Picketts Charge - A Confederate Perspective Part 1

[dave_kelly]

Post this to another board originally:

Pickett’s Charge – A Confederate View

7 Sep 2004

In order to resolve several of the debates raging over the right and wrongs of interpretation, presented in a number of threads recently, I propose to go back and review the pertinent historical accounts and some tertiary commentary to see if we can clear the field of some of the more questionable elements that have nested themselves in the historical debate concerning what happened on the last afternoon of the battle of Gettysburg. All references will be annotated as to source. (A note: ehistory.com uses the very poor quality h-bar transcript of the OR which is terribly corrupted. I have used it only because it provides a ready cut and paste, which my Guild Press program won’t do. Sorry)

To begin, and this will be the only significant paste of full text, due to space constraint, this is what General Lee offered as his final official comment on the operation in January of 1864:

“… The result of this day operations (2 July) induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's brigades, which arrived near the battle field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rode's and one from Early's division.
General Longstreet dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.
After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrechments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold is with right a force larger superior to the of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank a rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p. m.
General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills of the enemy's extreme left, from which is troops could be attacked in reverse the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank a rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth's division and two brigade of Pender's to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold is assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.
A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them of silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries there directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely.
About 1 pm., at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened, and continued for about two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first, but toward the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's division. in two lines, Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right, to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scale's brigades, under General Trimble.
The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left center.
His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled, to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back by heavy loss.
[Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 27, Part 2, pgs 320-1 http://www.ehistory.com/uscw/library/or/o44/0320.cfm ]

What are the salient points of Lee’s narrative?

1. That having obtained control of Emmitsburg Ridge, and made lodgments on both flanks of the Union position he felt that continuation of the previous days double envelopment, supported with the better artillery positions now available offered a chance for victory if concerted action could be applied.
2. Longstreet was not ready to support Ewell at the time Ewell was engaged.
3. A new plan for an assault on the center was fashioned. Longstreet was to command it. Law and McLaws were not available so Longstreet was opcon’d Heth and half of Pender (Trimble). A massive barrage was to precede an assault column into the center of the federal line.
4. When the barrage appeared to have had some effect the force of Pickett, Pettigrew, Trimble and Wilcox advanced.
5. Too late it was realized that the ANV artillery had practically exhausted their available on hand ammunition and the combat multiplier was lost to the attack.
6. In the end the assault was contained, enveloped and destroyed.

1st Point:
Much of the argument, that didn’t manifest itself until after Lee’s death, revolves around the concept of operations intended for the 3d day; as it commenced and as it evolved in the afternoon. In Frederick Maurice’s An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, Maurice discusses discovery of a memorandum from Col William Allen dated 15 Apr 1868 of a conversation with General Lee on several historical matters to include the loss at Gettysburg. [pgs 248-252] Regarding the battle Allan’s notes say “First, he (Gen Lee) did not intend to give battle in Pennsylvania if he could avoid it. The South was too weak to carry on a war of invasion, and his offensive movements against the North were never intended except as parts of a defensive system. He did not know the Federal Army was at Gettysburg, could not believe it, as Stuart had been specially ordered to cover his movements, and keep him informed of the enemy’s position, and he (Stuart) had sent no word. He found himself engaged with the federal Army, therefore, unexpectedly, and had to fight. This being decided on, victory would have been won if he could have gotten one decided simultaneous attack on the whole line. This he tried his uttermost to effect for three days and failed.”

The Napoleonic theme of effective mass dominates Lee’s thinking. As in previous campaigns the ideal that concentration of the “firstust with the mostust” could prevail even when the attacker was inferior, prevails. To an extent the first day had been won when Hill and Ewell combined their weight; and ultimately the last Federal position was not carried when that cooperation collapsed. On the second day Longstreet and Ewell’s attacks were out of sync. Again on the morning of 3 July Ewell was drawn into battle and Longstreet was not prepared to weigh in, in consonance with what was happening at the other end of the field.

2d Point:
Much ink has been spilt on just what the nature of orders for battle on 3 July was. In his official report Longstreet stated that he was ready to commit his force to a flank attack when Lee arrived at his headquarters and preempted the maneuver. [Ibid page 359] But by the time Longstreet published his memoirs and had spent 20 years fighting Early and the friends of Gen. Lee he went so far as to deny that any orders for a morning attack on 3 July existed [Manassas to Appomattox pg 385]. This denial is unsatisfactory in as much as Richard Ewell’s report states he was ordered to attack at first light on 3 July [OR, Ser 1, Vol 27, pt 2. pg 447] and Lee’s statement already quoted presumes his intent for a concert of action would mean similar orders were given to Longstreet. Jeffrey Wert in his Longstreet biography [pg 282] favors the notion that some form of order was communicated the evening of 2 July. As does Coddington [Gettysburg Campaign, pgs 455-8] However there are reservations expressed as to the specificity of communications which no one can document.

3d Point:
Armistead Long, Richard Venable and Walter Taylor accompanied Lee on the morning of 3 July when he made his way to Longstreet’s position. Lee’s staff officers in the post war years would publish accounts declaring that the planned assault on the center was supposed to have been made by 4 divisions not two. [Long, Memoirs of RE Lee, pgs 288-95] [Annals of the War, Taylor, Campaign in Pennsylvania pg 305] These allegations post date Lee and Longstreet’s official reports stipulating that the assault column was composed of Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble. For Longstreet to have pulled his Corps from his front and flank marched across the Union line would be to invite a role reversal of what happened at 2d Manassas. Such a move would uncover the 5th and 6th Corps.

Taylor accuses Longstreet of not following Lee’s wishes to employ his full force. Longstreet responds that this is nonsense; Lee knew the exact nature of the assault and concurred. Literally speaking Longstreet is perhaps correct that Lee settled for the tactical battle scheme that his chosen commander required to make the attack. But in a broader sense, Lee’s staff officer’s recriminations against Longstreet bespeak Lee’s deeper concern and intent that untiy of action and drawing together effective mass was the object sought to win the battle. Who was right? Lee assumed the responsibility for the failure.

Another less discussed influence on the thought processes involved was the persistent drone of the battle for Culps Hill. The battle had started about 4am and continued with remarkable intensity all morning long. So as Lee and the other commands discussed what they were going to do to engage the shank of the Union line it was a constant reminder that 2d Corps was fighting. In a macabre moment, after Pickett’s repulse, Lee had joined EP Alexander on Emmitsburg Road. While they conversed cheering was heard from the Union lines. Lee asked Alexander’s aide, Lt Colston, to ride forward and see what it was about. Colston returned and said the Yankees were cheering a Union officer riding along the line. Lee remarked that he thought perhaps Johnson might have gained some success. Alexander was taken aback by the comment, as even he was aware that Ewell’s offense had sputtered at mid day. Did the commander in Chief truly think that there was to be some concert of action by 2d Corps with this attack? (Memoirs p 426)

4th Point:
The attack plan that evolved for the afternoon was complicated by the fact that it cross-attached elements of two Corps. It was further complicated by the fact that the objective was in AP Hills sector of the front but Lee insisted that Longstreet supervise the attack It also called upon the entire artillery assets of the army to conduct a massive concentric bombardment of the Union center. Such a task placed a premium on the staff and technical expertise of the armies Chief of Artillery; and the armies artillery had been recently reorganized because William N Pendleton was demonstrably not up to the operational job.

Institutional leaders can be terribly territorial and pedantic when it comes to their responsibilities and prerogatives. Longstreet and AP Hill had a past that was somewhat hostile. Lee had had to separate their commands after the Seven Days when the two men feuded over newspaper commentaries of their respective achievements. Most commentators noted their exchanges lacked warmth, and while Longstreet claimed his planning for the attack was minutely detailed, Longstreet for the most part stayed out of Hill’s sector before and during the attack. [ Wert, Longstreet p286 ]

The men committed to the assault were not so inhibited. Pickett was affable and JJ Pettigrew was amendable. Isaac Trimble was just pleased as punch that he was at least given some sort of battle command at the last moment. It didn’t hurt that Birkett D Fry, now commanding Archer’s battered brigade, was an old plains chum of Pickett and Garnett. In interdivisional coordination the field commanders independently decided that Fry’s Brigade would become the maneuver center point of the lead battle line. What would become controversial were tactical omissions or commissions which aligned the support line to the center of the divisions instead of favoring the flanks, so that some protection was offered from enemy efforts to envelop the column as it made contact with the Union line. Some artillery was supposed to advance to provide close support. None was offered to the column directly; Alexander was holding on to Richardson’s battalion of smoothbores to advance at his discretion.

More vexatious is the issue of follow on forces. This returns to this issue of “concert” and “mass”. The assault was a defined mass of 13,000 supported by every available gun of the army. Should Pickett seize the Ridge what was to have happened next? What constituted force existed to support and exploit the first pulse of the attack?

Hood’s, now Law’s, and McLaws Divisions are essentially out of the picture. There is no indication that they were ever actually alerted to do more than be prepared to respond to what ever transpired in their immediate front. Law would become preoccupied with Federal cavalry as the afternoon wore on. In total there were actually eight Union Divisions between Big Round Top and the Weikert House, if you include the battered 3d Corps and Caldwell’s Division, and Kilpatrick was finally up with Farnsworth and Merritt.

AP Hill ostensibly commanded the center reserve with orders to hold the ridge and be prepared to support Longstreet. His authority over his own command was limited to Anderson’s Division and the Brigades of Thomas and Perrin. But even here there were twists as Andersons OR strongly suggests that he was operating under the assumption that the orders of 2 July placing him at Longstreets disposal were still in force [OR, Ser 1, Vol 27, Part 2. pgs 614-5.] So exactly what trigger was Hill pulling?

Robert Rodes, of Ewells Corps, had been required to detach 2 of his five brigades to support Edward Johnson’s attack. His remaining force of approximately 1800 effectives were deployed in the long road southwest of Gettysburg. Rodes Official Report does not bespeak an understanding of a direct involvement in the operation, but a general direction to support and exploit opportunities that might present themselves from his position. [Ibid. pg. 557]

In both Lee and Longstreet’s ORs Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade is gratuitously added to the list of units in the assault column. Longstreet’s report is proponent for this interpretation. This shorthand assignation is deceptive. According to Wilcox and Lang, their brigades were assigned to protect Dearing and Poagues guns early on the morning of the 3d. [Ibid. pgs 619 and 632 respectively]. Theirs were not assigned to the assault column, but were later called forward in support at a point too late to do more than add 300 more casualties to the carnage. [See also EP Alexander, Memoirs of a Confederate, pg 425]

The mass of evidence of the reports of commanders is that no cogent follow on existed that could respond to the outcome of Pickett’s assault. The forces remaining behind were not under any central command ready to respond to signals to perform some concerted mission.

[dave_kelly]

5th Point:

The poignancy, the bitter comic tragedy, that the senior leadership of an army could commit a forlorn hope to battle and suddenly realize that the artillery, a critical component of the attack, was out of bullets. I would quote William N Pendleton on the subject, but his statements aren’t worthy of the calamity. [OR, Ser 1. Vol 27, Pt 2 pgs 352-3]. EP Alexander explains [Memoirs 418-425] that the bombardment had been overdrawn, attempting to meet Longstreet’s mandate that the batteries supporting the Union center should be neutralized before the infantry was placed at risk. Alexander could not satisfy himself that such had been achieved until after 90 minutes he saw some demonstrable activity in the Union center, where Henry Hunt was replacing 2d Corps batteries which had exhausted their rounds.

But at that point Alexander became aware that his batteries were short or out of ammo, and caissons going to the rear were not coming back. Details of the logistical organization of the Confederate trains are few. The Corps had some form of reserve train with a limited number of rounds. The Army maintained the main reserve of artillery ammunition in the ordnance trains, presumed to be somewhere back near Herr Ridge. What limited supply the Corps trains had was quickly redistributed, then there was a wholesale rush on the ordnance trains which called for extended intransit time, and probably overwhelmed the limited handling resources of the trains.

The hoof print of Pendleton manifested itself in other annoying ways. Pendleton admitted to moving the 1st Corps ordnance train away from its endangered, posted location. He also displaced the battalion of Howtzers commanded by Major Richardson which Alexander reserved to go forward in support of Pickett. When the time came to call for Richardson, he was gone and unaccounted for.

Both Longstreet and Lee strongly imply that had they been given timely information about the state of the artillery they probably would have called off the attack. Ultimately, Longstreet declared that he didn’t have the authority to stop what was happening, going so far as to cry on Alexander’s shoulders that he had opposed the attack from the start, and would even now stop it except that he knew that Lee was committed to it.

6th Point:

There are several good micro histories of Pickett’s Charge. I have George R Stewarts. I haven’t felt compelled to get the newer ones. The attack itself was almost anti climatic having mentioned all the previous elements that went into the build up to the infantry assault.

There really was a chance that Pickett could have succeeded. Gibbons two divisions were relatively isolated on the ridge. Although Henry Hunt had succeeded in getting his artillery in and out of the kill box of Southern artillery fire the protracted barrage had managed to create a beaten zone around the objective which was vacated by nonessentials; and Meade was as slow as Lee in developing contingency response before the fact.

Joshua Chamberlain gets high praise for his stand at Little Round Top. Franklin Sawyer and the 8th Ohio should have one of the biggest monuments on the battlefield just to match the enormous grit of their stand. Inconcievably 160 soldiers attacked Pettigrew’s left, chased Mayo’s shaky brigade off the field and materially broke Davis’s. The mess prompted Longstreet to call on Anderson to start marching to that end of the field, and to tell Col Fremantle that the battle was already lost (which it wasn’t). Painfully, dozens of Southern artillerymen stood by with empty caissons watching this transpire, and Perrin’s Brigade was just a few hundred yards away capable of assisting in recovery of the situation.

Most of Pickett’s Division got across the Emmitsburg Pike around the Codori Farm and got a chance to regroup their formations and go in at the outer range of Federal riflemen. Pettigrew didn’t have the luxury as the Pike converged towards the Federal line entering town, and the double row of post and lintel fences provided a healthy barrier at the perfect killing range. No effective mass could get itself organized for a last lunge at the Union forces and too many soldiers quit fighting.

It was over in less than half an hour. Wilcox had responded to a belated order to support the attack and wandered into the upper Plum Run region where Freeman McGilvery’s guns chopped him up. Wilcox went back to Dearing’s gun line and was told there was no ammo to fire. He returned to his brigade and ordered a retreat. Lang had followed Wilcox as his orders were to conform to Wilcox’s movements. His smallish Brigade took both artillery fire and the brunt of Stannard’s riposte. Wilcox fumed at the waste of it all.

Conclusion:

Was this final epoch of Gettysburg foredoomed? Actually, in concept it wasn’t. The weaknesses of the Union center were real enough. Had the combinations discussed come to fruition, a properly supported column with continued and developing artillery support, the balance could have been tipped in the favor of the attackers. They got very close. It got down to one last charge to control the center, and it was Webb’s men who rallied and broke the back of Southern resistance. By modern accounts thousands of unhurt Confederates sheepishly marched off to the federal provost guard having been defeated by the shock of the battle into losing faith in the potency of their assault mass.

But then, even if Pickett stood victor at the angle, what could be achieved? The truth of the matter was that there were no organized supports. There were several demi-brigades that could have been encouraged to go forward piecemeal. There still was no artillery support at hand. The belated federal reply was accumulating on the flanks. Hunt could bring up more guns without disturbing the order of his front. As Wright told Alexander, “the problem isn’t getting up there, it’s staying”.

This was not Pickett’s Charge, or Longstreet’s Charge. This was Lee’s charge. Lee should have had Hill and Longstreet standing beside him in the point of woods between the two assault masses and corporately pulled the strings that made his attack work. But that isn’t how Lee worked; that routinely wasn’t how armies operated. The peculiar situation justified that sort of imposition by Lee, but he wasn’t going to do it.

Lee failed at Gettysburg. But that failure reflects the doctrine of the period and the immense lack of experience in handling large armies. Sherman had no more luck getting concert of action between his disparate armies at Atlanta. Meade would fail miserably at Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor and Petersburg for much the same reasons. Weaponry may have favored the defense, but so did the difficulties of command and control.

[danny]

David,
You have made some very interesting and compelling points. Among them you said:
"The mess prompted Longstreet to call on Anderson to start marching to that end of the field, and to tell Col Fremantle that the battle was already lost (which it wasn’t). Painfully, dozens of Southern artillerymen stood by with empty caissons watching this transpire, and Perrin’s Brigade was just a few hundred yards away capable of assisting in recovery of the situation."
I have always wondered why nearby troops did absolutely nothing to relieve the destructive action on this flank of the assault. Even an advance of a skirmisher line by Perrin or others could have had a significant impact. Such a move would also appear to be within a local commander's perogative, if nothing more than to protect his own sphere of operations.
Did Anderson actually begin such a movement, and did Perrin ever write about what must have been a frustrating episode in his military career?
It also seems inconceivable that there was not a single artillery piece available to counteract the inevitable flank and enveloping maneuver.
These appear to be un pardonable errors of omission for a veteran army, regardless of the new corps structures. I realize that Hill was having his first and probably worst battle as a Corps Commander, but unless he was sulking about the situation, I can scarcely imagine that such a fighter would not have taken any fundamental steps to even protect that part of his Corps that was being decimated so near to the rest of his idle forces.

[dave_kelly]

Danny:

All of the Brigade commanders involved in these events survived and filed reports (Perrin, Thomas, Wright particularly) I'm not aware of any detailed post war writings that assist in wading through this. There are some articles in Gettysburg Magazine and regimental histories that I don't have ready access to that might help. This summary was posted for a civil war board and not for publication, so my research is short of what would be critically required.

Didn't bring up the subject of the Bliss Farm engagement which occurred the morning of the 3rd and drew in parties for a fight over the same ground and resulted in a slightly overenergetic artillery duel.

The 3d Corps artillery commanders did not make an issue of the relative lack of ammunition in the critical moments of the battle. In concept Longstreet and Lee mention that batteries were supposed to have tactically displaced to support the advance. This was a critical element in fending off flank pressure on the assault column. EP Alexander in his memoirs states that he managed to collect 9 guns with some ammo and displace towards the Codori House to provide some fire to the south of the copse of trees; again they did not have full caissons. I'm not aware of any effort by the third Corps to do anything of the sort.

Thomas's report of the 3d is terse to being uninformative. Perrin only says very broadly that the skirmishing throughout the day was very intense. The report of Robert Rodes doesn't exactly contradict Perrins, but casts a different light, as he speaks of being in a position to launch an attack, but by the time he made his decision and preperations he claims that a general order was communicated down the line to cease offensive operations.

Gen Wright mentions he was called out to support Picketts "retreat" had advance his Bde 500 yards and then his orders were changed to support Wilcox and the artillery. This isn't the same as Longstreets statement that Anderson was called on to support the left, but it coincidently falls along the same time line. Fog of war issue.

I provided a URL for the ehistory.com OR site at the beginning of the post, along with page numbers for the reports I focused on. If you don't have access to the OR otherwise this is a handy way to get to it, but as mentioned the h-bar generated texts are a mess.

Unfortunately, when you really start to tear down warfare and look into the tactical details there are a lot of times when t appears that a kindergarten snowball fight is bette managed. Set piece battles take time to orchestrate. This attack was fabricated about 8-9 am in the morning and sent into execution at 1 pm. It involved 2/3ds of Lees army. With very small staffs and very little face to face communications details of the concept of operation had to be deciminated down to regiment and battery level. Armies with small logistical tails suddenly had to consider the problem of moving substantial amounts of ammunition to make it available for a short notice, maximum effort barrage.

The concept was doable, but putting all the pieces together in 4 hours challenged the limits of a rather fragile command and control system. And it hardly helped that the senior commanders were off their game that day.

Thanks for your interest. And welcome aboard, as I see this is your first posting

[danny]

David,
Thanks for the welcome and the informative follow up. These days, I am more of a Trans Miss student, but the lure of the what ifs of Gettysburg is still fascinating.
I use the Cornell site for accessing the OR's on line, plus I have many individual volumes in my bulging bookcases.
I suppose I am looking to make some sort of sense out of what was as you say a "kindergarten snowball fight". I appreciate the fog of war and try to make due allowance for that element while studying these momentous events.
To me, it still remains incomprehensible that Perrin, Rodes, et al, would remain silent spectators to what was happening to the left flank of the assault column. It has been years since I visited the battlefield, and I admit to not having much of a grasp for the terrain and troop dispositions and relative distances on this particular part of the field. If I recall, "Lost Lane" [Long Lane?] has been a part of the mystery in this area.
I promise to search the archives of this board so as to save the knowledgeable folks of the board the need to bring me up to date on this particular segment of the battle.

[dave_kelly]

Danny:

This part of the battlefield, the north end of the center was devoured by suburban sprawl in the 40s and 50's.

For folks wedded to the computer age I think purchasing the Guild Press DVD Civil War Archive is indispensible. It contains over $4000 in basic histories and documents and was $200.00 the last time I checked. For the price you get the Complete OR, army and navy; Southern Historical Society Papers, The Surgeon Generals complete report, Confederate Military History, Scribners Histories of the War, The Official Atlas, and half a dozen other biographies. While I love my books, this is just too good a resource to pass up for the price.

Sorry for the "wendy's man" plug, just think people ought to know this is out there

[danny]

David,
Thanks for the tip. Like most, I am always on the look out for a bargain, and this appears a good one. For now, my CW disposable income is being consumed by a professional researcher at the National Archives.
In your 4th point you mention "Institutional leaders can be terribly territorial and pedantic when it comes to their responsibilities and prerogatives". I agree with you, and unfortunately there are several examples though out the war to confirm the point further.
I had hoped not to drift too far toward the "what if", but one can't help but speculate on the action taken if natural fighters were in divisional command of these idle spectator troops, such as Trimble, or one of my favorites-D.H. Hill. Again, I am referring to that specific sector where troops were located that could see what was happening--and seemingly within their reach.
A.P. Hill had earned a similar reputation, but this fighting instinct was apparently nullified by the convoluted command arrangement. Perhaps we forget that he was also just a person, and not immune to what appears to be a severe case of pouting.

[dave_kelly]

>For now, my CW disposable income is being consumed by a professional researcher at the National Archives.<

Mysteriously intriguing...

We gotta knock off this love feast stuff...I adore DH Hill. Always thought he got a bums rush from Lee: just because he thought Stuart should be summarily executed is hardly a reason to not like the guy

AP Hill circumstances at Gettysburg are hard to discern. James I Robertson tried and shrugged. Hill was supposedly in command of Anderson and the Perrin/Thomas Bdes, but in the case of Anderson appears that Longstreet had such a hold on the Division that Hill just figured he had been stripped of any meaningful authority. There are some tertiary statements that defend AP Hill insisting Lee told him his primary responsibility was to hold what few reserves he had to prepare a last ditch defense if the attack was wrecked.

[danny]

David,

So, a Harvey Hill fan. Now that helps me to understand the commonality of our perspectives a little more.

Wonder what his impact would have been if he had continued on to Johnston's relief force at Vicksburg in the summer of 63 rather than being gobbled up by the acrimony in Bragg's army? What a waste. Of course, he may have proved a bust as a corps commander with Johnston, and perhaps had reached his optimal level as a division commander. But still an unaffordable waste of a fighting man.

If CW history had an equivalent to "fantasy football", he would be on my team. What do you think of Lovell and Buckner as other potential impact players left in the dust of Davis and his machinations?

"There are some tertiary statements that defend AP Hill insisting Lee told him his primary responsibility was to hold what few reserves he had to prepare a last ditch defense if the attack was wrecked."

Perhaps the attack would not have been wrecked-at least on the left-if Hill had felt compelled to do what he normally did-and that was to fight at the drop of a hat. The 8th Ohio was surely living a charmed life in that hour or so of destiny. If Perrin and/or Rodes were within a few hundred yards, don't you think that this total inactivity on their part was extremely uncharacteristic of Lee's army?

But, perhaps that is another example of why this battle was replete with poor battlefield tactics that could not support confused strategic goals.

[dave_kelly]

Senior leaders in both armies had a hard time overcoming an albatross associated with their reputations. Lovell was a victim of circumstance in New Orleans, Buckner was hurt by Donelson. DH Hill was probably more his mouth, but the bad blood concerning SO 191 got stuck to him although the evidence is pretty compelling that a courier (quite possibly Henry Kyd Douglas according to one historian) was to blame. Another candidate better used may have been Dick Taylor.

"Perhaps the attack would not have been wrecked-at least on the left-if Hill had felt compelled to do what he normally did-and that was to fight at the drop of a hat."

There's not enough documentation to make sense of command and control.
All we can do is observe and wonder. I think the command relationship cobbled together for the attack was "labored". Whatever conclusions evolve from that aren't very good....