Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

"but then if Sickles had stayed where he had been ordered, Meade could have reinforced him more quickly and effectively."

--Ah, here is the very essence of your case and that of others here. Yet, curiously, you provide no citations whatsoever from Coddington, or from others via him, in support of this remarkable statement!

--By this assertion, I assume Coddington means to argue that by virtue of the fact that Sickles would have been about a half-mile closer to the Fifth Corps, then obviously help would have been all that much closer. This is how Sickles responded to that argument, though indirectly:

"And this vantage-ground, by which I mean the Emmitsburg road ridge, the Devil's Den, the Emmitsburg road itself, and the intersecting roads leading to our left, once in possession of the enemy without loss, would have enabled him to deliver his assault upon me in the position indicated by General Meade, three hours before it was delivered, and with advantage of position and force that would have given Lee the victory." [Sickles's rejoinder to Meade/Benedict letter]

--What Sickles argues here is that the three hours or so it took the Confederates to battle their way through the Third Corps and reinforcements (that arrived after the battle had already been enjoined by the Third Corps) in the advanced line in order to reach the original Cemetery Ridge line, made the difference in the outcome. I.E., If Longstreet had been permitted to strike the Third Corps by itself along the original line, then there would have been nowhere near sufficient time for Meade to have hurried reinforcements (that should have been there hours earlier, which is the very factor that prompted Sickle's advance), shorter distance or not.

--Once again to use my analogy, Sickles's decisive and courageous decision to close and metaphorically "clinch" with the enemy bought the precious time needed by Meade; time needed because of Meade's own inability to listen to repeated warnings that it was not his right in liniment jeopardy, but rather his left. I simply cannot understand why you and others here cannot see this clear, simple fact, when Longstreet--of all people, the very man charged with leading the attack against the Union left--wrote of Sickles's movement as not only not a blunder, but almost outright obvious!

"Coddington further notes, (and a long talk with a friend of mine, a retired Army Officer, jrROTC instructor and a official Army historian, Grade 3 concures)

"By upsetting Meade's battle plans just before Longstreet's men started their assault, Sickles gave him little time to adjust to the Change. Forced to improvise in response to unexpected meeds, Meade had to send in his troops piecemeal, as they came up, to help the hard-pressed Third Corps. In this fashion he used up far more men than would have been otherwise have been necessary to stop the confederate attack once it had gained momentum. "

--What plans by Meade??? Show me any evidence of any exact plans Meade had in regard to his left flank that day. From Sickles's rejoinder:

"General Meade was surprised by the attack of Longstreet, on the Union left, on the afternoon of the 2d of July. No preparations whatever were made by the commanding general to meet Longstreet's assault. There was no order of battle. General Meade had not personally reconnoitered the position, though frequently solicited by General Hunt, General Meade's chief of artillery, General Warren, his chief of engineers, and myself, to do so. This appears in the testimony of General Hunt and in the report of General Tremain, my senior aide-de-camp. Not only was no preparation made by General Meade to meet the attack upon his left,-- the position I held,-- but he deprived me and himself of the most effective support he had on his left flank by the unaccountable withdrawal of Buford's division of cavalry, which held the Emmitsburg road and covered our left flank, including Round Top, until a late hour on the morning of the 2d. Geary's division of infantry had been withdrawn from the left very early in the morning of the 2d. These dispositions imposed upon me, thus weakened by the withdrawal of two divisions, the sole responsibility of resisting the formidable attack of General Lee upon our left flank. The first support that reached me was Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps; it got into position after 5 o'clock in the afternoon, two hours after the battle opened."

--By all means, Chuck, please ask your Army historian friend exactly what evidence there is that Meade had any plan at all in mind on July 2nd in regard to his left other than presumably expecting Sickles by himself to hold off anything that would (presumably unlikely) develop. Please ask him why Buford and Geary were ordered away from the left if Meade had had any plans at all for his left, or had had any aprehension it would be attacked. I--and I'm sure all--shall await his resopnse.

--More presently.

Don

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

--Thus, the anti-Sickles case comes down to the strictly hpothethical argument that Sickles's corpsby itself could have held its original line along Cemetery "Ridge" as well or better and longer than did his reality-tested advance line.

Don

You criticize the "anti-Sickles case" as "the strictly hypothetical argument ...", when your "irrefutable" theory is in itself strictly hypothetical. ?!?!

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

--This shall be my last note this evening to you as I need some time to read over Humprhey's official report again before responding; to answer some other posters, and to ask you a question before I proceed regarding your following citation from Coddington:

"General Humphreys later commented that if all the troops of the Third, Fifth, and Second Corps engaged on the Union left flank had been in position at the beginning of the battle on July 2, or if all the reinforcentments had been sent in one body, the result would have been different. Any attempt, he asserted, to maintain by successive reinforcements a position which was originally held by inadequate numbers of men, and was about to give way, was bound to be unsuccessful. It was so with the Third Corps. ( A.A. Humphreys, "The Fight for Round Top." Philadelphia Weekly Times, Feb.2, 1878.)
mobile_96 "

--My question is is to ask you whether I am right in assuming here that General Humphreys is referring to Sickles's advanced line and not his original line? Thanks much.

Best regards,

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

"Slightly pivoting to the left only left Sickles' flanks more exposed, if anything. Carr's right was wide open. The left of Ward wasn't much better. You seem to be fine with the fact that the move forward left Sickles' flanks wide open with a salient in the center no less. An extremely weak posistion. The losses incurred by the Confederates does not necessarily add to the value of the ground. Sickles' move forward virtually ensured that his corps would be smashed. Sickles did not move forward to sacrifice his corps to save the army (as much as he would have liked later generations to think so.) He saw ground he thought was stronger. It wasn't. His corps was isolated and smashed (not just temporarily...he did such a good job wrecking it it was one of the corps folded into the I and V Corps). Is that a wise action? I vote no."

--As cited before--from General Carr's official report--Carr stated he could have held his position all day had General Birney (after taking command of the corps) not ordered him to retreat. He stated that just shortly later--after Birney presumably realized his mistake--Carr once again advanced and easily retook the ground he never should have ceded to the enemy.

--As General Hunt noted in his the Century War Series article, the elevated ground of the Peach Orchid commanded the ground both in front and behind it. In Federal hands, a flanking movement would have been more difficult for the rebs. Likewise, with the DD in Union hands.

--Along Sickles's original line, a flank attack would have been child's play. If Longstreet could see that--commanding the enemy--I fail to see why you and others here cannot. Sickles certainly had, thank God for this most unlikely of saviors--until perhaps Oskar Schindler, that is.

--As I said before, Sickles's move had the effect of extending the entire Union line to the left, and greatly reinforcing it. Had he held his original position, the time necessary for that never would have existed. As it was, it was purchased for the Union with the blood of the most gallant Union Third Corps, and its fearless, decisive leader.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

--"and how could Hancock have possibly removed Caldwell's division--or one of his other two--out of his line, turn them about, and rush to the Sickles's left?"

"Same way he did in the actual event. He could have plowed straight into Anderson's left, assuming Sickles' line collapsed."

--Can you envision what a flank attack means, such as Jackson's plowing into the seemingly perennially hapless Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville? Don't you understand why a flank attack is so prized by the offensive side and feared by the defensive one?

--Are you perhaps picturing the scene from the movie Gettysburg where Chamberlain refuses a part of his line to the left, and at a right angle to his forward line in order to meet a flanking attack? If so, please know that was quickly accomplished by a regiment, and an undersized one at that! Do you seriously think an entire corps, or even a division, could ever accomplish such a feat in sufficient time to meet such a threat as Longstreet posed that day?

--A flank attack is so devastating because all the men--and all of their artillery--are facing the wrong way to meet the enemy! The usual result is exactly what happened to the Eleventh at Chancellorsville. I have no doubt that the same would have occurred if Sickles's line had collapsed at its original placement. The same sort of panic effect sets in that tragically kills people in the "human stampede" phenomenon we unfortunately witness at mass events from time-to-time. This is what General Sickles feared that day, and that is why he acted as he did--for want of his commander's attention to the impending threat.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Sam:

"No CSA brigade lost 40 of it's strength. 6 Union brigades did."

--Confederate divisions were much larger than Federal ones. Wasn't the same true of brigades? Thus, reducing a Union brigade by a greater percentage than a Confederate one would seem an easier proposition, would it not? If you, for example, were designated a "brigade" all by yourself, then I'd say it would be fairly obvious that totally annihilating your "brigade" would be a far easier proposition than doing likewise to one of, say, Pickett's.

"It was fortunate that the reserves Meade had available to bail out Sickles were not needed elsewhere at the time. If there were serious threats on the Union right at that time, those reserves would not have been able to support a threat at their right as they were busy trying to save Sickles' butt."

You have it backwards and are confusing cause with effect. It was Sickles who bailed out Meade. There were no serious threat to the Union right, yes--but hardly from luck. The right was where Meade had his strength, which is precisely why his left threatened to burn.

Yes, the casualty toll was horrendous that day, as the next. Such is war, such is its objective. As a premier Prussian military strategist (whose name eludes me at the moment) noted, the object of war is to destroy the enemy's armed forces, and not to capture territory. After the enemy's army is destroyed, then the victor can do what he pleases with the enemy's territory.

Lee's objective was hardly the capture of an insignificant town called Gettysburg. His objective was to destroy the AoP and then force a peace agreement on the North. Such an objective is inherently bloody, which is why war should never be entered into lightly.

If the casualty toll went disproportionately against the North July 2, 1863, it was because Lee caught the enemy commander by surprise on his left flank--which he never should have. You seek to blame for that not the man responsible for the lack of sufficient troops to hold the flank, but the man who acted decisively to salvage the situation in light of his commander's vacillation and/or inattentiveness. Unfortunately, such a remedy cost a lot of blood--on both sides. Such was the price paid to save the Union.

Don

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

It was Sickles who bailed out Meade.
Don

And you talk about 'revisionism'!

[Donald Schneider]

Ah Sam!

Your last couple of "responses" are so reminiscent of the last pathetic shots fired by a retreating adversary after defeat.

The entire situation regarding Sickles--whether he had remained in his original line or advanced--was brought on by the indisputable fact that the Union left was far too weak to contest an attack of the magnitude that Longstreet brought to bear. Instead of blaming the obvious person--the man who had command of the field that day--you seek to blame the man who--among others--repeatedly warned Meade of the threat developing against his left to no avail.

You want the final nail in the coffin to your case? Don't you find it at all curious that in the official reports of Buford, Pleasanton and Geary, that all merely relate "..was relieved by the Third Corps"? Every one of them? Why wouldn't a single one of them have been willing to state exactly who gave the order for Buford and Geary to have been withdrawn? Who were they trying to avoid antagonizing, the now-maimed and out-of-the picture General Sickles, or the commander of their army very much in a position to retaliate if so offended? I think the answer is obvious to any not blinded by the fact that he has been hoodwinked for years by historical revisionists, one following the next.

I know I don't have the power to extend justice to Dan Sickles who--notwithstanding his legion of faults--acted courageously and decisively to salvage the situation he inherited after a grueling forced march--on his own initiative--to get to the scene in the first place; but just perhaps some youngster lurking here, not yet prejudiced by blindly reading and accepting years of historical revisionism, will one day grow to gain the proper "credentials" to sufficiently impress folks, and will write that "landmark" book of which I spoke that will finally set the record straight. Anyway, one can hope.

There is an axiom concerning science and its development that could just as correctly apply to history. The axiom is that new ideas are not accepted so much by convincing those already in place, but rather gain acceptance with the passage of time as those already around pass on and new generations emerge not emotionally wedded to past ideas.

Best regards,

Don Schneider

[nbforrest]

As cited before--from General Carr's official report--Carr stated he could have held his position all day had General Birney (after taking command of the corps) not ordered him to retreat. He stated that just shortly later--after Birney presumably realized his mistake--Carr once again advanced and easily retook the ground he never should have ceded to the enemy.


Pure nonsense, whether Carr said so or not. Carr and Humpreys were delighted to say that they were only ordered back to Cemetery Ridge. Carr's brigade had no support on either flank and his position was untenable when he received word to retire. The 11th NJ on Carr's left had already been forced back to the Klingle farm. Carr's comments are self-serving and ignore the true tactical situation. Read the chapter in Pfanz's book on Anderson's attack, especially page 369. Have you even read Pfanz's book?

--As General Hunt noted in his the Century War Series article, the elevated ground of the Peach Orchid commanded the ground both in front and behind it. In Federal hands, a flanking movement would have been more difficult for the rebs. Likewise, with the DD in Union hands.

Just because the Peach Orchard "commanded" the ground around it (a very generous term) doesn't mean it was a good position. It was untenable. Moving to ground that ensures your corps will be destroyed and thus leave a huge gap in the Union line is the height of folly.


--Along Sickles's original line, a flank attack would have been child's play. If Longstreet could see that--commanding the enemy--I fail to see why you and others here cannot. Sickles certainly had, thank God for this most unlikely of saviors--until perhaps Oskar Schindler, that is.

Again, you automatically assume that Longstreet's attack would have succeeded. Longstreet wasn't even launching a "flank attack" so I'm not sure what you are talking about. Longstreet was launching an en echelon attack to roll up the Union line, not to somehow move around Sickles and strike his left.


--As I said before, Sickles's move had the effect of extending the entire Union line to the left, and greatly reinforcing it. Had he held his original position, the time necessary for that never would have existed. As it was, it was purchased for the Union with the blood of the most gallant Union Third Corps, and its fearless, decisive leader.

Extending to the left a bit, but at the cost of destroying his corps and leaving a gigantic gap! His sidle to the south did extend the line slightly...but increased the gap on Sickles' right (which was exploited by Anderson). And greatly reinforcing it? Huh? Sickles had the same number of men no matter where he was.

don, I truly appreciate that you are willing to take an unconventional stand, but I really think you are sticking to your story in spite of the facts. I don't think you have a good grasp of the ground or of the battle itself, or you wouldn't be swallowing the fairy tales folks like Sickles and Carr were telling. Either you are purposely ignoring the facts or just haven't been exposed to all the facts. I suppose the former is the grievous error, the latter can be corrected.

Respectfully

[nbforrest]

Can you envision what a flank attack means, such as Jackson's plowing into the seemingly perennially hapless Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville? Don't you understand why a flank attack is so prized by the offensive side and feared by the defensive one?

As to this discussion so far, I am confident that I have a firmer grasp of tactics than yourself, don, with all due respect. I fail to even see how your above statement even applies here.


--Are you perhaps picturing the scene from the movie Gettysburg where Chamberlain refuses a part of his line to the left, and at a right angle to his forward line in order to meet a flanking attack? If so, please know that was quickly accomplished by a regiment, and an undersized one at that! Do you seriously think an entire corps, or even a division, could ever accomplish such a feat in sufficient time to meet such a threat as Longstreet posed that day?

I think you are a bit confused, don. If Sickles had held his original line and that line had collapsed, Hancock would have turned his men southward and moved to fill the gap, as he did in actuality. Perhaps he would have attacked facing southward and hit Longstreet's flank. Or perhaps he would have rotated his men to face the west, as really happened. Think of the movements of Caldwell and Willard. They moved south. Then they faced west. Very simple and basic movements carried out on every battlefield.


--A flank attack is so devastating because all the men--and all of their artillery--are facing the wrong way to meet the enemy! The usual result is exactly what happened to the Eleventh at Chancellorsville. I have no doubt that the same would have occurred if Sickles's line had collapsed at its original placement. The same sort of panic effect sets in that tragically kills people in the "human stampede" phenomenon we unfortunately witness at mass events from time-to-time. This is what General Sickles feared that day, and that is why he acted as he did--for want of his commander's attention to the impending threat.

Again, I think you are confused. There was no mass flank attack planned. Longstreet's en echelon attack was not designed to place a large force facing north and then roll up Sickles. It just wasn't. That isn't how the attack was planned. Sorry, but there was not grand flank attack planned to attack in a northerly direction.

Now, maybe I was too harsh to you there Don. But I really do think that you are putting total trust in evidence that supports your theory and ignoring evidence that doesn't. Just be careful to keep an open mind.

Respectfully