Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
{ The first support that reached me was Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps; it got into position after 5 o'clock in the afternoon, two hours after the battle opened."}
Closer to 1 hour, as the fight on the left flank started in the neighborhood of 4 pm.
Would have been even sooner, if Sickles hadn't been 1/2 mile advanced as he was.
{"--What plans by Meade??? Show me any evidence of any exact plans Meade had in regard to his left flank that day. From Sickles's rejoinder:....."}
To be forthcoming, as soon as I finish up what I have. Also please note
part 2 of 2 articles in N&S mag on Meade at Gettysburg. I believe the latest issue is going to press very soon.
{but he deprived me and himself of the most effective support he had on his left flank by the unaccountable withdrawal of Buford's division of cavalry, which held the Emmitsburg road and covered our left flank, including Round Top, until a late hour on the morning of the 2d.}
Also to be covered when completed.
As for ..........
{Geary, that all merely relate "..was relieved by the Third Corps"? Every one of them? Why wouldn't a single one of them have been willing to state exactly who gave the order for Buford (upcoming as stated above)and Geary to have been withdrawn?}
...Simply return to my post on Geary and see who he stated 'gave him the order to move on the morning of the 2nd day', which was sent by Meade himself.
{--As I said before, Sickles's move had the effect of extending the entire Union line to the left, and greatly reinforcing it.}
...Extending the line means that, extending. An extension does not include leaving a large gap or hole in the line that can be exploited by the enemy. It might mean the men are spread out further than standard formations.
{exactly what evidence there is that Meade had any plan at all in mind on July 2nd in regard to his left } Considering the material I'm going to present was collected and written up by a modern revisionist, using material from Officers at the Battle, and don't agree with Sickles, I'm sure that you will find the evidence tainted and unworthy of use by anyone.
I'm also taking some time to closely read Hunts writings to see if everything of import, by him, has been posted on this thread in your analysis.
My time is limited this week, so I want to say for now that I do regret it if my remarks concerning the nature of a flank attack, and its ramifications, seemed condescending. I can see now that we have been writing at cross purposes to some extent, and that I have not made myself sufficiently clear as to what I envision would have happened had Sickles attempted to hold the line that Meade asserts he had intended him to in the Benedict letter.
As cited before from his memoirs, Longstreet states mater-of-factly that had he been able to hit Sickles's original position--even going so far as saying that had he actually held off just a bit to have given Meade sufficient time to order Sickles back!--then he would have easily enveloped LRT with his initial assualt. Longstreet then goes on to state that this would have compelled Meade to retreat. As I also stated, I think Longstreet was being too generous to his erstwhile enemy here.
In an odd way, I actually agree with those attempting to topple the "myth" concerning the importance of LRT, but for different reasons than most, however; if--and only if--Longstreet could have hit the Union left while Sickles held his original line.
You say that there was no plans for a Confederate flank attack. However, I shall later this week, probably Thursday evening, quote from Kershaw's the CWS article in which he apparently disagreed with you. He states flat out that it was "the understanding" that Hood would attempt to gain Sickles's flank and then turn perpendicular to the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. This is exactly what I think would have happened had Sickles held his original line.
Longstreet personally directed McClaws's attack, leaving Hood to his own devices for the most part. Hood was a naturally aggressive commander, and had he encountered Sickles's original line, for all I can see dispatching troops to occupy LRT would have been unnecessary and even a waste of time and men.
Soldiers in combat have certain tendencies. They tend to huddle together during artillery shelling, and tend to gravitate to one of their flanks while in battle. (From the movie Gettysburg, the Irish sergeant-major to Chamberlain: "They keep moving to the left.") I'm sure you would not contest the assertion that battles often have a tendency to take on a life of their own, regardless of what commanders originally intended. Whether Hood actually ordered such a move or not (and I think he would have), what I think would have happened was that when Hood struck at Sickles's left flank, his boys would have naturally started moving around it--North of the base of LRT--and rapidly gained the flank.
This, in accordance with Alexander's guns on the Peach Orchard--where they doubtlessly would have been placed had Sickles not wisely denied them this ground gratuitously--decimating Sickles's entire line, with McClaws's boys ready to charge as the next step in the echelon attack, would have rapidly resulted in the collapse of Sickles's line, with the result being mass confusion. The fact that Barnes would have been a half-mile closer, would not have compensated for the advanced time element we are discussing here.
Hancock moved Caldwell's division forward and to the left to meet Anderson. Attempting to pivot an entire division that quickly to rush perpendicular to the left would have been an entirely different matter. I have little doubt that a disaster would have befallen the AoP had Sickles not wisely "closed and clinched" with the enemy in order to buy the precious time Meade needed to reinforce the left he should have hours earlier. To Longstreet--and several other Confederate officers I cited--this seemed to be a "no-brainer." I cannot for the life of me understand why it is not for you and others here.
The best the AoP could have hoped for had Sickles held his original line would have been what Longstreet envisioned, with his forces easily enveloping LRT more than an hour before Vincent brigade's arrived to salvage the situation, almost literally in the nick of time. Why is it so difficult for you to see that no such time would have been available for the Union in the scenario you would have advocated for the AoP when even the enemy saw it? And had the best case scenario developed that Longstreet--generously--asserts would have resulted, then you would trade a certain decisive victory for the Union in favor of a march by a dejected and retreating AoP into an uncertain history?
Once again, NB, I acknowledge that your grasp of military tactics might indeed exceed that of my own. I am, after all, just a one-hitch Navy veteran, whereas for all I know I am writing to a retired professional Army veteran. Since you do, however, understand the dangers of a flank attack to a line positioned as the AoP had been along its line before Sickles advanced his corps, then I would suggest you give serious consideration--if not to my view of this hypothetical matter--then the views of military professionals such as Longstreet, Hood, Law and Kershaw who obviously had a more telling perspective on matters than either of us.
On a final note, please consider that General Daniel Sickles was very much a more highly-educated version of the man you apparently so honor with your screen name here. Both men lacked military experience, but both proved to have great natural instincts for the art of war. Because of this, both men similarly faced resulting jealousy and prejudice by the professional military establishment on their respective sides, and that same establishment had a resulting motivation to disparage their accomplishments. There was no way Davis, Cooper and Lee would have given this military genius whom you so honor the command of, for example, The Army of Tennessee. What a misfortune for the South that such was the case!
As cited before, had Hooker only listened to his "bar-and-brothel " HQ buddy at Chancellorsville, then this entire discussion might well be moot. With that in mind, perhaps you might just one day consider that the views you seemingly so adamantly adhere to here, against all logic--and even the views of the military field commanders of your ancestral side of this dispute!--have been inflexibly wedded into your consciousness from years of reading revisionist historians following one another, writing with the same sort of prejudices in favor of "professionalism" over "dilettantism" directed against not just Sickles, but your very own Nathan Bedford Forrest as well!
Cordially,
Don
Last edited by Donald Schneider; 03-20-2006 at 05:19 PM.
Haven't much time now, but I do have a couple quick comments.
Hancock moved Caldwell's division forward and to the left to meet Anderson.
No, he didn't. Caldwell wasn't even fighting Anderson's attack on Cemetery Ridge. Caldwell fought in the Wheatfield. He was fighting McLaws division. And to accomplish that move, he post certainly pivoted about...if division didn't pivot or change formation or change direction, they wouldn't go anywhere! Maybe you are thinking of Webb's or Harrow's brigades on Cemetery Ridge, they were the ones to fight Anderson.
I cannot for the life of me understand why it is not for you and others here.
Because it is based solely on an assumption that Sickles' original line had collapsed. Whose to say that the forward line held longer than the original would have? No one. Certainly not Longstreet.
Once again, NB, I acknowledge that your grasp of military tactics might indeed exceed that of my own. I am, after all, just a one-hitch Navy veteran, whereas for all I know I am writing to a retired professional Army veteran.
Heaven's no, I'm certainly no expert. I'm merely citing my interpretation of the tactics used based on what I have read.
Since you do, however, understand the dangers of a flank attack to a line positioned as the AoP had been along its line before Sickles advanced his corps, then I would suggest you give serious consideration--if not to my view of this hypothetical matter--then the views of military professionals such as Longstreet, Hood, Law and Kershaw who obviously had a more telling perspective on matters than either of us.
A flank attack is always dangerous...but Lee's plan was clearly to conduct an en echelon attack...Kershaw's comments would be interesting to see, but I would have to see more than Kershaw's words to change my mind. Throwing whole hearted support behind a source or two that supports one's theory is the height of folly in historical analysis, as tempting as it may be.Of course, I doubt that Lee had any real chance of success that day, no matter where Sickles was.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
Hancock moved Caldwell's division forward and to the left to meet Anderson.
No, he didn't. Caldwell wasn't even fighting Anderson's attack on Cemetery Ridge. Caldwell fought in the Wheatfield. He was fighting McLaws division. And to accomplish that move, he post certainly pivoted about...if division didn't pivot or change formation or change direction, they wouldn't go anywhere! Maybe you are thinking of Webb's or Harrow's brigades on Cemetery Ridge, they were the ones to fight Anderson.
In Gary Gallagher's The Second Day at Gettysburg is an outstanding essay on Caldwell's movements written by D. Scott Hartwig, at the time of publication ('93), supervisory park ranger at GNP. (BTW, Don, some of Hartwig's observations seem to support your effort -- see p. 143. Unfortunately, some do not -- see the rest of the essay.)
I would hope participant's in this debate have or will read it. Caldwell performed some highly unorthodox movements -- one of which was to march left without pivoting. "There was no time to countermarch so as to bring the men right in front, so we simply left faced and started." Hartwig credits the skill of the men, Caldwell himself, and the experience of the four brigade commanders for the ability to do what couldn't be done. (Lest 4 brigades be taken for an overwhelming force, there were among them only 3200 effectives.)
The essay doesn't much comment on the Sickles' thing -- only the performance of Caldwell's Division. But in discussing the battle resulting from Sickles' decision, it defines a piece of the action very well.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I am aware that Caldwell's division fought in the wheatfield. I was referring to Brigadier General George Anderson's brigade of Hood's Division and not Major General Richard Anderson's division of Hill's corps. Cross's brigade encountered Anderson's and succeeded for awhile in halting the latter's advance. Please see as follows:
It seems to me the height of irony that those here seeking to disparage Sickles's generalship do so by invoking a strictly hypothetical argument that Sickles would have been able to hold his original line--which even Coddington acknowledges was "difficult"-- long enough for Meade/Hancock to have rushed reinforcements to help sustain it before a flank attack by Hood would have resulted in the rout that I--for one--envision; and that seems to imply such great faith in General Sickles's military prowess and leadership ability! I'm sure that General Sickles would have been touched by the great confidence that Meade and you all seem to have placed in him, though somewhat bemused--as am I--, I suspect that you do so for the purposes of proving how inept he had been! Now if that does not constitute an exercise in convoluted logic, I fail to see what would!
Just looking at the a map of the situation that day, it seems so very obvious to me. Look where Sickles's advance placed his left. He had his left, under Ward, placed right in front of LRT, which would have at least forced the Confederates to march around both LRT and BRT to flank Sickles's advanced line and gain his rear; whereas where you would have had him, Hood would have easily marched obliquely northeast, attacked Sickles north of the base of LRT; easily broke the line, flanked and gained his rear, and all in much faster time than the former scenario that Law and Hood both so forcibly advocated, and which fortunately (for the Union) Longstreet would not allow in apprehension of Lee's views on the subject. Instead, Hood had to battle his way through Sickles, buying for the Union the precvious time it needed due to Meade's failures that day--not Sickles's!
As I also said, all of this happening while Alexander would have been blasting away at Sickles's lines from the very same Peach Orchid which commanding heights you would have gratitiously ceded to the enemy--with McClaws's boys read to deliver the coup de grace! For the life of me, the only explanation I can fathom on the part of those who hold to the view that Sickles's advance had been folly is pure stubbornness in light of the facts, logistics and views of the enemy themselves!
Someone here quoted General Humphrey's testimony before Congress in 1864. During the preceding year or so he seemed to have revised his views as compared to his official report. One wonders if such a revision could have possibly had anything to do with the fact that he had become Meade's Chief-of-Staff in the interim, Anyway, when asked what he thought would have occurred if Sickles had held his original line, even he responded: "That would have depended on what the enemy would have done, which I cannot, of course, know for certain"
Now your side quotes this testimony as being against Sickles, yet when I do exactly what Humphrey's suggests, quote from the emery's leadership's side, you simply brush it aside as if the enemy had no relevance that day!
As I said, I once held to your view--based solely on the views of an author from a single book. However, when I made a more thorough investigation of the matter (and I just began with Longstreet, not ended with him or with Sickles (of course)), I was forced by the totality of the evidence to amend my view. It is all right to that, you know, when facts compel it. Truth is more important that "being right."
Don
Last edited by Donald Schneider; 03-22-2006 at 05:09 PM.
I realized that I have never answered your twice posed question. As I said, I am from Philadelphia, so Gettysburg is a day trip for me. Yes, I have been there. (Though Meade, also from Philadelphia, had apparently never even heard of Gettysburg. Then again, he had had no reason to!)
Don
Last edited by Donald Schneider; 03-22-2006 at 05:14 PM.
Then, Don, how can you look at the forward line and still say it was a strong position?
I really don't think you are looking at the totality of evidence by any means. You haven't even really considered the inherent weaknesses of Sickles' forward line. Now, I nor anyone else can literally claim to have looked at the "totality" of evidence. But it seems pretty clear to me that you are the one more concerned with being right than with looking at all the evidence. That's just what it has seemed like to me, but certainly posting brief messages is not the best way to communicate in such a discussion.
So...as I warned before, just be careful to keep an open mind.
I think I'm going to give this discussion a break for a while...I don't think it is really going anywhere new (although I am very pleased that it was not only informative, but very civil...a discussion like this would likely not have turned out so well on other sites). For me this is a good time to respectfully agree to disagree.
Respectfully
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
Fair enough, though I still owe you the citation from Kershaw's the Century War Series article as such:
"In the meantime General Hood's division was moving in our rear to the right, to gain the enemy's left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood on my right, and cooperating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down the Federal lines in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle." [Emphasis mine]
As stated, I believe that exactly this strategy would have easily prevailed for the Confederacy had Sickles held his original line, and was ultimately foiled by Sickles's order to advance to his corps forcing Hood to battle his way through it. As Sickles acknowledged himself, no line he could have held would have been long tenable with the amount of troops he had available. His advanced line was the lesser of two evils. It cost a lot of blood--including his own--but it held long enough for the Union to prevail. The simple fact is that the Union left was too weak to have held an advance by Longstreet. The fault for that lay with the commander of the field that day. Meade did an admirable job after the fact rushing reinforcements, but the fact remains that his inattention to his left previously that day--despite repeated warnings--caused the situation that we now debate.
I agree, NB, we seem to be merely rehashing old ground. Once before I suggested we end this debate, and now seems as good a time as ever. I agree that this correspondence amongst ourselves has been most enlightening for all interested in the subject, and I most decidedly agree with you concerning the civil tenor of the correspondence, notwithstanding our differences in opinions. I thank all who have participated and made this note one of the more successful ones on this forum recently in terms of views and responses, as well as citations and analysis. We have all gained some URL references for material invaluable in studying and analyzing our most tragic Civil War.
On a final note to Sam, despite our differences, we apparently most decidedly agree on one score. I too have always greatly admired the man you so honor with your screen name. When you--and all--think about General Daniel Sickles, remember how he force-marched his already exhausted and most valiant corps, on his own volition, in an attempt to reach and aid the hard-pressed Howard as soon as possible; and--whether you agree with his order to advance or not--remember his fearless stand that day, holding the position on which he chose to defend his nation; and how he lit and waved his cigar in order to cheer and encourage his troops while he was carried off the field of battle with a mutilated limb. No matter what else Dan Sickles was--or was not--on the field of battle in the service of our nation, he was always conscientious and, he was always a man!
Cordially,
Don Schneider
Last edited by Donald Schneider; 03-26-2006 at 04:14 PM.
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