Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[milhistbuff1]

I disagree, it was hardly over in the west, Chattanooga, and Chickamauga could have sent Rosey running had someone other than the lethargic Bragg, been in charge.

[Jamieva]

Disagree on the assesment of the CSA position in the west. They still had a good shot in that theater in summer 63. Problem was they had Bragg in charge so any chance they had would be fumbled away.

[ole]

A whole bunch of "what ifs" doesn't change the fact. Bragg was in charge and the strength of the AoT was frittered away.

Ole

[milhistbuff1]

True but under JE Johnston, that strength was built back up and used intelligently for once. A CSA victory at GBurg, would tip the balance, and maintain not only morale, but also help hold on to the initiative.
Respectfully,
Matt

[nbforrest]

I'm siding with ole here. Even assuming Lee managed to beat Meade, so what? Meade would just shield Washington. It wouldn't alleviate the situation in the West for the South. Even with Longstreet Bragg was unable to affect a permanent turnaround. Even under Johnston the situation in the West was irretreviably lost. It just is not realistic to suppose that somehow the South would have been able to retake Nashville, reopen the Tennessee and Cumberland river valleys and then reopen the Mississippi. Just wasn't going to happen.
Lee had to move North. He could see the handwriting on the wall and knew that a victory in the North was his only chance, a very slight chance, but the only option. Lee correctly saw that the South could not militarily retrieve the situation by the summer of 63.

Respectfully

Respectfully

[ole]

Thank you, NB, for your very kind support. A case can be made that after Donelson and Shiloh, the fickle finger of fate had begun to write on the wall. It would have taken more than luck to change Confederate fortunes after that. Hope and Bobby Lee were the only things they had to hang onto after that. Lee, knew it, but at least had the 'nads to try reversing the trend.
Ole

[Donald Schneider]

To all:

In regard to the main point of my case, I believe I've made an irrefutable case in defense of General Sickles's unauthorized advance that day. Indeed, what makes Sickles's action so commendable was precisely because it had been unauthorized!

It is important to remember that in all my citations from Longstreet, that one gets the impression that in no way was Longstreet writing for the purpose of defending Sickles's advance; but rather, to answer his Confederate critics that his alleged delay in attacking that fateful day caused the ANV the battle because he should have attacked earlier--before Sickles had made his move.

It seems to me that to Longstreet's mind, Sickles had not done anything extraordinary or brilliant, but had simply done what military logic dictated. Thus, that Sickles was forced to take matters into his own hands--and one would have to assume after consultation with his division commanders (Did either of these most competent officers issue a protest?)--is the only thing that makes his actions extraordinary--and commendable!

As cited, it seems that just about every Confederate officer present who had an opinion, agreed with Longstreet's view of Sickles's move, even those later antagonistic towards Longstreet. I really don't see how there can be any further issue here or discussion on the point, except by those who seem not amenable to logic and the citation of facts concerning the events of July 2.

As Sickles maintains in his lengthy rejoinder to Meade in The Century War Series, at the close of the July 2nd Meade had about 60,000 troops present to defend the very same left flank he had presumably expected Sickles's light corps to have defended alone earlier in the day! Again, Meade--although he can be forgiven to some extent due to the circumstances of how and when he had taken command--had been clueless on July 2nd. He had the fixed idea of wanting to fight at Pipe Creek and, despite having been from Philadelphia, had never been to Gettysburg and had had no knowledge of the place whatsoever--as he testified before Congress. He had simply not felt comfortable fighting there, and looked for an opportunity to give a credible order for withdraw South. As Sickles pointed out, this might very well explain his seemingly inexplicable decision to strip his left flank bare of both Geary's and Buford's divisions.

As far as Halleck having lauded Meade as "the best of the commanders of the AoP," well, consider the source. Halleck always resented the upstart Grant. After Grant opted to make his HQ with the AoP, there resulted the awkward situation of that army having, in fact, two commanders. Grant acknowledges this in his memoirs, and states that he sought not to embarrass Meade as much as possible, and, whenever time permitted, always issued orders through Meade. Still, the fact remains that after Grant joined the AoP, Meade had been little more than a de facto cipher before Grant.

Although I have no particular beef with Meade, and I know of no significant criticism of him as either a division or corps commander, from Gettysburg onwards there was no real opportunity to test the mettle of the man as an army commander. He performed perfectly adequately in what must have been an awkward and somewhat unhappy position for him, but there is not much to be said for that one way or the other. At Gettysburg, his performance was less than spectacular, to be charitable; and we all know Lincoln's view of his actions afterwards.

After the Confederate debacle on the July 3, Meade had had the entire Sixth Corps--the strongest in the army; virtually a small army of-and-in itself, virtually unused and at the ready. What happened next speaks for itself. As Longstreet puts it in his memoirs: "As far as the Union Sixth Corps is concerned, they could have been back at Manchester...." [as far as they mattered at Gettysburg.] Thus, another opportunity was squandered to end the national bloodbath.

In regard to the importance of LRT, I remain incredulous. Someone has started another note on this topic, and that would be the proper place to debate the "issue" for those who want to try to prove black is white. One cannot have one's army flanked--and on high ground!--in such a vulnerable position as had been Meade's on July 2, without drastic--and adverse--results.

Every officer on the field that day--both Northern and Southern--would all seem to have been under the same mass "delusion," even those who had been antagonistic--not just to the enemy, but to others on their own side of the conflict. Certainly General Warren would have disagreed with any revisionist view of this matter, as would have General Meade (though he had been tardy to realize it) and General Lee.

History does not change, only views of it. It has become popular in recent times to ascribe "myth" status on many facts once thought uncontroversial and irrefutable. Who knows? Every now and then someone might actually be right about one such matter or the other. But not in this case. Those closest to the event all attest otherwise.

Finally, in regard to what would have happened had Lee prevailed at Gettysburg, that is a complete other topic. I notice there is a forum for just those kind of scenarios on this wonderful forum. Perhaps someone would like to start a topic there, as this hypothetical question is not really a Gettysburg matter per se, but rather one of a far more ranging, strategic significance, both from a military and political standpoint.

Don Schneider

[mobile_96]

"As Sickles maintains in his lengthy rejoinder to Meade in The Century War Series,"
Did this 'rejoinder' to Meade appear before or after Meade had passed away?
The Pipe Creek line was a fall back line incase the Union Army got into trouble.
Chuck in IL.

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Mobile:

Although I can't be completely sure, almost certainly after Meade's death. Sickles's rejoinder came about as a response to the publication of a personal letter by Meade to a certain Colonel Benedict who had apparently written Meade while he was headquartered in Philadelphia in 1870 as Commander, Military Division of the Atlantic.

I have no idea whatsoever who Colonel Benedict was (Can anyone help us here?) except that he was apparently from Vermont and had written an article defending Meade against apparent charges by Sickles's partisans that Sickles had saved the day at Gettysburg. From the tenor of the letter, I get the impression that General Meade had not known Colonel Benedict; and, if he had, certainly from the tone of the letter they had not been familiars.

In Sickles's rejoinder to the Benedict letter in The Century War Series, Sickles is speculating (and not suggesting otherwise) as to Meade's motive in stripping his left flank during the day of July 2, 1863. He offers lines of substantiation that would seem to support his speculation as to Meade's reasons for stripping the left, such as sending Buford to Westminster to guard his supplies trains prefatory to a possible retreat upon them.

Meade always denied he ever intended to retreat to Pipe Creek, unless necessitated by the fortunes of battle. Sickles attributes quotes to Meade that would certainly suggest that Meade had no liking for the idea of fighting at Gettysburg, and only reluctantly remained out of deference to the advice of his lieutenants. I do not know if these quotes (E.g., "It is decided then, gentlemen. We will stay and fight it out here. But I still say this is no place to fight a battle.") were substantiated by any or all of those present at the Council-of-War on the evening of July 2nd which Sickles was not, of course, present at.

In any event, one cannot be harsh towards General Sickles for waiting until Meade was gone for making his stinging rebuttal to Meade if Colonel Benedict (or whoever) did not release the letter for publication until then--which I feel almost certainly had been the case.

Although I am speculating as much as Sickles had been, my take upon matters is that Meade had been participating in a classic, "Methinks thou dost protest too much" exercise in denying he had ever favorably thought of withdrawing after the close of the day on July 2. I have no way of ever verifying that, of course. The point is only peripheral to my note and need not be dwelled upon.

On a side note regarding the illustrious General Sickles, that this man lived to be either 94 or 95 made him, in my estimation, the eighth wonder of the modern world! Only the good die young?


Don Schneider

[milhistbuff1]

Don, Ole, Et al,

Here is a portion of Longstreets day 2 acct.
"At three o'clock the artillery was ordered to open practice. General Meade was then with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of withdrawing his corps to the position to which it was originally assigned, but the opening admonished him that it was too late. He had just sent a cipher telegram to inform General Halleck, commander-in-chief, that in the event of his having no opportunity to attack, and should he find the Confederates moving to interpose between him and Washington, he would fall back on his supplies at Westminster.(*) But my right division was then nearer to Westminster, and our scouting parties of infantry were within rifle range of the road leading to that point and to Washington. So it would have been convenient, after holding our threatening attitude till night, to march across his line at dark, in time to draw other troops to close connection before the next morning."

transcribed onto civilwarhome.com

if Longstreet had only pivioted around the union flank using LRT and RT, it would have compelled a union withdrawl, according to Meades own telegram.

Respectfully,
Matt