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I'm an American, and seeing that statue--I am embarrassed. Indeed, it is not in the likeness of William Wallace. If it was to have been more authentic, I would have thought they would at least use the old Scotish language on shield, foot and such of the statue.
Mel Gibson is a nice looking man however, he walked away alive and had all his body's mechanical parts. William Wallace, if memory serves me correctly, was drawn, quartered and his head shoved on a pike for all to see as to warn others should they wish to rise up as Wallace.
Thank you for your excellent link and source. Made for some fascinating reading and a bit of history I had not encountered before.
You, sir, are a teacher of history.
At least, to this old man.
Thank you again.
Sincerely,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Reliable firearms made a dense target like an infantry square terribly vulnerable. Percussion caps made them less useful; rifled muskets even more so. Breechloaders and repeaters could tear them apart from cover. Better and rifled artillery meant they could be blown to shreds from even longer ranges.
However, that was always the case. What we're talking about is combined arms warfare, or, in the parlance of the time, the proper uses of the three arms. Also, they is no significant statistical difference in killing rates in that war depending on the weapons the combatants used, the rifled musket was not a significantly more deadly weapon in untrained hands.
This is the real weakness of both sides in the ACW, a lack of combined arms and a throwback to Frederickian tactics. This is not surprising as they used Jomini as their guide, and Jomini was a diehard of the old Prussian school.
In Napoleons time (which was presarged by some reforms dating from the Seven Years War) armies and corps de armees were combined arms formations. They had a core of infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry and a mobile force of artillery. Thus when they hit the cavalry was available for flank security and envelopment, the artillery could give close support etc.
When combined arms broke down you got debacles such as Ney's unsupported cavalry charges against Wellington at Waterloo, attacks ordered because he believed the enemy was retreating in disorder and the Pursuit phase of battle had been entered.
In the ACW, Armies were generally not combined arms. The three arms were generally treated as separate entities, and the infantry left to bear the brunt.
It's not difficult to imagine if Longstreet had a proper Napoleonic combined arms force of the 3rd day of Gettysburg a total success of that assault. The accompanying artillery could counterbattery the Federal guns and rake the defenders with Canister, the cavalry would prevent any envelopment such as Stannard's brigade swinging out (or if they did they'd be rapidly cut down and a hole opened for the cavalry to envelop the Federals).
This is not the only reason for lack of decision, at Gettysburg, for example, the train was 25 miles back at Winchester, and so a pursuit could not be organised for a significant amount of time.
Any American force coming up against a European force is going to be very roughly handled, and they have no means of exploiting any successes. The Europeans however only need to win once, and they'll smash the opposing army to pieces.
I wish I could find the specifics but when Emory Upto was teaching at the point he ran a War game where the British entered the war in 1863 IIRC. He ran it several times and every time the British were smashed. He was quite taken aback by the result.
Keep in mind that the French were thought to be the most advanced & best miltary in the world. They were thouroghly beaten by the Juaristas in Mexico. And a few years later got their head handed to them by the Prussians. The Austro Hungarians had also been thouroghly whipped by the Prussians which most of the nations on the Continent had thought had a third rate military.
Any European nation opting to enter into war w/ the US in the 1860's would have to come to the US fight on US soil against well equipped hardened veterans. I'll take any Brigade of the AoT against the Guards of 1863 and wipe the walls w/ them. THe AoT, either US or CS could march circles around a similar Brit or French force. Give me AJ Smith's boy w/ Wilsons Cav... Any similar sized European force would be in for the fight of their lives.
IMO only the Brits had an Army capabe of giving the US a run for its money.
__________________
Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
The planning figure in 1861-2 was to put 200,000 Rank and File into the field (half of them Canadians)
That's an interesting link. Thanks for posting it.
But like almost all sources on such things in history, it probably leans a bit to one side in its' appreciation of how things would go. For example, take this paragraph:
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The Canadian government had not exactly been zealous in providing for their own defence, but they were not exactly defenceless either. Canada had last defended her borders from filibustering US militia 20 years earlier, and Canadian Militia had won every engagement with the US, during this period they (Canada and the Maritimes) placed roughly 65,000 men on active service. It was these conflicts (the Patriote Rebellion, and Aroostook War) that informed British estimates of Canadian capability.
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Now there was an "Aroostock War" in 1838-39 over long-simmering tensions between Canadians and Americans over logging in the area. It was as close to bloodless as any war in the history of the world. There were no incidents that would rank even as small skirmishes, and the only thing that could be called military casualties seems to have arisen from a bar brawl in a tavern frequented by both sides. Maine called up several thousand Militia, but they never left their muster points.
The "Patriot War" was mainly a Canadian-on-Canadian affair (although the "Hunter's Lodges" of the "Patriots" existed on both sides of the Great Lakes). The idea was that the Peninsula containing Windsor was to be separated from Canada and join the US. But you'll find, for example, that the Michigan Militia foiled a "Patriot" attempt to seize Fort Gratiot and the United States Arsenal at Dearborn, while Patriots in the Detroit area seized US ships in Detroit to try to attack Amherstburg, and that an American General warned the British authorities of a "Patriot" attempt on Sandwich from Fighting Island. Again there is nothing here of an American-on-Canadian battel to measure capabilities in.
In short, any high opinion the British formed of the capability of Canadian Militia vs. American Militia was short on factual experience.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
However, that was always the case. What we're talking about is combined arms warfare, or, in the parlance of the time, the proper uses of the three arms. Also, they is no significant statistical difference in killing rates in that war depending on the weapons the combatants used, the rifled musket was not a significantly more deadly weapon in untrained hands.
This is the real weakness of both sides in the ACW, a lack of combined arms and a throwback to Frederickian tactics. This is not surprising as they used Jomini as their guide, and Jomini was a diehard of the old Prussian school.
In Napoleons time (which was presarged by some reforms dating from the Seven Years War) armies and corps de armees were combined arms formations. They had a core of infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry and a mobile force of artillery. Thus when they hit the cavalry was available for flank security and envelopment, the artillery could give close support etc.
When combined arms broke down you got debacles such as Ney's unsupported cavalry charges against Wellington at Waterloo, attacks ordered because he believed the enemy was retreating in disorder and the Pursuit phase of battle had been entered.
In the ACW, Armies were generally not combined arms. The three arms were generally treated as separate entities, and the infantry left to bear the brunt.
It's not difficult to imagine if Longstreet had a proper Napoleonic combined arms force of the 3rd day of Gettysburg a total success of that assault. The accompanying artillery could counterbattery the Federal guns and rake the defenders with Canister, the cavalry would prevent any envelopment such as Stannard's brigade swinging out (or if they did they'd be rapidly cut down and a hole opened for the cavalry to envelop the Federals).
This is not the only reason for lack of decision, at Gettysburg, for example, the train was 25 miles back at Winchester, and so a pursuit could not be organised for a significant amount of time.
Any American force coming up against a European force is going to be very roughly handled, and they have no means of exploiting any successes. The Europeans however only need to win once, and they'll smash the opposing army to pieces.
I have to respectfully disagree. Napoleaonic combined arms were indeed made obsolete by rifled muskets and rifled artillery. The Confederates did attempt counterbattery fire at Gettysburg. It failed. Further, your conjecture that they would have used artillery to rake the defenders with canister was impossible given the distances involved. The Confederate artillery was too far away to use canister to rake the defenders. Additionally, a cavalry charge would have been over the same long field and subject to enfilade fire from Union artillery on the flanks and devastating fire at long range from rifled muskets. A horse and rider make a very large target, even for relatively untrained riflemen.
Other than lacking cavalry, Lee's attack on the third day at Gettysburg was a model of Napoleonic tactics, with massed artillery to break the Union line followed by infantry to break the center. However, the increased range of rifled artillery and muskets make such a proposition iffy, at best.
Given their experience after years of "on the job training" I certainly cannot agree that the AoP or ANV would have been out-generalled by Europeans using combined arms tactics.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
However, that was always the case. What we're talking about is combined arms warfare, or, in the parlance of the time, the proper uses of the three arms. Also, they is no significant statistical difference in killing rates in that war depending on the weapons the combatants used, the rifled musket was not a significantly more deadly weapon in untrained hands.
This is the real weakness of both sides in the ACW, a lack of combined arms and a throwback to Frederickian tactics. This is not surprising as they used Jomini as their guide, and Jomini was a diehard of the old Prussian school.
In Napoleons time (which was presarged by some reforms dating from the Seven Years War) armies and corps de armees were combined arms formations. They had a core of infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry and a mobile force of artillery. Thus when they hit the cavalry was available for flank security and envelopment, the artillery could give close support etc.
When combined arms broke down you got debacles such as Ney's unsupported cavalry charges against Wellington at Waterloo, attacks ordered because he believed the enemy was retreating in disorder and the Pursuit phase of battle had been entered.
In the ACW, Armies were generally not combined arms. The three arms were generally treated as separate entities, and the infantry left to bear the brunt.
It's not difficult to imagine if Longstreet had a proper Napoleonic combined arms force of the 3rd day of Gettysburg a total success of that assault. The accompanying artillery could counterbattery the Federal guns and rake the defenders with Canister, the cavalry would prevent any envelopment such as Stannard's brigade swinging out (or if they did they'd be rapidly cut down and a hole opened for the cavalry to envelop the Federals).
This is not the only reason for lack of decision, at Gettysburg, for example, the train was 25 miles back at Winchester, and so a pursuit could not be organised for a significant amount of time.
Any American force coming up against a European force is going to be very roughly handled, and they have no means of exploiting any successes. The Europeans however only need to win once, and they'll smash the opposing army to pieces.
I have to disagree with your use of Napoleonic tactics. Any battery the Rebs might have had on day 3, would never have gotten close enough to rake the defenders with canister. True that they might counterbattery the federal canon, but at most that takes out th artillery. The union still had more than enough infantry to repel an assault with or without artillery. So say the rebs to silence all the canon, or most of it, how do they get the grape and canister within effective range of the defenders behind those walls? They have to wheel it up to the front, across that wide open field once again, all the while subjecting themselves to the same flanking fire the infantry did. The horses would not survive, they are much larger targets. The men would not be able to fire the canons, for fear of hitting the reb infantry on the charge. They cannot put the canon in front of the reb infantry, that close to the federal infantry because again, they would be mowed down before ever getting off a shot. And besides, the Rebs had artillery attached to the infantry, not like the union that kept it as a separate entity. Artillery was a nuisance in this war, but not affective as an attack force. Napoleonic tactics were on the way out, and for a good reason.
__________________
"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
However, that was always the case. What we're talking about is combined arms warfare, or, in the parlance of the time, the proper uses of the three arms. Also, they is no significant statistical difference in killing rates in that war depending on the weapons the combatants used, the rifled musket was not a significantly more deadly weapon in untrained hands.
Percussion caps on muzzle-loaders had two major improvements on the battlefield:
1) they were more likely to work than flintlocks (i.e., actually fire when the trigger was pulled). I've asked around over the years, of people with substantial experience with black powder weapons. Generally, their feeling is that a regiment of 1,000 men firing a volley would get roughly an extra 50 shots off if they were using percussion caps instead of flintlocks.
2) percussion caps were likely to work in the wet, where flintlocks were not. This was a major difference for the infantry, who could now actually shoot at the cavalry in wet weather
Rifles as opposed to smoothbores essentially increased range and accuracy. Since what we are talking about here is firing at formations -- not individual targets -- this really did have an effect on when and where officers would have their men fire upon other units. One rifleman trying to hit a single man at 200 yards is very difficult; a regiment trying to score hits on another regiment at 200 yards is a different type of thing. Particularly if the target regiment is made up of big targets like cavalrymen on horses, where a stumbling horse might take out several other men and horses.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
This is the real weakness of both sides in the ACW, a lack of combined arms and a throwback to Frederickian tactics. This is not surprising as they used Jomini as their guide, and Jomini was a diehard of the old Prussian school.
Jomini was a Swiss officer serving in the French Army, praised for his theoretical studies by Napoleon and made cheif-of-staff to Marshal Ney. Later he switched allegiance to the Russians. He was not a Prussian and never served with that Army. The tactical model he preached was Napoleon's, not Frederick the Great's.
Very few West Point cadets studied Jomini in any depth, although they all knew some catch-phrases from his work. Not many actually read French. There was really only one course at West Point on Military strategy and tactics in those days, or military history; it was short (a few weeks) and taught by Mahan. It was mainly on small units, outpost tactics, etc. Beauregard was very familiar with Jomini, however, as was R. E. Lee (a member of the Napoleonic Society at West Point when he was Superintendant there).
The Prussian you are thinking of is Clausewitz. He served in the Napoleonic Wars as a Prussian officer, fled to Russia when Napoleon conquered the place, and came back after 1812 to help rebuild the Prussian Army. Clausewitz was not translated into English until after the Civil War, IIRR, and almost no US officer spoke German. His work was essentially unknown to West Point officers.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
In Napoleons time (which was presarged by some reforms dating from the Seven Years War) armies and corps de armees were combined arms formations. They had a core of infantry, supported by a large body of cavalry and a mobile force of artillery. Thus when they hit the cavalry was available for flank security and envelopment, the artillery could give close support etc.
Close enough. But Frederick the Great made his cavalry an important battlefield force, and the French brought them back to the forefront 1793-1815. Napoleon also maintained separate all-cavalry corps with no infantry attached to use as a striking force: I believe he has four of them at Waterloo. In addition, you'll find that Napoleon adjusted the composition of his Corps according to the abilities of the commander; apparently he didn't believe Augereau could handle cavalry, so you will always find his corps has very little cavalry (almost none), while a Soult, a Davout, a Lannes, or a Massena has cavalry assigned to his corps in strength.
Napoleon always maintained a strong artillery force under his immediate command to be used at a point of decision.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
When combined arms broke down you got debacles such as Ney's unsupported cavalry charges against Wellington at Waterloo, attacks ordered because he believed the enemy was retreating in disorder and the Pursuit phase of battle had been entered.
Ney certainly botched it; that was Napoelon's immediate assessment when he saw the cavalry moving, that it was much too early.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
In the ACW, Armies were generally not combined arms. The three arms were generally treated as separate entities, and the infantry left to bear the brunt.
Well, yes-and-no as most of these things are. Rifles changed this by changing the spacing of the units. Gaps in the line could now be effectively covered by infantry fire, where they could not be in 1815 in Europe or even 1846 in Mexico.
For example, after Friedland in 1807, the battle-winning tactic of Napoleonic days was to push the artillery up to close range and blow a hole through the enemy line. Close range here was considered to be anything down to about 60 yards. If you try to push guns forward like that in the ACW, the enemy infantry will shoot your artillerymen and horses to pieces with their rifles, and you'll end up with a bunch of abandoned guns on the battlefield. The battlefield environment after percussion-capped rifles come into mass use is simply not the same as it was with flintlock smoothbores -- similar, but different. If you don't pay attention to those differences in your tactics, you end up dead and defeated.
OTOH, artillery in the defense was just as powerful as always. Witness what Mendenhall's massed guns could do at Stones River/Murfreesboro (both days) and Chickamauga (first day, almost again on the second day). Why? Because the enemy had to advance into their killing field, instead of the artillery moving into the enemy's.
On cavalry, notice the mass Union charge at New Market, as Napoleonic a moment as you'll find in the entire Civil War. When it was launched, there were Union officers who took one look (3,000 troopers headed for a gap in the Confederate center) and assumed the day was won for the Union. If that charge goes home, Breckinridge's Army will be destroyed. Yet the charge was shot into the ground by some Confederate infantry and artillery, never reaching the Confederate line.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
It's not difficult to imagine if Longstreet had a proper Napoleonic combined arms force of the 3rd day of Gettysburg a total success of that assault. The accompanying artillery could counterbattery the Federal guns and rake the defenders with Canister, the cavalry would prevent any envelopment such as Stannard's brigade swinging out (or if they did they'd be rapidly cut down and a hole opened for the cavalry to envelop the Federals).
Longstreet had plenty of artillery, and I don't see where cavalry would have made much difference in that field. Longstreet's artillery chopped up the forces around the Peach Orchard pretty well. What you are imagining is artillery being pushed forward the way French artillerymen like Senarmont did from Friedland in 1807 on in the Napoleonic wars, and that generally did not work in the day of mass deployment of percussion-capped rifled muskets (even worse in the days of breechloaders and repeaters). When you try to advance your guns to 150-100-75 yards of the enemy, you end up with lots of dead artillerymen and horses, and abandoned guns.
On cavalry, Longstreet had little (just Black's men, AFAIK, which Lee assigned to him just before he moved out to guide him) and they would mainly make big targets in that field and jam up movement. You will certainly not be making much use of them around the Round Tops. At best you might see Rebel cavalry having the same type of "success" that Kilpatrick and Farnsworth had the following day in the same area.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
This is not the only reason for lack of decision, at Gettysburg, for example, the train was 25 miles back at Winchester, and so a pursuit could not be organised for a significant amount of time.
Hmm, lost me. Union side has little supply problem on July 4 (when it was pouring rain anyway) and pursued moderately aggressively when they did move. Confederate train isn't at Winchester, VA, anyway, so I can't think that is what you're referring to.
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Originally Posted by 67th Tigers
Any American force coming up against a European force is going to be very roughly handled, and they have no means of exploiting any successes. The Europeans however only need to win once, and they'll smash the opposing army to pieces.
Even as late as 1870, the French army had no permanent organizations above regimental size. Brigades and divisions and corps and armies were only activated for short periods of time. Mobilizations -- whether into Italy in 1859, to the German frontier in 1866 during the Austro-Prussian War, or for the start of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 are best characterized as disasters plain and simple. Probably better organized than that mess in Florida for the Spanish-American War, but not much better. Battlefield pursuits and triumphs don't match up to what you are describing.
While a crack French regiment in 1861 would have chewed up any US Militia unit of a similar size -- and done a darn thorough job on most US Regular Army units -- the difference isn't quite as wide as you think. By 1863, the Prussian observer with the ANV (present at Chancellorsville-Brandy Station-Gettysburg) thought Confederate infantry was about as good as Prussian infantry, sloppier on precision drill, but very good at shaking out into battle line and fighting. The same man later fought in the 1864, 1866, and 1870 wars, was wounded, and went on to become a well-known military writer with his friend von Borcke (from Stuart's cavalry).
I'd suspect at a small unit level, US units would be bounced around pretty good in 1861-62. 1863-65 is another story.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Percussion caps on muzzle-loaders had two major improvements on the battlefield:
More importantly, you could aim a percussion musket much more effectively. The flintlock's flash prevented effective aiming, and the additional half a second between pulling the trigger and discharge caused the rounds to go high.
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Rifles as opposed to smoothbores essentially increased range and accuracy. Since what we are talking about here is firing at formations -- not individual targets -- this really did have an effect on when and where officers would have their men fire upon other units. One rifleman trying to hit a single man at 200 yards is very difficult; a regiment trying to score hits on another regiment at 200 yards is a different type of thing. Particularly if the target regiment is made up of big targets like cavalrymen on horses, where a stumbling horse might take out several other men and horses.
The problem of aiming for line is just one of marksmanship, but there was an additional problem with the low velocity Minie rifle, it required accurate range estimation, accurate to within 50m. To make matters worse, the sights of these rifles were only graduated very coursely (typically every 200m), and finer adjustments were made by adjusting the aiming point. This had major implications for rifle fire.
A man without specialist rifle training (which even the US Sharpshooters didn't receive much of) was unable to apply fire correctly. The leader on the American continent in giving his men such training was Cleburne, and by late 1864 some specialised CS skirmishers had received such training. The Union never really seems to from what I read.
It's interesting to note the only Army which universally applied such rifle training was the British. The French only gave it to specialised units. The Danish regular cadre had it, but they only made a third of the mobilised force. The Austrians simply ignored it.
The Prussians are an interesting case. Their Dreyse was unaimable. The breach leaked gases and would often blind anyone who tried to aim it. Thus they adopted the tactic of not aiming, but firing rapidly from the hip at ranges of 300 yards and below.
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Jomini was a Swiss officer serving in the French Army, praised for his theoretical studies by Napoleon and made cheif-of-staff to Marshal Ney. Later he switched allegiance to the Russians. He was not a Prussian and never served with that Army. The tactical model he preached was Napoleon's, not Frederick the Great's.
Very few West Point cadets studied Jomini in any depth, although they all knew some catch-phrases from his work. Not many actually read French. There was really only one course at West Point on Military strategy and tactics in those days, or military history; it was short (a few weeks) and taught by Mahan. It was mainly on small units, outpost tactics, etc. Beauregard was very familiar with Jomini, however, as was R. E. Lee (a member of the Napoleonic Society at West Point when he was Superintendant there).
No, he was a reactionary against Napoleon's tactics, and a preacher of a return to Frederickian linear tactics and fighting by fire, not shock.
The first West Point translations of Jomini were introduced to the syllabus in 1818, and it was a continuing process. The officers that led the ACW had been taught from an English translation of the Precis of the Art of War (not the Art of War, which was only published in English in NY in Jan 1862).
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The Prussian you are thinking of is Clausewitz. He served in the Napoleonic Wars as a Prussian officer, fled to Russia when Napoleon conquered the place, and came back after 1812 to help rebuild the Prussian Army. Clausewitz was not translated into English until after the Civil War, IIRR, and almost no US officer spoke German. His work was essentially unknown to West Point officers.
Yes, it was unknown. Although Grant, Sherman etc. can be described as Clauswitzian, even though they'd never read it/
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Close enough. But Frederick the Great made his cavalry an important battlefield force, and the French brought them back to the forefront 1793-1815. Napoleon also maintained separate all-cavalry corps with no infantry attached to use as a striking force: I believe he has four of them at Waterloo. In addition, you'll find that Napoleon adjusted the composition of his Corps according to the abilities of the commander; apparently he didn't believe Augereau could handle cavalry, so you will always find his corps has very little cavalry (almost none), while a Soult, a Davout, a Lannes, or a Massena has cavalry assigned to his corps in strength.
The cavalry corps (he maintained four for much of the late NW, although at Waterloo some were barely a brigade) were attached at the infantry corps. Typically one to each flank, one to the spearhead corps and one to the reserve. They were part of the combined arms battle, much like a modern army might keep a couple of armoured brigades for attachment to the force at the decisive point.
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Napoleon always maintained a strong artillery force under his immediate command to be used at a point of decision.
The monstrous grande batteries were very late development (his earlier artillery reserves were often only 20-30 guns strong), and used to compensate for the decreasing efficiency of his infantry and cavalry. His best force was that he commanded in 1806, and the French Army is in decline after this. By 1812 his forces are not capable of the complex movements they were in 1812 and his main trick was simply to try and blow the objective away with massed artillery. In this there is a parallel with the 3rd day at Gettysburg.
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Well, yes-and-no as most of these things are. Rifles changed this by changing the spacing of the units. Gaps in the line could now be effectively covered by infantry fire, where they could not be in 1815 in Europe or even 1846 in Mexico.
For example, after Friedland in 1807, the battle-winning tactic of Napoleonic days was to push the artillery up to close range and blow a hole through the enemy line. Close range here was considered to be anything down to about 60 yards. If you try to push guns forward like that in the ACW, the enemy infantry will shoot your artillerymen and horses to pieces with their rifles, and you'll end up with a bunch of abandoned guns on the battlefield. The battlefield environment after percussion-capped rifles come into mass use is simply not the same as it was with flintlock smoothbores -- similar, but different. If you don't pay attention to those differences in your tactics, you end up dead and defeated.
The unsupported artillery charge at Friedland was a mistake, and the result should have been a lot of dead gunners. The defending Russians were simply thrown out of their OODA loop by such a move and allowed the French gunners to deploy and rake them without countering.
Supported artillery OTOH certainly could move forward with infantry without much drama. In the ACW it seems to me that the early integration of the artillery was at the expense of its proper employment, and later its proper employment got in the way of close infantry support (at least in the attack).
Prussian Artillery in 1870 OTOH was actually pushed forward in the advance.
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OTOH, artillery in the defense was just as powerful as always. Witness what Mendenhall's massed guns could do at Stones River/Murfreesboro (both days) and Chickamauga (first day, almost again on the second day). Why? Because the enemy had to advance into their killing field, instead of the artillery moving into the enemy's.
This a typical feature of linear warfare, and what Napoleonic impulse warfare was about avoiding.
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On cavalry, notice the mass Union charge at New Market, as Napoleonic a moment as you'll find in the entire Civil War. When it was launched, there were Union officers who took one look (3,000 troopers headed for a gap in the Confederate center) and assumed the day was won for the Union. If that charge goes home, Breckinridge's Army will be destroyed. Yet the charge was shot into the ground by some Confederate infantry and artillery, never reaching the Confederate line.
That's the one where they stopped to caracole the CS infantry, and were shot to pieces by Texans with smoothbores?
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Longstreet had plenty of artillery, and I don't see where cavalry would have made much difference in that field. Longstreet's artillery chopped up the forces around the Peach Orchard pretty well. What you are imagining is artillery being pushed forward the way French artillerymen like Senarmont did from Friedland in 1807 on in the Napoleonic wars, and that generally did not work in the day of mass deployment of percussion-capped rifled muskets (even worse in the days of breechloaders and repeaters). When you try to advance your guns to 150-100-75 yards of the enemy, you end up with lots of dead artillerymen and horses, and abandoned guns.
A lot of guns, but very little of it really mobile (in part due to the practice of slimming down batteries to just gunners and borrowing the labour needed to operate a battery effectively from the infantry), and very lacking in ammunition. Lee had cut away from his train and had just 200 rounds per gun for the entire battle (and I guess half that was canister). Even firing at deliberate rates (20-30 rounds per hour) the CS artillery was not able to conserve enough to support the attack from long range. The batteries still had large quantities of grape and canister though
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On cavalry, Longstreet had little (just Black's men, AFAIK, which Lee assigned to him just before he moved out to guide him) and they would mainly make big targets in that field and jam up movement. You will certainly not be making much use of them around the Round Tops. At best you might see Rebel cavalry having the same type of "success" that Kilpatrick and Farnsworth had the following day in the same area.
Why send cavalry up the round tops?
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Hmm, lost me. Union side has little supply problem on July 4 (when it was pouring rain anyway) and pursued moderately aggressively when they did move. Confederate train isn't at Winchester, VA, anyway, so I can't think that is what you're referring to.
Nope, the Union left their train at Winchester so as to not obstruct the roads for their concentration at Gettysburg, bring forward only a small ammunition reserve and a small number of ambulances.
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While a crack French regiment in 1861 would have chewed up any US Militia unit of a similar size -- and done a darn thorough job on most US Regular Army units -- the difference isn't quite as wide as you think. By 1863, the Prussian observer with the ANV (present at Chancellorsville-Brandy Station-Gettysburg) thought Confederate infantry was about as good as Prussian infantry, sloppier on precision drill, but very good at shaking out into battle line and fighting. The same man later fought in the 1864, 1866, and 1870 wars, was wounded, and went on to become a well-known military writer with his friend von Borcke (from Stuart's cavalry).
I'd suspect at a small unit level, US units would be bounced around pretty good in 1861-62. 1863-65 is another story.
Tim
However, the Prussian Infantry is actually pretty bad. As late as the Franco-Prussian war they're pretty awful, saved only by an efficient artillery. Earlier they're much worse.
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