Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[whitworth]

First, Sickles moved to a position where both his flanks were exposed. He moved without permission and his corps payed the price.

Sickles never came back to the Army of the Potomac in any command. So much for his great leadership.

Halleck considered Meade the best of the Army of the Potomac commanders, shortly after Gettysburg. So much for Sickles getting Meade removed from command.

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt and NB:

I shall try to address all and both of your points by quoting from Longstreet's memoirs, previously referenced.

Firstly, that Sickle's new line was not formidable, from page 369:

"In his [Hood] usual gallant style he led his troops through the rock fastness against the strong lines of his earnest adversary, and encountered battle that called for all of his power and skill. The enemy was tenacious of his strong ground; his skillfully-handled batteries adept through the passes between the rocks; the more deadly fire of infantry concentrated as our men bore upon the angle of the enemy's line and stemmed the fiercest onset until it became necessary to shorten their work by a desperate charge." [Emphasis mine]

--Note also how Longstreet points to the effectiveness of the Union artillery in Sickles's new line. This was one of the primary reasons Sickles wanted to make the move; a move that General Hunt, the Union artillery chief at Gettysburg, acknowledged as one of the positive points in favor of Sickle's (then) proposed new lines. Sickles had had limited placement ability for his cannon in his original line.

--Also, let us not forget Law's protest--with Hood's support--about the ordering of a frontal attack against this presumed "less than formidible" line, and how long the line was held, enabling the tardy and clueless Union commander to finally rush reinforcements from his right!

Secondly, even more telling than the quote I previously posted regarding Longstreet's--and by implication, other Confederate officers'--view of the military propriety of Sickles's unauthorized advance, from page 381:

"Colonel Taylor [a Confederate A.A.G on Lee's staff, and a severe critic of Longstreet after the war] claims that the attack by the Confederate right should have been sooner, and should have met the enemy back on his first or original line, and before Little Round Top was occupied. But Little Round Top was not occupied in force until after my battle opened, and General Sickles's advance to his forward lines was made in consequence of the Confederate threatening, and would been sooner or later according as the threatening was made." [Emphasis mine.]

Now what more do your fellows want? If Sickles's move was a "blunder" as revisionist historians have tried to make out--which was never maintained even by Meade before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War--then shouldn't the presumed beneficiaries of this "blunder" have been happy about it?

Once again, with Colonel Taylor we have yet another Confederate critic of Longstreet chiding him for not attacking earlier--before Sickles could have made his move! The clear implication is that Sickle's move was not at all considered a blunder by the enemy; but rather, an excellent tactical move that caused the ANV the day!

But what is really telling is that which I highlighted for obvious reasons. Not only did Longstreet not consider Sickle's advance to have been a blunder; rather, he actually considered it to have been both the obvious and inevitable (i.e. necessary) response for any competent Union commander to have taken when he threatened the Union's left that day.

In regard to the astounding remark that LRT wasn't really all that significant an objective, my response to that is an incredulous; "WHAT?!"

In all my years reading literature concerning Gettysburg, I've never heard such a statement. Never! Longstreet refers to it as "the citadel of the field," and its "crowning point." The brunt of the criticism mounted against him by his legion of erstwhile comrades turned enemies regarding Gettysburg on the 2nd was his failure to capture LRT which they blame upon him for the lateness of the attack. As I said previously, I actually believe that Longstreet was too optimistic for his enemy if he had that day been successful in taking LRT. He seems to have envisioned an orderly withdraw by the AoP, whereas I fear a panic and resulting rout would have developed, with God only knowing what ultimate result. Vicksburg would have been deemed small consolation for the loss of Washington and perhaps my hometown, Philadelphia!

Gentlemen, if you want to maintain that Sickle's "blundered" that day, then--taking it from the perspective of the enemy--I am reminded of a most famous historical quote--paraphrasing it as : "One more blunder like that by the enemy and we're lost ."

Don

[milhistbuff1]

Don,

I agree on the importance of LRT, its just that timing was against the CSA if they had taken the hill. Sickles' was supposed to defend LRT, and with Sykes's help from the 5th corp, he did. Longstreet's goal in taking LRT would have to control the Taneytown road, but due to the union's forces either being present or on the Balt. Tpke there was nothing left to cut off. If performed early on July first, possibility of success, but not when Longstreet attacked, served little purpose, unless cutting meade off from Wash DC was the objective.

[william42]

If performed early on July first, possibility of success, but not when Longstreet attacked, served little purpose, unless cutting meade off from Wash DC was the objective.
__________________

I may have read this before but I don't remember now. Was July 2nd the only time the ANV would have been able to manuever to cut off LRT and the AOP from Washington? Is there a reason that Longstreet or another Confederate Corps, did not cut off LRT from Washington, besides the delay in Longstreets move on July 2nd? Was there no other opportunity for Lee or any of his generals to attempt that manuever?

If the manuever could have been successfully executed, and cut off the AOP from Washington, would that not put Meade in a situation where he might over-react, possibly panic, and re-deploy his army perhaps bringing about a different outcome to the battle? Would Lincoln have intervened at that point and directed Meade to adjust his army for the protection of the capital?


Terry

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Whit,

Sickles, like Butterfield, was closely linked to Hooker. I believe that Meade would have removed Sickles in any event, battle or no battle; unauthorized advance by Sickles or not. The pious, temperate (though irascible) Meade I'm sure had no liking for that trio's "habits" at HQ. I do not argue that General Sickles was a saint, simply a surprisingly good amateur military commander and conscientious while on the field as well.

Secondly, I also believe Meade (the professional) recognized how Sickles (the amateur) had saved his butt and unconsciously resented him for it. This explains his own revisionist view of the battle as evidenced by his letter to Colonel Benedict conflicting with his testimony before Congress.

I have no idea how old you are. If you are anywhere near my age (51), perhaps your introduction to this subject, like my own as a kid, was that stupendously horrible book, Gettysburg: The Long Encampment in which the author seemed out to expose his own ignorance of the very subject matter he was writing about! (For example, he attributed Spencer repeating rifles to Buford's brigades, which they did not have.) In this farce, he makes Sickles out to be a buffoon, and exhibits his own lack of knowledge concerning the topology of the battlefield. He harps, for example, on Sickles's placing his troops in an inverted 'V' position, normally one of the worst possible formations (as it exposes both sides of the salient to enfilade fire.) He doesn't, however, point out that--as Hunt noted--this disadvantage was largely mitigated by the high ridges covering the position.

Being a kid, of course, I took this absurd (well, it does have some excellent photographs) book as gospel for many years until I began a more serious study of the subject and realized the truth concerning it. For any who think of Sickles as a buffoon, I'd suggest you pick up at least Volume III (of IV) of The Century War Series and read in full the rejoinder to his critics of this highly intelligent and astute lawyer and congressman.

Although denied field command for political reasons, General Sickles remained in the army for a few years and retired with the rank of brevet major general in the regular army--a well-deserved honor for his great personal sacrifice and courageous and conscientious service to his nation.

Don Schneider

[nbforrest]

In all my years reading literature concerning Gettysburg, I've never heard such a statement. Never!

This is the response I often get. Just because one has never read it doesn't mean it isn't true. Histiography is constantly changing. Hanging blindly onto an idea because historians say it is true is foolhardy in the extreme. And I guess you haven't read Gary Adelman's book on LRT.

Longstreet refers to it as "the citadel of the field," and its "crowning point."

Just because he said it was important doesn't make it so. Just because it looks important doesn't mean it was. Remember, Longstreet never stood atop the hill and saw it true strategic significance, or lack thereof.

The brunt of the criticism mounted against him by his legion of erstwhile comrades turned enemies regarding Gettysburg on the 2nd was his failure to capture LRT which they blame upon him for the lateness of the attack. As I said previously, I actually believe that Longstreet was too optimistic for his enemy if he had that day been successful in taking LRT.

You are under the mistaken impression perpetrated after the war that LRT was a target of the Confederate attack as a point of significance. It was not. The attack plan had nothing to do with a seizure of LRT. The plan was to roll up the Union line with an en echelon attack.

Vicksburg would have been deemed small consolation for the loss of Washington and perhaps my hometown, Philadelphia!

It is a mighty big assumption to think that Hood, McLaws, and three brigades of Anderson's divisions (as fine troops as they were) could somehow destroy the AOP and leave the way open to Washington or Philadelphia. Those cities weren't even targets of Lee's invasion, that is another popular myth. Lee had no intention of making an implausible strike against those major cities.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

I'm a bit perplexed why a couple of quotes are taken to be the Gospel regarding Sickles' move forward. As I said earlier, I actually see that theory as plausible in the sense that his move disrupted the Confederate en echelon attack. But his move also destroyed his corps and left a gaping hole that had to be filled. It is a huge "if" to assume that Longstreet would have cracked Sickles' original line. Moreover, I don't think that Sickles saved the Union line for the very reason that there were plenty of Union reserves to shore up the line, no matter what. Sickles did not save Meade, numbers did.

Respectfully

[ole]

A most excellent post, NB. Am most grateful for it.

The PA campaign was well-intentioned and a last-gasp try to bend northern will. It was, however, doomed from the start. Lee had nothing but a chance to play with. Stopped anywhere -- in actuality, Gettysburg -- the plan was finished. No resupply. No friendlies. No support whatever. Up that proverbial creek without the wherewithal to continue.
Had Lee forced the Union army to fall back, he'd still have had to face a well-supplied force between his forces and Washington. Winning at Gettysburg would have given him nothing more than a morale victory.
A morale victory would have been good, but he would still be in hostile territory with a formidable force against him. Where is the gain? If he hadn't been whupped at Gettysburg, he'd have been whupped eventually somewhere closer to Washington. Pipe Creek?
No. The effort was in vain. A good idea without realistic support. The last gasp, as it were. A noble effort. A foolish move. A last move before the check.
Ole

[milhistbuff1]

Ole,

I disagree with your conclusions on this matter. A victory in the east, would give the CSA a chance to regain the initiative in the west & allow the ANV to support such action since the AOP would be forced to refit. Morgan's raid into Ohio was around this time as well, in addition to causing mass confusion, he could also help secure a line of march SW along with Stuart.
respectively,
Matt

[ole]

With respect, Buff,

Stuff and nonsense. It was all over but the shouting. There was no resurrection in the west.

Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?
Ole