"One hand behind its back"

[samgrant]

Shelby Foote made this well known, and often quoted, opinion:

"I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back. At the same time the war was going on, the Homestead act was being passed, all these marvelous inventions were going on... If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War. "

Some folks interpret this as being some kind of "lost cause" excuse.

We do know about the advantages that the federals had over the rebels, in manpower and industry and transportation, to name a few.

We also know that at some points, the rebels came within reach of ending the war on their own terms.

So I ask, what do you think of what Foote said about that? How do you interpret it ? Just exactly what do you think he meant by that?

And, if you agree with Foote, in this regard, just what do you think that that "other hand" might have consisted of? What was the "other hand" that the North could have brought from behind it's back, if it needed to?


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[larry_cockerham]

Of course I doubt anyone will ever know exactly what was in Shelby Foote's mind at this point aside from what he wrote. Seems to me he is merely referring to the untapped industrial and human strength of the northern states if such really existed. To have potential is one thing, but to put it in the field making war is quite another thing. After three and a half to four years, the US Army was still probably doing about as well as it could logistically, thanks greatly to Grant and Sherman. Could the effort have realistically been more brutal or effective as Foote suggests? I doubt it. I think Foot was surprised at the degree of success that the Confederate armies had. With the industrial and logistical strength of the north, that shouldn't have happened. I think that is Foot's point. There was more fight there than was ever brought to the field? Perhaps bureauracy was a limiting factor much as it often is today.

[timewalker]

Foote is no doubt looking at the unprecedented economic growth in the North during the war, but even under "full mobilization" during WWII the US also experienced tremendous economic growth.

As far as the North "taking its other hand out" I do not think that was possible from a political sense in that Licoln and Chase were having enough trouble financing the war as it was. Did Foote really think that with additional Southern success those political and funding problem would go away?

Besides, the North already had more than enough men and material in the field to defeat the South all through the war. The South only lasted as long as it did because of "bone head plays" by the likes of McClellan, Halleck, Burnsides, Hooker, et al. I have often argued that given the numbers and equipment of the AoP, it should have been able to defeat the South in 62 or 63 and probably should have during the Peninsula Campaign, Chancellorsville, or Antietem. Any of these, with competant generalship, could have been a resounding Union victory.

As Lincoln said, once the North found the proper general, the war was as good as over.

[ole]

Foote's "other hand" theory has always struck me as virtually true. We saw the hand begin to emerge when Lincoln brought Grant east. Had there been a Grant available to him in the early years, the north had the overwhelming power to steamroller the Confederacy at any time Lincoln could have managed to let slip the dogs of war. It was not that the hand wasn't there, it was that the will and the ability to bring it out were politically unavailable. I don't know what it would have taken to allow him to bring it out, but it was there.

Foote was simply expressing, somewhat poetically, what many suspect: the war was a noble expression of extreme foolishness -- not unlike an alchohol-induced bravado, as in, "I don't care if he outweighs me by 100 pounds and is a professional fighter. I don't like his attitude so I'll mosey over and punch his nose." He is constrained from murdelizing you, but you can carry that forebearance only so far.

I've rambled this far, guess I'll ramble a little more. I'm reminded of the fight between Dragline and Cool Hand Luke. Luke was more than game and comes off as an example of nobility to be admired, but he had lost the fight before it started. Dragline simply brought out the other hand.

Think about it.

ole

[67th Tigers]

Foote's "one hand" quote is one of the silliest things I've ever read. Yes, more of an effort could be made, but not without fundamental shifts in the Federal social structure. The "other hand" is so unacceptable (conscription at bayonetpoint, hangin all the deserters, phalanxes of spear armed Federals with the instruction to pick up the musket if the man in front is hit etc.) that the Federals would not be able to use it.

As for the economy, it recovered from the recession of the late 1850's, but did not in fact expand. In fact the economy nosedived (by a similar % as the Great Depression of the 1920's-30's) and did not return to the highs of 1853 (when the Crimean war disrupted the global economy) until the 1880's.

Similarly, while the US economy expanded in WW1 and 2 before US entry into the war, it shrank after US entry.

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

As for Shelby Foote's comment with the Union having one armed 'tied behind their back,' statement -- for me, personally as an observer of both sides--both armies had their one hand tied behind their back. Mostly for the Confederates--food and supplies; for the Union -- leadership within the ranks, to which numbers didn't match results. Until Lincoln had General Grant to whom utilized Sherman and Sheridan; Grant still had lost the many lives of soldiers equal to Lee's Army to go 'stalemate/draw.' Lee did with less--however, he had his 'soldier's love, admiration and they would follow Lee into hell if need be. The defeat of the Confederate Army wasn't in leadership, soldier's dedication and the like--as what soldiers remained were dedicated and quality. On the other hand; the Union finally got their faith in leadership when they were going forward and not beaten back into a retreat pattern. Cavalry was better used and skills sharpened. Gen. JEB Stuart knew this as did Lee. The Union Army finally 'grew up.'

Each Army had their one hand tied behind their backs, in my opinion. Furthermore, the better equipped Union--as well as having a bigger production of food and equipment base then the Confederacy; once the railroads were cut off from the Confederacy, the food cut off as well as the dwindling supplies--the Confederacy was defeated more by the death within the Confederacy, e.g. lack of supplies for beasts and men, lack of replacements of many things--was something that wasn't seen in a larger sense. Previously, other states compensated for another's lack of production in war, e.g. Mexican, 1812, Revolutionary, skirmishes, et. al.

Union, was accessible to many states to which thankfully, did not suffer war in their fields and gave as they were able to give. Amish due to religious beliefs do not fight--so they were productive in the field.

As far as economics dropping during war, it is true-- however, agriculture was the biggest 'economic' base for the USA; industrial was coming of age with the harnessing of steam, hydrolics and such. However, during World War II; and wars prior--everybody fought in their own way--folks at home did their share and sacrifices for the war effort--Wars afterwards, did not change greatly the spending habits of the population as drasticly with wars prior. Even today, as Iraq and such go on--we haven't been forced into food stamps, ration books, for food, gas, clothing and such.

Economic halts during World War II, especially -- was when auto factories halted making cars to make tanks, jeeps, airplanes, etc.; other factories converted into making ammunition, uniforms, etc. Once war ended, they converted back.

But, I also agree--global economics affects/effects everybody; to include the Union and Confederacy, in regard to that era.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

Note: Parents grew up in the Great Depression, one city and one in rural farmland.

[whitworth]

In fact he was only saying the same thing Margaret Mitchell said in 'Gone With The Wind' through one Rhett Butler.

If one studies the logistics of the war, it is not at all shocking the Confederacy lost the war. Instead, any shock is that it held out in some areas for nearly four years. But then it was holding on to only some states in the last 2 and half years of the war.

Many of the Confederate territorial aims were lost in the first and second year of the war.
The Confederacy lost the logistical and military ability to control Missouri, Kentucky, western Tennessee and western Virginia by 1862. Lost Memphis and New Orleans, both in early 1862. It had to retreat out of the Territory of New Mexico, because of a lack of adequate supplies in 1862 and never mounted a successful invasion in later years.
True the Confederacy was able to hold on to Vicksburg until mid 1863 and kept Atlanta as a supply base until September 1864. But even then the Confederacy was getting to be a shell of itself and its former size and desired size.

And no slave empire was going to survive with only six or seven states.

[Blockaderunner]

I have always taken the meaning to be that the Union could have fielded much larger armies. But could they? The Union heavily outnumbered the Confederates on all fronts, but could they have supported larger armies? For instance, what would have happened if Sherman had marched for Atlanta with 250,000 men. The supply lines stretched back to the Tennessee border and beyond. Personally, I think the chances of supplying such a force would be close to impossible.

[OpnDownfall]

Whitworth, is probably closest to the truth, Foote, was just expressing the truth, that the potential for succerssfully waging a long and ever expanding war, resided almost exclusively in the North. It is indeed likely that Foote was really expressing a gentle reminder of why the Union victory took as long as it did.
For various reasons, the North never fully engage all it's industrial and manpower resources in fighting the war. (as was the case in all of America's so-called total wars of the 20th Century)

[ole]

Blockade said:

I have always taken the meaning to be that the Union could have fielded much larger armies. But could they? The Union heavily outnumbered the Confederates on all fronts, but could they have supported larger armies? For instance, what would have happened if Sherman had marched for Atlanta with 250,000 men. The supply lines stretched back to the Tennessee border and beyond. Personally, I think the chances of supplying such a force would be close to impossible.

Point well made and taken. But, yes, it might have taken an extra day or so, but the Union could have built another track to supply Sherman's 250,000 men. And built the extra cars and engines. The means were there. The northern and western farmers were feeding Europe while they were feeding the Federal armies.

Although I don't precisely agree with Shelby Foote, he wasn't far wrong. It would be like me (I love analogies) going into a salon (yes, I spelled it right) with 10 Harleys parked out front. Then I say, I want four of you guys to come out to the parking lot and dance with me. (Oooooops. 10 bikes. That leaves six.) That's the other hand.

ole