalry. The problem then was that Robertson was the 3rd ranking cavalry general -- after Stuart and Hampton -- in the ANV. Stuart took Hampton with him, so Robertson was in command after he left. "Grumble" Jones was with him, but Robertson was in command.
Stuart wrote a crystal clear set of orders for Robertson -- who failed to carry them out in a timely fashion. He was supposed to leave the gaps and move North of the Potomac when the AoP moved north of the river. He stayed at least 1 day, and probably 2 days, longer than he should have at the gaps in Virginia. If he'd moved when he should have, he'd have been up near Gettysburg on the 2nd, and maybe the 1st, if Lee had wanted him there.
Compounding this was some lousy communication-and-staff work.
a) Stuart didn't make it clear to higher HQ who he was leaving behind. Longstreet seems to have assumed he'd leave Hampton if Stuart went himself. This would probably mean taking Jones, an excellent officer who did not get along well with Stuart.
b) Lee's HQ staff was tiny (4 officers?). That is one reason he farmed so much out to Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart. Nobody there seems to have paid much attention to cavalry while Stuart was gone, or they would have noticed Robertson wasn't moving
c) Robertson doesn't seem to have made the situation clear to higher HQ or been aggressive about asking what he should do.
When it hit the fan, 6 of these 7 brigades were at Gettysburg by late on the 2nd or early on the 3rd. The other (Imboden) moved East and took over train-guard duty on the 2nd, relieving Pickett so he could move to Gettysburg for his charge on the 3rd.
After Gettysburg, Lee and Stuart got rid of Robertson once again. Stuart's fault in this is probably that he should have taken Jones and left Hampton, or he and Lee should have found a way to get the cavalry without Robertson. Longstreet should perhaps have paid more attention to what Stuart was doing as he left on his raid. Lee/his staff should have been more on top of this; maybe they were overloaded, but this isn't their finest hour.
Thank you for clearing that up. I agree especially with your post entirely. If anything, Lee's General Staff was pathetically, and dangerously small and caused all kinds of screwups especially when it came to the wording of the orders Stuart received.
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
Thank you for clearing that up. I agree especially with your post entirely. If anything, Lee's General Staff was pathetically, and dangerously small and caused all kinds of screwups especially when it came to the wording of the orders Stuart received.
Here are the orders Stuart left with Robertson. They are about as explicit as anyone could expect of a commander going off where he would be out of touch. If followed energetically, they should result in Robertson leaving his position in the Gaps in VA about 1-2 days earlier than he did.
=====
HDQRS. CAV. DIV., ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 24, 1863.
Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: Your own and General Jones' brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.
Your object will be to watch the enemy; deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.
After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.
As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.
If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.
You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.
I send instructions for General Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpike.
In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions and, if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the Gaps.
In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.
You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse artillery.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, Commanding.
[P. S.]--Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.
=====
To me, these look like Stuart trying to minimize the damage an officer he didn't trust to do his job might do while the boss is gone.
The problem is that Stuart does not want Robertson (who he thinks incompetent, with an untried brigade) or "Grumble" Jones (the "best outpost officer in the Army", but a pain to deal with) along on the mission. The solution to the tangled command chain is to leave Hampton behind (as Longstreet assumed he would do) and take one of these, probably Jones, so that Hampton could handle Robertson. With a little bit of better luck, it would not have mattered too much -- but then this was war, and relying on your luck is usually a bad idea.
given what's been said, would anyone say that Stuart disobeyed the orders that he had, as ambiguous and vague as they were?
so much history has been written blaming Stuart for the loss at Gettysburg. But if he followed his orders, and didn't start the battle, can he really be solely blamed for the loss?
__________________ Ancestors in the 28th, 38th, 46th, 59th and 22nd Btn. Virginia Infantry and 2nd Virginia Cavalry.
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