Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[johan_steele]

Don, no offence taken or intended. The actions of the AoP are not really my forte, I prefer to study the real decisive actions of the War out west w/ both AoT's & the AoC. My knowledge of Gettysburg is more concentrate to the Iron Brigade, 1st MN & other westerners.... so keep in mind these are only the thoughts of a man who has studied Gettysburg only peripherally.

If you look at a map of the Union Line the majority of Union troops were coming up the road that ran parrallel to and behind the Left side of the Union Line. Lee had made a very real attempt to bust open the Union right at Culps hill. Meade and Hancock must have known that he needed to protect his left flank and Sickles III Corps was the perfect unit for such a task. They were an experianced unit and had a good contingent of Arty; taking a less threatened sector (when they arived on the field) they would have some breathing room. W/ the Atry already at the Union Center able to provide significant support and w/ the natural terrain features it was an excellent defensive position. Any force advancing against III Corps would have to cross a very wide open space and be almost constantly exposed to effective Arty fire.

That said Meade didn't reprimeand or I even think fault Sickles for moving forward to the exposed position that he took because I believe he knew his orders could have been misunderstood. I don't believe Meade knew what kind of politicking Sickles did after the battle. As it is I can understand how Sickles might have misunderstood the orders given him and having stood there I can see how it looks like better higher ground and after what happened to Sickles at Chancelorsville where Arty was placed on high ground against him... I can understand his concern.

Keep in mind that Longstreet pretty much tore III Corps apart w/ his attack and a badly outnumbered and outgunned III Corps slowed him down dramatically. I look at that field and understanding the terrain advantages that would have ben held... plus the easier method of reinforcing threatened areas that the road would have provided. I do wonder if Longstreet wouldn't have been forced to slide further to the Union left and attack around the Round Tops... would the result have been any different? I don't know; regardless it was one hell of a brutal fight.

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Shane and Terry:

Shane, in your analysis of this situation on the left, you fail to mention the time element involved; i.e., what was happening while the Third Corps was battling Longstreet.

Can you fellows think of any other battle--in all history--as momentous as Gettysburg in which the commander of the victorious army gets such scant mention and praise as does Meade? Look, I'm from Philadelphia and my parochial instincts would naturally be to be very supportive of Meade. I do not lambaste the man. He took command in very embarrassed circumstances on the eve of this monumental and epic battle. However, his actions on July 2 exhibit a commander who didn't seem to have a clue; a commander wedded to fixed ideas, such as that the major threat was upon his right. It was not just Sickles, but also Hancock and Hunt who warned him about the precarious state of his left, which Meade seemed to brush aside, holding the Fifth Corps in reserve on his right. How long after Sickles became engaged was it that the Fifth reached LRT? Two hours or so?

The Comte de Paris cites Sickles as an example of a good soldier who instinctively recognized the threat at his front and desperately tried to warn his commander to no avail. In his rejoinder in The Century War Series (and not The American Century series that I mistakenly cited before), he cites the count as estimating that the line Meade claimed--in retrospect, in 1870 in a private letter to a certain Colonel Benedict--he had ordered Sickles to hold was 2200 yards. The front assigned to Hancock's Corps, which was larger than that of Sickles's, had been only 1200 yards! Sickles claims he was ordered to take the position previously held by Geary whose division had never been on LRT. Can anyone present any evidence that Meade ever ordered Sickles to extend his line to LRT? I think not. I repeat, there is no way the Third Corps could have effectively held such an extended line figuring into the equation the amount of troops that would have been needed to hold LRT.

Additionally, much of the line Sickles had been ordered to hold was topologically untenable to place artillery upon. In the same work I cited, General Hunt, who Meade at last dispatched to see what Sickles was pestering him about, takes, in my opinion, a rather craven, middling position regarding the Meade/Sickles controversy. He acknowledges that Sickles's new proposed line had merit, especially from the point of view of a possible later counterattack upon the Confederate right, but he didn't think there were as yet sufficient troops to hold it, and that Sickles's present line was more tenable from a strictly defensive standpoint.

However, Sickles states that no line the Third Corps could have taken by itself would have held indefinitely in light of what Longstreet had to throw against him. I agree. One of Meade's seemingly fixed ideas I had referenced previously was that he wanted to fight at Pipe Creek and that, as Sickles points out, probably accounts for Meade's seemingly inexplicable countermanding of Hancock's orders to Buford to guard the Union's left flank with his superb dragoons; a decision that the Comte de Paris refers to as "one of those blunders that happen in the course of a battle." When Meade finally did wake up to the threat upon his left, it was too late. Buford was gone and Merritt and any other unit--including the Fifth Corps--was too far away to render assistance in time, Thus, it was the heroic stand by Sickles and his corps that saved the Union line by buying precious time for it on the left. I do not believe that Sickles could have made a stand for as long as he did in his original position; and certainly could not have had he been forced to extend his line to LRT.

Of course, one might argue that Longstreet could have flanked Sickles instead of hitting him head on notwithstanding the protest of Law, backed-up by Hood. But for reasons we could argue later, Longstreet did not order such and actually forbade it. Thus, Sickles's action saved the day for the Union as the only possible remedy for his commander's oversights, and in my opinion he deserves that recognition and a monument on the field attesting to it!

Don

[william42]

Can you fellows think of any other battle--in all history--as momentous as Gettysburg in which the commander of the victorious army gets such scant mention and praise as does Meade?

Hi Don: No. If we're talking about Meade I agree with you. And I fault Sickles for taking away some of the credit that was due Meade. Some of us are reading, "These Honored Dead" by Thomas Desjardin,for a book discussion on the board that begins on March 1st, last I heard. The book goes into the Sickles/Meade controversy in some detail. Pick up a copy if you can and join us if you like.

If we're talking about Sickles I still think he disobeyed Meades order. I don't know anything about the comte de paris and his letter. As far as claims Sickles makes after the battle I have consider the source and hold them at the very least suspect. I think it's very possible that Meade overestimated Sickles' ablility to cover the assigned ground with the men he had available. Having said that, it would be up to Sickles to proceed to follow Meades orders regardless, disperse his men as ordered, then advise Meade as to his situation, with suggested recommendations.

Your post is well written. I don't like debating with long posts on the board because I think folks generally don't read them when they go over a certain length. I know I don't. Plus if I type one out then I've got to go back over it and proofread it, correct, punctuate differently, yada, and basically I'm a lazy slob and don't want to have to do that. So I'll just leave it at this.

It's good to have you on the board Don. You're well read on the subject it seems to me. Be prepared for all sorts of opinions on the board, some of which you will probably disagree. Folks here are just as passionate as yourself with their own viewpoints, both North and South. Sometimes in the heat of typing out ones thoughts one forgets to add words that would otherwise temper the heat some. Take care.

Terry

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Terry:

You write just fine, and you will be hard pressed to find any note I might leave longer than a sentence or two that has not been edited! I am one lousy typist! (And thank God (or possibly Bill Gates (er, if there's a difference, that is) for spell-check!)

As far as the tenor on this board, are you serious? Have you ever been to a political board? I note with some irony that thus far, at least, I have found this to be the most civil forum I've yet encountered not excluding--and especially--religions boards!

I fail to see why I--or any poster--should "take offense" simply because someone disagrees with me, him or her (The nerve!) If I write something factually inaccurate, I would hope someone would point this out to me with documentation. Truth has always been more important to me than "being right."

The Comte de Paris wrote a celebrated book on Gettysburg. Here is an URL for a review on Amazon:

http://shopping.yahoo.com/p:Battle%2...BHNsawNib29rcw--

Sickles claims it as the best written to that time. (Since it seems to support his case to some extent, that opinion is not surprising.)

If Sickle's account cannot be trusted because of his vested self-interest, I fail to see why Meade's version of events should be granted any more credibility simply as an assumption. Sickles points out many factual errors made in Meade's testimony before Congress regarding the placement of units, and several disputes he had had over factual issues with other officers of the AoP.

I hope to be able to before very long to take your advice and look for the book you referenced. Thank you for the tip. It is appreciated. My views are not wedded in stone. I am no relation to General Sickles. (My only Civil War veteran ancestor that I know of was in the Navy (like myself.))

Best regards,

Don

[johan_steele]

Don you raise a couple of good points. There primarily the time span involved. THe stickler for me is the position of the roads. Logistics make and break Armies, it doesn't matter how strong a position held if their is no ammo. His supply wagons couldn't easily get to where they were going to be needed... roads. If he had kept III Corps where Meade intended he would have had that excellent road at most places less than 300 yards behind his battle line and his own reserves as well as any other pushed in his direction could have been rapidly shifted from point to point making a superb fire brigade.

THe time span involved is something I need to look at again before I make any kind of credible comment. IIRC at least two different Corps came down that road and were actually fed into the battle.

Keep in mind a couple things, Longstreets men did not utilize any real roads on their march to the Union left but went cross country which further delayed them. If Sickles had stayed put that would have gained them at least another 2 hours before the hammer struck and there was no way Longstreet could have deployed his attack w/out being observed. Their approach was well chosen to mask their approach and confuse Meade and Longstreet did a superb job there. I think Meade expected Lee to take advantage of the road network and to try and turn his Right near Culps Hill or to try to rupture his center. Was he caught a bit flat footed by Longstreets attack? I think so. But I think he positioned III Corps where he did because he knew they were a capable bunch of troops; I believe he thought they could hold off any diversionary attack or hold on long enough for him to push reinforcements where they were needed if a major attack developed. Regardless it was a very close thing.

I agree that holding the line stretching as far as the Round Tops was not an option, I agree that he didn't have enough men; though I think that was never intended. I see Longstreet turning the Union left by getting behind the Roundtops not by seizing them... though at that point Longstreet might have found himself in a real pickle. But Meade would have been having a heart attack.

IMHO Meade was looking at possibly hitting Lee on his Left... who knows; one of those what ifs. He certainly had the troops to do it on the morning of July 2nd how succesful such an action would have been is another matter entirely.

[william42]

Don, thanks for your reply. I had assumed from the tone of your second post that you were offended. Could have been just my perception, because it is a matter to which I pay much attention - I mean ...I try not to use inflammatory punctuation or words in my posts. I unleashed a torrent of them in a post last May I think, directed towards a member with an opposing viewpoint. Thankfully the board owner deleted them probably soon after. There was no profanity involved, but it is an episode I regret. I left the board for 6 months, though I didn't want to, then when I got back on in October I publicly apologized to that member for my post. I'm probably too vigilant sometimes in reading posts, and what the punctuation, tone, etc. reflects. Plus I'm adjusting to new meds too.

As far as political or religious boards go, I have not been on any other board other than this one for any length of time. I might try a political board if I found one interesting. Religion? No way, no how. I'm not an atheist but I am rock-solidly anti-religion (all of them). That's as far as I'm going with that.

Thanks for the link to the book. Hope you can join our discussion in March, and thanks for your service in the Navy as well.

Terry

[nbforrest]

I would not necessarily endorse the theory that Sickles saved the Union line, but to some extent I have come to think it is somewhat valid. Had Longstreet punctured Sickles' line, there could have been some uncomfortable moments in the Union rear. However, I think any hole could have been plugged fairly easily. Sickles' exposed position also upset the en echelon attack, leading Hood's men astray and diverting Anderson to strike Humphreys. But again, I think any gap would have been shored up by the V Corps or worst case the VI Corps.

I do have some sympathy for Sickles' decision though because I see a direct correlation between Hazel Grove and his decision to move to the high ground. His move still ensured the destruction of his corps and was based on half-reasoned information, but I think Sickles foresaw another Hazel Grove.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

Comte De Paris? Vichyssois!

[milhistbuff1]

NB, et al, wouldnt it have been far more prudent to leave the higher ground of the peach orchard open to federal fire creating a killing zone. Digging in line with hancock frome weikerts hill south to the round tops and letting the csa charge straight up the line would have minimized union difficulties in reinforcement and communications, while mass confusion would reign in csa ranks as they got close to the entrenched, fully cohesive union line. 5th, 6th and 2nd corp, instead of being forced to aid a mauled and practically destroyed 3rd corp, could have extended the line south and flanked Hood's division. Or alternatively, have 5th corp dig in and extend the line to fully cover the round top area, and have 6th corp with support from 2nd attack the weakest point of any army, the border between two units. Driving a wedge between Anderson of 3rd Corp and McClaws in 1st corp would have disrupted the en echelon attack, and relieved pressure on the main union line.
Sickles was wrong, the height of the peach orchard was useless, it was the ability to use the woodline along cemetary hill-ridge stretching south the roundtops to entrench forcing the csa troops to approach under fire, without being able to suppress it without difficulty.
respectfully,
Matt

[blue_zouave]

Dan might have done a lot more that day, but he didn't have a leg to stand on.

<Ducks as scholarly books are thrown this direction>