Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt:

Thank you for posting the URL for Cabell's report. However, I'm not sure what your question or point is. Here is a line from this report:

"directly in front, about 600 or 700 yards distant, were a large number of batteries, occupying a peach orchard."

Obviously Sickles did have his artillery there and at the ready. Did you read my recent excerpt from Alexander's The Century War Series piece, written far earlier than his after the turn of the century memoirs? That, combined with the several quotes I made from high-ranking Confederate First Corps infantry commanders that day makes it perfectly clear that Sickles's line had been formidable and that the Confederate troops did suffer severely. Indeed, so severely that they did not have enough left to win the day and accomplish Lee's objectives.

This, at least, does not fall under the category of opinion, speculation or "what-ifs." Rather, this is historical fact. After all, the capital of the entire nation remains Washington, D.C..

Don

[nbforrest]

all,
I had some time free on Saturday so I went up to Gettysburg. I walked the entire length of Sickles' forward line, all the way from Carr's right to the 4th Maine's position. Then I walked along Sickles' original line.
I can say unequivocally, upon my examination of the ground, that Sickles' forward line was much weaker than his original position. Looking at how Carr was just floating in the open, how the Peach Orchard salient bulged out, and how de Trobriand and Ward's positions just meandered through Rose's Woods, I just could not accept the argument that Sickles' new position was stronger. Had Sickles stayed put, he would have been able to take advantage of McGilvery's position on his right and Munshower's Hill on his left. Artillery sweeps the approaches. The center of his line was on lower ground, but certainly less exposed than the center of Sickles' forward line.

Again, don, you are calling his forward line "formidable." How so? His forward position was untenable, as events proved. Just because Alexander was shot up doesn't make Sickles' new position strong, or even tenable. In fact, Alexander's losses probably derive from improper deployment of his batteries rather than any innate advantages of the Peach Orchard. I suggest you read a little book by R.L. Murray called Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard. It's a quick read and offers an interesting perspective on the Peach Orchard artillery duel.

I guess I haven't directly asked yet, so here it is:

Don, have you ever been to Gettysburg?
I really do think that you might question your theory if you took an honest appraisal of the ground.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Ole:

As I alluded to previously, I shall have to wait until some historian or other, with sufficient credentials and following, arrives at the same conclusion I have, without regard to what generations of historical revisionists have written, following one another like lemmings after having read the Meade letter to Benedict, before others say, "Well, of course! That was obvious from the beginning!" Such is the nature of academia.

By closing and clinching with the enemy, Sickles denied the enemy sufficient torque (i.e. "twist"), sufficient space, to bring to bear all they had upon the Union left in sufficient time to have prevailed. Even you acknowledge that Sickles's movement upset Lee's contemplated echelon attack, which was exactly the point of Sickles's advance.

Had Sickles held his original line, his flank would have been rapidly enveloped; his center decimated by Confederate artillery from the very ground that Meade and you would have gratuitously ceded to the enemy. There would not have been time to rush the Fifth Corps around to salvage the situation; and how could Hancock have possibly removed Caldwell's division--or one of his other two--out of his line, turn them about, and rush to the Sickles's left? Simple, he never could have. Instead, he was able to order Caldwell forward to close the more tenable gap to Sickles's right. Not only could he have, he did in fact and the Union prevailed.

Of course, none of this would have been necessary had Meade been more attentive to his left, even after repeated warnings from Sickles and others.

If the course of action that you and others here would have recommended been followed by Sickles, then today august historians as well as yourselves would have blamed that buffoon of a hack political general for the resulting disaster, a much easier target than the West Point professional in command of the field.

Meade's initial ineptitude placed General Dan Sickles in the unenviable proverbial "****ed if he had, ****ed if he hadn't" position. At least Sickles went to his grave--an incredibly long while afterwards!--with the Congressional Medal of Honor he so richly deserved for his cool, decisive leadership that day, and his fearless sacrifice; and knowing that ****ed as he might unjustly have been by revisionist historian snobs closing ranks with the professional Meade, that he at least died in the same unified nation he so valorously helped preserve.

Dan Sickles, a man with absolutely no military experience, proved himself one of those amateur soldier-commanders, like Cromwell before him, with great natural instincts for the art who time and again showed-up his professional superiors. Had Sickles been listened to at Chanellorsville by Hooker concerning Jackson's famed flanking march, then quite possibly this entire discussion would now be moot.

Not only did General Oliver O. Howard have no reason to be prejudiced in Sickles's favor, he had, on the contrary, every reason to loathe the man! Not only was Sickles the polar opposite of this Sunday-school advocating, puritanical general officer, but Howard had been aggrieved by Hooker having given Sickles command of the Third Corps over him, despite Howard's commission antedating Sickles's. Howard had it right, and he had no reason to lie for Sickles; and a man less likely to lie than Howard--for any reason--could not be found. Sickles's stand that day was heroic and he saved the AoP and our nation.

You fellows go against not just Howard, but Longstreet--the field commander of the attack in question that day--and his Confederate critics who maintained that the South would have prevailed if only Longstreet would have hit Sickles's original line. You go against mathematics and physics (i.e., the logistics and time situation) of the matter in order to follow a bunch of lemming-like writers and historians, one following the next uncritically.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear John:

Welcome to the thread.

The point here is not "The Meade/Sickles controversy." The point in question is not whether or not Dan Sickles had been a modest man, or a superlative and exemplary human being; or a "loose cannon," with a penchant for idiotic remarks. The answer to all these questions are "no-brainers," and only distract from the point in question. I.E., whether or not Sickles's advance had been justified by the facts or not, and whether or not it had been in fact a wise move.

On the contrary, if Meade would have lived long enough; or had made his letter to Colonel Benedict public in time for Sickles's rejoinder to have been published, then Meade would have had to answer all of Sickles's compelling points or remain silent and let the entire nation hear his silence.

It is the facts of the military situation at hand that day in which we--and anyone sincerely interested in historical accuracy--are concerned with.

Sickles's rejoinder to the Meade/Benedict letter can be found in my reply #90, page nine. The Meade letter to Colonel Benedict, which Sickles was replying to, can be found referenced on my reply #91, page 10.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Chuck:

What is you interest in what books I have read on the subject beyond those I have quoted here to support my arguments? I have read others and I do not choose to quote from them as either being of no relevance, or unnecessary as I prefer to--whenever possible--form my conclusions and base my arguments on source documents, the writings of those involved on both sides that fateful day as well as official reports and maps.

For many years I had just assumed that General Sickles had been just another buffoon of a political hack general that both sides had been afflicted with in the course of the Civil War. This extremely prejudicial opinion of mine had been entirely based at the time on just a single book I had read on the subject as a kid. It was only when--years later--I had read Longstreet's memoirs--simply because my brother had given it to me one Christmas--did the proverbial light bulb go off within my mind that caused me to investigate the matter further.

As I am just as capable of researching source documents as, for example, Coddington, why should I--or anyone--rely solely on facts filtered through the viewpoint of another who had been born years after the facts in question?

I don't base my conclusions solely on Longstreet, but also Hood, Law, Kershaw and many others. With each and every source I quote--no matter how intimately and vitally involved the source was with matters that day--the anti-Sickles camp only resorts to casting aspersions upon each and every source so quoted in an attempt to discredit anyone--even those with absolutely no motive to support Sickles--whose views might support Sickles's orders that day. But how can the totality of it--their common agreement--simply be ignored?

On a final note, I find myself horrified to acknowledge that not only have I never read General Howard's memoirs, I had never even known he had written any. I thank Sam--of all people--for bringing this to my attention, even if he had not meant to support Sickles by so doing. I intend to remedy this oversight on my part as soon as possible.

Don

[milhistbuff1]

Don,

To answer your question about Col. Cabell's report, my point was that Sickles would have suffered less extreme losses in arty and infantry if he retained his original position. Getting forming the V shape around the orchard was begging for enfilade fire to destroy his corp.

Respectfully,
Matt

[ole]

...which was exactly the point of Sickles's advance.

And Sickles said that when? Where?

Don, my hat is off to you. Not only have you displayed tenacity, but you have managed to not sound idiotic while promoting Sickles as a hero. Few could pull that off.

Ole

[mobile_96]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

Dear Chuck:

No. it won't be necessary, but I do thank you for your generous offer, and for posting the relevant part of Geary's report.

I shall take the good general's word for it that he had posted two regiments on LRT. I find this of no consequence, however, as the force had been entirely inadequate to have held LRT if Sickles had posted a similar miniscule force there on the 2nd. The fact remains that Sickles did not have the men--and the strength of ground--to have posted a sufficient force on LRT and to have extended his corps to the right without leaving a significant gap in the line with Hancock. Again, he could not have held a line 1,000 yards longer than that of Hancock's with less men and a far inferior position than Hancock's.Thanks again.Don

You find it of no consequence but whether it was enough troops to hold LRT is not the issue.
The issue was whether Geary had posted troops on or 'up to" LRT.
...As for numbers of troops in the 2nd Corps and the 3rd, expect to have you some numbers tomorrow. And will cover more on the difference between the original line Sickle's was supposed to hold and the line he moved to. Would have done earlier except for the storms in the area yesterday. Kept my puter disconnected.
Chuck in IL.

[mobile_96]

(Don says:
As I alluded to previously, I shall have to wait until some historian or other, with sufficient credentials and following, arrives at the same conclusion I have, without regard to what generations of historical revisionists have written.)
What credentials are you requiring, and if a real historian with sufficient credentials to be called an historian Doesn't arrive at Your conculsion, does that make them only a revisionist?
Do you recognized "Any" historians of today? Or are all the history writers of today only revisionists and not worthy of recognition.
I really hate to tell you that all historians are revisionist. As new material comes to light that changes or enlarges our understanding of history, and that material is added to the story, then history has been revised. Another form of revision is a Author changing/twisting facts to fit His viewpoint, or 'forgetting' to add important facts so the story will again fit his viewpoint.
Do you consider all material written by the people 'there' as being fully reliable?
I hope not, as Sickles was quite apt at 'fudging the truth' when and where he wanted.
I'm only trying to understand your methodology since you use so few sources for your paper.
Chuck in IL

[nbforrest]

Had Sickles held his original line, his flank would have been rapidly enveloped;

raw speculation

his center decimated by Confederate artillery

Sickles' center in his forward line was decimated by Confederate artillery...fair tradeoff even assuming Confederate artillery 1)had clear fields of fire to Sickles' original line and 2) was not shot apart by Union artillery from Munshower's Hill and McGilvery's future position.

There would not have been time to rush the Fifth Corps around to salvage the situation;

then the V Corps would have just becomed engaged further to the east. No big deal.

and how could Hancock have possibly removed Caldwell's division--or one of his other two--out of his line, turn them about, and rush to the Sickles's left?

Same way he did in the actual event. He could have plowed straight into Anderson's left, assuming Sickles' line collapsed.

Go walk the ground, if possible!

Respectfully