Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[Donald Schneider]

I'm brand new here, and I'm certain this topic has been discussed previously. Thus, please pardon a neophyte's interest. I've read with great interest General Sickles's rejoinder to his critics in The American Century series, and it seems to me that he makes one very compelling case for his actions that fateful day at Gettysburg. If nothing else (and there is much more) his argument seems irrefutable to me that there is no way his light corps could have held a position along Cemetery Ridge from Hancock's left up to Little Round Top. Had he attempted to do so, as he put it, his line would have been "a mere skirmish line" which the Confederates would have run right over.

Meade did seem curiously unconcerned about his left on July 2--despite warnings from Sickles and others--and had it not been for Sickles's unauthorized movement in *front* of LRT, then history might be vastly different than what we know it to be today. Sickles sacrificed a large part of his corps, but in doing so he bought precious time for the AOP and at great personal sacrifice not just to his men, but to himself.

On top of Sickles's own arguments, it seems to me that he received verification--and vindication--in Longstreet's memoirs. Longstreet notes that had he not had to waste time time battling the Union's detached III Corps, that he would have easily secured LRT!

Dan Sickles might well have been one colorful and checkered character in American history, but in my humble opinion he had been a surprisingly, instinctively good general and a fearless individual who just might very well have saved our union. Like King Canute before him, I think he has gotten one raw deal in history's sometimes myopic eyes!

Do any agree/disagree with this assessment?

Thanks much.

Don Schneider

[tomh]

Don,

Ahhh... one of the greatest debates of G'Burg!

<his argument seems irrefutable to me that there is no way his light corps could have held a position along Cemetery Ridge from Hancock's left up to Little Round Top>

His position from Emmitsburg Road to Hauck's Ridge is actually longer than the distance from Hancock to LRT.

<Had he attempted to do so, as he put it, his line would have been "a mere skirmish line" which the Confederates would have run right over seems irrefutable to me>

see above <grin>

<Longstreet notes that had he not had to waste time time battling the Union's detached III Corps, that he would have easily secured LRT!>

If Sickles had placed his guns on Munshower's Knoll on the left of his assigned position he would have actually commanded the wheatfield, Weikert Farm and much of the Codori Farm as well as having a clear line to parts of the Slyder Farm. Plus there was also 5th Corps coming up behind LRT on Taneytown Rd, around 10,000 troops that could have slammed into Hood's flank (or even rear) if he had continued on his original line of attack?

Just a humble opinion,
TomH

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Tom,

Thanks much for your well-reasoned reply. I would like to wait awhile and see if any more knowledgeable here than I agree with you or takes General Sickles's side before reaching any conclusions. I'm here to learn, and certainly not to teach people like yourself who have obviously studied and debated this topic far more thoroughly than I. Thus, I am grateful for the discourse from people like yourself, and their time. I shall comment later.

Thank you very much, and I do hope others will weigh in presently.

Donald Schneider

[johan_steele]

THe problem w/ the line of argument that Sickles had saved the line is that the line he was supposed to hold was considerably stronger due to better fields of fire and being closer to a road where reinforcements could have been moved to positions along the line. The line he moved forward to... was poorly chosen due to poor fields of fire and it was too long etc; his actions put his left flank in the air and endandered the entire AoP.

Desjardin I think treats Sickles quite fairly in his book These Honored Dead. Sickles was a despicable man in every way imaginable. About the only he can't be faulted for is a lack of courage; he had plenty.

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Tom and Shane:

Okay, please allow me to ask you fellows this. In The American Century article I referenced, General Sickles, regarding purely logistical considerations such as the feasibility of his holding a line to LRT, invokes the Comte De Paris's assessment of the situation; leaning heavily upon him for vindication. I take it you don't think much of the count's military historical acumen and/or his knowledge of the Gettysburg geography? Is that right, or is it that you allege Sickles misuses his source? Please advise and thanks.

Don

[william42]

Don: Great post and welcome to the board. I don't think I'm more knowledgeable than you but I'm going to give you my opinion anyway. (The members here will probably agree when I tell you that being only partially informed on a subject doesn't necessarily stop me from voicing my opinion on it.)

I think it was an extremely foolhardy move on Sickles' part, (moving his corps forward that far out in front) and he survives this long in history as a "General of Note" only because of the following: His corps survived, the AOP eventually won the battle, Longstreet wrote what he wrote in his memoirs, and his extraordinarily savvy, cunning, political manuevers immediately after the battle.

Looking forward to reading your posts.

Terry

[samgrant]

What does one make of this exchange between Gen. Alexander S. Webb and artist James E. Kelly, as documented in the book Generals in Bronze by William B. Styple:

"K - What sort of man is General [Egbert L.] Viele?

W - A most reliable man.

K - Could you depend on what he said?

W - Oh, yes, indeed.

K - Well, here is a story Viele told young [William] Sweeny - son of General Sweeny. Do you know him?

W - Yes.

K - That's when Sickles received the wound in his leg at Gettysburg, that the wound was only a slight one, but he saw the blunder he had made in placing his men where he did, that he ordered a surgeon to cut off his leg, but he refused. In fact, if I remember right, two surgeons refused to do it; and at last, he ordered a drunken volunteer surgeon to do it, and he did it.

W - Well, if Viele said that it be true"

[tomh]

Don,

I am not familiar with the Compte de Paris' comments on Sickles action. Did the count actually visit the field or were his assesments based on Sickles after action reports? I have spent some time walking the ground involved (both the assigned line and the "higher ground" line) and find it to have little resemblance (especially since the trees have been cut) to the ground described in the AAR's or in Sickles' subsequent defense of his actions. Yes, the Emmitsburg Road is higher ground, but, as Shane pointed out, his flanks were in the air, he was further from supply and was outside of the protection of the guns on the Cemetery Ridge line. The center of Sickles assigned position had a poor field of fire and was in a low area, but ground in front of that section was even lower and swampy. On the left is the knoll where artillery was finally placed with great effect and on the right is higher ground with an excellent view of most of the ground crossed by McLaws.

Sickles move to higher ground was in fact an exception to the general rule of tactics in this case, the higher ground was not the better position.

Again, a humble opinion,
TomH

[Donald Schneider]

Dear William and Sam,

We seem to have a curious and rather puzzling situation at Gettysburg on July 2. On one hand, we have this picture of this horrible, political hack of a general having wormed his way up the chain of command present, while on the other hand we have an army commander seemingly unconcerned about one of his flanks--in the midst of a major battle--in whose hands was entrusted to this very same disreputable, incompetent general.

It also seems to me that Sickles gets scant praise for his commendable forced march--on his own volition, nonetheless--to arrive at Gettysburg when desperately needed.

Thanks for your kind welcome, William. As to Sam's source's sensational allegation, does anyone here have any comment? It seems strange that such a vain man as Sickles would have needlessly accepted going through the remainder of his life so maimed and deformed--for any reason!

As an edited afterthought, I remember seeing a picture of the preserved remains of Sickles's
leg, which the general would visit from time-to-time. Am I remembering wrong, or doesn't the skeletal remains clearly indicate massive injury? I could be wrong here, I acknowledge. Am I?

Don

[william42]

Hi Don, thanks for your reply. I can only speak for what I posted, and from what I've read, my opinion is that Sickles was out of line, (literally and figuratively) on July 2nd, by disobeying Meades direct orders and marching his corps out to the position they ultimately held. That's my opinion formed from my reading. You have your opinion based on your reading.

I think Sickles march to get to Gettysburg is very commendable, and I've never said otherwise.

From my reading I only know that Sickles' leg was shorn off, (most of it) below the knee by a Confederate shell. Then it was amputated. I don't consider that a slight wound. I'm sure Sickles felt it was a major wound and very painful. I've always given him credit for the slightly theatrical manner in which he left the field, on a stretcher smoking the cigar. I think that act probably helped bolster his mens morale, and helped them to get through the mess that he put them in when he marched them forward, out to that position.

Please don't take offense. I respect your argument and the way you presented it. We just have a difference of opinion.

Terry