Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[nbforrest]

I think that is pretty well said, sam. I'm glad don has a different opinion, but I don't think it is as open and shut as he claims. And as sam points out, from the time of the battle it was accepted that Sickles screwed up. Now, that doesn't mean he did, but it does mean that a pro-Sickles view would be the revisionist one. I'm going to dig into the Confederate accounts a bit when I have time to see what some of them had to say, but I'm not as captivated as don by a couple of primary sources...I have become very wary of what most generals wrote after the war! Using a couple of them is a bit dangerous...taking them together can be useful.

Respectfully

[ole]

Excellent posts from both sides, gentlemen. Fascinating learning experience.

History seems to have made up its mind that Sickles was in error. (Great observation, NB.) It is good to pursue the subject to its origination and factual basis but, lacking the energy to disprove a century of study, I'll go with the majority.
Ole

[Donald Schneider]

To Mobile, NB, Sam and all:

As requested, I shall presently post from Law, as well as from Hood and Kershaw, but first a few points of importance. You are quite right in that I have been posting from the Battles and Leaders of The Civil War (Volume III, Castle Books, 1995) anthology taken from The Century War Series. For any who might be unfamiliar with it, The Century War Series was a collection of articles that had appeared in The Century Magazine regarding the Civil War; mostly contributed by Civil War veterans.

The poster who seems to be--in effect--asking for my credentials is indicative of the mentality that underlies the entire issue at hand (and many others as well, I suspect). My credentials are as follows: I am someone who--as you might have noticed and noted--has put forth an argument and has supported it by exclusively quoting participants in the Battle of Gettysburg; most of them high ranking officers on both sides.

To recapitulate, my first exposure to this subject was when, as a kid, I had read a book called, Gettysburg: the Long Encampment, by Jack McLaughlin (1963--I had been age nine). As this had been my first exposure to the subject, I had no way of knowing what apparently shoddy scholarship went into the writing of the book by the author. For example, as I noted previously the author attributes Spencer repeating rifles to Buford's dragoons, which we all here know is not accurate. McLaughlin also paints a picture of General Sickles as a buffoon of a political hack general who had wormed his way up the chain of command by political connections. Being a kid I, of course, took this book's account of the events and players at Gettysburg as gospel. I've never forgotten that and have tried to learn from it.

Now, where exactly did McLaughlin, for example, get the idea that Buford had had Spencers? I would say a safe guess would be that he had read one or more previous authors who had maintained such; probably based in turn on their having done the same thing.

I had never been all that much interested in the Civil War in general. Therefore, it had not been until years later, when I was given Longstreet's memoirs as a gift, that my "epiphany" occurred regarding the subject of General Sickles and his controversial movement of his corps on July 2nd.

"If Sickles's unauthorized movement of his corps had been such a blunder, and so nearly such a disaster, why then," I thought to myself, "is Longstreet writing in such a matter-of-fact manner of Sickles's movement as having been not only a good tactical employment, but even as an obvious one for Sickles to have made after Longstreet began to threaten the federal left? Furthermore, why does Longstreet write as if that if Sickles had maintained his original line, then Longstreet would have easily broken his line, carried LRT and the day for the rebs?"

So I went back and revisited the subject. Having been once burned by taking as gospel the "history" of an author writing on the subject, I acquired the Battles and Leaders... anthology which I have referenced and have extensively quoted from here. After all, why is it necessary to have history filtered through the perspective of a writer and/or historian born long after the events in question, when one can consult at least some of the same sources such writers and historians have themselves and draw one's own conclusions? I also consulted the available memoirs of others who had been present at Gettysburg during the battle, such as Hood and Early. (The latter was of no help, as one might expect, due to General Early's placement on the opposite side of the field during the battle.)

After reading all the accounts of the actions of the armies on the Federal left on July 2nd, I found myself completely perplexed. I could find no indication that anyone, except Meade (who obviously had had a vested interest in the subject) who had written an account included in this anthology had written as if Sickles's movement had even been controversial at the time, let alone derided as a blunder.

Even Meade's letter to a certain Colonel G.G. Benedict was not written until 1870 (and apparently not published until sometime around 1888); and, as Sickles noted in his highly effective and astute rejoinder to it, makes an argument as to what Meade's order to him as to the placement of his corps had been that contradicts Meade's own testimony (and Sickles's--which Meade had never heretofore disputed) before Congress to the Committee for the Conduct of the War in 1864.

As I noted before, Sickles effectively demolishes in his rejoinder Meade's assertion that he had ordered Sickles to hold a line to the left of Hancock to and on LRT. If Meade had issued such an order, then the order would have been absurd on the face of it and impossible to obey with the amount of troops Sickles had had on hand.

Where then does this present day sentiment that Sickles's move was such a blunder originate from? Why do so many think this? I'm going to take a guess (all I can do in the absence of any further definitive input) that it originated with some Civil War writer/historian or other, writing some years later, who had read the Meade letter to Benedict and, without much further research or reflection upon the matter, took Meade's version as gospel and so wrote as such. After all, Sickles had not only been a "political general," but one with such a flamboyant and seeming nefarious reputation and background. Besides, Meade was the West Point professional, while Sickles had been the amateur citizen warrior. (Case closed.)

Then, I would imagine, other and later writers picked-up on this train of thought and most gradually came to simply accept such a historical revision as "fact," neglecting to even read or even consider why high ranking participants in these events wrote as they had--not seeming to even have been aware that anyone would later find Sickles's movement to have been a blunder or even particularly controversial.

Some of you here have mentioned someone named "Steve." Being new here, I don't know who he is. However, I get the impression that he is a man who is highly-respected here for his knowledge on the Battle of Gettysburg; and perhaps has more knowledge than myself on the subject--including the point in question--and thus a better grasp and understanding of the matter. Fine. As I said, I have no vested interest in this matter, and I am no relation to the late general in question. Truth has always been more important to me than simply "being right." If I have been firmly convinced upon some point or other, and another, through reasoned argument and citation of facts and sources, convinces me that I had been wrong, then I'm honestly happy. Because, for that to have happened then I know for certain that I have now found truth.

Therefore, will someone please ask Steve exactly what is the earliest (as to publication or testimony date) reference that he can find from any credible source considering Sickles's movement on July 2nd to have been a "blunder?" As far as I can determine, the letter by Meade to Benedict, presumably published in either 1887 or 1888, is the earliest such instance. I might well be wrong. If so, then perhaps Steve or someone else can point out one or more such earlier references which we can then assess in light of the several citations I have made on this forum from his contemporaries at the battle seeming to support Sickles's order as sound military tactics.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Ole:

I hadn't read your last post before I posted my most recent. What a coincidence! My post could have been addressed directly at your remarks!

Don

[Donald Schneider]

To all:

From The Century War Series from Law:

"The position occupied by the Federal left wing in front us of was now fully disclosed to view and it was certainly one of the most formidable it had ever been the fortune of any troops to confront. Round top rose like a huge sentinel guarding the Federal left flank, while the spurs and ridges trending off the north of it afforded unrivaled positions for the use of artillery. The puffs of smoke rising at intervals along the line of hills, as the Federal batteries fired upon such portions of our line as became exposed to view, clearly showed that these advantages had not been neglected." [Volume III, page 320]

I ask you, how much clearer can anyone be regarding the strength of Sickles's advanced lines?

"I found General Hood on the ridge where his line had been formed, communicated to him the information I had obtained, [from Law's scouts and from captured Union medical personnel] and pointed out the ease with which a movement by the right flank might be made. [Which could have been made just as easily had Sickles retained his ordinal line. Thus, since a flanking attack was forbidden by Longstreet, the issue now becomes one of which of the two lines Sickles held that day was better for his corps and the entire Union left flank.] He coincided fully with my views, but said that his orders were positive to attack in front, as soon as the left of the corps should get into position. I, therefore, entered a formal protest against a direct battle on the grounds: 1) That the great natural strength of the enemy's position in our front rendered the result of a direct assault extremely uncertain. 2. That, even if successful, the victory would be purchased at too great a sacrifice of life, and our troops would be in no condition to improve it. [Isn't that exactly what happened?] 3. That a front attack was unnecessary,--the occupation of Round Top during the night by moving it from the south, and the extension of our right wing from that point across the enemy's left and rear, being not only practicable, but easy. 4.That such a movement would compel a change of front on the part of the enemy, the abandonment of his strong position on the heights, and force him to attack us in position. (Page 321)

"General Hood called up Captain Hamilton, of his staff, and requested me to repeat the protest to him and the grounds on which it was made. He then directed Captain Hamilton to find General Longstreet as quickly as possible and deliver the protest, and to say to him that he (Hood) indorsed it." (Page 322)
__________________________________________________ _____________
From the personal memoirs of General Hood, Advance and Retreat:

"I found that making the attack according to orders, viz. : up the Emmetsburg [sic] road, I should have first to encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle [I.E. Sickles's]; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found moreover, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the enemy's main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front; and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain and, if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice...." (Page 58)

Hood then goes on to relate how three times he dispatched staff officers to Longstreet entreating him to abandon the attack up the Emmitsburg Road in favor of Law's flanking idea to no avail.

"After this urgent protest against entering the battle at Gettysburg, according to instructions--which protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career--I ordered the line to advance and make the assault." (Page 59)

Notice the common thread between Law's and Hood's account which coincides with every other Confederate account I've quoted here. That thread is: Sickles's advance position was formidable. Just as the quote form General Hunt on the other side suggests, Sickles wisely foresaw that with his original line he had no good placement along half his line for his artillery; whereas, with the higher ground to his front he would have excellent placement for his cannon. As Hunt observed, the ground commanded the ground both before it and behind it. If the enemy had been allowed take this ground for free, the result would have been the rout of the Union left that fateful day. Who--at the time--argued otherwise? If no one, then why do so now?

Don

[Donald Schneider]

To all:

This is from Kershaw who commanded a brigade in Longsteer's other division present on the field on July 2 that day, commanded by McLaws from The Century War Series:

"At 3 P. M. the head of my column emerged from the woods, and came into the open field in front of the stone wall which extends along by Flaherty's farm, and to the east past Snyder's. Here we were in full view of the Federal position. Their main line appear to extend from Little Round Top, while their signal flags were flying, until it was lost to sight far away to the left. An advanced line occupied the Peach Orchard, heavily supported by artillery, and extended from that point toward our left along the Emmitsburg road. The intervening ground was occupied by open fields, interspersed and divided by stone walls, The position just here seemed almost impregnable....."

"In the meantime I examined the position of the Federals with some care. I found them in superior force, strongly posted in the Peach Orchard, which bristled with artillery...." (page 332)

Now we have the Confederate perspective from the other side of Sickles's line. It would seem clear that both those of Hood's and McLaw's divisions would have been incredulous if one were to have suggested to them what good fortune had befallen them with such a "blundering" positioning of their enemy's forces.

Don Schneider

[nbforrest]

Law's comments are interesting in that they make no sense in regards to Sickles' advanced line. Sickles wasn't positioned on any ridges north of either of the round tops. It's hard for me to question an account that I'm reading out of context...I guess I will have to give you and Law the benefit of the doubt...but I'll keep some of my doubts. Even assuming Law did see Sickles' new position as formidable...it wasn't. Just because he said it was doesn't make it so. And the attack proved him correct. Sickles was smashed without extreme difficulty. Did Longstreet suffer heavy casualties? Yes, but many of those were taken in the fight with the II and V Corps. The fighting in the III Corps was bloody, but not unusually so. For an attack on a "formidable" position, Sickles was crushed rather easily. If it was as "formidable" as Law appears to suggests, the III Corps would have been triumphantly sitting atop that hill at the end of the battle, not broken and skedaddling.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Sam:

Well, yes I must maintain that Sickles's critics are revisionist; and, if my argument is not irrefutable, it certainly hasn't been refuted by anyone here thus far. Whereas I have cited the written record from several high-ranking officers on both sides, all you can seem to offer is "Well, everyone knows that Sickles blundered. End of discussion." Indeed, the only one who has offered a citation from anyone here from an officer actually present at Gettysburg claiming that Sickles had blundered was me--and that was from Meade, of course. And even he had made this assertion seven years after the battle, and six years after his testimony before Congress where he had made no such assertion, nor had he attempted to refute Sickles's testimony.

Don Schneider

[mobile_96]

{As I noted before, Sickles effectively demolishes in his rejoinder Meade's assertion that he had ordered Sickles to hold a line to the left of Hancock to and on LRT. If Meade had issued such an order, then the order would have been absurd on the face of it and impossible to obey with the amount of troops Sickles had had on hand.}
No more absurd than Sickels taking himself to a position that was even longer than the one he was given, making it even harder to defend than before.
Also, was the order 'and on LRT" or 'to LRT'. a bit of difference, although it might be impossible to determine which was actually indicated.
Also notice, How did Sickles demolish Meade? Only by saying...it didn't happen.

{asking for my credentials is indicative of the mentality that underlies the entire issue at hand}
Not credentials, but.....what your sources are.
Considering how long this debate, (many years longer than just this group) has been going on, I'd recommend you digging into some other sources and then reconsidering your position. Who knows, it might remain the same. But on the other hand, knowing what other things going on that morning away from Sickle's might give you a different perspective. I've never been to Gettysburg, but that area is one I wish to explore, not just look over. Did Longstreet or McLaws ever go back to Gettys and stand where Sickles was supposed to be and then decide which was the better position, before they deemed it a 'formidable position"?
I haven't had time yet but thinking about sifting thru my issues of Gettysburg Mag, as I think there might an article or 2 by some of the park historians.

You don't know Steve because he's not a member of this group. He is a member of GDG, "Gettysburg Discussion Group" (Located at http://gdg.org ,- they have a discussion board anyone can post in, and several studies on different aspects of the battle. Shotgun's site also has some and might include something on Sickle's and the III Corps) along with several others that I belong to, and Shotguns chat room, where I see him several times a wk.

As for Hood, I know too many students of the CW that all insist, only read Hood with a grain of salt, as he distorts much of his history.
Longstreet's book was only written in defense of attacks by Early after Lee had died, (in the attempt to place any blame on the southern losses on Anyone except Lee. It could not be, we were outmanned, out gunned, out maneuvered, out supplied, but....
someone didn't do the job given them by Lee.)
And Longstreet can distort also, but not nearly what Hood does.

{why is it necessary to have history filtered through the perspective of a writer and/or historian born long after the events in question, when one can consult at least some of the same sources such writers and historians have themselves and draw one's own conclusions? }
The original writers also had their own bias, and you have to sift thru both their comments, when it was written, and what others said, especially anyone that wrote closer to the event.

You have 2 Southern Officers claiming Sickles had a 'formidable position'.
I'd be a bit suspect on his comments. Are we positive that Longstreet and McLaw were not giving Sickles that compliment in order to increase the value of their own achievements in busting the III Corps?
What did any of his regimental officers say in their after action reports..Do they reflect Longstreets, years down the road, description?
Lots to ponder here.

Now we have to consider something that Sickles 'thought' when he moved his Corps, and opened his flanks to possible turning movements.
From a fast reading, last night, from Coddington, Sickles thought that Buford was still at the extreme left of his position and "maybe thought?" his left flank was actually secure. However, unknown to him, Buford was sent away to rest and refit. And no one replaced him IIRC.
If Sickle had been where he was supposed to be, there was much less chance of a flanking movement, And in a sense, thats exactly what happened, when Hood smashed against Sickles left flank, the Devils Den area didn't hold long.
And if McLaws had moved when he was supposed to, its more likely that the III Corps would have been destroyed, not just crushed. If in the original position Sickle's was Supposed to be in, it would also have taken less time to move help to him, if he was actually in danger of being overrun.
Just a few opinions and thoughts here, and am sure others are digging, digging, and digging more to support their own 'opinions'
Chuck in IL.

[samgrant]

Don,

Since you appear to have been obsessed with this subject since you were 9 years old, I'd have think that you have put in much more thought and research into it than I have. I just happen to have many varied areas of interest about the CW, and so cannot match you word for word, source by source, etc. on this particular subject; nor do I wish to.

I still must maintain that your claim of "an irrefutable case in defense of General Sickles's unauthorized advance" is "refutable" on the face of it.

For a subordinate to ignore/disregard/disobey an order from a superior is not "defensible", at least according with military regulations, no matter what the outcome.

As to your suggestion, and that of Mr. Sickles, that he was the "savior of the Union" by his actions at Gettysburg, that may indeed be irrefutable, but hardly credible.

(If our colleage, Cash, were to weigh in, he might call your assertion "argumentum ad ignoratiam", an appeal to ignorance that proposes that we accept the truth of a proposition unless an opponent can prove otherwise. But I'm not a logicistician, so back to my own words.)

First you must accept the proposition that Gettysburg was the defining battle of the war; that if Gettysburg was lost therefore the Union was lost... I don't think one could easily make a case for that proposition.

Even if one did were to accept that proposition, one then must prove that it was Sickles, and only Sickles, who did that one most important thing that turned the battle in order that the Union army would prevail. This is obviously an impossible position to maintain (much like Gen. Sickles' chosen place on the battlefield ).

There were thousands, if not tens of thousands of individual actions and/or non-actions which made the difference at Gettysburg or any other battle. One cannot point to any one of them and say that 'that one' was the one that made the difference. There are just too many dependencies; if X did this, then Y did/didn't do that ad nauseum.

Meade was not a 'great' general, but of commanders of the AOP, it would be arguable as to who was better.

I personally believe that Meade handled the battle quite well, considering the circumstances, and was not helped by subordinates such as Sickles who thought they knew better than their commanding general.

So, If you do believe that Gettysburg was the battle that saved the Union, which I do not, perhaps you should make poor George Meade your 'Savior'.