Confederate artillery strategy

[hoosier]

It's well known that prior to Pickett's charge on July 3, the Confederate artillery under Alexander laid down a bombardment against the Union position on Cemetery Ridge.

Given the fact that Alexander did not have ready access to all the ammunition he might have liked to have at his disposal, the question comes to my mind - where would he have directed his fire?

Would he have aimed everything he had at the area where he knew the charge was going to be focused? If he had done that, it seems to me that he would, in effect, have been telling the Union, "OK, here's where they're coming."

Or would he have tried to spread his fire all along the Union line? That way, he could have kept the Union a little more confused about where the attack would be directed, but he would also have been using precious ammunition to shoot at troops who really wouldn't be involved in the Union defense.

Anyone know how Alexander decided to proceed?

[gary]

I thought his fire was intended to destroy the Union artillery. I also understand that there were quite a bit of overshooting and the Union artillery was intact and ready to assist in repelling the infantry assault.

[wt_jimbos]

In Alexander's "Fighting for the confederacy" He states his orders were "First, to give the enemy the most effective cannonade possible. It was not meant simply to make a noise, but to try & cripple him" Longstreet is quoted as saying "Drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him" and "advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack" (which 9 12pr. howitzers were aquired for the role which were ordered away before they could be deployed with the assault, but thats another story.)
From what i can gather from this is his fire was to be directed on the point of assualt. I haven't had a chance to re-read the chapter, but I don't recall any mention of counter battery fire, though there may have been some not mentioned as the narrative is very focused on, when and who was to order Pickett to advance. Alexander does mention the retiring of union artillery , and was using the amount of fire being return on him as a guide to the effect of his fire on the union artillery, due to the fact with all the smoke he couldn't get a good visual on his effect.

[gary]

The Union did offer some counter-battery fire, but allowed it to die off to deceive the Confederates into believing that their fire was effective. Those devilish Yankees.

[johan_steele]

Actuallt Gary i have read that the Union Arty was beginning to run shrot of ammo... tHe need to conserve ammo for the coming assualt probably led more to the decision to conserve ammo than anything.

[mobile_96]

Hunt wanted the already, slowly firing artillery, to stop firing as he didn't believe they were having much effect on the Confederate cannon position. Meade concured after receiving a message for Gen. Warren, watching the cannonade from atop Little Round Top, that the artillery were doing the enemy 'very little harm'. They and the Confederates were both accomplishing little more than "filling the valley with smoke," which might conceal the advance of enemy infantry. He therefore advised that the Union guns cease their fire in the hope that the Southerners would follow suit. Unknown at the time, the Union fire was doing some heavy damage to part of Pickett' regiments and companies.
As for Hunt running out of ammo, this was not likely. Even though Hunt was forced to move his reserves back a short distance to escape the Confederate fire, he still had the huge Sixth Corps Artillery brigade from which he could draw to replace batteries running out of ammunition or disabled by fire.
As it turned out, because Hunt stopped the Union firing, Alexander thought his cannonade had shut down the Union's cannon. He also saw batteries removing themselves from the main Union line, thinking about 18 had retired, but in reality it was only 2 6 gun sections, the 3rd being just behind the trees and considerably slowed down because of damage to equipment and heavy loss of men.
Info taken from The Gettysburg Campaign,A Study in Command, by Coddington, still the best overall book on the battle.
Chuck in Il.

[dawna]

I have several questions regarding the Battle of Gettysburg and I hope that it will be okay to post them to this thread: Did Lee hold Longstreet responsible for their defeat at Gettysburg, and if not, was General Lee ever put in the position of defending Longstreet after the war? Why Did Early wait until after Lee's death to publicly attack Longstreet? What did it take Longstreet 5 hours to position his troops after Lee's late morning orders? What did Longstreet do after the war? What caused the lack of communication with Jeb Stuart's unit during the Battle of Gettysburg? Did Buford ever receive the recogniton for his contribution on the first day of battle? What was Longstreet's option instead of Pickett's charge? How would the battle have turned out if Lt. Chamberlain had lost Little Round Top? How did the Town of Gettysburg cope with so many wounded men after the battle was over? Why did it take Lincoln 5 months to visit Gettysburg after the battle was over? Is if fact or fiction that A.P. Hill send a division into the town of Gettysburg to purchase shoes?

A general question regarding the Homeguard...what were the qualifications in order to join and how effective were they?

I hope that you will bear with the thirst for knowledge of a green cadet.

Thank you in advance.

Dawna

[hoosier]

Boy, what a lot of questions!

I'm only going to try to answer a few of them.

No, I don't believe Lee blamed Longstreet for the loss at Gettysburg. Lee took personal responsibility for the failure of the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble charge. He didn't try to lay the blame on anybody else but himself. Longstreet remained one of Lee's most trusted generals.

I believe it is fiction that Hill sent a division into Gettysburg looking for shoes. If you wanted to send out a foraging expedition for shoes, you wouldn't send a whole division to do it. I'm inclined to think that the Confederates' immediate objective was Harrisburg, and Hill's troops were just moving along in that general direction. I don't think they were expecting to find shoes. I don't think they were expecting to find the Union Army, either.

I have to make a small correction to your question about the action on Little Round Top - the commander of the 20th Maine was Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Lt. Chamberlain was Tom, Joshua's brother. As for what would have happened if the 20th Maine had been unable to hold - that's a good question, one we might mull over on the "What If" board. Certainly would have made things tougher for the Union.

[dawna]

Thank you for your response and the correction to my typo. I have so many questions and I'm sure that this all must seem tedious to people who have so much experience and knowledge. But I do appreciate you taking the time to answer my questions as I am particularly interested in the Battle of Gettysburg, and General Longstreet.

Dawna

Ok, this is from Robertson’s book on A.P. Hill.

'With Pender’s division at hand, Heth gave permission for Pettigrew’s large brigade to proceed to Gettysburg, “search the town for supplies (especially shoes), and return the same day.”'

They ran into troops but at this stage all intelligence indicated it was merely small groups of cavalry.

‘Pettigrew knew Lee did not want to bring on a battle so he withdrew and rode back to Cashtown to inform Heth that Federals of undetermined strength were in Gettysburg.

Heth was listening to Pettigrew's report when Hill joined them.

Hill quickly dismissed Pettigrew's concerns. "The only force at Gettysburg is cavalry," he said "probably a detachment of observation. I am just from General Lee, and the information he has from scouts corroborates what I have received from mine---that is, the enemy is still at Middleburg and not yet struck their tents."

Heth then said “If there is no objection, then I will take my division tomorrow and go to Gettysburg and get those shoes”

“None in the world,” Hill replied without hesitation.

'Hill duly informed Lee of the situation and stated his intention “ to advance the next morning and discover what is in my front.”'

'When Hill sent Heth out on Wednesday his final orders were succinct and to the point: “ Do not bring on an engagement.” '.....

So there is at least some truth to it. But the engagement that was difficult to withdraw from came the next day.

Recon with infantry in force would indicate the cavalry they had on hand was not in place to help.


Dawna,
Never hesitate to ask us anything. It isn't tedious at all. And you are more than welcome.



(Message edited by aphillbilly on August 20, 2004)