J.E.B. Stuart

[hoosier]

The movie Gettysburg shows J.E.B. Stuart in an extremely bad light. Harrison the spy dismisses his actions as "riding around trying to get his name in the papers," while Lee wonders out loud how Stuart could "leave us blind."

There is a school of thought that says that Stuart was basically following good military procedure by taking a circuitous route back to the main body of the army. Hancock's corps had come between Stuart and Lee. Had Stuart tried to go directly back instead of circling around Hancock's men, he might have been cut off completely.

Also, Lee had other cavalry besides Stuart's at his disposal. One brigade of Confederate cavalry (Jenkins') was with Ewell's corps and saw action on the first day of the battle. Lee also had two other brigades of cavalry, Imboden's and Grumble Jones', which had been left behind in Maryland to guard the army's rear, but which could have been brought forward if Lee had felt it necessary to do so.

Was Stuart primarily responsible for the Confederate high command's lack of knowledge about what they were getting into, or should Lee (and maybe others) bear a share of the blame?

[gary]

Two schools of thought. Critics of Stuart say that he was trying to revive the glory from the other two rides around the Union Army. Defenders state that Lee's orders were loosely penned and permitted several interpretations.

BTW, where can I get a copy of Lee's orders? Is it bound in a single volume?

Gary,
You can likely find it in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. It is the most used source for the CW that I know of. Lee's orders would most likely be in volume 27.

http://moa.cit.cornell.edu/moa/brows...aphs/waro.html

You can get battle reports here. Granted they are after the fact.

http://www.swcivilwar.com/cw_article...ttle.html#Gett

If you don't have any luck let me know and I'll see if I can find it more definitively.

YMOS
tommy

Ok I just read Lee's order to Stuart in Vol 27, page 923 of the Offical Records.
I can't copy it, sorry. But in it he sets out Stuart's mission as they crossed the Potomac in late June. He is to scout and gather supplies. One thing I noted. Lee wanted the rest of the remaining Cavalry to be behind and at the the flanks of the army. Not ahead.

(Message edited by aphillbilly on August 25, 2003)

[mobile_96]

Stuart failed in his mission. Yes, I know he did gather supplies, but.....was it as ordered?
On Jun. 21 Lee and Stuart met near Paris,Vir. At this meeting Lee impressed upon Stuart that he lose no time on placing his command on Ewell's right as soon as Stuart perceived the Federals were moving northward.
Early on the 22nd. Stuart sent Lee, thru Longstreet, a note that the Federals were retiring from their position near Ashby's. Lee returned a written authorization to Stuart to enter Maryland :"If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him imformed of the enemy movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."
Stuart was advised that Ewell would porbably move toward the Susquehanna River in two columns: one via the Emmitsburg route and the other via Chambersburg.
At 3:30 pm Lee wrote to Ewell:
"I also directed General Stuart, should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit departure of of portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army."
No mention was made to Ewell of Stuart's route or a point of endezvous.
In 3 seperate articles in Gettysburg Magazine, the latest...Vol. 29, Summer/2003-
Jeb Stuart's Advance to Gettysburg, by Douglas Craig Haines, they all reach the same conclusion: "Stuart in the hours after crossing the Potomac River, in his interpretation of General Lee's discretional orders led to a failure to reestablish contact with the army
through General Ewell thus depriving it of his unsurpassed skills of an outpost officier when it was most needed."-Ed Bearss.

A major failure, of Stuart, was leaving Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson in charge at the Blue Ridge passes instead of Brig. Gen. William E. Jones, even though Jones had approx 2/3 of the forces to be watching Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap, and was considered by Stuart to be the best outpost officier he had. He did give very specific orders to Roberston, because he knew him to be incompetent, on how to handle serveral different contingencies, even down to making sure all his horses were shoed, its possible that he though that because of Jones' experience he would be able to help guide Roberston to achieve the goals.
Another failing, being already 2 days late in crossing the Potomac, was taking the wagon train along that he had captured instead of burning it right away, and also not paroling the Federals, both slowing him down.
Chuck in Il.

(Message edited by mobile_96 on September 21, 2003)

[gary]

Tommy,

There's suppose to be an order inspired by General C. Wilcox. In that order (Jan-Mar 1864) Lee ordered the raising of sharpshooter battalions and every brigade was suppose to have one. This is nearly two years after the Confederate Adjt. Gen. issued that very same order. I haven't been able to find Lee's order though in the OR.

Gary

[9thvacav]

Most people don't realize how much cavalry was available to Lee on his march into Pennsylvania, nor do they realize the problem associated with moving cavalry as a screen in the Shenandoah Valley while the infantry filled the roadways. Considering much of the cavalry had been in battle since Brandy Station, and continuing the constant action up through the Middleburg, Aldie and Upperville area they were lucky to be able to be utilized at all in any capacity. Lee did have the brigades of Jones and Robertson, given specific orders by Stuart to guard the rear and flanks of the moving army. Jenkin's brigade was to be leading Ewell's advance into Pennsylvania, supposedly to be 3,800 strong. On the left flank of the army was Imboden with his 2,000 troopers. It's clear that Stuart expected to be back in contact with the army prior to July but circumstances in meeting enemy cavalry and infantry caused him to have to fight his way through or go around. I believe Stuart did everything possible to ensure the main army had available cavalry. The only thing he didn't do was be there in person to see his orders were carried out.

There also seems to be a missing order from Lee to Stuart detailing this mission which was sealed and confidential, or it could have been a lengthy addition to the orders already written in the orders book. Several people make reference to this order, it's even hinted at in other documents, but it seems the original order has disappeared from the available record and is not included in the Official Records. Stuart's adjutant H. B. McClellan received these orders late on the night of the 23rd June, read them and eventually woke Stuart to read it to him. In the orders he states from memory:
1) The message was very lengthy (much longer than the one now adopted as these same orders) and was sealed marked "confidential".
2) It told Stuart to place his cavalry with Early at York and not with Ewell.
3) It informed Stuart that the roads to Shepherdstown and Williamsport were crowded and recommended moving in rear of the enemy.
4) It informed Stuart that York would be the probable concentration point of the whole army.
5) It informed Stuart that Early would look for him if he chose that course around the Federals.
6) It spoke of accomplishing the movement as speedily as possible.

A post war need to find a person to blame the Gettysburg loss on, other than Lee himself, fired up the Stuart detractors. With Stuart dead he was personally unable to answer charges. Both Mosby and McClellan did their best to use logic in defending the decisions made by Stuart during the campaign and the books written by them are interesting to read.

L. Ahearn
http://9thvirginia.com

[johan_steele]

Stuart was a scapegoat for certain. There is no doubt who the blame for the loss at Gettysburg rests... the Union Army. Stuart brought almost 200 wagonloads of supplies w/ him to Lee... much needed supplies I might add. He wasn't playing around trying to grab headlines, he was acting in much the same manner he had acted on previous campaigns. In short the South needed someone to blame, Stuart was dead and unable to defend himself. How obliging of him... I guess the Yanks aren't the only people capable of creative blame eh?

[traveller]

I also agree that it is not correct to lay all the blame on Stuart. After all he was out doing what he did best. His actions could have just as well made him a hero. I believe that Lee was indeed upset about the fact that he didn’t know Stuarts whereabouts and the lack of Stuarts presence probably did have an effect on the outcome of the battle but there are a lot of other factors involved. It is way to simple to blame one person. How about putting the biggest blame on the Federal Army. If not for the determination and bravery of men like Buford, Chamberlain and Hancock, just to name a few, I’m sure it would have been another Southern victory. How about laying some of the blame on Ewell. His unwillingness to obey Lee’s orders contributed to the outcome of the battle. Lee had a definite advantage on day one that may have been squandered right there. Another factor, I believe was Lee’s condition. His illness could be blamed for some poor decisions such as a direct assault on the Union center. As Shelby Foote puts it “And that was the mistake he made, the mistake of all mistakes....and there was scarcely a trained soldier who didn’t know it was a mistake at the time, except possibly Pickett himself...”
Was it such a poor call? I believe it was, but on the other side of the argument you could say that Lee had a great belief that the assault might succeed. After all, bearing in mind the offensive prowess of Lee’s soldiers as demonstrated on previous occasions, and, indeed, at Gettysburg itself during the previous two days of combat, the attempt to break the Union Centre by a massive infantry assault, well supported by artillery, cannot be dismissed as the result of recklessness or wishful thinking on the part of Lee. Any way you look at it though, it was a costly mistake.

Traveller

[FSPowers]

Stuart was among the last of the cavalier types who also knew how to deploy cavalry.

I think Stuart was also embarrased by Brandy Station and he wanted to make up for it.

When he took the route he did, he effectively cut off communication with the ANV. Lee had cavalry with him but they were heading toward Harrisburg. They would not have been in a position to spot Buford.

All those wagons that were captured did come in handy to transport the wounded.

[manofdreds]

To address the cavalry brigades. Imboden's and Jenkin's brigades were nothing more than mounted infantrymen. Lee had no confidence in their cavalry capabilities, more foragers than cavalrymen. Ewell and other commanders of the II Corps complained repeatedly about Jenkins. It seemed they were more interested in capturing goods and Negros in PA. Jenkins had orders, from Lee, to relieve the Stonewall Brigade on the far left covering Johnson. Jenkins was wounded and the brigade simply vanished and did not fullfill the order. Stonewall Brigade did not participate in the battle for culp's hill was the result. John Mosby, who was in communications with Stuart during his ride north, informed him of a path through the union corps that would've put him in the rear of Lee's columns and probably would've reached Lee a day earlier. Stuart ignored it captured his wagons, threatened Wash DC and the rest is history.