Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[nbforrest]

This book has been on my reading list a while and this discussion made me think of it: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/157...Fencoding=UTF8

Anybody read it?

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB and Sam:

You go with the facts? The fact is that the Union won the battle! If you and others here can assume that the Union would have prevailed anyway had Sickles stayed in his miserable original line where Meade had wanted him (presumably), and that the Union would have perhaps even had "won better," then I can assume that had that been the case the actual result would have been that--exactly as Longstreet wrote in his memoirs--Longstreet would have easily taken LRT and then rolled up the Union flank--unless Meade could have hastily organized an orderly retreat, a proposition in which I have grave doubts. In that event, no doubt the very same people here and elsewhere who lambaste the memory and judgment of this great amateur soldier--even though the Union prevailed--would now be blaming it all on this very same man!

Sickles reminds me a lot of another great military leader, Julius Caesar. Sickles had been very popular with his men. Like all true soldiers, the III Corps liked their commander's aggressive fighting spirit and his willingness to take chances in order to reap superior results. Like Julius, Sickles was fearless and no saint, which is what many admired about him. He was a natural leader of men and inspired the confidence of those who served with him--which might explain Humphrey's ex post facto criticism as Sam posted here; despite the fact that he had not protested at the proposed movement at the time. Sickles's other division commander, Birney, in his report makes it seem as if he might have suggested the movement himself. At the very least, Birney seemed to approve of it and his commander's willingness to take the bull by the horns while the army commander fiddled at HQ while his left threatened to burn away in the firestorm Sickles and Birney knew was almost upon them.

Sam quotes someone who said that Howard's praise of Sickles was merely a matter of "paying his debt" to Sickles. What debt was that? Do you know anything about the personal life of General Howard? Howard had been as far removed personally from Sickles as two men could possibly get. He was perhaps the most religious general officer in the Federal Army. He had been a New England Congregationalist, a latter day Puritan and strict "teetotaler". I can't imagine him lying at all, let alone for the likes of Sickles. He simply gave credit where he saw it was due.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

Oh, Chuck undoubtedly has. Please see his posts #83 and #84. Chuck posts a long excerpt written by this presumably "objective and unbiased" historian, in which he labels Sickles's associates as his "henchmen," and Federal general officers who agreed with Sickles in his assessment concerning Meade's performance at Gettysburg as "malcontents." Now there are the plain, unvarnished facts! This is why the true student of any subject will always try to locate as many source documents as he can so his view can--to the fullest extent possible--be formulated unfiltered from the viewpoints and "interpretations" of others.

Don

[nbforrest]

My argument that Sickles' move forward was a poor decision has nothing do with assumptions and hypotheses about Union victory. Something like a "what if" regarding LRT, yes those involve speculation. But not this case. The facts:1) Sickles' "formidable" position collapsed. 2)this left a huge gap in the Union line
Those alone should be enough to seriously question Sickles. Let alone the fact that Sickles' claims fall flat. You, don, even admit that Sickles' claim of his movement preventing Meade from retreating was false (read:a lie). Sickles' other claims similarly seem to fall flat. Which is why you don't like Sauers I suspect. I have read other books by Sauers and been impressed, so I fail to see any reason to suspect him of playing loose with the facts (like say, Sickles did).
Whenever true facts are brought up, your only crutch to fall upon seems to be the hypothetical "the line would have collapsed anyway" theory. And that does not convince anyone.

Respectfully

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by nbforrest

This book has been on my reading list a while and this discussion made me think of it: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/157...Fencoding=UTF8

Anybody read it?

Respectfully

I did order it on the 16th also Union Generals Speak...

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/080...lance&n=283155

While Mr. Schneider has not persuaded me that Sickles won the War, he has persuaded me to take more interest in the matter and thereby diminish my bank account through the purchase of these 2 books.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

Sickles reminds me a lot of another great military leader, Julius Caesar.


Sam quotes someone who said that Howard's praise of Sickles was merely a matter of "paying his debt" to Sickles. What debt was that? Do you know anything about the personal life of General Howard?
Don

Wonder if anybody else has ever made that comparison?

***

It was a quote, so I can't take credit for it. I don't know anything about Howard's personal life. I do know a little bit about the character and reputation of Mr. Sickles, both from contemporary and historical accounts.

Just to calm you a bit about the leg thing, I don't accept that 'irresponsible surgeon' stuff as fact, but just thought it was a somewhat humorous sidelight to the whole story, tho the the suggestion is not something uncharacteristic of the ways of Mr. Sickles.

sam

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by Donald Schneider

Dear NB:

Oh, Chuck undoubtedly has. Please see his posts #83 and #84. Chuck posts a long excerpt written by this presumably "objective and unbiased" historian, in which he labels Sickles's associates as his "henchmen," and Federal general officers who agreed with Sickles in his assessment concerning Meade's performance at Gettysburg as "malcontents." Now there are the plain, unvarnished facts! This is why the true student of any subject will always try to locate as many source documents as he can so his view can--to the fullest extent possible--be formulated unfiltered from the viewpoints and "interpretations" of others.

Don

On this, I find it imposssible to know by just what post you take NB to task.

On the whole, I can't help recalling the phrase from Shakespeare: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Matt:

I'm sorry, but I have been unable to find the map online you reference from General Birney's report. However, please try emailing this gentleman:

http://www.civilwarhome.com/webmaster.htm

It is his invaluable site in which General Birney's and so many others are contained. Read it over and then click below to email him. Please let me know if you get any results.

Why I wanted William and/or yourself to look over General Birney's report concerning Gettysburg was that I would be interested if you discerend--as I thought I had--thatGeneral Birney had not only been in total agreement concerning the corps advance, but might have even suggested it. Nowhere does he actually state eother, but from its tenor it sounds liek that might well have been the case. Please let me know on that score as well.

Thank you very much for your time. Matt. I've enjoyed William's and your input here immensely, along with that of all.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Dear Sam:

As I said in the post, replies #83 and #84 by Chuck (Mobile) and not by NB. I had just pointed this out to NB becuase he had posted an URL for a book by the same author (Sauers) that chuck had posted an article from in "Gettysburg Magazine."

The only interesting point I personally found in the Sauers article was as to whom exactly had Sickles's sharpshooters flushed out that led to confirmation that the Rebs were massing on the left for an attack. I shall have to research this. Though interesting, I fail to see what relevance it has. The Confederates were massing for an attack on the left, after all, even if these particualar troops had been from Hill's command and not Longstreet's.

Don

[Donald Schneider]

To all:

The discussion on this thread has seemed to pretty much run it course, unless someone has something new of a substantive nature to contribute. Thus, I would like to take this opportunity to summarize the position in favor of General Sickles's order to his corps to advance on the afternoon of July 2, 1863.

Sam recently quoted General Humphrey's testimony before Congress in 1864 indicating he then felt that the advance had been an error. When asked what would have, in his opinion, been the result if the Third Corps had held its original position, Humphrey's answered that that would have depended upon the enemy's course of action, of which he could not, of course, be certain. He then added that he assumes the enemy would have advanced across the field and attacked the Union left, with the result having been very much the same as what had happened in a (presumably) similar attack on July 3rd., i.e., "Pickett's Charge."

This, however, was pure nonsense on Humphrey's part, and distorted hindsight. Had he had any problem with the movement, he should have voiced his objection at the time to Sickles, and noted such in his official report. He had not. Secondly, and more importantly, to compare the situation at noon on July 2nd, to the time of Pickett's advance on the next day as analogous is absurd.

Firstly, we have the number of troops in the Union line to consider. On July 3rd, from Hancock left the Union had 40,000 in the line and in close reserve. At the time of Longstreet's attack upon the union left on July 2nd, counting Hancock, the Federal force amounted to about half that number.

Secondly, the tragic attack by the South on July 3rd was centered upon Hancock's line, not Sickle's. Hancock had had much better placement for his artillery than Sickles's had had in his original line, which was one of the primary reasons Sickles's made the move. This is borne out both by General Hunt, the most highly respected artillery commander in U.S. Army history, as well as by one of Sickles's own artillery commanders at Gettysburg in his official report. There is no way that Sickles could have put up the virtually impenetrable defense to a frontal attack (at his original placement in the line), that Hancock was able to do on the 3rd. Also, let us not forget that distance involved would have been but half that of Pickett's Charge--assuming the rebs would have attacked frontally, which I doubt they would have for the reasons already stated per Longstreet. It simply would not have been necessary.

Thirdly, there is the matter of the strength of Sickle's Corps (about 10,000) and the topography. Over the weekend, I measured with a ruler the Union position on a map; measuring the line held by Hancock. Taking this same area and extending it from Hancock's left, it wouldn't have reached anywhere near LRT, and bear in mind that Hancock's corps was somewhat larger than Sickles's. Therefore, had Sickles maintained a line anchored to Hancock's left, then--just as Longstreet suggested in his memoirs that I quoted--his men would have simply walked onto LRT--thus dooming the Federal position, one way or the other. (I.e., forcing an orderly retreat or with a rout resulting.)

For those who counter that the vitally important strategic position commanded by LRT is a "myth," you are engaging in a pure exercise of historical revisionism. The Confederates couldn't have gotten sufficient artillery up the hill; and would not have had ample placement upon it for cannon due to its heavily wooded terrain? Are you suggesting that Romans could have accomplished their almost unbelievable engineering feat at Masada, but the Confederates couldn't have managed such a relatively simple task 1900 years later? You know, even in 1863, mankind did have a tool known as an "axe," and trees were often cut down!

Poppycock! The most one can argue is that the Confederates would have had to have spent much of the night positioning artillery, which would have given Meade time to organize a retreat from the field into an uncertain history, and away from the certain one we know today.

For Sickles to have occupied LRT, would have meant leaving a huge gap in Hancock's line, the result of which would have been Longstreet rolling up the Union flank before Sickles could have managed to plant sufficient artillery to aid the Union line.

Therefore, Sickles chose the only tenable course of action. He was the left of the Union line, no matter where he placed his troops. Thus, one of his flanks would have been "in the air," regardless where. He chose to leave a gap with his right flank as the lesser of two evils. There is some controversy about exactly how long Sickles's advanced line ultimately held. However, there is no doubt of this: It held long enough! It held long enough for Meade to finally rush the reinforcements to his left--the Fifth Corps--that he should have had in position after receiving repeated warnings concerning the precarious state of his left that day.

I quoted from high-ranking Confederate infantry commanders in the thick of the action that day and pointed out that none of them seemed to consider Sickle's advance that day--either at the time or writing afterwards--to have been any sort of a "blunder." On the contrary, they write as if Sickles's movement in reaction to their threatening his front had been not only necessary defensively, but actually obvious; and had Sickles not made this move, then they would have easily prevailed. All the opposing point of view can come up with the sole, dissenting voice of Colonel Porter Alexander, writing years later and lacking command experience in infantry. Who better and with more certainty could have assessed whether Sickles's movement had been a "blunder," than those who had to confront it?

From the Union side, we have a lot ex-post-facto criticism from Meade loyalists defending him against the--admittedly, by me at least--the post-event aspersions cast upon Meade by--if not by Sickles per se--then by those friendly towards Sickles. Indeed, it seems to me that General Sickles, throughout his remarkable and checkered life and career, had a penchant for acting at times as his own worst enemy. The facts are clearly on his side, and he should have been satisfied with recounting them without casting aspersions upon the conduct of other officers, and attempting to second guess his commander's state of mind and intentions that fateful day. That course of action unfortunately cast doubt on anything Sickles could have said, and distracted attention away from the matter at hand; i.e., the propriety of the advance by the Union III Corps that day judged from a strictly military and analytic perspective.

Dan Sickles, no matter what else he had or had not been--had been a surprising good "citizen soldier," who, without any prior military experience, intuitively grasped all that was necessary to become a first-rate commander of infantry. Far from being the "buffoon" that so many historical revisionists following one another like lemmings seek to portray him as, Dan Sickles had been an extremely intelligent and astute man. This quality, accompanied by his native physical fearlessness, made him one of the best and most popular (among his rank-and file troops, that is) corps commanders in the AoP. Just as the Comte de Paris alluded to in his history of the battle, Sickles intuitively perceived the threat upon him--and the entire AoP as a result--and simply did what had to be done, and at great personal risk to his men and to himself. He paid dearly for this courage and attention to duty at a chaotic moment of destiny, and the man deserves the credit that has been so wrongfully denied him by historians engaging in shoddy scholarship.

General Daniel Sickles saved the United States of America on July 2, 1863!

Don Schneider