Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[nbforrest]

don,
I still don't understand your argument that is based on people like Law saying that Sickles occupied a formidable position. Obviously it was not formidable. It collapsed. A quick look at the topography of Sickles' forward line shows that it most certainly was not formidable. Have you ever been to Gettysburg? I suggest you go and look at the battlefield sometime. Sickles' left just trailed off into Rose's Woods and the Plum Run Valley and his right ended abruptly, able to easily be outflanked (which Anderson did). I went back and went through Pfanz's book on the second day...he quotes Law among others. It seems to me that a handful of post-war writings by either a)Confederates who want to make themselves look good b)Longstreet cronies, is not a good thing to base a theory on. Again, I fail to see any substance in that theory...Sickles line is called formidable...obviously it wasn't. How does that make Sickles look good?


Respectfully

[samgrant]

As to the question of Meade 'wanting to retreat' and the 'council of war'..., I'll repeat something I posted previously in a different thread:


Actually, Meade had, at approx. 8pm, already sent a message to Halleck announcing his intention of staying in his present position - the only issue for him was as to whether his operations would be of an offensive or a defensive character. He later called a meeting of his corps commanders to get their opinions about the condition of their troops.

It was not Meade who set the questions to those assembled, but Sickles' buddy Butterfield, who Meade had inherited as Chief of Staff. The first question was to stay or to retreat?, everyone recommended staying. The next question was should we attack?, all the generals thought it wise to remain on the defensive. The last question was how long they should wait for an enemy attack?, it was agreed to wait a day or so before considering other options.

[ole]

I'm guessing that a lot of "Gettysburg" books are being consulted this weekend. I was tempted once or twice yesterday, and I might still riffle through a few tonight. Or I might take a nap.

It appears that a timeline -- including orders, reports, conferences, movements, observations -- would be very useful. Anyone have a site to recommend?

This kind of discussion is what makes this board fresh and exciting. Whether Sickles is a hero, scapegoat, or the devil incarnate isn't ultimately important, it's the exploration and discovery.

Thanks for the stimulation, fellas.
Ole

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

"No more absurd than Sickles taking himself to a position that was even longer than the one he was given, making it even harder to defend than before."

--What exactly are you basing this on, please? Do you mean that Sickles's advanced line had been longer than the original one he had held before the movement, or do you mean to claim that it was also longer than a line from Hancock's left to LRT, which the Comte de Paris measured as 2,220 yards, or a 1,000 yards longer than that of Hancock's, whose corps had been larger than Sickles's?

"Also, was the order 'and on LRT" or 'to LRT'. a bit of difference, although it might be impossible to determine which was actually indicated."

--This is precisely the point. In his letter to Col. Benedict in 1870, Meade claims he ordered Sickles to hold a line from Hancock's left to and on LRT. Sickles demolishes this revisionist claim by Meade on several counts. I have already spent considerable time citing sources here, whereas you fellows have not. If you are all so interested in Gettysburg then buy at least Volume III of the Battles and Leaders of.... anthology I referenced previously to read Sickles's long rejoinder to the Meade's letter.

--Please note, I do not fully agree with Sickles on all his points. I wish the general would have left out his speculations regarding Meade's motives at Gettysburg as unnecessary to prove his principle point and perhaps improper. I'd rather agree at this point that by the close of July 2nd, Meade had given up any idea of redeploying south.

--Also, there is another point that I have not mentioned concerning Sickles's rejoinder to the Benedict letter. Sickles seems to argue that not only was his move both wise and necessary (and I fully concur with him here), but also was not unauthorized because it fell within the discretion he claims Meade gave to him verbally as to the placement of his corps. I have not concerned myself with that because one way or the other, Sickles's move was correct--which is my focus here. If Sickles is correct on this point (and I have my doubts), then instead of my saying that the fact that Sickles's movement was unauthorized was precisely what made his actions that day so commendable, then simply change the word "unauthorized" to the words: "having been made on his own volition within the bounds of his discretionary authority afforded him by his commander." Again, my focus here is the wisdom of the movement of the Union III Corps that day per se, and not on whether Sickles movement had been unauthorized.

"Also notice, How did Sickles demolish Meade? Only by saying...it didn't happen."

--By urging the reader to consult the official records, including booth Meade's own testimony before Congress in 1864 as well as Sickles's , which Meade never publicly attempted to refute. Please read my previous posts.

"Not credentials, but.....what your sources are.
Considering how long this debate, (many years longer than just this group) has been going on, I'd recommend you digging into some other sources and then reconsidering your position. Who knows, it might remain the same."

--But why else am I here? I'm waiting for your side of this issue to tell me why you believe as you do and provide some citations. If you quote an historian like Coddington, then please see if he referenced his claims at all; and if so, to some original source document as opposed to just another historian.

--Once again, what is the earliest reference that you, or your friend Steve, or any other expert can produce from writings or testimony from any participant at Gettysburg that indicates even the existence of an opinion of a participant--on either side--claiming that Sickles's movement had been thought of as some horrible sort of blunder either at the time or in its aftermath? Is it the Meade letter to Benedict published around 1888?

"But on the other hand, knowing what other things going on that morning away from Sickle's might give you a different perspective. I've never been to Gettysburg, but that area is one I wish to explore, not just look over. Did Longstreet or McLaws ever go back to Gettys and stand where Sickles was supposed to be and then decide which was the better position, before they deemed it a 'formidable position?

"As for Hood, I know too many students of the CW that all insist, only read Hood with a grain of salt, as he distorts much of his history.
Longstreet's book was only written in defense of attacks by Early after Lee had died, (in the attempt to place any blame on the southern losses on Anyone except Lee. It could not be, we were outmanned, out gunned, out maneuvered, out supplied, but....
someone didn't do the job given them by Lee.)
And Longstreet can distort also, but not nearly what Hood does."

--Hood's memoirs seemed to me to have been rushed, written by a man who was a physical wreck due to his profound war wounds; a man who seemed to me to be a man on a mission. He hurries through the first 4/5 of his life, including most of the Civil War, so he can really "get down to business." I.e., a two hundred page or so diatribe against Joseph Johnston. Nevertheless, that is all the more reason to give weight to what he writes about the events at Gettysburg, which, in light of what I just observed, seemed of little moment to him just then as he sat down to write.

--The old joke that if five people witness an automobile accident, that the police will get six different opinions on what happened has more than a grain of salt in it. Reading through these various accounts of July 2, 1863 concerning the events at Gettysburg on the union's left flank, one sees there are numerous discrepancies among the various correspondents, especially in regard to the timeline. (With exactly when did Longstreet finally launch his attack, and how long Sickles's line had held, being particular points of timing disputes.) So in light of this human tendency, what one looks for are areas of agreement; or at least areas of substantial agreement.

--What strikes me about all these accounts is that I cannot find any--not one--save the Meade letter to Benedict not written until 1870, and not published until around 1888--that seems to indicate that anyone present that day had thought of Sickles's move other than as a good one, or even as an obvious and necessary one. What seems remarkable is that none of them even seem to be aware that there was any issue over it! Not a one of them is writing for the benfit of Sickles, but rather to rebut each other; and all sides of these intercine conflicts agree that there was nothing "blunderous" or even contraversial about Sickles's movement of his corps.

--I have quoted the commander of the Confederate I Corps, the very corps charged with assaulting Sickles's lines; a commander who is attempting to refute critics on his own side who charge him with losing the battle by not attacking earlier before Sickles's had made his move. Does this same commander counter that had he done that--had he hit Sickles in his original placement--then the outcome would have been even worse from the Confederate perspective? On the contrary! Longstreet actually argues that it didn't matter when he would have attacked Sickles because as he built up and threatened Sickles, then Sickles would have made his move--regardless of what time it had been. In other words, Longstreet is arguing that not only was Sickles's move wise, but it wasn't even particularly brilliant. It was simply what any competent commander would have done in that situation.

--I then back up Longstreet's assessment of the situation with the report of one of his division commanders; a brigade commander of that division; as well as a brigade commander of the other I Corps division present on the field that day. What is remarkable is that we have complete unanimity of opinion from the enemy's perspective that Sickles's move had been both competent and defensively formidable. It is the totality of all this testimony from high-ranking officers, even those antagonistic to one another and who disagree on many other points, that makes the case for Sickles begin to look more and more ironclad.

"The original writers also had their own bias, and you have to sift thru both their comments, when it was written, and what others said, especially anyone that wrote closer to the event."

--Yes, as per above. But also per above, remarkably they all seem to agree upon the point in question except, of course, for Meade (and even he writing privately, years later).

"You have 2 Southern Officers claiming Sickles had a 'formidable position'.
I'd be a bit suspect on his comments. Are we positive that Longstreet and McLaw were not giving Sickles that compliment in order to increase the value of their own achievements in busting the III Corps?"

--I could be wrong here, but if memory serves, when a large part of the Confederate I Corps moved west to aid Bragg after Gettysburg, didn't Longstreet actually have Law arrested due to some sort of insubordination? If so, here we have yet another case of officers hostile to each other both reporting the same basic facts regarding the wisdom of Sickles's movement. Once again, the overriding consideration here is that while reading all of these reports, one cannot find any sense of there being any disagreement at all concerning Sickles's movement; or even any sense that any of them even had been aware (perhaps until the release of the Meade/Benedict letter) that anyone would question Sickles's actions that day Yet, here we are in 2006 and most seem to take the "fact" that Sickles had "blundered" for granted, without once going back and making a story of what those actually present that fateful day had to say.

"What did any of his regimental officers say in their after action reports..Do they reflect Longstreets, years down the road, description?
Lots to ponder here."

--I don't know? Do you? I do know that in Sickles's rejoinder to the Meade/Benedict letter he cites excerpts from the official reports of his two division commanders as well as from brigade commanders, all attesting that Meade's (later) claim that the Third Division had been "virtually destroyed" had been nonsense. Yes, the corps took heavy causalities, but so had Longstreet's. By the close of the day, Brigadier General Carr of Birney's division reported that he had been able to retake the his original position--which he claims he never would have yielded except for Birney's order that he fall back.

"If Sickle had been where he was supposed to be, there was much less chance of a flanking movement, And in a sense, thats exactly what happened, when Hood smashed against Sickles left flank, the Devils Den area didn't hold long."

--The same line that both he and Law protested assaulting? How long the Union Third Corps held that day--against great numbers--has always been a matter of dispute.

"And if McLaws had moved when he was supposed to, its more likely that the III Corps would have been destroyed, not just crushed. If in the original position Sickle's was Supposed to be in, it would also have taken less time to move help to him, if he was actually in danger of being overrun."

--Had the Confederate army been given gratis the same ground that Sickles made them fight for, Longstreet would have quickly and easily rolled up the Union left flank, and history as we know it would be vastly different today.

--All this commiserating over the heavy casualties suffered by the Union III Corps, begs the question, "Do you consider the heroic charge of the First Minnesota to have been a "blunder" due to the resulting carnage inflicted upon this bravest of regiments?" If not, then why are you so critical of Sickles for likewise simply doing what he had to do to compensate for how ill-informed his commander had apparently been on July 2nd about the placements of units upon the field, both his own and that of the enemy's? What price? What price for the Union?

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

Whoa! Coddington claims that Sickles didn't know that Buford was gone from his left? What is his (or your) source for this extraordinarily revisionist claim, please? This flies in the face of everything I've ever read, from Sickles or about him.

Of course Sickles knew that his left was bare. That is precisely one reason he had made his advancement.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

With the amount of men Sickles had available, he could have deployed on LRT and left a huge gap with Hancock's left which the rebs would have certainly exploited to the hilt, even without LRT.

Sickles line from Hancock's left to where it ended originally would have been as easily, if not more easily, flanked than his advanced position. Fortunately--from the Union perspective--Longstreet would not allow any flanking movement. (Which I think Lee would not have objected to in this tactical sense--but only in the strategic sense as in Longstreet's desire to move the whole army to the right and closer to Washington to force an attack by the Yanks. This is another issue.)

Thus, Sickles, recognizing the importance of LRT, made the only wise choice he could have. By placing his men in front of it, not only did he successfully defend it long enough for Meade to finally order reinforcements to his left, but also leaving as small a gap with Hancock as possible while doing so.

As Sickles notes in his rejoinder in the work cited, the Federal Third Corps could not have held any line indefinitely with what Longstreet had to throw against him. Had the reinforcements that finally reached Sickles later in the afternoon from the V Corps had been on hand when Longstreet commenced his attack, then the Confederate advance would have been easily repulsed.

In the absence of such timely reinforcements, Sickles's wise deployment bought the precious time needed to hold the Federal left until help finally arrived.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Sam:

As I indicated previously, I'm now inclined to agree with you concerning Meade's state of mind at the council of war at the close of July 2nd. In any event, it is not an important point regarding the main issue at hand here.

Don

[samgrant]

mobile_96,

Sorry to say, your link to
http://gdg.org
did not work for me.

Is it just me!, or is there more to it?

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

Dear Sam:

As I indicated previously, I'm now inclined to agree with you concerning Meade's state of mind at the council of war at the close of July 2nd. In any event, it is not an important point regarding the main issue at hand here.

Don

thanks for that!

[samgrant]

Don,

Obviously you have given a Lot of thought to this subject. Perhaps more than anyone else on this forum.

I fear that your case is somewhat weakened by, to at least obvious morons like me the incoherent presentation of your arguments:

Dear Chuck:

"No more absurd than Sickles taking himself to a position that was even longer than the one he was given, making it even harder to defend than before."

--What exactly are you basing this on, please? Do you mean that Sickles's advanced line had been longer than the original one he had held before the movement, or do you mean to claim that it was also longer than a line from Hancock's left to LRT, which the Comte de Paris measured as 2,220 yards, or a 1,000 yards longer than that of Hancock's, whose corps had been larger than Sickles's?

"Also, was the order 'and on LRT" or 'to LRT'. a bit of difference, although it might be impossible to determine which was actually indicated."

--This is precisely the point. In his letter to Col. Benedict in 1870, Meade claims he ordered Sickles to hold a line from Hancock's left to and on LRT. Sickles demolishes this revisionist claim by Meade on several counts. I have already spent considerable time citing sources here, whereas you fellows have not. If you are all so interested in Gettysburg then buy at least Volume III of the Battles and Leaders of.... anthology I referenced previously to read Sickles's long rejoinder to the Meade's letter.

--Please note, I do not fully agree with Sickles on all his points. I wish the general would have left out his speculations regarding Meade's motives at Gettysburg as unnecessary to prove his principle point and perhaps improper. I'd rather agree at this point that by the close of July 2nd, Meade had given up any idea of redeploying south.

--Also, there is another point that I have not mentioned concerning Sickles's rejoinder to the Benedict letter. Sickles seems to argue that not only was his move both wise and necessary (and I fully concur with him here), but also was not unauthorized because it fell within the discretion he claims Meade gave to him verbally as to the placement of his corps. I have not concerned myself with that because one way or the other, Sickles's move was correct--which is my focus here. If Sickles is correct on this point (and I have my doubts), then instead of my saying that the fact that Sickles movement was unauthorized was precisely what made his actions that day so commendable, then simply change the word "unauthorized" to the words, "having been made on his own volition within the bounds of his discretionary authority afforded him by his commander." Again, my focus here is the wisdom of the movement of the Union III Corps that day per se, and not whether Sickles movement had been unauthorized.

"Also notice, How did Sickles demolish Meade? Only by saying...it didn't happen."

--By urging the reader to consult the official records, including booth Meade's own testimony before Congress in 1864 as well as Sickles's , which Meade never publicly attempted to refute. Please read my previous posts.

"Not credentials, but.....what your sources are.
Considering how long this debate, (many years longer than just this group) has been going on, I'd recommend you digging into some other sources and then reconsidering your position. Who knows, it might remain the same."

--But why else am I here? I'm waiting for your side of this issue to tell me why you believe as you do and provide some citations. If you quote an historian like Coddington, then please see if he referenced his claims at all; and if so, to some original source document as opposed to just another historian.

--Once again, what is the earliest reference that you, or your friend Steve, or any other expert can produce from writings or testimony from any participant at Gettysburg that indicates even the existence, let along preponderance of opinion, of a participant--on either side--claiming that Sickles's movement had been thought of as some horrible sort of blunder either at the time or in its aftermath? Is it the Meade letter to Benedict published around 1888?

"But on the other hand, knowing what other things going on that morning away from Sickle's might give you a different perspective. I've never been to Gettysburg, but that area is one I wish to explore, not just look over. Did Longstreet or McLaws ever go back to Gettys and stand where Sickles was supposed to be and then decide which was the better position, before they deemed it a 'formidable position?

"As for Hood, I know too many students of the CW that all insist, only read Hood with a grain of salt, as he distorts much of his history.
Longstreet's book was only written in defense of attacks by Early after Lee had died, (in the attempt to place any blame on the southern losses on Anyone except Lee. It could not be, we were out manned, out gunned, out maneuvered, out supplied, but....
someone didn't do the job given them by Lee.)
And Longstreet can distort also, but not nearly what Hood does."

--Hood's memoirs seemed to me to have been rushed, written by a man who was a physical wreck due to his profound war wounds; a man who seemed to me to be a man a mission. He hurries through the first 9/10 of his life, including most of the Civil War, so he can really "get down to business." I.E. a two hundred page or so diatribe against Joseph Johnston. Nevertheless, that is all the more reason to give weight to what he writes about the events at Gettysburg, which, in light of what I just observed, seemed of little moment to him just then as he sat down to write.

--The old joke that if five people witness an automobile accident, that the police will get six different opinions on what happened has more than a grain of salt in it. Reading through these various accounts of July 2, 1863 concerning the events at Gettysburg on the union's left flank, one sees there are numerous discrepancies among the various correspondents, especially in regard to the timeline. (With exactly when did Longstreet finally launch his attack, and how long Sickles's line had held, being particular points of timing disputes.) So in light of this human tendency, what one looks for are areas of agreement; or at least areas of substantial agreement.

--What strikes me about all these accounts is that I cannot find any--not one--save the Meade letter to Benedict not written until 1870, and not published until around 1885--that seems to indicate that anyone present that day had thought of Sickles's move other than as a good one, or even as an obvious and necessary one. What seems remarkable is that none of them even seem to be aware that was any issue over it! Not a one of them is writing for the benfit of Sickles, but rather to rebut each other; and all sides of these intercine conflicts agree that there was nothing "blunderous" or even contraversial about Sickles's movement of his corps.

--I have quoted the commander of the Confederate I Corps, the very corps charged with assaulting Sickles's lines; a commander who is attempting to refute critics on his own side who charge him with losing the battle by not attacking earlier before Sickles's had made his move. Does this same commander counter that had he done that--had he hit Sickles in his original placement--then the outcome would have been even worse from the Confederate perspective? On the contrary! Longstreet actually argues that it didn't matter when he would have attacked Sickles because as he built up and threatened Sickles. then Sickles would have made his move--regardless pf what time it had been. In other words, Longstreet is arguing that not only was Sickles move wise, but it wasn't even particularly brilliant. It was simply what any competent commander would have done in that situation.

--I then back up Longstreet's assessment of the situation with the report of one of his division commanders; a brigade commander of that division; as well as a brigade commander of the other I Corps present on the field that day. What is remarkable is that we have complete unanimity of opinion from the enemy's perspective that Sickles's move had been both competent and defensively formidable. It is the totality of all this testimony from high-ranking officers, even those antagonistic to one another and who disagree on many other points, that makes the case for Sickles begin to look more and more ironclad.

"The original writers also had their own bias, and you have to sift thru both their comments, when it was written, and what others said, especially anyone that wrote closer to the event."

--Yes, as per above. But also per above, remarkably they all seem to agree upon the point in question except, of course, for Meade (and even he writing privately, years later).

"You have 2 Southern Officers claiming Sickles had a 'formidable position'.
I'd be a bit suspect on his comments. Are we positive that Longstreet and McLaw were not giving Sickles that compliment in order to increase the value of their own achievements in busting the III Corps?"

--I could be wrong here, but if memory serves, when a large part of the Confederate I Corps moved west to aid Bragg after Gettysburg, didn't Longstreet actually have Law arrested due to some sort of insubordination? If so, here we have yet another case of officers hostile to each other both reporting the same basic facts regarding the wisdom of Sickles's movement. Once again, the overriding consideration here is that while reading all of these reports, one cannot find any sense of there being any disagreement at all concerning Sickles's movement; or even any sense that any of them even had been aware (perhaps until the release of the Meade/Benedict letter) that anyone would question Sickles's actions that day Yet, here we are in 2006 and most seem to take the "fact" that Sickles had "blundered" for granted, without once going back and making a story of what those actually present that fateful day had to say.

"What did any of his regimental officers say in their after action reports..Do they reflect Longstreets, years down the road, description?
Lots to ponder here."

--I don't know? Do you? I do know that in Sickles's rejoinder to the Meade/Benedict letter he cites excerpts from the official reports of his two division commanders as well as from brigade commanders, all attesting that Meade's (later) claim that the Third Division had been "virtually destroyed" had been nonsense. Yes, the corps took heavy causalities, but so had Longstreet's. By the close of the day, Brigadier General Carr of Birney's division reported that he had been able to retake the his original position--which he claims he never would have yielded except for Birney's order that he fall back.

"If Sickle had been where he was supposed to be, there was much less chance of a flanking movement, And in a sense, thats exactly what happened, when Hood smashed against Sickles left flank, the Devils Den area didn't hold long."

--The same line that both he and Law protested assaulting? How long the Union Third Corps held that day--against great numbers--has always been a matter of dispute.

"And if McLaws had moved when he was supposed to, its more likely that the III Corps would have been destroyed, not just crushed. If in the original position Sickle's was Supposed to be in, it would also have taken less time to move help to him, if he was actually in danger of being overrun."

--Had the Confederate army been given gratis the same ground that Sickles made them fight for, Longstreet would have quickly and easily rolled up the Union left flank, and history as we know it would be vastly different today.

--All this commiserating over the heavy casualties suffered by the Union III Corps, begs the question, "Do you consider the heroic charge of the First Minnesota to have been a "blunder" due to the resulting carnage inflicted upon this bravest of regiments?" If not, then why are you so critical of Sickles for likewise simply doing what he had to do to compensate for how ill-informed his commander had apparently been on July 2nd about the placements of units upon the field, both his own and that of the enemy's? What price? What price for the Union?

Don

Perhaps if you could present your arguments a bit more simply and cogently, we might be better able to understand your thesis. Your arguments seem to be all over the place so , to me , and don't appear to have a tying together that would support your thesis. It's just a bunch of seemingly unrelated accounts which cannot logically be reconciled.