Hey all, I'm new here, and I have been looking around and bit. Seems this has been talked about before, but I thought I would share this essay I recently wrote with everyone. I have fully cited my sources, so these are the thoughts and opinions of numerous authors as well.
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James Longstreet and July 2nd, 1863
The role of James Longstreet in the fighting on July 2nd at Gettysburg was significant, however, poorly done. Lt. General James Longstreet would drag his feet throughout the day, possibly costing the Confederates the battle. “There seems no Doubt that had Longstreet’s attack on the 2nd been made materially sooner, we would have gained a decided victory,” (278 ) Longstreet’s close friend E P Alexander states. Throughout the morning unnecessary delays were taken by Longstreet, along with erroneous assumptions that reflect poorly on Longstreet’s record.
“Lt. Gen. James Longstreet and his staff awakened early on 2 July, perhaps as early as 3:00 am, and breakfasted before daylight,” (104) according to Pfanz. When Longstreet met with Lee early in the morning of the 2nd. “Col. John L. Black…was impressed to see Generals Hill, Longstreet, and General Lee in serious conversation. General Lee, to Black, was the best looking man in the universe. Longstreet he saw as “fat and full,” and Hill as slender,” Pfanz continues. (105) Lee had yet to determine his plan of attack, and decided to send out his “best and most deserving…reconnoitering officer,” Sam Johnston of his staff. Longstreet sent along Captain Clark of his staff officers. A second of Lee’s staff joined the expedition. It must be noted that Longstreet did not want Lee to move to the attack today, and that sentiment would affect his actions that day. Throughout his meetings with Lee that morning, Longstreet could barely conceal his anger and displeasure.
Captain Johnston’s party took a roundabout rout to the round tops. “According to captain Johnston’s recollection (Major Clarke, so the record shows, never wrote a word about the expedition), the party rode from Lee’s Headquarters near the Chambersburg Pike southward behind Seminary ridge to a crossing of Willoughby Run, then eastward toward the Peach Orchard, then south again along Seminary Ridge and across the Emmitsburg Road…” Sears affirms. (253) If you trace this rout on a map, you will see that it is no where near the rout taken by Longstreet’s troops on their approach.
Once Johnston returned from his amazing venture behind Union lines, and informed Lee of his news, General Mclaws joined the conference and General Lee asked him if he could move his men over to the position scouted by Johnston. Mclaws told General Lee that he saw no reason why he couldn’t. Noah Andre Tredeau explains, “He (Mclaws) had not a clue as to the lay of the land, though, so when Lee mentioned a survey undertaken by Johnston, Mclaws misunderstood the context and asked at once to accompany that officer. Longstreet stepped forward from where he had been standing. “No, sir, I do not wish you to leave your division,” he said, not bothering to explain that Johnston’s reconnaissance had already occurred.” (289- 290 ) Pfanz continues, “General Lee had no more to say, and Longstreet seemed irritated, so Mclaws returned to his division” (110). Pfanz concludes, “and what of Major Clarke, Longstreet’s engineer, who did accompany Johnston? If already back, he would have talked with Longstreet or could have been expected to provide the information needed by Longstreet’s corps.” (110) Thus Longstreet insured that, if he had not talked with Major Clark, he would be leading his men blindly on a march which, “given the urgency of the situation, celerity,” was necessary (Krick, 68 ) Of that celerity which was need, Krick says, “Longstreet ignored that patently obvious imperative from the outset.” (Krick, 68 )
Once the meeting broke up and Mclaws reconnaissance was turned down, Longstreet and Mclaws returned to their men. Once they left, Lee had set his mind on his plan and Longstreet knew that plan. The only thing left to be done was go and see Ewell and arrange things with Hill. This he did after Longstreet and McLaws left his HQ. It was approaching 9am. Lee arrived at Ewell’s HQ to find Ewell out on a reconnaissance patrol with Major Venable of Lee’s staff. When they returned, Lee informed Ewell of his orders: Attack to the sound of Longstreet’s guns. It was at this point that Lee became uneasy and fidgety. He return to his HQ. Then, according to Pfanz, “after his (Lee) return, General Lee examined a portion of Cemetery Ridge and, according to Colonel Long, became increasingly impatient, “remarking in a tone of uneasiness, “what can detain Longstreet? He ought to be in position now!”” (112) It was 10:00.
As stated before, once Longstreet and McLaws left Lee’s HQ, they returned to their troops that were posted along Herr’s ridge. Here Longstreet delayed until his entire force was up (he was missing Laws brigade, 1/8 of the entire force). Once Law arrived, however, Longstreet was no prepared for he waited until “after his arrival” to “make our preparations.” Pfanz agrees, “Some of Longstreet’s delay had resulted from his impractical decision to await the arrival of Law’s brigade before moving to the assault position.” (115) This in itself was an unnecessary waste of time. To wait to make preparations for the march until Law came up makes no sense at all. “Law of course would have arrived at the jump-off point for the march long before his turn came to fall in at the end of the column. Longstreet was simply dragging his feet.” (Krick,69 ) Pfanz echoes those thoughts, saying, “Why is was necessary for Longstreet to hold both Mclaws’s and Hood’s divisions on Herr Ridge awaiting Law’s arrival instead of moving to the assigned position at once, Longstreet and others did not explain.” (118 –119)
Also, Longstreet choose not to make a reconnaissance of his rout of march while he was waiting to begin preparations, but instead decided to take a rest under a tree with General Hood! This would be a mistake that Longstreet could not shift the blame for, as he very often did. The only thing he did was have Lt. Black of his staff send out two fellow Lieutenants recon the jump of area. “Black also had another Lieutenant check out the Black Horse Tavern. He did so and found some barrels of whiskey, which Black then had destroyed,” Pfanz says. (116)
Turns out Longstreet was more worried about the fact that Black didn’t save him any whiskey, instead of what the Lieutenant found in ways of reconnaissance.
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When Longstreet finally, unwillingly, began his march, after waiting forty minutes for Law, and then preparations, it was around one p.m. Moxley Sorrel stated that Longstreet this day “failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield….” Sorrel wondered “what was going on to disadvantage this army,” referring to Longstreet dragging his feet.
Now comes the agonizing march of Longstreet’s men. The blame for the march and its miss direction has been unjustly been thrust on Lee’s morning scout, Captain Johnston. Lee’s only orders to Johnston were this: “I was ordered by Gen’l Lee to “ride with Gen’l Longstreet,” this is all the instructions that I Received. I had no idea where he was going.” Remember that Johnston’s rout took him no where near the rout taken by Longstreet. Lee did not send Johnston to Longstreet as a guide for the march, rather as a person to help Longstreet’s deployment once they got to the jump of point. Those were Lee’s only intentions. It is impossible to argue against that statement. When Johnston returned from his scouting trip in the morning, he traced his path on the map for Lee and Longstreet. Lee new Longstreet’s morning troop placements as well. To have Johnston be the head of the column would have been absurd. And that leads me to answer the question, “Why did Johnston not know about the clearing at Black Horse Tavern?” That would be because he was never there. It would have been Longstreet’s responsibility to scout the rout, something that Lt. Black did indirectly, yet poorly. Maybe if Longstreet had been more aware of the important things, such as recon, and not so bummed about not getting the Black Tavern Whiskey, he would have found out about the clearing. Johnston joined Longstreet’s command and said, “He did not move off very promptly – nor was our march at all rapid. It did not strike me that Genl Longstreet was in a hurry to get into position. It might have been that he thought hurry was unnecessary.”
At this point Krick says, “Longstreet decided to play an ugly game with the misguided Lee- and with thousands of unfortunate soldiers and the destiny of a mighty battle- by taking ludicrous position that Sam Johnston really commanded the march. He was Lee’s man on the spot, and this wholly silly march and arttack were Lee’s idiotic idea, so let him have his way and then we’ll just see who really knows best!”(Sarcasm) (69) Thus Longstreet took up a position at the head of Hoods Column, second in line, even though he was in command of the march and should have been at the head. When Johnston heard of the false statements Longstreet would say about Johnston being in command, Johnston stated, “I was ordered by Gen’l Lee to “ride with Gen’l Longstreet,” this is all the instructions that I Received. I had no idea where he was going.”
Lee had given Longstreet orders, and he should have been the one to see them carried out. Krick goes on to say, “Longstreet’s bitter game, with his own rules developed as he went, eventually allowed him to assume command of Hood’s division but not that of McLaws. Under this system, Longstreet could declare that he “did not order General McLaws forward, because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee (He unquestionably did not)* to follow the conduct of Colonel (sic) Johnston**: Therefore, I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not emcumbered by these instructions.” All this petty and dishonest posturing dramatically exacerbated the tendency of Longstreet’s command to move eith what some observers thought was unwonted sluggishness even under ordinary circumstances***. ( )
*Longstreet lied
** As shown above, Johnston had no such orders
*** McLaws division was known to be the slowest marchers in the army
Longstreet’s sluggishness no doubt threw his men into a sluggish pace and that would cost them time!
After a short time on the march, Longstreet’s column had run into trouble. McLaws, with Johnston by his side, came to Black Horse Tavern, where the road they were on went up a rise to a clear bald hill where signalmen on LRT could see them. The troops needed to find away around without being seen. EP Alexander, who had found an easy route, “told the officers at the head of the column of the route my artillery had followed- which was easily seen- but there was no one with authority to vary orders they were under, & they momentarily expected the new ones for which they had sent & which were very explicit when they came after the long, long delay…. It has sense appeared that if our corps had made its attack even two or three hours sooner than it did, our chances of success would have been immensely increased”…( 236 –237) Longstreet decided to waste time, two precious hours, because he preferred to stay on the roads. This amazes me, because a path (that of EP Alexander), which he was informed of, was suitable for artillery, and cut a four mile counter march down to one mile march, and thus saving that much needed time. His want to stay on the roads is absurd, for any route passable by artillery is certainly passable by infantry. He was simply dragging his feet again because he did not want to attack.*
*Longstreet states after the battle that "I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute his orders faithfully as if they were my own.” Is this his guilty conscious speaking…for he certainly did not do as he said on the 2nd!
E P Alexander sheds light on the falsity of the statement by Longstreet above. “The long & Short of the matter seems to me as follows. Longstreet did not wish to take the offensive. His objection to it was not based at all upon the peculiar strength of the enemy’s position for that was not yet recognized, but solely based on principles.” (237). Longstreet didn’t like it, and he turned into the sulky person he becomes when he does not get his way… and he messed up.
When Longstreet finally did get his men into position after wasting hours of much needed time, he did no better. General McLaws states, “General Longstreet is to blame for not reconnoitering the ground and for persisting an ordering an assault when his errors were discovered…during the engagement he was very excited, giving contrary orders to every one, and was exceedingly overbearing…” All of a sudden, Longstreet wanted to follow Lee’s, now destroyed, plan to the letter. He failed to look over the ground in his front, staying behind the line. McLaws sent his messages saying he need him to recon, but he just kept saying attack.
Finally, E P Alexander states, ““ There seems no Doubt that had Longstreet’s attack on the 2nd been made materially sooner, we would have gained a decided victory. Nor is there any doubt that it could have been – or that general Lee much desired it to be made very much earlier…* goes on to say Lee ok’ed the wait for Law*… and the delay caused by Longstreet’s infantry being being taken in sight of Round Top seems to have escaped his attention & that of his staff…”(278 ) Alexander also says that Longstreets staff did a poor job as well.
Wert, Longstreet’s biographer agrees, “Longstreet’s performance during the morning deserves criticism, as noted previously.” (279)
Longstreet’s overall job on the 2nd was poorly done, and clearly deserves a high level of criticism. Longstreet “disliked and distrusted Lee, largely because he was jealous of him.” (Woodsworth 107) Longstreet had been harbor these feelings for a long time, and expressed them to his good friend and former commander, Joseph Johnston, in a letter after Antietam. Longstreet’s personality is something that plagued the army that day. If Longstreet did not get what he wanted, he became angry, stubborn, and disconnected. These three things are showcased on July 2nd. In the end, Longstreet wasted precious time that could have been used preparing, scouting and fighting.
Work Cited
Alexander, Edward Porter. Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Ed. Gary W. Gallagher. London and Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
Krick, Robert K. The Smoothbore Volley That Doomed the Confederacy: The Death of Stonewall Jackson and other Chapters on the Army of Northern Virginia. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002.
Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: The Second Day. London and Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
Sears, Stephan W. Gettysburg. Boston/ New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003.
Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.
Wert, Jeffery D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.
Woodworth, Steven E. Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of The Gettysburg Campaign. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. Imprint, 2003.
-Ben Ross
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