Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[J_Man0507]

Originally Posted by cw1865

I think the Feds were going to lose a corps (or the equivalent of one, one way or another); you are going to lose something to beat off an 1863 Confederate Corps. Its difficult to determine which would've been a better position, the Peach Orchard, or Sickles' original position, but even if we consider Meade's original position to be better, I am still concerned that the full weight of a Confederate Corps will make the entire fishhook untenable. The Federals can 'afford' to lose the Peach Orchard, they cannot lose any position on the fishhook, for any substantial period of time of course)

The Army of the Potomac had already lost a corps. The First Corps was all but used up after the first day. To be sure, they would lose the equivalent of one, but it would be fairly spread out over the entire army. Two corps were rendered unusable during the battle. Even if the full weight of the attack had fallen on the original position, there were two corps in reserve that could come up and add their weight. And if artillery is placed right, and Hunt was a good artillerist, with good fields of fire, the attack would have lost momentum and it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early.

[ole]

Sickles' position may have been a "better" one for his corps, but it was not a "better" one for Meade's army. The move carried discretion too far. He placed his corps in harms way and, in doing so, bollixed up Meade's arrangement.

ole

[OpnDownfall]

Just the opposite Ole, Sickles' forward movent was bad for the 3d Corps but good for the Union Cause and vice versa for the original placement.
Lee's early morning reconnaisance, had indicated that LRT was unoccupied so two confederate division were to attack the Union Left from the S and W followed closely by the rest of Lonstreets Corps moving further North, guiding on the Emmitsburg Rd, before turning more or less NNE ( probably at a slight angle to the Union Line) into Sickles Corps, by brigades With a Division from Hill's Corps hitting, approximately, the junction between Hancock and Sickles Corps.
The history of the war in Va. indicates that a major assault on the flanks of the AoP up to 1863 almost always resulted in a major victory by the ANV. There is little to indicate from Meades or his other corps commanders actions that anticipated such a move.
The Confederate attack, was not merely slowed down, the whole impetus of the attack was completely dissipated in a strike at a position that was Not part of the Union Main Line of Resistance.
The reasons for Sickles move,may or may not be to ones liking, but the results of the move are not in doubt.
I will concede that staying in it's original position would probably have resulted in fewer overall casualties than those from its more forward position, but 3d Corps would still have been shattered by the flank attack and Hancock would have been rolled up along Cemetary Ridge. Losing Cemetary Hill and the Battle (not the war).

[J_Man0507]

The thing with those flank attacks was that they were always surprise attacks; Jackson at Chancellorsville for example. They were made on an unexpecting flank and were successful because there was no resistance. There would have been no surprise this time. You have the signal station on top of LRT which would have spotted Hood's and McClaws coming, and would have relayed the news down the line. Troops would most likely be sent to defend LRT and most likely securing the left flank of Sickle's Line, had he stayed in position. So Hood can not just go up and over, but he would have to do the same thing as before and try to attack LRT. There would have been no surprise as to Longstreet's attack. The Federal's seeing the movement, would probably maneuver to counter and break up the attack. The Confederates would have been under concentrated artillery and musket fire, and the attack would have most likely fallen apart.

[OpnDownfall]

McClellan anticipated Lee's attack on his Right on the Peninsula and Porter was well dug in and better prepared for the attack than Meade or Hancock apparently were at Gettysburg.
Even with Lee's plan miscarrying, the ANV broke through in the end and the battle was a great confederate victory.
There is some controversy, as to how much the signals from LRT, just before and during the attack, helped or confused Meade and his staff. With all that advanced information, the battle was a near run thing, with darkness ending the fighting as much as the piecemeal reinforcements.
The chances of a single Union Corps repulsing an all out attack on their flanks (even if well dug in, which Hancock nor Sickles were not) is problematic and goes against most experience during the war so far, in the East. ,

[J_Man0507]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

McClellan anticipated Lee's attack on his Right on the Peninsula and Porter was well dug in and better prepared for the attack than Meade or Hancock apparently were at Gettysburg.
Even with Lee's plan miscarrying, the ANV broke through in the end and the battle was a great confederate victory.
There is some controversy, as to how much the signals from LRT, just before and during the attack, helped or confused Meade and his staff. With all that advanced information, the battle was a near run thing, with darkness ending the fighting as much as the piecemeal reinforcements.
The chances of a single Union Corps repulsing an all out attack on their flanks (even if well dug in, which Hancock nor Sickles were not) is problematic and goes against most experience during the war so far, in the East. ,

While the Seven Days battles have gone down as a Confederate Victory, all but one of the separate battles were in reality, Union victories. The Union forces held the field after every battle, except for one (which escapes me at the moment). The Confederates won a strategic victory, not tactical. McClellan's men stymied Lee, but Little Mac pulled back like a fool instead of pressing his advantage.

As to the signal station. If a message goes out that there is a strong enemy force forming across the way, at least a staff officer would come and take a look, probably Warren or one from Hancock's Corps. This is in essence what happened. Warren was sent to see what was going on. It was already known that the Confederates were going to attack there, it was just when and where exactly.

Now lets go with what we have, assuming that Sickles doesn't move forward. A message is seen from the station, saying that enemy troops have been spotted and are forming to attack. Warren is dispatched and he sees an imminent attack which is going to go against the line below. What will he do? Most likely the same thing he did when Sickles moved forward. He is going to get the Fifth Corps, which is bivouacked nearby, and artillery, maybe Hazlett's battery and others, to form up on the left of Sickles and extend the line. If the attack avoids LRT as it was supposed to, Hood and McClaws would have fire coming down on them from the heights, so they either attack it or retreat, and Hood being who he is, he would have attacked. But even Hood saw the attack as foolhardy, because once their were guns on those heights, it was over. He didn't say this, but I quote Sam Hood from the movie Gettysburg: "They don't even have to use guns. All they need to do is roll rocks down on us." With men on that hill, the flank is secure.

I still say that had Sickles stayed, with artillery in place and the Fifth Corps coming up to reinforce the flank, it would have been Pickett's Charge a day early. The oncoming attack would have been decimated by artillery in good postion (which even the enemy artillery commander recognized) with good fields of fire, and reinforcements a plenty, they would not have been able to achieve and exploit a breakthrough. And the casualty count on the Union side would have been much lower, and that of the Confederates the same or higher.

[OpnDownfall]

All very well and good, if everyone from Meade, Warren Sickles and Hancock on down made all the right assumptions and all the right moves, at the right time.
Real time, real experience during the war argues that perfection in the heat of battle was rarely achieved.
Experience, argues that, at Best, 3d Corps would have been, at least partially, driven back from his position and this is assuming that in this scenario, the attack of Hill division does not occur or does not get the penetration on Cemetary Ridge, that it did in real life.
So at the end of Dau 2. the confederate left has at least pushed back the extreme right of the Union Line on Cemetary Ridge enveloping the extreme of the Union's MLR.
Anyone have any idea's on what Meade's plans were, in case such an untoward event occurred? Like the Seven Days, the morale of the Commanding General is usually more important than that of his army. McClellan Told Porter to be prepared and immediately began to plan his retreat (saved his army, lost the battle). McClellan was more interested in not losing rather than winning. Meade had Butterfield, drawing up maps and planning the AoP's retreat if things got too hot too early.
Knowing what we know now of Meade's abilities and disabilities. even a partial lodgement of the ANV on his right, ON Cemetary Ridge, would most likely have been the signal to Meade to retreat to fight another day (saving his army, losing the battle)

[J_Man0507]

That is what this threads is about: an assumption. It is being assumed that Sickles in his original position would have been driven off. I am making the counterpoint to that. With an attack on that flank, the Fifth Corp would most likely have been brought up to secure it. Warren is highly likely to have done the same thing as he did in the actual scenario; go to LRT to observe what was going on with the Confederates, see that LRT needed men on it, and call for them to come up. To hold LRT down to where the end of Sickles line was would take about a division. That leaves atleast two divisions in reserve to bolster the Federal line on Cemetery Ridge. I reiterate the point that the Second and Third Corps would have been able to hold, even though not without a tough fight. The reason for the breakthrough on Day Two is because Hancock is trying to fill gaps left all over because of Sickles. If Sickles doesn't move, there are no gaps to fill.

Now, in the event that Meade did lose on the Second Day, no matter the movements of troops, he most likely would have pulled back to the Pipe Creek line that was his original intent to hold in the first place. This would force Lee to attack him on good ground of Meade's choosing. Lee can't stay in the North because his communication and supply line is too extended, and he can't just go around and try to attack Baltimore or Washington because then he would have the enemy in his rear. Even if the AoP had had to pull out on the Second day, Lee still would have had to leave Pennsylvania and get back to his lines of supply and communication and return to Virginia.

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by J_Man0507

It is being assumed that Sickles in his original position would have been driven off. I am making the counterpoint to that.

And from the Sickles' defender, the point does have merit. Hancock and Sickles are both backed up by two corps.

[ole]

Well, you guys jumped about a mile ahead while I was sleeping. Will have to let this one alone until the pace slows a bit. Am enjoying the action. Keep on truckin.

ole