Confederate artillery strategy

[Admiral_Porter]

I don't know buff.

I do know that Baldy's artillery made for good target practice on the second day. This delayed Ewell's attack on the Federal right.

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by milhistbuff1

Coming back to the artillery discussion that began this thread, was there ever a credible explanation for why Ewell's artillery was not sending more than a few shots into Hancock's lines via enfilade fire. Had Ewell's arty fire sufficiently bloodied Hancock and his reserves, among them the 20th ME Pickett might have broke through with enough to do some heavy damage. Since Alexander's and Hill's batteries were doing little damage, it was doubly important.
Respectfully,
Matt

Latimer got cut up on Benner's Hill, showing that any further attempts to mass artillery would be likewise defeated. Anyway, Ewell's guns couldn't hit Hancock's line. Even assuming that the bombardment was more effective, there were just too many reserves to plug any gap.
Incidentally, the 20th ME was far from the Pickett's Charge area, contrary to the "Gettysburg" depiction. It was massed next to the III Corps near the Wheatfield.

Respectfully

[whitworth]

The Confederate generals, including Lee, certainly did not have good control of a limited supply of artillery ammunition. The Confederates ran out of long-range ammunition. Several of the reports and writings of Confederate officers say so.

How incompetent were the Confederate artillery crews? Were they fresh enough to engage in two hours of artillery fire on July 3?

How could the ANV really break through Cemetery Ridge and hold the gains without enough artillery ammunition?

[milhistbuff1]

The problem is Lee didn't have a supply line at all. The incompetence was not in the crews, but in that bumbling fool named William Pendleton. His swiping of Richardsons batteries without informing Porter Alexander is simply one example of his incompetence.
Respectfully,
Matt

[manofdreds]

Speaking of the artillery arm of the ANV. During the winter of 1862-1863 Lee should've given a directive for Pendleton to reorganize the artillery. Not just in the form of battalions but in moving guns around to form a more homogenous battery. How can a battery be truly effective with so many different calibres within a battery: i.e. (Richmond "Hampden" (Virginia) Artillery 2-12 pdr Napoleons, 1-3" Rifle, 1-10 pdr Parrott, 90) or Lynchburg "Lee" (Virginia) Battery - (1-3" Rifle, 1-10 pdr Parrott, 2-20 pdr Parrotts, 90)

Another poor staff choice by Lee having Pendleton as chief of Arty.

[whitworth]

Historians failed, in most cases, if not all, to tell of the failure of Confederate artillery.
The fact is, that Confederate artillery failed to destroy the AoP artillery and the infantry on Cemetery Ridge on July 3.
Both Generals Henry J. Hunt and John Gibbon, a division commander in Hancock's Corps, both artillery experts, later wrote of errors in the Confederate artillery barrage. The Confederate artillery attack was both too dispersed and inaccurate.

Alexander ran out of long range artillery ammunition, just before Pickett's Charge. That meant the Confederate army could not effectively follow up any lodgment captured by Pickett. That really meant the "high water mark" was on Seminary Ridge and not on Cemetery Ridge.

The Confederate command failed to inventory their artillery ammunition and decide how much would get used on July 3. It was a major error. Historians seem to not inventory major errors of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Confederate artillery was not highly regarded by many officers in the Army of the Potomac. Was this the achilles heel of the Army of Northern Virginia, that R. E. Lee should have given more attention? How does an army launch a major assault on defensive lines without an adequate supply of offensive artillery ammunition left? Do we assume the the Confederates thought the AoP would give the worst performance possible and just crack and retreat?
My perspective is that the battle was lost on the first step of the first private in Pickett's division.