Dan Sickles, Union Savior?

[nbforrest]

A handful of quotes from Confederates seeking to make their deeds look more daring and from Sickles does not constitute an open and shut case. Sickles' forward position was simply not strong. The very fact that his position collapsed relatively easily proves that.
I query again: have you ever been to Gettysburg? It's pretty hard to stand on Sickles' forward line and say that he had chosen a good position.

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:

You--and others--continue to ignore one of General Sickles's major points; indeed, perhaps his most telling point. With little more than one-quarter the troop strength that the Union had on the left at the close of July 2nd, Sickles could not have indefinitely held any line. Thus, he moved to the one he felt more defensible; the one he felt would buy more time for Meade to finally bring forth the reinforcements from the right that he properly should have had on the left when Sickles made his advance.

When one views matters from the perspective of the enemy forces that had to engage Sickles's advanced line, it seems clear that they agreed with Sickles as to which line had been more formidable. The valiant III Corps did hold long enough for the reinforcements to finally arrive, and General Carr, one of Humphrey's brigade commanders, noted in his official report that he could have held his advance position all day had he not been improperly ordered to fall back by Birney after Sickles's wound.

Perhaps the problem with the way some view the situation is that instead of standing upon Cemetery Ridge looking towards the peach orchid, they should stand visa versa and see how the Confederates would have viewed the situation against the weak line they would have encountered at the start of Longstreet's advance. Confederate artillery upon this high ground would have decimated Sickles's corps on Cemetery "Ridge", while the defenders would have had precious little to answer with due to the poor placement opportunities their original line had had for their cannon.

Don

[nbforrest]

Who's to say that Sickles' original line would have collapsed? No one.
Your comment about the Confederate artillery is interesting because it defies the very topography of the battlefield. From what position could the Confederate artillery have struck Sickles' originial position. It really couldn't in any meaningful manner, as demonstrated by the reinforcements who had no trouble with Confederate artillery. Now, Sickles' forward line most certainly was exposed to Confederate artillery fire (although Alexander's deployment was not very good, but that is another story).
Even assuming that Sickles' original line collapsed, no one can say that it would have ruined the Union line, far from it.
A couple quotes from Confederates referencing a "formidable" line does not change the topography of the land. That is inarguable. Now that you say that Sickles could not hold any line, you are sort of contradicting your original argument that Sickles' new position was advantageous and "formidable." Go up to the Peach Orchard at Gettysburg and walk along the rest of Sickles' line. I can alone shake my head when I ponder why Sickles thought he was moving to a good position. Your theory is based solely on the hypothetical conclusion that Sickles' original line would have collapsed, an unprovable assertion. What can be proven is that Sickles' new position was weak. The terrain doesn't lie!

Respectfully

[Donald Schneider]

Dear NB:


"The terrain doesn't lie!"

Yes, but perhaps it changes over time. Perhaps ridges once stood to protect Sickles's position, as General Hunt indicates in his article in the Century War Series, that have since been eroded with time over the last 150 years, or approaching.

I cannot explain why you, this Steve and any others would survey the same scene that General Sickles had, General Hunt had, and I assume Generals Birney and Humphreys had (whom at the very least had not protested Sickles's order as absurd beforehand (nor afterwards to my knowledge); nor why every high-ranking Confederate officer whose account I have read who had been in the thick of what General Longstreet referred to as "the finest three hours of fighting on Earth," had as well, and come to an apparently diametrically opposite conclusion than had they other than the reason I speculated upon above.

Can you? If you dismiss the idea that the topography might have changed radically in the interim time, then perhaps you just might entertain the thought that you--and those who agree with you today--might have lacked the military accmen of these highly seasoned general officers. Otherwise, you are suggesting that they all lacked yours!

Don

[Donald Schneider]

Matt:

I'm sorry, I'm still working on it.

Thanks

Don

[ole]

Originally Posted by milhistbuff1

Ole,
I dont know that we can consider Longstreet 'inept'. He was many other things but i don't see incompetence on that list. If anything, it was Lee's failure to see the ground over which Longstreet would attack over with his own eyes that helped condemn the en echelon attack to failure. Lee's extensive experience as an engineer would have given him a different perspective of the ground, had he not been up at hq, miles away.

See Krick's essay in Gallagher's Gettysburg: The Second Day. Very critical of Longstreet on that day specifically, and Longstreet in general.

Perhaps overdone, it is still an interesting commentary on the man and his actions before and during that engagement.

Respectfully,
Ole

[milhistbuff1]

Ole,
Did that essay come out after Krick's book Smoothbore Volley that doomed the Confederacy,or is the Longstreet material included in there, the same essay you are referring to?
Respectfully
Matt

[milhistbuff1]

Don,
No apology necessary, was just concerned didn't know if you were checking it out or just hadn't gotten around to it yet. By the way, civilwarhome.com has an interesting section on the Meade/Sickles controversy, called historicus, here's the link to the pertinent portion
http://www.civilwarhome.com/historicus.htm
Respectfully,
Matt

[ole]

Matt:
Gettysburg; The Second Day was published in '93. Before or after Krick's book? Don't have that book so can't answer the question. One thing is clear: Krick did not hold Longstreet in high regard.

Ole

[milhistbuff1]

that was ten years prior to the book i referred to, Smoothbore came out in 2002. I just wonder, how much of Krick's distaste for Longstreet was due to his later petulence, as a result of the Fort Sanders fiasco out west.
Matt