Lee's Order Morning of July 2: I Don't Get It

[elektratig]

I may be dense, but I’m reading Harry Pfanz’s “Gettysburg: The Second Day”, and I just don’t get it.

On the morning of 7/2, General Lee instructed Lafayette McLaws “to place your division across this [Emmitsburg] road”, pointing to a line perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road (and therefore basically parallel to the Wheatfield Road?), south of the Peach Orchard. Presumably, Lee intended the “attack” to take place basically straight up the Emmitsburg Road, across the Peach Orchard, then across Wheatfield Road.

What I don’t understand is this: didn’t Lee believe (based on the report of Captain Johnston) that this area was not occupied by Union troops? If so, what was McLaws “attacking” except a vacant area? Moreover, I don’t understand how occupying this area would put McLaws on the (perceived) Union flank. Wasn’t the area East of the Emmitburg Road and North of the Wheatfield Road in front of, rather than on the flank of, the perceived Union line (presumably extending North-South down Cemetery Ridge toward the point where Cemetery Ridge crosses Wheatfield Road?

Pfanz states:

“[General Lee’s] immediate objective was to gain the high ground between Seminary and Cemetery ridges, that along the Emmitsburg Road described above and occupied in force a little later in day by General Sickles’ Third Corps. Hood’s and McLaws’s divisions were to envelop the enemy left and drive it in . . ..”

In the next paragraph, Pfanz states that Lee “wanted McLaws to attack the Peach Orchard . . ..”

Without being unduly repetitive, this doesn’t help me. Was McLaws supposed to “occupy” the Peach Orchard or “attack” it? How do you “attack” a piece of unoccupied ground? And, again, looking at the maps, it looks to me like this would leave McLaws along or just north of Wheatfield Road, between Emmitsburg Road on the West and Plum Run to the East – in front of, rather than astride Cemetery Ridge.

I hope I’ve explained my confusion adequately. If Lee’s order was meant to be preliminary to attack, simply to occupy the “high ground” and to get McLaws into position, then it leaves him perhaps SW of the perceived Union line (depending on how far south Lee thought the line extended), but not astride it. Why not move him further East so that he would be squarely perpendicular to the perceived Union line? If on the other hand the order was to “attack” the Peach Orchard area, then I am confused because Lee was not expecting anyone to be there.

I’m probably missing something because I’ve never been to Gettysburg. I will, this summer. But until then, can someone help? Thanks.

[tomh]

elektratig,

I believe that the confusion is in the statement - General Lee instructed Lafayette McLaws “to place your division across this [Emmitsburg] road”. Both Hood and McLaws were to cross the Emmitsburg Road, wheel left and strike the southern end of the Federal line believed to stretch from the saddle to the north of LRT up to the Cemetery. Hood, on the right was to strike the end of the line after crossing over the base of BRT and would assault from south to north. McLaws, on the left was to cross the road and wheel to the north starting on the Rose Farm, and parallel Hood's assault. This gives McClaws two options, either to echelon right and support Hood's assault on the end of the line, or continue on his original path to strike the line further north of Hood (in the area of the Sedgewick Monument). The attack was to be en echelon with units engaging from south to north. "Across the Emmitsburg Road" did not mean that McLaws was to straddle the road and attack north, but to get his entire division across the road before turning north, and I believe the original attack plan called for McLaws to attack in a northeasterly direction into the Federal left and not straight up the road in front of the Federal line.
As the units crossed into the Rose Farm and points south everything came apart. Units from Mclaws division ended up moving too far to the right (south) and ended up intermingled with Hood's troops on the assault on Houck's Ridge and half of Kershaw's Brigade turned north at the Rose Farm to assault the line on Wheatfield Road (the tragic Bugle Call incident). To paraphrase an old military adage "No plan of battle survives first contact with the enemy".
I believe the references to the high ground at the Emmitsburg Road was intended as an artillery platform to support the assault and was to be occupied once McLaws division had passed by and was to the east of the position and assaulting the Federal line.

Just a humble opinion,
TomH

[william42]

Hey elektratig, would you let us know what you think of that book after you've finished it? I've seen it at all the bookstores, but never have bought it. I don't think I've seen a review on it either. Would be curious to know what you think. Thank you.

Terry

[elektratig]

tomh,

Thanks so much. You're right, part (most?) of my confusion lay in the fact that I understood "across" to mean "straddling." You are saying, if I understand you correctly, that the plan was for the Confederate line to wheel into position so that it would be more or less parallel to and facing Wheatfield Road, with the line extending from Emmitsburg Road on the left (west), across the Rose farm, across Plum Run, to the north side (or perhaps northwest corner) of Little Round Top on the right. That would put the right side of the line more or less due south of the assumed Union position. Then the line would attack more or less due north (the right side, furthest east) and/or northeast (the left side, further to the west).

Now I've got another question, if you don't mind. In that case, clearly Hood (on the right) had a lot more ground to cover than McLaws (on the left) to get into position. Wouldn't it have made more sense (as always, ignoring Sickles' actual position) to have had Hood's division lead the march rather than McLaws's?

william42,

I'm only about 130 pages in, but I'm enjoying the book tremendously. For all the book's detail, Pfanz is a fine writer, and I find that I'm not bogged down at all. I'm reading slowly, making notes and referring back and forth, but only because I'm trying to absorb and understand as much as I can. I think the book is widely regarded as authoritative (no doubt others can speak to that).

[tomh]

elektratig,

From what I understand McLaws would have crossed the Rose farm and into the area of the Stoney Hill (east of the farm). That would have sent his right-most troops over the Stoney Hill and through the Wheatfield towards the eastern slope of LRT and the saddle to the north of LRT. Because it was intended as an en-echelon attack the line would not be perpendicular to the Federal line, but instead the furthest south regiments of Hood's Division would have engaged first, followed by each regiment in turn from south (right) to north (left).

I will have to verify this but I believe that McLaws led the countermarch to the staging area located on what is now South Confederate Ave. Hood did step off first during the assault, engaging Federal Sharpshooters at the Slyder Farm, pushing them back to BRT and proceeding Northeast to attack on a line from the Triangular Field to BRT/LRT. Hood was engaged before McLaws stepped off and part of the confusion may be because Hood's first engaged unit was Law's Brigade, sometimes confused with McLaws' Division.

The timing of the assault is still a confusing issue today. Remember, Lee first ordered the action based on information provided by scouts that reconnoitered the area before Dan Sickles disobeyed orders and marched into history. Lee's order was based on the belief that the Federal line was at Cemetery Ridge and ended in the area of the saddle north of LRT. Kershaw's brigade (the far right of McLaw's Division) entered the Rose farm traveling almost due east. The three regiments on Kershaw's left (2nd, 8th and 3rd Battalion SC) wheeled left and started to assault the line on Wheatfield Road while the 3rd 7th and 15th SC regiments continued east to support Anderson's second assault on the Stoney Hill.

In one of the truly tragic events of the day the three regiments on the left began the assault (through some pretty swampy ground followed by a clear field of fire from the Federal guns located uphill on the Wheatfield Road) as the three regiments on the right ran into a post and rail fence on the Rose Farm. The right regiments were given the order "by the right flank move" in an attempt to get to a large gate in the fence rather than to try to scale the fence. The three regiments on the left heard the bugle call order, assumed it was intended for them, and, being veteran soldiers used to following orders regardless of how absurd they may sound, they formed a column of fours with rifles at shoulder and marched across the field parallel to the entire line of Federal guns. By the time they reached the high ground at the eastern edge of the field they were decimated and ended up fleeing into the woods at the edge of the field to regroup. Some historians believe that it was these troops emerging from the woods in the rear of Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades (Barnes Div) in the Wheatfield/Stoney Hill area that caused their retreat. T and S were engaged with Anderson's brigade and the right of Kershaw's brigade in their front and Benning's on their left and it is believed that the retreating remnants of Kershaw's left three regiments were mistaken as another brigade attacking Barnes from the rear.

BTW: I wholeheartedly agree about the Pfanz book, all three in fact. Definitely a must have in any Gettysburg library.

Just a humble opinion,
TomH

[ole]

TomH

Heartily agree. Pfanz's books are a must when studying Gettysburg. And Coddington, and Bachelder. If you have nothing else, at least have Pfanz.

Ole.

[tomh]

Ole,

The Pfanz books are considerably more readable than most, all the specifics of the action but presented in a way that seems to be easier to understand and more enjoyable than most. IMHO Coddington reads like a phone book <grin>. Wert's "Day Three" is also a very good read.

TomH