Meade's lost opportunity?

[gary]

After he was wounded on the 3rd day, Hancock sent a message to Meade to attack in the center before the Confederates could rally any measurable number of troops. If Meade did attack, could have smashed the center?

On one hand, the Union troops were victorious, but exhausted (and probably very low on ammunition). On the other, the Confederate artillery was pretty depleted (probably still had cannister shot).

Perhaps Meade could have shifted troops from his left flank? Thoughts please.

[johan_steele]

I hate second guessing history... but remember his 1st, 3rd, 11th & 12th Corps were exhausted... His own arty limbers & ammo chests were close to empty. The ANV was still a viable fighting force, how many Cannnon were sitting there w/ Canister? Attack Lee across a field you had jsut repulsed his own attack... I'd rather tackle a grizzly w/ a sore tooth.

Did he wait too long to pursue? Absolutely, but he also knew how worn down his own men were.

[hoosier]

It's possible that a counterattack by Meade could have succeeded. It's also possible that it could have resulted in turning a victory into a defeat.

Of the two, I tend to think the latter is more likely. I think Shane's points are very valid. A Union counterattack would have essentially repeated Lee's strategy - which had just proven to be a failure - in reverse. The results for the Union may even have been worse than what happened to the Confederates, considering that all the trees on Seminary Ridge probably afforded better cover than the low stone wall on Cemetery Ridge.

I think Meade was wise to quit while he was ahead.

[ewc]

Meade still had a fresh VI Corps and a relatively fresh cavalry available, as well as call ups from the VIII Corps and Couch's Dept of the Susquehanna in Harrisburg. But these last would have to be coordinated through Halleck's office and not in immediate plans. So a late afternoon Day 3 or early Day 4 attack by Sedgwick and the VI Corps- also the largest in the Army of the Potomac. I'm sure that's what President Lincoln and perhaps Chief Halleck in Washington wanted.

But as the responsible man on the scene, Meade faced a Lee led rebel Army still in place. He knew he had held him off and had seriously harmed him, but noone in that army (The Army of the Potomac) had ever not seen an Army of Northern Virginia able to leap out and rip one's head off at the least ill movement. And Lee was still there on those heights of his own- Seminary Ridge, ready, if called upon, to give battle.

Meade could have pushed Sedgwick forward the afternoon after Pickett's repulse, but did he not just see what happened to an assaulting army against his own heights? I too agree that the likelihood of success for Sedgwick is not great, minimal in fact. The possibility existed for a flank movement to the South, by Lee's right, and try to get between Lee and his route to the Potomac. But again, that was putting a portion of his army into harm's way when the commander was not sanguine on the probability of proper support from his used up army.

The hard fighting veteran I & III Corps were so shot up that they would pass out of existence within 8 months, the XI Corps was in no fighting condition, and the II & XII Corps had seen some serious fighting and were licking their wounds. Forget not that Meade had been in command less than a week- still pulling together his grasp of command, and now needing to heal and refit a battered and broken army. I think expecting an immediate counterattack under these conditions is asking the impossible of Meade.