Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[OpnDownfall]

Assuming the two Corps are in position to reinforce immediately. Was the Cemetary Ridge Line reconstituted before the battle ended because of darkness? Another hour of daylight and would there have been anything to reinforce?
Again, if past events are prologue, then the history of the Civil War was that a Full Blooded assault on an army's flanks were seldom withstood.
Given the experiences of the AoP and it's officer corps and the ANV and its officer corps, especially their respective commanders, would probably, lead to the same result; what happened to Sickles forward position would have happened (more or less) in his original position, except, it would have occurred 'In' the Union MLR rather than in 'Front' of it.


P.S. as an example of theory vs reality, LRT was a prime tactical and strategic position, yet it was mostly ignored by most of the higher ups in both armies.

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by J_Man0507

I still say that had Sickles stayed, with artillery in place and the Fifth Corps coming up to reinforce the flank, it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early.

Foote tends to agree with you, "Whatever else it was o wasn't [Sickles' movement] - and entirely aside from the fact that it helped to discourage Longstreet's men from attacking as Lee had ordered, straight up the Emmitsburg Road, which probably would have meant utter destruction for them if Sickles had stayed back on the ridge to tear their flank as they went by...."

[J_Man0507]

I meant to post something yesterday, but didn't get a chance. I was gone for the weekend and didn't have access to a computer. I will post more this evening, but I will say that the Fifth Corps was in immediate reserve of the left flank, hence the reason that it was brought up as quickly as it was. Warren told Meade that LRT should be defended, and when he saw Confederate troops moving in its direction, because of Sickles rash maneuver, he brought them up. I will post more later, though. Work calls.

[ole]

There is general agreement among students of the Second Day; i.e., Lee's plan was aimed to roll up the 5th Corps. Had Sickles been where he ought to have been, Longstreet's attack would have, at most, brushed Sickles' Corps at a steep angle--for the most part, they would have been marching almost parallel in front of Sickles' guns.

One might speculate that, when the when the planned attack reached the 5th Corps (and one might assume that Longstreet would have held things together at least that long), it would have already been considerably bloodied and disorganized. Hitting the 5th in that condition would be predictably disastrous--not to mention that Sickles would be in a position to swing in behind the attacking force.

Great posts, gentlemen.

ole

[cw1865]

Is Sykes even on the line on the morning of Day 2? I think most pro-Sickles and anti-Sickles movement would agree that Lee is aiming the assault at Hancock, no?

[J_Man0507]

I really don't have much more to say. Through my research of this battle, I have come to the conclusion that if Sickles had stayed in position, he could have held. He had good ground. He had good fields of fire. Sykes corps was in immediate support, within a mile or so of the battlefield. If a threat to the flank had been detected, it would have been taken care of. The key is LRT. Warren recognized it as the key to the line. He most likely would have been sent down to check it out. He would have realized the importance and called for men to hold the position. Thats my position, and I'm stickin' to it. Both theories have merit. I don't deny that there was some good that came out of the foolhardy move, but I still don't think it was a good one tactically. Now, I'm going to get something for this headache....stupid coffee.

[ole]

I have come to the conclusion that if Sickles had stayed in position, he could have held. He had good ground. He had good fields of fire.

Most I know of hold the same conclusion. Sickles-apologists will recall for you his state of mind re having enemy artillery on higher ground at Chancellorsville.

It remains, for me, that his movement forward was not in keeping with allowable discretion. That it inadvertently turned Day Two into a bloodbath that ended with a Confederate withdrawal means no nevermind. If, and this is what the whole thing boils down to, Sickles had placed his troops where instructed, the battle may well have ended that day.

But these are things that were, and we can't change them much. But it does make for a good conversation. Does anyone have a spare cold one? I ran out.

ole

[cw1865]

And this I think is where we should 'flip sides' and look at the Confederate side of things. Specifically, Hood, and ultimately his decision to go around Sickles who is now of course in the Peach Orchard.

It seems to me that Lee's plan is a little bit too ridgid, he wants to hit the Union flank but it doesn't seem that he is willing to concede any tactical flexibility to his commanders to find the flank. Is Lee ultimately ridgid because of the differences of opinion that he has had with Longstreet about slipping around the Federal left and awaiting an assault? ie. does he interpret the desire to go around Sickles a 'subversive' way for Longstreet to get his way?

[OpnDownfall]

Wasn't it Longstreet who was being too rigid? Hood requested permission to move to his left, several times to Longstreet and was refused each time. Unlike Longstreet, Hood used his initiative to sidle to his Left anyway, otherwise the battle would not have reached LRT.
Lee had been acquiescing to his Corps commanders indecisions and reluctance all through the battle and Longstreet now decides to follow the letter of his instructions.
IMO Lee was impatient with Longstreets obvious attempts to redirect the offensive and based on faulty intelligence, thought he knew where the Union Left was located. Lee was probably anxious to end the campaign as soon as possible (day 2) and get back to Va. befsore his ammo and supplies completely failed.
Lee was trying to get the battle over as fast as possible and as a result made mistakes that, ultimately, reinforced the mistakes of his corps commanders.


P.S. The terrain between Seminary Ridge and Cemetary Ridge was undulating, from Sickles original position( lower than Hancock's position and lower than the Peach Orchard where Lee planned to site his supporting artillery) how good a field of fire 3d Corps would have had on Longstreet's Corps as it passed on its way to Hancock, is problematice. even If that was really their target)

[ole]

Opn:

Will assume you meant Hood's right.

In the situation you've presented so ably is Longstreet's infamous snit. He knew that Lee's orders no longer applied, as the situation had changed so drastically. But, for whatever reason one might imagine, he insisted in following them. All of which adds to the never ending discussion about Gettysburg, Day 2.

ole