Civil War History - General DiscussionFor Discussions on Civil War Era Personalities, Politics, Issues, Campaigns, Battles, and more. Serious Civil War Discussions Only Please! All other posts will be deleted.
has a limited interest, over the decades, in the battles of significance, and not all aspects of the war.
A Civil War book on logistics, on intelligence, on foreign policy decisions gets little or no interest. Yet one can see the results of the war in what happened in these sub-fields.
We seem to have unlimited knowledge and debate over why General Longstreet slowly approached Cemetery Ridge on July 2, but never a good reason why. Of course, who studies where the U.S. Signal Corps was on July 2nd, and what they were observing. For all practical Civil War reading purposes, the Army of the Potomac Signal Corps never existed.
I believe it's because of the political and symbolic importance of the east. The west was more important, militarily. but for both sides, their souls were but a hundred miles apart on the east cost. as a result, Richmond, and Washington took on a significance exponetially more valuable than its actual worth to the war effort. Those two cities and the armies committed to defending/taking them, thus got most of the press attention, as well as for geographic reasons.
Gettysburg is studied ad infinitum more than others because it is the last possible turning point, politically. Had Lee won at Gettysburg without destroying himself in the process, a march on Washington DC would have commenced, thus nullifying the greater military defeat of Vicksburg.
Just as the fall of Paris and Mexico City ended the war for all intensive purposes in 1815, and 47-48 , so would Washington's fall have damaged the Northern War effort, maybe beyond repair....
Someone raised the revolution, there were far fewer men under arms, thus more likely that someone would stand out, even if just in local lore.
In contrast the Civil War was so large in scope and scale that standards underwent an enormous shift, the extraordinary of 1859, had become commonplace. For instance, look at the discussions by the CSA whether or not to mine the James River. In 1861, it was ungentlemenly and dishonorable, by 1864, not only commonplace, but necessary. when honor is faced off against self-preservation, many times, honor will yield.
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
I write about what interests me. That's why I've had a wide variety of subjects, ranging from The Battle of Monroe's Crossroads (March 10, 1865) to and including Gettysburg.
Eric
__________________ “Cavalry is the whirlwind of war. Batteries thunder and crush - - infantry forms the conflicts, surge and shock, but it is the charge of horse - - a wild erratic horse - - that seems the very tempest of the strife. Half man, half brute, it knows no fear - - an awful swell of carnage and commotion - - a terrible, relentless deluge of trampling hoofs and hewing steel.”
Battles, particularly, a Perryville, Kentucky should be remembered more often. But Perryville is more than a vicious draw of two brave armies. It also is on close inspection, a synopsis of why the war went badly for the Confederacy.
Perryville was the last gasp of the Confederacy to greatly control Kentucky. It had later raids, as did Missouri and western Virginia, but Perryville showed a valiant army and an inherent weakness. That weakness was strategic supply problems. A tale of an army out of touch with a supply system and an army that ran out of ammunition and forage, quite quickly.
The Union army could bring more troops to the point of attack, eventually, and keep them supplied.
Perhaps by avoiding the Battle of Perryville, we are allowed for a time to imagine some sort of Confederate victory; a victory the Perryville's would not allow.
The Confederacy could fight once at a Perryville, but never hold it for long.
It was combating a Union army that had supply depots across the northern edge of Kentucky, where the Ohio River layed. The Confederates had no railroads to move supplies inland in Kentucky, and the Union had less distance to travel, from those depots, to combat the lesser sized army fielded by the Confederates.
The Confederacy could never hold Kentucky, despite the bravery of its armies. It had too few supplies, too few effective ways to get those supplies to the small army that received them. It had both the components of victory and the reasons for defeat.
Perhaps it is too uncomfortable to consider that Kentucky was never winable. That the Confederacy could never really imagine, holding all the states represented in their battle flag. Thirteen stars - too far beyond their reach. Even at the beginning.
There are many battles that deserve more focus and study then the most notable ones.
Brandy Station was where the Cavalry really pit against one another and for many hours with charge after charge. This is when the US Cavalry 'grew up' per se. First Bethal is another battle, as is Five Forks,
Seven Pines, etc.
Just like there are more generals that are under the radar and though important, are not as 'recognized.' The same with Brevet Generals on the Union side.
To me, personally --there is much furtile ground to explore, study, appreciate and discuss. The 'behind the scenes' per se is there for all of us to look into.
I'm looking forward to anybody who has knowledge about Brig. General States Rights Gist of the CSA, who was killed at the battle of Franklin, Nov. 30, 1864. One of the many unique names if not below the radar Generals; to include Brig. General Robert Selden Garrnet, cousin of General Richard "Dick" B. Garnett who was killed at Gettysburg. Brig. General Robert S. Garnett is reported to be the first CSA General killed in the Civil War; on July 13, 1861 at Corrick's Ford.
Battles, particularly, a Perryville, Kentucky should be remembered more often. But Perryville is more than a vicious draw of two brave armies. It also is on close inspection, a synopsis of why the war went badly for the Confederacy.
Perryville was the last gasp of the Confederacy to greatly control Kentucky. It had later raids, as did Missouri and western Virginia, but Perryville showed a valiant army and an inherent weakness. That weakness was strategic supply problems. A tale of an army out of touch with a supply system and an army that ran out of ammunition and forage, quite quickly.
The Union army could bring more troops to the point of attack, eventually, and keep them supplied.
Perhaps by avoiding the Battle of Perryville, we are allowed for a time to imagine some sort of Confederate victory; a victory the Perryville's would not allow.
The Confederacy could fight once at a Perryville, but never hold it for long.
It was combating a Union army that had supply depots across the northern edge of Kentucky, where the Ohio River layed. The Confederates had no railroads to move supplies inland in Kentucky, and the Union had less distance to travel, from those depots, to combat the lesser sized army fielded by the Confederates.
The Confederacy could never hold Kentucky, despite the bravery of its armies. It had too few supplies, too few effective ways to get those supplies to the small army that received them. It had both the components of victory and the reasons for defeat.
Perhaps it is too uncomfortable to consider that Kentucky was never winable. That the Confederacy could never really imagine, holding all the states represented in their battle flag. Thirteen stars - too far beyond their reach. Even at the beginning.
Whitworth, this is well stated and I believe accurate opinions, for what that's worth, (and with me you never know the value...too many scholars lurking around here.) Seems to me the battle at Fishing Hook Creek - Mill Springs, Kentucky early in the war had similar characteristics, ie, a group of Tennessee farmboys trying to take on the US Army. Mismatch, much like Vanderbilt playing a real football team. The establishment of Camp Nelson as a federal supply depot, hospital etc. brought the end to Confederate activity in that area for the most part.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Last edited by larry_cockerham; 03-26-2008 at 11:14 PM.
All the little ones were important in setting up the larger ones. Seems that the books concentrate on a watershed moment. There have been lately, for example, books on Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. There's hope for the lead-in activities and follow-ups. The scholarship is still maturing.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
There is a book that was written a few years ago about the Forrests' raid through Middle Tennessee in 1864. It is less than two hundred pages but filled with some very interesting facts. The book is called "The Railroad War".
The book is well written and very well researched. It is hard to find as it is out of print. Another thing about this book is that it was written by a southener about what happened in his home area. The author actually shows no bias to any side in this question. It is just "the facts" and the results.
__________________ Located near Indianapolis, home of Col. Eli Lilly and the Eli Lilly Civil War Museum
i also think "ease" of information is also a reason for certain battles to rise to the top of the media's glass. Larger battles are easier to research and are usually well documented whereas smaller battles take time and effort to research and require alot of "digging" through old archives and records. Unfortunately people who are willing to do that or even enjoy doing that are few and far between (although there is no shortage of them here on this web site..kudos to you all). I would think that is one of the factors of why certain battles get more lime light than others. BTW I'm kinda sweet on Antietam, ggg grampa Andrew Bermingham wounded there fighting with 69th N.Y. inf. GO IRISH!
There are similarities between battles at Gettysburg, Westport(Kansas City, Mo.) and Perryville, Kentucky. Lee at Gettysburg, Price at Westport, and Bragg at Perryville all had the same severe problem, a limited amount of ammunition and supplies. None had enough supplies to sustain their army for long, as an offensive army.
Bragg in his 1862 raid into Kentucky had some 10 day supplies. At Perryville, Bragg was nearly 300 miles from his military depot in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The Union army had a great depot, some eighty miles away at Louisville, Kentucky, served by steamboats on the Ohio River. Bragg couldn't sustain a relatively small army in Kentucky; the Union had the supplies to sustain an army of 60,000. Time wasn't on Bragg's watch, as he made a quick retreat back to Tennessee.
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