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Upon further reflection and reading, I think Foote is far off the mark. The Army of the Potomac and Army of the James actually fell to 44,000 effectives in the fall of 1864. Recruiting was not working and many of the men they were getting were pretty much the dregs. Draft riots were breaking out and the North was near financial bankruptcy. The peace movement was gaining strength.
I think with a few more Confederate victories, the North was more likely to throw in the towel than "bring out the other hand."
I think it was in Flags of Our Fathers where they said that democracies can only fight wars for 5 years before the people get tired of it and demand peace.
While Lincoln had the political will to bring out the other hand, I am not sure that he had the political capital to accomplish it.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Upon further reflection and reading, I think Foote is far off the mark. The Army of the Potomac and Army of the James actually fell to 44,000 effectives in the fall of 1864. Recruiting was not working and many of the men they were getting were pretty much the dregs. Draft riots were breaking out and the North was near financial bankruptcy. The peace movement was gaining strength.
Close, Timewalker, but if you want a cigar for that, you'll have to go elsewhere. First, 44,000 in the two armis? Naah.
I will go with you on the idea that when the people run things, about five years is all you can expect. But I drop the ball when five years is the bottom of the ninth, and it's 7 to 3 with two outs. Cain't happen, bro.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
While Lincoln had the political will to bring out the other hand, I am not sure that he had the political capital to accomplish it.
Guess we're not ever going to really know, are we? I believe there was more to tap. And you don't.
It isn't the same thing, but it almost is -- WWII. There was no way to mobilize to the point of meeting a two-front war. Remind me if I'm wrong, but I'm reasonably certain that we were on the winning side in both fronts? Seems that this sort of thing was Foote's extra arm?
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Guess we're not ever going to really know, are we? I believe there was more to tap. And you don't.
It isn't the same thing, but it almost is -- WWII. There was no way to mobilize to the point of meeting a two-front war. Remind me if I'm wrong, but I'm reasonably certain that we were on the winning side in both fronts? Seems that this sort of thing was Foote's extra arm?
ole
Perhaps, but I think the mood of the country was considerably different in WWII than the Civil War. You did not have draft riots, etc. during WWII. I think the North had the capacity to spare, but not the collective will to use it.
It is, I admit, rather hypothetical and I readily admit that I could be wrong. It certainly has been the traditional failing of the enemies of the United States that they did not believe the United States had the will to fight as long and hard as was necessary for victory.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Is Foote speaking of "Total War" where the nation's entire economic effort is devoted to the war machinery and ultimately, to victory? It's like the guns or butter argument whereas society could have one, but never both concurrently.
If this is indeed what Foote was writing of, there are several flaws. First, there's an assumption that the Federal government could mobilize society into an all-out effort. That it organized the railroad to prioritize movement was a step in the right direction, but it couldn't mandate the cessation of the production of civilian products in favor of war material. But the means for the Federal government to extend itself to what could be done on WW II levels were not there. Nor was there public support for the Federal government like there was in WW II. There was a large peace-democrat movement back in the Civil War period (just like there's opposition to today's war). Second, Foote asserts that the South never had a chance (lost cause thinking?). James McPherson says there were several chances but that all were gone by the end of 1862.
"Upon further reflection and reading, I think Foote is far off the mark. The Army of the Potomac and Army of the James actually fell to 44,000 effectives in the fall of 1864."
By late 1864, the Confederacy would have settled for what territory?
They had lost Kentucky, Missouri, much of Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, western Tennessee, western Virginia and Atlanta.
By late 1864 the Confederate States was a figment of itself. It had Alabama, part of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and some of eastern Virginia.
And the Confederacy had no army to move Union forces permanently out of these controlled areas. By late 1864, the Confederacy would not have any great military successes.
When Lincoln was sworn in as President, there was no gov't less prepared for war tha the United States.
A miniscule, widely dispersed, army, a superanuated senior officer corps (many of whom were dough faces) and a War Dept. so tied in bureaucratic red tape that it was barely able to shuffle its paperwork from one bin to another.. A treasury with, almost literally, no money etc.
The directing and control of a nationwide war, was a work in progress all through the war. The point is that Lincon and his administration were activists, they met the challenges as they occurred, head on and found solutions to problems, rather than reason's something could not be done or reject programs, because 'it had never been done that way before'.
By mid 1863 and beyond, the war was won militarily, it was a matter of the war for the hearts and minds of the Unionist's something that Lincoln and his party knew a great deal about.
Lincoln was perfectly capable of leading the Union's war effort, and as others have noted, where Lincoln led, the people and Congress eventually followed.
It is true that of necessity, the North Had to fight with severe, political, social and industrial handicaps, but as the war progressed and the country learned the art of war making (almost from the ground up) the restraints of those handicaps lessened and as the war continued the other hand (of steel) was surely being loosened, until it was fully freed, had the south managed to survive the hand of iron..
"Upon further reflection and reading, I think Foote is far off the mark. The Army of the Potomac and Army of the James actually fell to 44,000 effectives in the fall of 1864."
By late 1864, the Confederacy would have settled for what territory?
They had lost Kentucky, Missouri, much of Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, western Tennessee, western Virginia and Atlanta.
By late 1864 the Confederate States was a figment of itself. It had Alabama, part of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and some of eastern Virginia.
And the Confederacy had no army to move Union forces permanently out of these controlled areas. By late 1864, the Confederacy would not have any great military successes.
My citation of the number of soldiers in the AoP and AoJ in 1864 was to show that Union manpower was not the inexhaustable supply that Foote and others seem to think it was. If as late as 1864, with the victories in Atlanta, the Union was unable to muster more troops, where was this "other hand" of which Foote speaks going to come from?
The Union was not completely behind the war effort and I do not believe further Confederate victories would have changed this for the better.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Ole, I respect your opinions and remarks. I posted a question the other day asking about the signifiance of the Triangular Field @ Gettysburg. I either never got a response or I couldn't find it. Would you enlighten me, please?
Believe I saw that and saw some responses to it. Maybe that was on another board. I'll look for it.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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