Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt:

In regard to the inverted 'V' position in which Sickles placed his corps, I've already discussed that, noting that General Hunt had commented upon it as well in his The Century War Series article. Please see my reply #35, page 4.

Thank you.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB, Tom and Ole:

Ole, although General Sickles never, to my knowledge, explicitly stated that his reason for advancing was to disrupt Lee's plan for an echelon attack, as a naturally instinctively good soldier, this was his sense of the matter and prompted his action. He knew that his left was about to be enveloped. Sickles, in his rejoinder to Meade's private letter to Colonel Benedict, made public in 1886, noted that he could not have held any line with the amount of troops he had and what was coming against him with Longstreet's huge divisions on the move, with Hill in support.

NB and Tom, you especially seemed concentrated on the look of the lay of the land, and seem uninterested in anything else beyond this point. However, what many here exclsuively focus on is that Sickles ordered his corps forward. However, he also did something else. Think about it for a moment.

What Sickles also did was order his corps to pivot to the left, making it at least somewhat more difficult for Longstreet to flank his position. By doing this he left a gap with Hancock's division's not only by virtue of Sickles's advanced position, but also adjacent to Hancock's line. Now, in effect, what was the result of this action?

The answer is that Sickles caused the entire Union line to extend itself to the left, with ultimately the Fifth Corps, and parts of other corps, being used to fill the necessary space. This is what Meade should have done, and his failure to do so left Sickles in the unenviable position of having to make a terrible decision; a decision that saved the AoP that day, and one for which he gets lambasted for now simply because he did what his commander should have! As I stated, it was a far simpler matter for Hancock to order Caldwell's division forward and to pivot to the left than it would have been to take that division out of his line, turn it around---about 3,500 men I think--and rush over to extend Sickles's line to the left had the latter held his original position. In fact, as I stated before as well, I believe that would have been a logistical nightmare and virtually impossible to accomplish in time.

As events unfolded, Sickles was able to hold long enough for Meade to finally commit himself by ordering the Fifth Corps to his left. Had Longstreet been able to hit the Union left while Sickles was in his original line, I have no doubt whatsoever that no such precious time would have been available, and the Union left would have been rolled up as easily as Jackson had done to it at Chancellorsville--and with far worse results for the Yanks.

As Sickles replies in his rejoinder to Meade's aforementioned letter, for Meade to have contended that all Sickles's advance caused was for his division to be ultimately driven back at great cost to the same line it originally held, was both absurd and possibly outright mendacious. In no way was the line of the Union left what it had been prior to Sickles's advance that day. As Sickles pointed out, Mead had a greatly extended left afterwards with over twice as many men on it or in close reserve. It was Sickles who had bought the time for Meade to accomplish this. It had been Meade's inattentiveness to his left earlier in the day that had caused the dire position of Sickles and the Union left, and then Meade had the unmitigated nerve to actually blame Sickles for salvaging the situation through his cool, decisive leadership, courage, and heroic stand.

Also, as stated before, then--of course--all latter day "warriors of the quill," as Longstreet sardonically termed then, would have blamed Sickles for the resulting disaster.

Don

[mobile_96]

{all latter day "warriors of the quill" as Longstreet sardonically termed then,}
As were both Longstreet and Sickles.

Anyhow:As to the relative sizes of the 2nd and 3rd Corps, which are not actually as Sickles understood;
..........................Corps Strengths July 2, 1863.
........."Gettysburg Campaign", Coddington pg 725.note #132
"Though the Second Corps was usually judged to be larger than the
Third by as few as 145, or by as many as 1,071 officers and men,
there is rather impressive evidence that on July 2 the opposite was
true: that the Third Corps was stronger than the Second. Hancock reported that he went into battle with 10,000 officers and men, which on July 1 the Third Corps headquaters reported the corps as having 12,169 offiecers and Men. OR, XXVII, pt.1, pg 375: Memoranda Field Return, Hdqu. 3rd Army Corps, July 1, '63, signed by Sickles [?], Field Reports, George Gordon Meade Papers, HSP. Also see OR XXVII, pt 1, pp151, 375, 534; Selected Pages from Historical and Statistical Record of the Principal Military Commands in the union and Confederate Armies, IV, 80, 143-144, Entry 161, Record Group 94, NA: Philadelphia Weekly Times, Feb 2, 1878: Tremain, Two Days of War, 104; Gross, Battlefield of Gettysburg, 8."

.........This note covers material on page 355 of Coddington;
..." Actually the assignment Meade gave it was a difficult but not an impossible one. To cover the ravine separating the Round Tops Sickles would have had to stretch his men out for a mile and a quarter, whereas the slightly larger Second Corps(see note 132) had a front of only about a mile in length. but then if Sickles had stayed where he had been ordered, Meade could have reinforced him more quickly and effectively.
Coddington further notes, (and a long talk with a friend of mine, a retired Army Officer, jrROTC instructor and a official Army historian, Grade 3 concures)
"By upsetting Meade's battle plans just before Longstreet's men started their assalt, Sickles gave him little time to adjust to the Change. Forced to improvise in response to unexpected meeds, Meade had to send in his troops piecemeal, as they came up, to help the hard-pressed Third Corps. In this fashion he used up far more men than would have been otherwise have been necessary to stop the confederate attack once it had gained momentum.

General Humphreys later commented that if all the troops of the Third, Fifth, and Second Corps engaged on the Union left flank had been in position at the beginning of the battle on July 2, or if all the reinforcentments had been sent in one body, the result would have been different. Any attempt, he asserted, to maintain by successive reinforcements a position which was originally held by inadequate numbers of men, and was about to give way, was bound to be unsuccessful. It was so with the Third Corps. ( A.A. Humphreys, "The Fight for Round Top." Philadelphia Weekly Times, Feb.2, 1878.)

[mobile_96]

.................................comment on length of Sickle's line:
..................................Coddington page 725 note # 131
Sickles said that Little Round top, "the key of our position on the left flank," was unoccupied, as he was unable to extend his line "further than the base of the hill, and, of course was wholly unable to defend it." Sickles to H.P. Smith, Aug. 11, 1911, D.E.Sickles Press Letter Book, DU. In this letter he was claiming that his corps could not cover a section of Meade's main line of a little less than a mile in length. In earlier accounts he asserted or implied that by advancing his men on the other line which everyone recognized was longer, he could and did find by some sleigh of hand enough men to occupy Little Round Top. In other words, Sickles changed his story to justify his conduct and also revealed faulty logic. CCW, Report, 1, 298: OR, XXVII, pt 1, pp. 130-131 [The "Battle of Gettysburg" by "Historicus" in the New York Herald, Mar.12, 1864].

This note attends the material from page 355, 2nd para.
........"Still the position Sickles chose was a good one as long as there were enought soldiers to man it. But if the Third Corps was considered too weak to hold the line Meade drew for it, how did Sickles expect it to do better on one a quarter of a mile longer?"
(My comment...Need to remember here, Sickles himself claimed the original line was too long to cover with troops available.)
I also am confused as to how a newspaper report became part of the Official Records. Anyone have any ideas on this?
Chuck in IL.

[nbforrest]

What Sickles also did was order his corps to pivot to the left, making it at least somewhat more difficult for Longstreet to flank his position.

Slightly pivoting to the left only left Sickles' flanks more exposed, if anything. Carr's right was wide open. The left of Ward wasn't much better. You seem to be fine with the fact that the move forward left Sickles' flanks wide open with a salient in the center no less. An extremely weak posistion. The losses incurred by the Confederates does not necessarily add to the value of the ground. Sickles' move forward virtually ensured that his corps would be smashed. Sickles did not move forward to sacrifice his corps to save the army (as much as he would have liked later generations to think so.) He saw ground he thought was stronger. It wasn't. His corps was isolated and smashed (not just temporarily...he did such a good job wrecking it it was one of the corps folded into the I and V Corps). Is that a wise action? I vote no.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck, NB and Matt:

Matt and NB, in my post #192 I addressed a remark concerning the lay of the land in question to "Matt and Tom." That should have been "NB and Tom." I have since corrected it and I apologize for the error.

Chuck, thank you very much for the quotations from Coddington. I have just had time to rapidly read over them, and my first impression is that at least Coddington seems more thoughtful and reasonable regarding this issue than other writers I have read. I look forward to reading them over tonight, and I hope to respond tomorrow to them as well as to NB's first post today, and his subsequent one as well as to Ole.

Thanks again.

Don

P.S. Altough one would not seem to realize it by reading here, I am not the only one today to agree with Sickles's advance as a wise military tactic. There is a minority (I suppose) school of thought referred to as "The breakwater" school," which I agree with, but I go further in Sickles's defense. Apaprently, either no one else who agrees with Sickles reads here, or else prefers to remain silent for whatever reason. It sure would be nice, though, to hear from even one of them!

[samgrant]

Here's another perspective:

Lee committed 11 Brigades to this attack. That's less than a third. Overall, losses ran to 5400 out of 17,000 infantry - bloody but not devastating.


Meade sent 24 Brigades to the fight, out of 50 with the army. His losses ran to 8900, out of about 29000 infantry committed. Overall, these numbers are still about a third, but if you discount the 3-4 brigades of 2nd and 6th corps who lost only about 100 men each, you get losses among the heavily engaged brigades of closer to 35-40 %.

No CSA brigade lost 40 of it's strength. 6 Union brigades did.

The only thing I can make out of this is that it would not have taken Meade almost half his army to stabilize the situation unless Sickles committed forward. This was a great opportunity for the South that almost shatter the Union army, not a lighting rod to uselessly divert the power of Longstreet into some safe channel. Meade lost the use of all of III Corps, and goodly portions of II and V corps as well.

It was fortunate that the reserves Meade had avaliable to bail out Sickles were not needed elsewhere at the time. If there were serious threats on the Union right at that time, those reserves would not have been able to support a threat at their right as they were busy trying to save Sickles' butt.

[tomh]

Don,

<NB and Tom, you especially seemed concentrated on the look of the lay of the land, and seem uninterested in anything else beyond this point.>

I believe that you have misinterpreted my statement. I posted the photos of the terrain to support my contention that Sickles chosen position was in fact weaker than his assigned position. In my opinion, Sickles made a decision that he was not qualified to make, in direct opposition to an order received, resulting in the loss of his corps and those that were forced to fight forward of the planned line on Cemetery ridge.

Regarding the move to the left, Longstreet's initial planned approach route (Slyder Farm) was still south of Sickles second position and I do not believe that the move had any consequence on where Longstreet's two divisions crossed to the east.

Again, just a humble opinion.
TomH

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

{all latter day "warriors of the quill" as Longstreet sardonically termed
then,}

"As were both Longstreet and Sickles."

--Longstreet was grievously wounded in the Wilderness. Sickles, of course, used to visit his leg in a museum for many years, often to impress the ladies, or so it is said.
__________________________________________________ _____________

"Anyhow:As to the relative sizes of the 2nd and 3rd Corps, which are not actually as Sickles understood;..........................Corps Strengths July 2, 1863.

"........."Gettysburg Campaign", Coddington pg 725.note #132
"Though the Second Corps was usually judged to be larger than the
Third by as few as 145, or by as many as 1,071 officers and men,
there is rather impressive evidence that on July 2 the opposite was
true: that the Third Corps was stronger than the Second."

--Then you quote the same source thus:

".........This note covers material on page 355 of Coddington;

..." Actually the assignment Meade gave it was a difficult but not an impossible one. To cover the ravine separating the Round Tops Sickles would have had to stretch his men out for a mile and a quarter, whereas the slightly larger Second Corps (see note 132) had a front of only about a mile in length..." [Emphasis mine.]

--Now, even though I've never read him, I am aware that many consider Coddington's Gettysburg Campaign to be sort of an unofficial Bible for historians and buffs alike. Therefore, I am relunctant to just assume that Coddington would so carelessly and blatantly contradict himself, and within the same book. Therefore, perhaps you can explain the apparent contradiction. Perhaps you are lifting passages out-of-context, and the disjointed nature of the quotes makes it seem as if the author is contradicting himself?

--Whatever. Let's compromise and split the difference and--if only for the sake of argument--let's assume that the two corps in question were similar in size that fateful day. Coddington then acknowledges that the line Sickles was presumably supposed to hold had been a quarter-mile longer than Hancock's, and with the same amount of men--and with, unlike Hanconck, one of his flanks open.

--Most saliently, at least in the passages you cite, nowhere that I can see does Coddington take any note of the topography of the situation, and writes as if the question were merely a matter of comparative distances. Hancock had a much stronger position on higher ground (as Pickett would later discover) than the position that Meade apparently expected Sickles to hold by himself. His part of Cemetery Ridge was hardly a "ridge" at all.

Here is a passage from General Sickles's rejoinder to Meade's letter to Col. Benedict:

"General Meade's statement, I repeat, is absurd, tactically and topographic ally, because it designates a line and positions for the. Third Corps which it could not have occupied by reason of the great extension of the line and the number of troops required to hold Round Top. The distance from Hancock's left to Round Top is stated by the Comte de Paris to be a mile and a quarter, that is to say, 2200 yards. The front of the Second Corps, Hancock's, which was stronger than mine, was only twelve hundred yards, so that my line, if taken according to General Meade's confidential letter, from Hancock's left to and including Round Top, and the necessary force to hold that natural fortress, would have been a mere skirmish line utterly incapable of resisting assaulting Columns. Moreover, the direct line from Hancock's left to Round Top was a line through swale, morass, swamp, boulders, and forest and tangled undergrowth, unfit for infantry, impracticable for artillery, and hopelessly dominated by the ridge in front, which I would have surrendered to Lee without a blow if I had attempted to execute the impossible order General Meade confidentially states to his correspondent that he gave me. Nay, more, if I had occupied the line General Meade represents in 1870 that he told me to take, I would have had no positions whatever for my artillery over one half of my line, and would have surrendered to Lee the positions for his artillery which he states in his official report it was the object of his movement to gain. In other words, the line indicated by General Meade in his confidential letter is one that would have abandoned to the enemy all the vantage-ground he sought and had to fight for all the afternoon. And this vantage-ground, by which I mean the Emmitsburg road ridge, the Devil's Den, the Emmitsburg road itself, and the intersecting roads leading to our left, once in possession of the enemy without loss, would have enabled him to deliver his assault upon me in the position indicated by General Meade, three hours before it was delivered, and with advantage of position and force that would have given Lee the victory."

--In light of the fact that not only Meade, but apparently Coddington, years after the fact, of course, expected Sickles to hold not just a line twenty-five percent longer line than that of Hancock's, but also apparently a vastly inferior one that left him no proper placement along much of that same line for his artillery, it was "nice" of Coddington to have at least conceded that Sickles was handed a "difficult but not impossible task."

--More presently.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

".....................comment on length of Sickle's line:

"..................................Coddington page 725 note # 131

"Sickles said that Little Round top, "the key of our position on the left flank," was unoccupied, as he was unable to extend his line "further than the base of the hill, and, of course was wholly unable to defend it." Sickles to H.P. Smith, Aug. 11, 1911, D.E.Sickles Press Letter Book, DU. In this letter he was claiming that his corps could not cover a section of Meade's main line of a little less than a mile in length." [Emphasis mine.]


--Less than a mile in length? As I responded to in my last post, you just quoted Coddington acknowledging that the line Sickles was presumably to hold was a mile and a quarter. You have an explanation for another apparent and blatant contradiction?

"In earlier accounts he asserted or implied that by advancing his men on the other line which everyone recognized was longer, he could and did find by some sleigh of hand enough men to occupy Little Round Top. In other words, Sickles changed his story to justify his conduct and also revealed faulty logic. CCW, Report, 1, 298: OR, XXVII, pt 1, pp. 130-131 [The "Battle of Gettysburg" by "Historicus" in the New York Herald, Mar.12, 1864]."

--When exactly did Sickles ever maintain that he had occupied LRT?

--Here is another quote from Sickles's aforementioned rejoinder to the Meade/Benedict letter:

"General Meade proceeds: "Now, his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that key-point unoccupied, which ought to have been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps." To this I answer: First, that I was in the right place to defend Round Top when I put myself in front of it, and I staid there until after 5 o'clock, giving General Meade time to bring up the Fifth Corps from the right, where he had kept it all day; second, that if I had not put my troops in position in front of Round Top, Longstreet would have occupied it at any time during the two hours that elapsed before the Fifth Corps was brought over from the right to occupy it; third, my line was a good one, but there were not troops enough at hand early in the day to hold that line, or any other line, against the forces employed by Lee in the attack." [Emphasis mine.]

"This note attends the material from page 355, 2nd para.

"........Still the position Sickles chose was a good one as long as there were enough soldiers to man it. But if the Third Corps was considered too weak to hold the line Meade drew for it, how did Sickles expect it to do better on one a quarter of a mile longer?" [Emphasis mine.]

"(My comment...Need to remember here, Sickles himself claimed the original line was too long to cover with troops available.)"

--Okay, in addition to Hunt, who agreed with Sickles that the (then) proposed advance line was strong but couldn't endorse it because he thought the Third Corps by itself lacked sufficient men to hold it, now we also have Coddington in agreement; not to mention Longstreet, with Hood and Law actually protesting hitting their portion of Sickles's advanced position; and Kershaw attesting to its strength on the other side which McClaws hit. Therefore, can we dismiss those who argue that Sickles's position per se was weak and easily broken, and all that one has to do is stand at Sickles's original position and look at his advanced line to ascertain such? After all, Coddington said it was strong!

--So now we come down to the argument that Sickles's advance was wrong because he lacked sufficient strength to have held it with his corprs alone. From the above quote from Sickles:

" third, my line was a good one, but there were not troops enough at hand early in the day to hold that line, or any other line, against the forces employed by Lee in the attack." [Emphasis mine.]

--Thus, the anti-Sickles case comes down to the strictly hpothethical argument that Sickles's corps by itself could have held its original line along Cemetery "Ridge" as well or better and longer than did his reality-tested advance line.

--More presently

Don