Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[nbforrest]

Milhistbuff,

I don't disagree. I don't think that Sickles' move forward was very good. The idea that the Peach Orchard area was a good artillery position was not true. But I can understand why Sickles moved forward, although certainly dashing forward to ground of questionable value was foolish. But Sickles had seen what had happened when Hazel Grove was abandoned and I suspect that he did not want a repeat performance.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Shane:

You wrote:

"The time span involved is something I need to look at again before I make any kind of credible comment. IIRC at least two different Corps came down that road and were actually fed into the battle."

The following is from Longstreet's memoirs, From Manassas to Appomattox [a rejoinder by Longstreet that his delay in launching the attack on the Union left was responsible for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg]:

"At the opening of the fight, General Meade was with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the Third Corps back to the line originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the Confederate battle. If that opening had been delayed thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back into the general line, and my first deployment would have enveloped Little Round Top and carried it before it could have been strongly manned, and General Meade would have drawn off to his line selected behind Pipe Creek. The point should have been that the battle was opened too soon."

Actually, Longstreet's rather sardonic rejoinder to his Confederate critics disagrees with Sickles's own account in the respect of timing. Sickles relates that the battle commenced while he had just arrived at Meade's HQ for yet another council-of-war that he had begged to be excused from due to what he believed was an impending attack at his front. This, however, is not relevant to the point in question.

Here, Longstreet is by implication lauding Sickles's unauthorized advance from his original line and crediting Sickles for saving the Union position at Gettysburg. (I also am not at all certain that Longstreet's rather benign analysis of what would have resulted had he been able to take LRT at the outset is not too optimistic for and generous to the Union. I think a real chance of a rout and resulting panic could have quite possibly doomed the AoP and the Union as a result. Whatever, had that happened one thing is for certain. That is, that the highly favorable outcome the Union reaped at Gettysburg would not have occurred, leaving the future highly uncertain.)

Now, here is a quote by Colonel William Allan, C.S.A. from The Century War Series as a rebuttal to Longstreet:

"Had Longstreet attacked no later than 9 or 10 A.M., as Lee certainly expected," [Which Longstreet denied--but that is another topic for another time.] "Sickles's and Hancock's corps would have been defeated before part of the Fifth and the Sixth Corps arrived"

Thus, we have evidence that even a Confederate officer hostile to Longstreet and his protestations agrees with his antagonist that had Longstreet attacked Sickles along his original line that the Confederates would have carried the day.

Also, it must never be forgotten that there would be no issue here--and quite possibly no Battle of Gettysburg as we know it--had it not been for Sickles's admirable decision--on his own volition in the absence of orders--to force march his corps to Gettysburg from Emmitsburg upon hearing reports of the incipient conflict and Howard's desperate position.

Shane, you called Sickles's a "despicable man." He certainly had his faults, and his justification in the Key affair is something one must make one's own mind up about. It is doubtlessly true that he saw the war as an opportunity to rebuild his life and shattered career--and far away from his omnipresent creditors. Nevertheless, I believe he proved himself to be one of those rare, gifted amateur soldiers that come along from time-to-time, from Cromwell to Chamberlain (at LRT); which, combined with his formidable native courage (which you seem to position as his one, lonely virtue), made him into quite a good general and natural leader of men. To quote the abrasive and conflict-ridden Admiral King when he had been recalled to active duty after Pearl Harbor, "When the going gets tough, they call for the s.o.bs!" At the very least, Sickles proved himself such a man; a man the Union desperately needed just then.

Notwithstanding his motivation for initially forming his brigade and entering the service of his country, I truly believe that Sickles had at least one other quality that was rare for a political general like himself: He cared! As such, he embraced his new, opportunistic calling with earnest and zeal. Imagine someone like, for example, Butler at Emmitsburg when the battle began. Do you think his reaction would have been the same as Sickles's? Would Butler have forced march his men and himself out of concern without being under the onus of orders? Or do you think he would have reacted by sipping tea in the comfort of his HQ, advising his lieutenants that "This isn't our problem. We wait for orders"

I really think that it is time for a great many people, and, most of all, history itself, to rethink this remarkable, albeit deeply-flawed individual's role within it, and his formidable influence on the history of our great nation.

I shall perhaps cite a bit of Sickles's very telling rejoinder to Meade's personal letter to Benedict as time allows. I think many will find it most interesting and illuminating, especially in the area of what Meade--and several other very credible officers, such as Hunt and Hancock--told the Congress in 1863 and how Meade "remembered" events seven years later.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

You posted to another poster:

"I don't disagree. I don't think that Sickles' move forward was very good."

If you would please read my response #22 to Shane, you'll see that your side (I assume by your screen name and location) apparently disagreed.

Don

[milhistbuff1]

NB, re: post 21,
my point in bringing up the peach orchard was that it was better off left empty, so arty could use the orchard as a clear field of fire through it having been posted along cemetary ridge and weikerts hill, where Meade originally wanted Sickles. if that was the situation when the en echelon attack began, one or both in the situations would have been a plausible and acceptable to Meade.
respectfully,
Matt

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt:

You posted where Meade had "originally wanted Sickles." What is your source, please, for wherever it was that Meade had ordered Sickles? Sickles claimed that all his orders from Meade had been verbal, and that the only definite order he ever received from Meade was to replace Geary's Division's of the XII Corps position.

Sickles claimed that Geary had been in front of and to the right of LRT, exactly where Sickles was, before having been ordered over to the right early on the 2nd. Sickles further claimed that the records of the War Office had been "ransacked" (to 1870) [presumably] by those seeking to prove Sickles wrong "to no avail." If you cite a book, could you please cite where the author got the information from as well

Thank you.

Respectfully,

Don Schneider

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt:


You wrote:

"NB, et al, wouldnt it have been far more prudent to leave the higher ground of the peach orchard open to federal fire creating a killing zone. Digging in line with hancock frome weikerts hill south to the round tops and letting the csa charge straight up the line would have minimized union difficulties in reinforcement and communications, while mass confusion would reign in csa ranks as they got close to the entrenched, fully cohesive union line. 5th, 6th and 2nd corp, instead of being forced to aid a mauled and practically destroyed 3rd corp, could have extended the line south and flanked Hood's division. Or alternatively, have 5th corp dig in and extend the line to fully cover the round top area, and have 6th corp with support from 2nd attack the weakest point of any army, the border between two units. Driving a wedge between Anderson of 3rd Corp and McClaws in 1st corp would have disrupted the en echelon attack, and relieved pressure on the main union line.

"Sickles was wrong, the height of the peach orchard was useless, it was the ability to use the woodline along cemetary hill-ridge stretching south the roundtops to entrench forcing the csa troops to approach under fire, without being able to suppress it without difficulty."

--This is from an article by General Henry J. Hunt in The Century War Series:

"On my return to headquarters...General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially as he could not use his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning and had noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, I accompanied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchid, where he pointed out ridges, already described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for the enemy to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it." [Emphasis his.]

General Hunt, one of the ablest artillery commanders in history, here seems to vindicate Sickles's view that his current line offered unfavorable placement of artillery (as evidenced by Hunt's reference to the terrain and his decision, therefore, to go with Sickles to at least explore Sickles's alternative line idea.).

Hunt then goes on to say that the downside of Sickles's idea was that it would lengthen the required line--because Hunt assumed that the line must end on LRT. However, once again I believe that we have an officer clearly writing through the haze of time--because Sickles's line never ended on LRT to begin with. Again, Sickles could not have made any semblance of a formidable defensive front across terrain of 2200 yards with the amount of men he had had available.

Sickles moved to terrain that presented a formidable defensive position--more so than the one he had held--in front of LRT, the only spot where he had any hope of defending the critical hill short of leaving a wide gap between his right and Hancock's left. Those who favor the Union can be thankful that Longstreet refused to allow a flanking attack. He could have flanked Sickles's original line as well; but assuming he wouldn't have had for the same reasons, it would not have been necessary with him having been ceded gratuitously the terrain Sickles's wisely claimed as his own. As noted in my previous post to Shane, Longstreet and other Confederates appeared to give credence to the wisdom of Sickles's unauthorized advance.

Respectfully,

Don

[nbforrest]

Much of this seems to be based on the idea that Little Round Top was a crucial position. I must disagree. It was only important so far as any envelopment of the Union line required its capture.

Sickle's move forward upset the Confederate en echelon attack. If his move forward did indeed help the North, I think it was in that respect. The entire theory behind the attack was ruined, causing among other things, the divergence of Anderson into Humphrey's rear and away from Cemetery Ridge and the divergence of much of Hood's division into a pointless attack on Little Round Top. Without the entire en echelon attack going forward as planned, there was no point to a Confederate occupation of LRT.

Regarding Hunt's comments, we must remember that at the time he was unwilling to really suggest Sickles to move forward, merely noting that it could be favorable ground for artillery (Which it really wasn't. Had Alexander's guns been better deployed, the III Corps artillery could have been in a tight spot).

Respectfully

[milhistbuff1]

Don,
I humbly ask, at what cost? stopping an enemy attack is all well and good, but i submit that it was because of sickle's move that any gain of initiative was lost. Generally after an enemy retreat, pursuit is the wisest course, in order to further unbalance the already decimated, disoriented and disorganized units of the original attacking force. Both Hood and McClaws suffered greatly not only in lost effectives, but in the command structure as well, Hood, Semmes, and Barksdale numbering among the wounded and slain.
The trouble with Sickles's line is it required too much support that would have been better off being held in reserve until after 1st corp exhausted itself and then launched a counter attack against the disorganized 8000 men that Longstreet had left on the morning of July 3rd at dawn. Will get back to you on the sources.
Respectfully,
Matt

[nbforrest]

Sickles moved to terrain that presented a formidable defensive position--more so than the one he had held--in front of LRT, the only spot where he had any hope of defending the critical hill short of leaving a wide gap between his right and Hancock's left.

I don't think the Peach Orchard/Rose's Woods line was "formidable" at all. The Peach Orchard area was wide open to being swept from the north, which is exactly what happened when Anderson pitched in. The line in Rose's Woods was in a very weak position, offering no terrain advantages at all. A line running through a woodlot is hardly formidable. Rose' Woods was open to a sweep up Plum Run, again what happened when Hood and McLaws went in. The slaughter in the Wheatfield and Plum Run area of the II and V Corps showed that the terrain that Sickles moved to was terrible for a battlefield.
If Sickles helped the North, it was in disrupting the en echelon attack, not assuming a position of strength.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

the only spot where he had any hope of defending the critical hill short of leaving a wide gap between his right and Hancock's left.

Two problems there:
1)Sickles' new position did not adequetly protect LRT. Ward's brigade was spread thin just to Plum Run. There was nothing to the southwest and very little in Devil's Den.
2)LRT was not a crucial position in itself. It was only important in the sense that Longstreet had to roll up the Union line and the Union line ended there. The hill itself was of no real value to Longstreet.

Respectfully