Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[mobile_96]

Don,
{ Although I am speculating as much as Sickles had been, my take upon matters is that Meade had been participating in a classic, "Methinks thou dost protest too much" exercise in denying he had ever favorably thought of withdrawing after the close of the day on July 2. I have no way of ever verifying that, of course. The point is only peripheral to my note and need not be dwelled upon.}
From Coddington, which you Must have read, and might have forgotten about...
starting on page 452.
When the Committee on the Conduct of the War reviewed the campaign history in early 1864, Butterfield and Birney accused him of wanting to retreat and did not based on advice of his field commanders without offering any real evidence to substantiate it. They also made factual errors about the meeting, which no one could challenge because the minutes of the meeting and the comments of the various generals which Butterfield had recorded were missing.
Meade got wind of the charges in March of '64 in newspaper articles purporting to be based upon a knowledge of the deliberations of the council claimed that he had wanted to retreat on July 2. Greatly disturbed by these accusations, Meade adked Gibbon, Newton, Sedgwick, Sykes, Alpheus Williams and Slocum what they remembered of the meeting with special reference to anything he might have said about the need to withdraw from Getts on July 2. All excepot Slocum replied to his request for information. None had obtained the impression that he desired to retreat. Sedgwick, who was the ranking officer next to Slocum, declared positively: "At no time in my presence did the general commanding insist or advise a withdrawal of the army, for such advice would have great weight with me, and I know the matter did not engage my serious attention" Alpheus, who had written a long account of events in a letter to his daughters three days after the battle declared uniquivocally of Mead: "I heard no expression from him which lead me to think he was in favor of withdrawing the army from before Gettysburg."
Even more convincing evidence shows that Meade's critics were wrong in saying that he wanted to retreat. A message which he sent to Halleck prior to the meeting breathed confidence, and very positively and without any reservations declared it was his intention to hold his present position.
So what was the purpose of Meade putting the question to a vote? His purpose was to find out the if the condition of the army warranted offensive operations., and there were some doubts with Meade and others about the advisablilty of remaining so far away from their base of supplies.
Sickles was not speculating about Meade but engaged in a smear campaign against Meade in order to try and protect his own honor.
I have several friends that have been to Gettysburg during the tree clearing, with special interest in the Area of the 3rd Corps. Steve said that since viewing area since the trees have been cleared he is still shaking his head over why Sickles would abandon the position he was given to take the one that wound up destroying the III Corps.
Chuck in IL.

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Mobile:

Gibbon also supports Meade, while Sickles quotes Slocum. I have never read the quote he attributes to Meade, which I posted, secondhand via Slocum from Slocum himself. You also quote other officers present who support Meade in this matter, and thus you might well be right here.

Sickles is trying to attribute motivation to Meade to partially explain his commander's attitude toward the overall situation that day, such as stripping his left of Buford's and Geary's divisions. It might well be that at the close of the day on July 2nd, that Meade had decided to remain; and, thus, Sickles is wrong here. However, Sickles might well be right about Meade's perception about the matter at the start of July 2nd and sometime into the day. Whatever the case, as I said this point is peripheral to my initial post and not essential to making Sickle's case concerning his advance.

In regard to your friends' attitudes toward Sickles's move, perhaps you might print out my posts and send them to them. I'd be interested in their response. I simply cannot see how you/they can get around all the quotes I have made from the Confederate perspective; not to mention the incontrovertible fact that Law actually lodged an official protest, supported by his division commander, Hood, about attacking frontally because of the strength of Sickles's position; while neither of Sickles's two highly-respected division commanders issued a similar protest over Sickles's order to advance. (Indeed, Meade requested Humphreys to become his chief-of-staff, replacing Butterfield, a diehard Hooker loyalist.)

Once again, if Sickles's move was such a blunder, it would seem as if that characterization would have come as a great surprise to the enemy that day. Again, Longstreet wrote as if Sickles's move had been the obvious thing to do by any competent commander once Longstreet began to threaten his flank.

Don

P.S. And General Hunt, by what he wrote, didn't seem to "shake his head" in disbelief when Sickles pointed out to him his proposed new line. Perhaps those closer to the action that day just might have had a better perspective on matters than revisionist historians years later?

[Donald Schneider]

To Mobile and all:

I'd like to take the opportunity to correct two errors I made, one to you. I stated that I could not know for sure if Sickles issued his rejoinder to Meade's letter to Colonel Benedict (1870) before or after General Meade had passed away, but that I had thought it was almost certainly the case that it had been afterward. After consulting the Century War Series (Volume III) last evening, I see I had missed a footnote indicating that Sickles had made his reply to the Benedict letter in 1888. Although there is no such indication as to when the Benedict letter was made public, as Sickle's rejoinder is labeled a "reply," it almost certainly had been soon before, in a recent issue.

I also stated that at the end of the day (7/2) Meade had had 60,000 men on the same left flank that he had presumably expected Sickles's light corps to hold alone earlier in the day. The actual number had been 40,000--still far more than the Union III Corps. I apologize for the error.


Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Mobile:

As an afterthought regarding Meade's state of mind at the council of war on the evening of July 2, Gibbon attributes a quote to Newton very similar to the one Sickles attributes to Meade via Slocum. Thus, assuming Sickles is correct at least as far as Slocum's view, Slocum could well have been mistaken as to who had said what at the council. I'm ready to concede this minor point while standing by the main thrust of my argument regarding Sickles's move.

Don

[nbforrest]

In regard to the main point of my case, I believe I've made an irrefutable case in defense of General Sickles's unauthorized advance that day.

With all due respect, I fail to see how you have. Sickles' new position guranteed the destruction of his corps, which you are ignoring. Assuming that LRT was crucial, as you claim, then Sickles doubly failed because even his new forward position failed to screen LRT. I guess I'm not convinced by a couple of Confederates looking for reasons that they lost.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

Don,

Can you possibly provide Law's comments? Not sure if you have posted them already, but I couldn't find them.
I guess I fail to see why Law would be protesting about a position that he wasn't facing.

If Longstreet truly believed that Sickles did the correct thing, then that really makes me scratch my head. First off, why would anyone think that taking an exposed position of little value with both flanks wide open would be a good thing? One can certainly hypothesize that Longstreet would have broken Sickles' original line, but it is just that, a hypothesis devoid of facts. It just doesn't make sense that Sickles' move forward was tactically a good thing. It's a direct cause-effect relationship...Sickles' move ensured his corps would be destroyed, thus leaving a huge hole in the Union line. And that would be better than staying put? Even assuming Longstreet broke through, the result would have been the same. If anything, Longstreet would be sticking his neck out. Any move ****her east would have stirred up a hornet's nest with the II and V Corps descending on Longstreet.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

I'm pressed for time now. I will, as you request, post Law's comments ASAP. As to why Longstreet simply didn't flank Sickles, that's an interesting point--for another topic and time.

I'll be back to you ASAP and have a nice weekend.

Don

[mobile_96]

Don,
While considering if, and if so, How to bring Steve into this I'd like to ask:

Are you a member of GDG, and if so, I'd expect that you've read all the feedback from the group concerning Sickles?

Also, I think most readers here would recognize Battles and Leaders a bit quicker than "The Century War Series"

And, have you referenced Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign or even The Bacheldor Papers, in developing your 'opinion'.
Chuck in IL.

[nbforrest]

Thanks for the reply Don. This subject has drawn me in so I might have to crack open a few books this weekend. An interesting discussion to be sure.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

To all:

In regard to the main point of my case, I believe I've made an irrefutable case in defense of General Sickles's unauthorized advance that day. Indeed, what makes Sickles's action so commendable was precisely because it had been unauthorized!

I'm not convinced what so ever.

"Irrefutable" is not a relative term.

I see several of our colleagues on this forum willing to contest your assertion, better than I might do.

You keep claiming that Sickles critics are "revisionist", which I can't swallow as many of those critics were contemporaries.

I would say that your assertion is "revisionist" as it contradicts most of the historical accounts of the issue.

I'll add that your idea of disobeying/ignoring orders as an admirable strategy is itself a quite "revisionist" theory.

I am satisfied that you have that particular opinion of the controversy, but to say "I believe I've made an irrefutable case in defense of General Sickles's unauthorized advance that day." is quite a stretch!