Ashley,
I hadn't heard any contentions that
CS Troops refused to make the assault, but there is a recently developed view that some troops stopped advancing once they reached the post and rail fences at the Emmitsburg Road. The Battlefield Detectives crew tried to support that theory in the episode that you mentioned.
I have walked that field several times, and until you walk in their steps, you really cannot get a feel for what they were confronted with. Once leaving the relative shelter of the woods on Seminary Ridge, the troops crossed a series of low ridges and the swales between the ridges. They would quickly cross the ridge and then redress lines in the swale, where they were protected from the view of the Federal troops behind the wall. This worked for a couple of ridges until they got close to the road. At that point the guns on LRT had enfilading fire along the length of the next swale. During a real time walk with a Ranger, this was pointed out in dramatic fashion, we got into the swale and everyone took a breath, used to being out of view in the low ground. The guide then pointed out Federal artillery, sitting on the northern end of LRT, and looking at the small black holes marking the bores of these Parrot rifles certainly drove it home.
Up until the time that they reached the road, all the fences that they encountered were "worm" fences, cedar rails with no ground anchored posts. These fences were intended to control livestock grazing and were built to allow easy movement to another section of the field. When the
CS troops reached these fences they were able to knock them down, preserving their lines and most of their forward momentum. At the road the fences were not only sturdy post and rail fences, but the rails were nailed in place, making them nearly impossible to knock down. The troops had to climb over these fences, redress lines, climb the fence on the other side of the road and redress again, all under the galling fire from both the infantry in front and the artillery both in front and on either flank. It isn't hard to accept that some of these troops may have simply decided that enough was enough and lay down in position, but I really don't believe that the numbers presented on BField Detectives were accurate.
Also, during the filming of that episode the firing demonstrations were done under nearly ideal conditions. No smoke, no confusion and, most of all, no-one firing back. I really believe that the results were inflated expectations on the hit ratio and effectiveness of the weapons involved.
While the series has presented some great attempts at solving unknown aspects of some of the battles, the bottom line is that they have to meet the production company's entertainment requirement and sometimes historical relevence takes a back seat. I was involved in the Antietam/Sharpsburg episode and even though the archaeology crew spent five long days in and around the Piper Orchard, our efforts ended up as the shortest segment of the show. We were able to get a much clearer picture of both the actions of the 7th Maine during their ill fated charge south of the sunken road, and more precisely locate a NC regiment on the Piper Farm. The longer broadcast element was the husband and wife team demonstrating the fact that when you are at the bottom of a swale you cannot see over the top of the ridge. Duh!
I beieve that Lee's unsupported comment refers more to two things. One, the planned diversionary attack on Culp's Hill that was supposed to draw reserves from the Union Center was completely nullified. Hours before the assault was supposed to start, the Federal Troops staged a charge of their own, recapturing the works, pushing the
CS troops back down the lower hill and totally disrupting the formations for the assaulting troops. There was no need to shift Federal troops north, leaving them at the wall to repel PPT's Assault. Second, there has been quite a bit of discussion lately concerning the presence of a reserve force made up of remnants of the 3rd Corps troops involved on Day 1. Documentation is confusing, but if this was in fact a "second wave" planned for the assault, then their inactivity could have elicited that opinion from Marse Robert.
Sorry about the long rant, but you touched on one of my favorite discussion topics and places on the field.
Last comment: I brought a friend to the field a couple of days after he returned from action in Afghanistan. He is a highly trained Special Forces operative who has been in his share of hot places. After going over the particulars in PPT's Assault I asked him how he would have handled the situation. His response ... "I would have shot my officer".
Just a humble opinion,
TomH