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The South never had a good chance to win due to:
1. The Defend all points strategy of 61/62.
2. Poor command decisions from Davis on down.
3. Paying more attention to Virginia than Western Dept.
As for your question. Apart from the many errors of Gettysburg, Lee would have had to win the battle on Day1. Lee claims to have no reserve to assist Ewell's if practical pursuit. He had Anderson's division handy and when Johnson's div of Ewell arrived could have had those divisions sweep across the front of Heth and Pender(now the reserve) and assist Ewell, who could have advanced part of Early and some of Rodes.
Even if Lee won at Gettysburg, I think it would be hard to follow-up with casualties to tend, the supply of ammo(unless restocked from Fed supplies) food and reinforcements.
The South's best chance would have been if Syd Johnston had destroyed Grant at Donelson, then turned on Buell, who would have stopped/retreated after word of Grant's fall. Sure would have lifted the lid off the war had he done so.
There are two questions here.
Did the South have a chance(in hindsight). Did Southerners have a chance(did they think they had a chance at the time and were wrong).
Get the difference.
Foote is saying, in hindsight, they didn't have a chance because of the odds. He wasn't saying that the South didn't think they had a chance.
If seems to me, Davis and Lee had solved the problem of defending the Confederacy in the east, and had successfully done so until the Overland Campaign of 1864. Even the seige of Petersburg 64/65 and losing Richmond wasn't necessarily fatal to the Confederacy: its all the stuff going on in the West and Georgia that was killing off the CSA.
The Confederacy did not hit upon a way to defend the western Confederacy. The bigger geographical space seemed to work against the CSA, not for them.
There were some bad decisions early in the western war, and some bad leadership during the war. Over ambitious offensives, didn't seem to work, cautious defense didn't seem to work. The military talent of Thomas, Sherman, Sheridan and Grant seemed to be the first team for the Union, while the CSA leadership of Bragg, Beauregard, Hood and Johnson, all had ability, but none were first rate army commanders or could coordinate a theater defense. The 2nd rate Union army commanders, like Rosecrans and Buell were not decisively smashed like Lee and the ANV had done with the hapless Burnside and Hooker.
I mean, I don't know what the proper theater defense of the west would have been.
Kentucky didn't secede because most of the people in Kentucky didn't want to.
The Union was driving into eastern Tennessee and along the Mississippi River. Could an overall CS theater commander concentrate against one threat, defeated it, then shifted to the other threat? (saving men by using fortifications on one front, while operating a big field army against the other.)
I know that "interior lines" supposedly favored the CSA, but given the rail network, did they really?
It does'nt surprise me that the south lost. What's amazing to me is that the south survived as long as they did. They had a quarter of the resources of the north...No navy...No arms industry. It would have been a cold day in the infernal regions before the south could win by force of arms. Had they gotten recognition...Had they won at Gettysburg...All these excuses are just that. If you are going to go to war, you better well make sure that you know what you're doing, and the south obviously did not.
This in my view is one of the things that makes the Civil so very sad and compelling.
In fighting the Civil War, the south hastened by at least 20 years the very things it was trying to avoid; the abolition of slavery and a more centralized federal government.
Ahem...Now I'll get off of my soapbox.
__________________ David
"I refuse to have a battle of wits with an unarmed person" diddyriddick
It is my opinion based on the amount of records within "The Official Records of the Rebellion" that even in 1860, the conception of organizing to separate from the Union was ill planned and a few 'rebel rousers' put into motion a cause that was started by emotion rather than preparedness to wage a long campaign. In addition to the official records, Colonel Walter H. Taylor's comments in his book; "Four years with General Lee" comes to the same conclusion, that the Confederate Government was never prepared for a war longer than 90 days. And, though the Confederacy had a Navy--it was no match for the Union's Navy and those to whom joined the Union Navy as seasoned fishermen from the northeast Union states. The US Government was quick to seize all shipping yards and ports along the coast; to include Norfolk. The battle of New Bern proffered vast information, documented in the "Official Records of the Rebellion," that without captured guns from the North; their present arms were extremely lacking and had no ammunition to use for them; permitting General Burnside to capture the coast and Confederate forts handsomely.
Another cause of my opinions, are the many correspondences of General Lee and Col. Taylor with Richmond. Always asking for food, clothing and supplies in general. This is documented in the Official Records of the Rebellion, Letters and Correspondences of General Lee published by Lee's younger son; Four Years with General Lee by Col. Walter Taylor his most trusted aid and Confederates consider him an official source of information after the Civil War; and peppered throughought personal memories of General Longstreet, General Sorrel, General Early and General Gordon.
Supply feeds an army, either by food or by comfort, e.g. shoes, clothing, horses, harnesses, saddles, horse shoes, etc.
Another point is, that General Lee had no ability to promote deserving officers and place them as he saw fit. Everything had to be approved by President Jeff.Davis. Only near the end of Lee's part of the Civil War did he finally have that power but, only too late. So, this would have hampered any success of Lee's and had to do with what he had--which still was remarkable. Union side did not have such obstructions of moving quality officers within the military structure.
Although the Confederacy if at it's height of power and supplies were maintained as the North--The ability of Lee to promote and or transfer officers and if other commanding generals in other areas had the same powers--It could be just enough to win over the north. However, it is evident once the 'honeymoon' or 'romantic' phased passed in the conflict--deserting soldiers became the washout of the underpinnings of the Confederate Armies thus collapsed from lack of manpower, supplies and areas to move in safety. This does not include the thousands of POWs in Union prisoner camps. The foundation was never strong, e.g. inter structure of support, e.g. rivers, canals, railroads, wagons, horses, mules, factories, etc. So, when these were destroyed or captured by the Union; these supports for troops were gone--was just a matter of time of total collapse. It should be said, that it wasn't due to a lack of heart on the Confederate side but--just having heart, passion and or duty isn't enough--there must be something to support it all.
As for Baggage Handler #2's posting - capture of senators and congressmen after Bull Run; I think it would just be a good excuse to hold special elections for those seats vacant due to capture -- they would have thrown more fuel to the fire per se; against the Confederacy--making Lincoln's job much easier -- Interum congressmen and senators would fill the seat and government continues. It had been a built in safety for just such a case early on when structure of the US Congressional government was born. It was briefly exposed during 9-11 about the 'what ifs'-- I am sure that if these state representatives were captured--those who were on the fence or against fighting would indeed change their mind. But, this is just my personal opinion.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
What I was thinking re. Bull Run, was that if the Union government was "pithed" the CSA would have had 90 days or so before the US government would have been able to reorganize.
This properly belongs in the "What If" I suppose, but consider how the press would treat a Union army in full rout, rebel troops in downtown DC, the government half gone... No newspaperman could resist this.
It generates a fantastic amount of anarchy, and in this chaos is the possibility of some settlement.
The confusion among pursing troops is very like that among the pursued -- which is a major reason you don't read much about successful pursuits of a routed army.
I've often considered that a few regiments burning a bridge or two would have been a massive political coup for the Confederates. But Washington City wasn't exactly undefended, and the Confederates would have had to stop to regroup before making such an attempt--thus giving a cool Federal officer (if there was one) a chance to set up a daunting defense.
Handler is quite correct in that this might more properly be a "what if" question, but as it was presented as a specific element of the basic post--as in, if Grant hadn't taken Donelson, would the Confederacy's chances have improved? I ain't that picky.
We can't always stay exactly on topic: there's usually a bit of banter now and then; and a question or comment that must be made.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I am thinking in a case of an emergency, the Governor of the State and or Commonwealth can immediately appoint a representative or senator. Elections can be held when the emergency passes. The 'framers' of the Constitution built in as many 'fail safes' as possible.
As far as chasing the Union troops into Washington and or Georgetown; the problem becomes who follows who? Citizens or 'non-combat' participants in those days were--'paws off.' Back then there was some structure to combat--thus 'uniforms.' But, again--the problem with 1861's Bull Run/Manassas was the confusion of uniforms, similarities, even flags when hanging--were problems as they looked like the US flag--
To which General Beauregard then immediately after Bull Run/Manassas of 1861 designed the Confederate battle flag to be the 'St. Andrews Cross;' and those flags in existance were given a red edge to distinguish it from stripes. [Reference: Four Years with General Lee by Col. Walter H. Taylor]. Plus, the Confederate as well as the Union Army were not battle seasoned. These troops were raw and untrained. And, all armies demand/require discipline and work as the extentions of the Commanding General. In addition, in 1861 Manassas/Bull Run you had a bunch of political Generals without any previous military experience doing 'their own thing.' For the likes of Beauregard, Jackson, Bee, Longstreet, Early, D.H. Hill, A.P. Hill and the future high ranking Generals --they had to check these political Generals by being the example as well as teaching while doing. The same for the Union. The sudden swell of troop numbers the lack of qualified officers in this first major battle could have been a disaster just due to the green of the training on either side--Just happens the Union was the loosing end of the stick in that battle.
The only crossings at that time from Virginia to Georgetown was 'Chain Bridge' and it was not sufficiently sound to handle vast amounts of artillery. From Virginia into Georgetown using the Aqueduct Bridge was stone but very narrow; which would choke the armies. Heights established on the Virginia side and DC/Maryland side would have been entrenched and ready to fire on any approaching enemy--Another point would be from the Long Bridge from Virginia to Washington, which it's original position was just a few blocks from the Washington Arsenal (Ft. McNair) and blocks from there--you had the US Marine Barrack at 8th & I. SE. In addition; there would be a call for all naval vessels to come up and take positions along all water ways as far as Georgetown to all the points south of Mt. Vernon. There naval guns would be able to lob shells on the troops chasing behind those of the Union. Observation of Bull Run/Manassas by Professor Lowe's hot air balloons would have reported movement in time for such battle. If necessary, I am sure one of those battleships would have destroyed the bridges halting further progress into Washington. The Ferry in upper Potomac to cross Virginia into Maryland would also be a choke point for Confederate troops in pursuit of Federals back into Washington/Georgetown.
In addition, you have to consider the condition after a major battle--the troops need to rest, as do the horses and thus--I don't think from Manassas Battlefield to the Long Bridge (which is approximately 3 1/2 miles from the present 14th Street Bridge); the horses, troops and or artillery would have had the energy to pursue past Fairfax Court House or Chantilly.
With uniforms that were not distinctive--it is documented that friendly fire happened way to often.
But, since your comments -- I've been reading Colonel Walter Taylor's book, Official Records, Lee's Papers and Correspondences, General Longstreet's Manassas to Appomatox; General Gordon's accounts as well as General Early's accounts [Confederate Generals Speak] and Official Records -- these 'voyeurs' were not the focus --I highly doubt if any side had time to identify who was picnicing as they watched. I did not see any indication of pursuit other than from General Longstreet's willingness to do so but, he was under Beauregard and he did not pursue beyond Fairfax Court House.
In all the Army regulation books/manuals I have -- the army in summary are to avoid civilians as to not attract attacks on them and or cause injury and or death to the 'innocent.
In refering to the Army regulation books/manuals -- after a battle it seems if routing an enemy it causes havoc to the 'command' structure and soon thins into stragglers to which can be easily captured if the pursued turns and are the ones in pursuit. Usually Cavalry is used for this purpose. That said though -- Cavalry can only do so much before they isolate themselves and are subject to being captured by infantry rear guards and or supporting Cavalry.
But, I still maintain my thoughts as why the civilian governmental representatives weren't touched goes as previous stated. Plus, it opens the door for the same to be done to them.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
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