Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[mobile_96]

Originally Posted by samgrant

mobile_96,

Sorry to say, your link to
http://gdg.org
did not work for me.

Is it just me!, or is there more to it?

Sorry:
http://www.gdg.org

[mobile_96]

(Don..If you are all so interested in Gettysburg then buy at least Volume III of the Battles and Leaders of.... anthology I referenced previously to read Sickles's long rejoinder to the Meade's letter.)
Don, I have the 4 vols of Battles and Leaders, + the 2 new Vols by Cozzens; The Annals of the Civil War, with intro by Gallagher, and The New Annals of The Civil War, edited by Cozzens & Girardi, all including material about Gettysburg, even if not specifically about Sickles.
I also have the Series 1, Vol. XXVII, 3 part (Gettysburg) set of the ORs in a larger size issued by Morningside Press + on the OR cd from Guildpress; paperback and hardback copies of Coddingtons "The Gettysburg Campaign"; The 3 vol.set of "The Bachelder Papers"+accompaning maps; "Gettysburg" by Trudeau, "Gettysburg" by Sears, "Gettysburg Day Three" by Wert, "Pickets Charge-Last Attack at Gettysburg, by Hess; Pickett's Charge-Eyewitness Accounts edited by Richard Rollins;"The Colors of Courage" by Creighton; Days of "Uncertainty and Dread" by Gerald Bennett;
The 3 books by Pfanz, "The Cavalry at Gettysburg" by Longacre, Gettyburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions by Wittenberg; Gettysburg-Day Two, A study in Maps by John D. Imhof;and Tuckers "High Tide at Gettysburg"; "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" by Troy Harman,and last but not least all 35 issues of Gettysburg Magazine, issued by Morningside. And maybe I should include 3 or 4 full years of digests of email discussions from GDG,(online Gettysburg Discussion Group.)
And Gettysburg is not even my biggest interest in the CW era.
When I asked previously about 'sources' I should have stated it better and asked what other books you were using as a source for your study, believing that most of these would be giving their primary sources.
This is more for Sam......Coddington has more material on Hunt and Sickles. If you don't have the book, and can't get access to it, let me know and I'll work on getting it typed up for you. I'm presently having some issues with my right arm that makes too much typing at a time a not fun prospect. Even this little bit is starting to bother me.
Following this post will be material from a Gettysburg Mag.(issue 4) discussing the controversy. It's in 2 parts. I also have more material from a newer article(issue 34) and considering scanning to post here.
Chuck in IL.

[mobile_96]

Gettysburg Mag, Vol.4 (Jan/1991.page 120
This is excerpted from Gettysburg Controversies
by Richard A. Sauers. BA in History from Susquehanna University
also author of The Gettysburg Campaign, a Comprehensive, Selectively Annotated Biography.
please read Note 36, botton of this page
........... the Meade-Sickles feud on the Union side. More properly it might be called the Sickles Controversy because General Meade never said much about the criticisms directed his way by Sickles and his henchmen. Meade preferred to let his record speak for him. It might have been better for Meade, who abhorred newspapermen, to speak out in his own defense. However, Meade died in 1872; Sickles survived until 1914.(36)
Dan Sickles was the most controversial general in the Army of the Potomac. A lawyer by training, Sickles graduated from the Tammany Hall school of politics. His congressional career was derailed in 1859 when he shot and killed his wife's lover, Philip Barton Key. Although he pleaded temporary insanity and was not imprisoned, Sickles went back to New York. In 1861, he organized a brigade of infantry and managed to have himself appointed a brig- adier general of volunteers. His battlefield experience was limited, but Sickles, via his political connections, rose to command the Third Corps. At Chancellorsville, his troops performed gallantly against heavy odds, but Sickles' own generalship has not been scrutinized in any detail. Still, his men liked his jaunty and reckless style. Until Gettysburg, there seem to be very few adverse criticisms from the men in the ranks.
Sickles arrived at Gettysburg with some of his troops late on July 1. By the early morning of July 2, all of his corps except two brigades had arrived, and these units reached the field sometime around ten o'clock. When Meade developed his battle line-the now-famous fishhook-he assigned Sickles the task of forming his corps on Hancock's left and extending the line south along Cemetery Ridge to the Round Tops, which he was to occupy, if practicable. However, Dan was not happy with his position, which he considered to be dominated by the higher ground to his front-the Peach Orchard and its environs.
Sickles made his objections known to army headquarters, but Meade was adamant about the line to be occupied. He did send Henry Hunt, his capable Chief of Artillery, to see Sickles and examine the ground. Sickles showed Hunt the Peach Orchard area and asked to move his corps forward. Hunt said he could not authorize the move but would inform Meade of Sickles' wishes. He also suggested a reconnaissance to sweep the woods in front of the proposed position.
Col. Hiram Berdan and his sharpshooters, supported by the 3rd Maine, performed this task. Berdan's soldiers ran into Confederate troops in Pitzer's Woods, "three columns in motion in rear of the wood, changing direction, as it were, by the right flank," as Berdan later reported. After a brief firefight, Berdan's men were pushed back. He reported the skirmish to Sickles, who decided to forestall enemy occupation of the high ground. Sometime after two o'clock, the III Corps marched forward, forming a long V-shaped salient stretching from Houck's Ridge to the Peach Orchard and then north along the Emmitsburg Road.
Sickles got into position just before Longstreet's corps finally reached its assigned position to attack "up the Emmitsburg Road." However, McLaws found Yankees in force where there were not supposed to be any. The end result was a frontal attack that eventually mangled the III Corps, roughed up a number of supporting brigades, and produced what Longstreet described as the "finest three hours of fighting on the planet." By nightfall, the Yankee line was established on Little Round Top north along the ridge. Sickles was badly wounded when a cannonball struck his right leg, forcing amputation.
After the battle, Sickles loudly and repeatedly called attention to Meade's shortcomings as a general. Meade had placed the III Corps in an untenable position dominated by high ground, then ignored the corps commander's repeated warnings about a Confederate flank movement. Sickles advanced on his own, since he did not have definite orders from army headquarters. His move stopped the flank march and forced the enemy to attack. The battle also prevented a Yankee retreat to Pipe Creek, Maryland. So convincing and so bulky was the material that Sickles contributed to the literature of the battle that Meade's reputation has suffered ever since.
Sickles used a combination of the truth, half-truths, and outright lies to paint a picture of Meade as a befuddled commander who owed the victory to the terrain, not his own generaiship. Sickles based his defense on four major points. First, he claimed that his movement was a reaction to the southward flank march of Longstreet's Corps, which would have outflanked the Union army and occupied the Round Tops had not the III Corps advanced. Sickles cited a high volume of skirmish fire as one indication of the enemy movements.
Berdan's skirmish in Pitzer's Woods was also used. Berdan, a selfless promoter of his own suspect reputation, helped publicize the importance of the fight. According to Sickles and his men, Berdan's reconnaissance delayed Longstreet for forty minutes, allowing Sickles to move forward and forestall a bloodless occupation of the Round Tops. There is one major problem with this theory-Berdan encountered Wilcox's Alabama brigade of Anderson's Division, Hill's Corps. Longstreet was miles away, just beginning his flank march. Hindsight enabled Sickles to fabricate this part of his propaganda. And even though this story should have been demolished decades ago, it still surfaces now and then, most recently in a painting purporting to show Berdan's troops halting Longstreet. (37)
Sickles also claimed he had no orders on July 2. What ever positions he took he occupied on his own without direction from army headquarters. At times, Sickles did admit to receiving orders, but the directions were so vague as to be useless. Meade ignored his imprecations, and so Sickles....................continued on next page

(35). Tucker, Lee and Longst?,eet, p. 272, nl5.
(36). The summation of the Meade-Sickles Controversy that follows is taken from this author's A Caspian Sea of Ink: The Meade- Sickles Controversy (Baltimore, Butternut and Blue, 1989). The bibliography in this book includes a comprehensive listing of both primary sources and secondary studies pertaining to this controversy.
(37). For an illustration of this painting, together with its explanation, see the advertisement inside the front cover of the October 1988 issue of Blue & Gray Magazine. GETTYSBURG: Historical Articles of Lasting Interest

[mobile_96]

page 121 Gettsyburg Mag.
...... said he was forced to act on his own. However, contemporary testimony, in the report of David Birney and others, indicates that the corps took position approximately where Meade wished Sickles to be. For Meade to completely miss issuing orders to a corps contravenes the efficiency of both Meade and his staff.
Sickles also complained about the higher ground to his front. He indicated that the III Corps' original line on Cemetery Ridge would have been untenable with Southern artillery firing on him from the Peach Orchard. Hunt thought the proposed line was good, but on riding back from the area, he noted how far in advance the orchard was, and realized that the ground was only good if Meade wished to attack, which he did not.
By advancing to the orchard line, Sickles stretched his corps to the limit, belaying his further contention that the position assigned him on the ridge was too long for his corps. Yet, an examination of the Third Corps line on the morning of the second shows that Sickles did not adequately deploy his corps. Andrew A. Humphreys complained later that his division was massed in three brigade lines most of the morning, while Birney had at least one brigade in reserve. Dan Sickles simply was lax in preparing his troops for battle.
Finally, Sickles accused Meade of wanting to retreat from Gettysburg. Daniel Butterfield buttressed Sickles' story with his own contrived tale, while other malcontents such as Albion P. Howe and Alfred Pleasonton also echoed Sickles' accusation. However, a study of Meade's exertions to get his army to Gettysburg, followed by a took at his actions once there, paints a different picture. His council of war on the night of July 2 was also used to show his vacillations, but when his son wrote and asked all surviving officers for their recollections, he could not find anyone who supported Sickles.
Sickles also speculated in "what if" scenarios as did Longstreet's detractors. Both controversies resorted to this speculative quasi-history to support some of the contentions. However, the propagation of such literature is all for nothing, since the "what if" did not happen and some of the so called "facts" could not be proven. As Edwin Coddington so aptly stated, such altercations "cluttered up" the already vast literature of the battle. (38)
The Confederate assault on Cemetery Hill, which occurred at dusk on July 2, also touched off a post-battle controversy. The two brigades of jubal Early's Division which made the attack smashed into the XI Corps line posted on the hill, drove it back, and struggled hand-to-hand with Yankee artillerists defending their guns. General Hancock heard the noise of the battle, and, fearing the worst, dispatched three regiments of Col. Samuel S. Carroll's brigade to reinforce Howard's men. Carroll's units arrived just in time to throw the Rebel attackers back and salvage the position. Less than a year after the battle, 11 Corps veterans complained that they did not receive enough credit for helping; Howard's men claimed that they did not perform as poorly as others believed. This controversy, too, continued years after the war. (39)

38. Edwin B. Coddington, "The Strange Reputation of George G. Meade: A Lesson in Historiography," The Historian 23 (1962): i47.

39. Samuel S. Carroll, "Congress and General Howard," Army and Navy journal I (February 20, 1864): 403; idem., "Congress and General Howard," Army and Navy journal I (April 2, 1864): 531; "General Howard and Gettysburg," Chicago Tri- bmtie, July 2, 1876; John G. Reid, "Gettysburg, Criticism on Gen. Howard's Monograph on the Battle . . .," NT, January 22, 1885; A. W. Peck (17th Connecticut), "Gettysburg," NT, May 19, 1892; Robert Collins, (7th West Virginia), "At Gettys- burg," NT, September 8, 1892; H. B. Booth (33rd Massa- chusetts), "Credit to Whom Credit is Due," NY, December 3, 1908; J. L. Dickelman (4th Ohio), "Gen. Carroll's Gilbralter@ Brigade at Gettysburg," NT, December 10, 1908; John Dineen (33rd Massachusetts), "On East Cemetery Hill," NT, June 10, 1909; J. E. Murdock (7th West Virginia), "On Cemetery Hill," NT, July 29, 1909; A. F. Sweetland (55th Ohio), "Repulsing the 'Tigers' at the Cemetery, Gettysburg, July 2, 1863," NT, October 21, 1909; E. C. Caines (14th Indiana), "A Gettysburg Diary," NT, December 23, 1909; Charles H. Myerhoff (14th Indiana), "Carroll's Brigade at Gettysburg," NT, October 14, 1915.

[nbforrest]

With the amount of men Sickles had available, he could have deployed on LRT and left a huge gap with Hancock's left which the rebs would have certainly exploited to the hilt, even without LRT.

You are assuming LRT was some sort of commanding position that must be held by Sickles. It wasn't! Anyway, Sickles' move forward left a huge gap between the III and II Corps (not only in a north-south sense, but east-west as well) and still did not cover LRT (assuming it was as important as you say). Thus, Sickles' new line failed to cover both of your specifications.

Sickles line from Hancock's left to where it ended originally would have been as easily, if not more easily, flanked than his advanced position.

Purely hypothetical and likely not true. Sickles' forward line was hanging in the air. Any line around Weikert's Hill could not have more open flanks than Sickles' forward line. His flanks were wide open on unfavorable ground. Look at the deployment of Ward's brigade. Just asking to be rolled up!

Thus, Sickles, recognizing the importance of LRT, made the only wise choice he could have. By placing his men in front of it, not only did he successfully defend it long enough for Meade to finally order reinforcements to his left, but also leaving as small a gap with Hancock as possible while doing so.

Again, you are assuming that a Confederate capture of LRT would somehow have rendered the Union line untenable. It wouldn't have! And again, Sickles' new line did not cover LRT, even if it was important. He had a couple regiments in the Devil's Den and Plum Run Valley....the only troops in front of LRT were the U.S. Sharpshooters. And yet again, Sickles' new line did leave a huge gap with the II Corps. And this is all based on the assumption that Sickles' original line would have collapsed.

In the absence of such timely reinforcements, Sickles's wise deployment bought the precious time needed to hold the Federal left until help finally arrive.

I say again, who is to say that the original line would not have held? No one can say either way. Plus, even assuming that the original line did collapse, Longstreet would be in a bad spot. With the II Corps crashing down on his left and the V Corps smashing into his right, Longstreet would have been in a very tight spot. His neck would have been on the chopping block.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

Dear NB:

With the amount of men Sickles had available, he could have deployed on LRT and left a huge gap with Hancock's left which the rebs would have certainly exploited to the hilt, even without LRT.

Sickles line from Hancock's left to where it ended originally would have been as easily, if not more easily, flanked than his advanced position. Fortunately--from the Union perspective--Longstreet would not allow any flanking movement. (Which I think Lee would not have objected to in this tactical sense--but only in the strategic sense as in Longstreet's desire to move the whole army to the right and closer to Washington to force an attack by the Yanks. This is another issue.)

Thus, Sickles, recognizing the importance of LRT, made the only wise choice he could have. By placing his men in front of it, not only did he successfully defend it long enough for Meade to finally order reinforcements to his left, but also leaving as small a gap with Hancock as possible while doing so.

I'll have to agree with NB on this. LRT was not crucial, tho in lore it became the site where the battle, if not the war was decided.

How can you claim it was "the wise choice" to leave a gap in the original line so that reinforcements could later be sent to save Sickles troops who had been moved to a longer more indefencible line?

I just don't see it.

[ole]

Sickles had his reasons for moving forward. He got lucky -- probably because of Longstreet's inept leadership.

But his disobedience transcends criminal simply because he endangered Meade's defensive setup, thus endangering the entire army. And it was not just the defensive setup. Meade was counting on this and that corps moving here and there to be available for whatever. The defensive setup as well as contingency and logistical planning were disrupted.

If he had, during the heat of battle, counter attacked or moved forward, he might be excused. But to disrupt the planning and placement of an entire army is inexcusable.

Ole

[milhistbuff1]

Ole,
I dont know that we can consider Longstreet 'inept'. He was many other things but i don't see incompetence on that list. If anything, it was Lee's failure to see the ground over which Longstreet would attack over with his own eyes that helped condemn the en echelon attack to failure. Lee's extensive experience as an engineer would have given him a different perspective of the ground, had he not been up at hq, miles away.

Respectfully
Matt

[nbforrest]

But is not the proper place for an army commander at army HQ? Why make the position of corps commander redundant? Maybe Lee should have gone forward with Longstreet. It could be argued either way. Frankly, I don't think it would have mattered whether Lee went forward or not or even if Longstreet had attempted to move around to his right. I understand why Lee attack, and I suppose he was right to hope for a miracle, but I see a decisive Confederate victory at Gettysburg as next to impossible.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

To Chuck and all:

Thanks for taking the time for a more full and more fully-researched response than previously offered. I have been pressed for time recently, which accounts for the sloppy nature of my posts on Sunday. I simply did not have time to edit thoroughly before being forced to leave here, and I shall fix the myriad typographical errors and haste mistakes as soon as possible. Nevertheless, I'm sure all understood what I had been trying to convey, even if not in agreement with my conclusions.

Chuck, I shall reply to you--and others--ASAP. In the meanwhile, I discovered something that hadn't occurred to me previously. Sickles's rejoinder to the Meade/Benedict letter, which I have referred to so often before, is available online! I didn't even think to look to see if it was. It is simply too long for me to have printed it here--I do not have a scanner.

Here is the URL, which I urge anyone seriously interested in this debate to consult, reflect upon and then reply and attempt to rebut the late general if you believe you can. However, please let us stay off the point of whether Meade wanted to leave Gettysburg or not as General Sickles charges. This is speculation and I have already conceded that at least by the close of the day of July 2, that it appears Meade no longer had such an intention, if he ever had. (Still, the mystery as to why Buford's and Geary's divisions were stripped from Sickles's left, when so desperately needed, remains a salient mystery in this entire controversy.) Instead, please let us concentrate on the central issue of whether or not General Sickles's ordering his corps forward was wise or a blunder. Here is the URL:

http://gscoverco.com/Battles%20&%20L...ntroversy).htm

Once all participating here have read this, then we can all be on a more equal footing.

Thank you.

Don