"Battle of the Month" Club

[Hanny]

I was near Kilpatrick when he impetuously gave the order to Farnsworth to make the last charge. Farnsworth spoke with emotion: "General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry? The First Vermont has already been fought half to pieces; these are too good men to kill." Kilpatrick said: "Do you refuse to obey my orders ? If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it."
Farnsworth rose in his stirrups--he looked magnificent in his passion-and cried, "Take that back!" Kilpatrick returned this defiance, but, soon repenting, said, "I did not mean it; forget it."
For a moment there was silence, when Farnsworth spoke calmly, "General, if you order the charge, I will lead it, but you must take the responsibility." I did not hear the low conversation that followed, but as Farnsworth turned away, he said, "I will obey your order." Kilpatrtick said earnestly, "I take the responsibility."


The charge was a daring and spectacular one. The First West Virginia, and Eighteenth Pennsylvania moved through the woods first, closely followed by the First Vermont and Fifth New York Cavalry, all mounted, and drove the foe before them until heavy stone walls and fences were reached. Two regiments cleared the obstacles, charged a second line of infantry, and were stopped by another stone wall, covering a third line of infantry. The First West Virginia was for a time entirely surrounded, but succeeded in cutting its way hack with a loss of but five killed and four wounded, bringing with it a number of prisoners. When the body of Farnsworth was afterwards recovered, it was found to have received five mortal wounds.
General W. M. Graham, U.S.A. (Retired), says: *

The following is the account of Farnsworth's death as seen by a (Confederate officer and by him related to me in the winter of 1876-77 at Columbia, South Carolina: I was introduced to Captain Bachman, who commanded the "Hampton Legion Battery," with which I was engaged (Battery K, First United States Artillery), at Gettysburg on July 3d. Naturally our conversation drifted to the war, and he remarked: "One of the most gallant incidents of the war witnessed by mc was a cavalry charge at the battle of Gettysburg, on July 3d., made by a General Farnsworth of the Yankee army. He led his brigade, riding well ahead of his men, in a charge against my battery and the infantry supports; we were so filled with admiration of his bravery that we were reluctant to kill him, and so called out to him to "surrender," as his position was hopeless. He replied by emptying his revolver and then hurling it at us and drawing his saber, when we shot him through the body, killing him. His men were nearly all killed, wounded, or captured, very few escaping to their own lines."
* Journal Military Service Institution for March, 1910, p. 343.


General Graham adds, "Bachman was a fine fellow who, like all those who fought on each side, had buried all bitterness of feeling."
All things considered, it seems wonderful that these four regiments did not suffer more severely (sixty-five casualties out of three hundred men in the charge). This fact can best be accounted for by the moral effect of the charge, the fearless troopers leaping the obstacles and sabering many of the Confederate infantry in their positions. The Confederate general, Law, said of this:

It was impossible to use our artillery to any advantage, Owing to the close quarters of the attacking cavalry with our own men, the leading squadrons forcing their horses up to the very muzzles of the rifles of our infantry.


But while this was taking place on the Federal left flank, a great cavalry battle, fraught with tremendous responsibilities, was being waged on the right flank.
On July 3d., the Second Cavalry Division, under Gregg, had been ordered to the right of the line with orders to make a demonstration against the Confederates. About noon, a despatch reached Gregg that a large body of the Southern cavalry was observed from Cemetery Hill, moving against the right of the Union line. In consequence of this important information, Custer's brigade, which had been ordered back to Kilpatrick's command, was held by Gregg.
This Confederate column moving to the attack was Stuart's cavalry, which, belated by many obstacles, was advancing toward the lines of Ewell's corps. Stuart took position on a ridge, which commanded a wide area of open ground, and his plan of attack was to engage the Federal troops in his front with sharpshooters, while he moved the Confederate brigades of Jenkins and W.F.H. Lee secretly through the woods in an effort to reach the Union rear. Stuart hoped to strike at the psychological moment when Pickett's famous infantry charge, on the center of the Union line of battle, would engage the entire attention of the Army of the Potomac.
The cavalry combat which followed was probably as desperate and as stubbornly contested as any in which the cavalry took part during the entire period of the war. A mounted charge by a regiment of W.F.H. Lee's brigade, was met by a countercharge of the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, the two regiments meeting face to face on opposite sides of a stone wall, and discharging their carbines point blank. The First Michigan Cavalry, aided by Chester's battery made a charge which, followed by a hand-to-hand fight, drove the Confederate lines back in confusion. Then followed charges and countercharges by each opponent, until a large part of both commands was involved in a general melee.
In this terrible cavalry combat every possible weapon was utilized, and after it was over, men were found interlocked in each other's arms, with fingers so firmly imbedded in the flesh as to require force to remove them. The casualties were heavy for both Stuart and Gregg, but the latter was able to stop the Confederate cavalry leader's critical turning movement. Had Stuart with his veteran cavalry been able to strike the rear of the Federal army simultaneously with Pickett's infantry charge in front, the result of this decisive battle of the war might have been different.
On April 4, 1864, General Sheridan assumed command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and thereafter a new order of things was inaugurated for the Union cavalry in the Eastern theater of operations.
Sheridan insisted that his cavalry should not be separated into fragments, but should be concentrated "to fight the enemy's cavalry," and in deference to Sheridan's wishes, General Meade promptly relieved the cavalry from much of the arduous picket duty which it was performing at the time. But he gave little encouragement as yet to Sheridan's plans for an independent cavalry corps--a corps in fact as well as in name. By the end of July, the Cavalry Corps had succeeded in almost annihilating the Confederate cavalry and had accomplished the destruction of millions of dollars' worth of property useful to the Confederate Government. In all the important movements of the Army of the Potomac, the cavalry had acted as a screen, and by its hostile demonstrations against the Southern flanks and rear, had more than once forced General Lee to detach much-needed troops from his hard-pressed front.
On May 11th, at Yellow Tavern, Sheridan had fought an engagement which gave him complete control of the road to Richmond and resulted in the loss to the Confederates of Generals Stuart and James B. Gordon. Merritt's brigade first entered Yellow Tavern and secured possession of the turnpike. The other Union divisions being brought up, Custer with his own brigade, supported by Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division, made a mounted charge which was brilliantly executed, followed by a dash at the Southern line which received the charge in a stationary position. This charge resulted in the capture of two guns. Then, while Gibbs and Devin forced the Confederate right and center, Gregg charged in the rear and the battle was won.
At Deep Bottom, too, July 28th, occurred a brilliant fight which is worthy of more than passing notice.
The Second United States Cavalry led the advance on the 27th and took the New Market road in the direction of Richmond. When close to the Confederate pickets a dashing charge was made, forcing the foe back rapidly. On the afternoon of the following day the Union cavalry pickets were furiously attacked, and before the leading troops could dismount and conduct the led horses to the rear, an entire brigade of Confederate infantry broke from the woods, and with colors flying advanced in splendid alignment across an open field. So closely were the advanced Union troops pressed, that despite the destruction wrought in the Southern ranks by the breech-loading carbines, there was danger of losing the led horses.
The following is quoted from the graphic description of this fight by Lieutenant (afterwards Colonel U.S.V.) William H. Harrison, Second United States Cavalry:


With a cheer which makes our hearts hound, the First New York Dragoons, the First United States, and the Sixth Pennsylvania on the run, dismount, and form themselves on the shattered lines of the Second and Fifth. A few volleys from our carbines make the line of the enemy's infantry waver, and in an instant the cry is heard along our entire line, "Charge! Charge!" We rush forward, firing as we advance; the Confederate colors fall, and so furious is our charge that the North Carolina brigade breaks in complete rout, leaving three stands of colors, all their killed and wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. The enemy did not renew the fight, and we remained in possession of the field until relieved by our infantry.

[Hanny]

It was, however, in the fail of the year (1864) that under Sheridan's brilliant leadership the Union cavalry won its greatest laurels. On September 19th, at Opequon Creek, Sheridan's infantry and cavalry achieved a victory which sent the Confederates under Early "whirling through Winchester," as Sheridan tersely stated in a telegram which electrified the people of the North.
While essentially a battle participated in by all arms, the brilliant part taken by Wilson's division in a mounted charge which gained possession of the Winchester-Berryville turnpike, and the subsequent demoralizing attack of Averell's and Merritt's cavalry divisions on the Confederate rear, had much to do with the Union victory.
The most severe fighting on the part of the cavalry took place in the afternoon. Breckinridge's Confederate corps had fallen back on Winchester, leaving General Early's flank protected by his cavalry, which was successfully attacked by General Devin's Second Brigade and driven in confusion toward Winchester. Then within easy supporting distance of each other, the First Brigade, the Second Brigade, and the Reserve Brigade moved forward without opposition until the open fields near Winchester were reached.
What followed is well described in Lieutenant Harrison's recollections: *


While awaiting in suspense our next movement the enemy's infantry was distinctly seen attempting to change front to meet our anticipated charge. Instantly, and while in the confusion incident to their maneuver, the Second Brigade burst upon them, the enemy's infantry breaking into complete rout and failing back a confused and broken mass. * Everglade to Canon, N.Y., 1878.


Immediately after, the Union reserve brigade under the gallant Lowell, formed to the left of the position from which the Second Brigade, under Devin, had just charged. They rode out fearlessly within five hundred yards of the Confederate line of battle, on the left of which, resting on an old earthwork was a two-gun battery. The order was to charge the line and get the guns. Lieutenant Harrison continues:


At the sound of the bugle we took the trot, the gallop, and then the charge. As we neared their line we were welcomed by a fearful musketry fire, which temporarily confused the leading squadron, and caused the entire brigade to oblique slightly to the right. Instantly, officers cried out, "Forward! Forward!" The men raised their sabers, and responded to the command with deafening cheers. Within a hundred yards of the enemy's line we struck a blind ditch, but crossed it without breaking our front. In a moment we were face to face with the enemy. They stood as if awed by the heroism of the brigade, and in an instant broke in complete rout, our men sabering them as they vainly sought safety in flight.

The charging force emerged from the fight with two guns, three stands of colors, and over three hundred Confederate prisoners. Altogether there had been six distinct charges by parts of the First Cavalry Division--two by the Second Brigade and one by the First Brigade; one by the Second Brigade and one by the Reserve Brigade against Early's infantry; and one, the final charge, in which all three of the brigades joined. General Custer describes the scene in graphic language:


At this time five brigades of cavalry were moving on parallel lines; most, if not all, of the brigades moved by brigade front, regiments being in parallel columns of squadrons. One continuous and heavy line of skirmishers covered the advance, using only the carbine, while the line of brigades, as they advanced across the country, the bands playing the national airs, presented in the sunlight one moving mass of glittering sabers. This, combined with the various and bright-colored banners and battle-flags, intermingled here and there with the plain blue uniforms of the troops, furnished one of the most inspiring as well as imposing scenes of martial grandeur ever witnessed upon a battlefield.

The Union victory at Opequon came at a time when its moral effect was most needed in the North, and restored the fertile Shenandoah valley to the Union armies, after a long series of humiliating reverses in that granary of the Confederacy.
A month later Custer encountered three brigades of Confederate cavalry under Rosser near Tom's Brook Crossing. Merrit at about the same time struck the cavalry of Lomax and Johnson on the Valley pike, the Federal line of battle extending across the Valley. The fighting was desperate on both sides, being essentially a saber contest. For two hours charges were given and received in solid masses, boot-to-boot, the honors being almost equally divided--the Confederates successfully holding the center while the Federal cavalry pushed back the flanks.
This finally weakened the Confederates, and as both their flanks gave way, Merritt and Custer ordered a charge along their entire line. The retreat of Rosser's force became a panic stricken rout, which continued for twenty-six miles up the Shenandoah valley. Eleven pieces of artillery, three hundred and thirty prisoners, ambulances, caissons, and even the headquarters' wagons of the Confederate commanders were captured by the Federal troops.
Early ascribed his defeat to Sheridan's superiority in numbers and equipment, and to the fact that Lomax's cavalry was armed entirely with rifles and had no sabers; that as a consequence they could not fight on horseback, and in open country could not successfully fight on foot with large bodies of well-trained cavalry.
In the brilliant part taken by Sheridan's cavalry in retrieving the misfortunes of the morning Of October 19,1864, when the Union camp at Cedar Creek was surprised and routed- with "Sheridan only twenty miles away "--resulting in the final defeat and pursuit of the Confederate army, the Federal cavalry alone captured 45 pieces of artillery, 32 caissons, 46 army wagons, 672 prisoners, and an enormous quantity of other property.
This battle, which Sheridan's magnetic presence turned into a great victory, was followed by a number of small but highly successful cavalry movements, culminating on March 27, 1865, in Sheridan's veteran cavalry corps joining the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg for the final campaign against Lee.
In the Valley campaign Sheridan's cavalry captured 2556 prisoners, 71 guns, 29 battle-flags, 52 caissons, 105 army wagons, 2557 horses, 1000 horse equipments, and 7152 beef cattle. It destroyed, among other things, 420,742 bushels of wheat, 780 barns, and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition.
Meanwhile, during the years of vicissitudes which marked the evolution of the cavalry of the East, from a multitude of weak detachments lacking organization, equipment, and training to a veteran army, filled with confidence in itself and in its commanders, the cavalry of the West had been equally unfortunate in its slow and discouraging development of fighting efficiency.
Under General Rosecrans, as early as 1862, the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland was organized into three brigades under General David S. Stanley, but the mounted force actually at the disposal of its commander was but four thousand effective men. Although actively engaged, particularly in curbing the depredations of the Confederate cavalry under Forrest, its operations were not especially important. Nevertheless, at Stone's River, at Knoxville, at Chickamauga, and at other important battles, the cavalry of the West did desperate fighting and, considering its numbers, was not lacking in efficiency.
The cavalry which General Sherman assembled for his Atlanta campaign numbered about fifteen thousand sabers, organized into four divisions, and it participated with credit in all the celebrated movements and engagements of Sherman's army between May and August, 1864. Protecting the rear and preventing the destruction of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad by Wheeler's enterprising cavalry, some Union cavalry under Rousseau remained at Decatur until by a rapid and circuitous march around Johnston's Confederate army, in which he destroyed immense quantities of stores and damaged several railroads, Rousseau joined Sherman near Atlanta. After the fall of the latter city, a cavalry division of over five thousand men under Kilpatrick, accompanied Sherman on his famous march to the sea.
Up to this time the activities of the Union cavalry in the Southwest, while noted for boldness and celerity of movement, for endurance, and for accomplishment of results, though hampered by many drawbacks, were not yet distinguished by any of those great cavalry combats which marked the development of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.
Towards the close of October, 1864, however, General James H. Wilson, who had commanded a cavalry division in Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah, and who had been instrumental in raising the efficiency of the cavalry service through the Cavalry Bureau, reported to Sherman, in Alabama, and began a thorough reorganization, a remounting and re-equipping of the cavalry corps of Sherman's army.
Wilson's cavalry corps speedily made itself felt as an integral part of the army, taking a prominent part in the battle of Franklin, scoring a decisive victory over Forrest's cavalry under Chalmers, and pressing the foe so closely that the Confederate troopers were actually driven into the Harpeth River. This decisive action of the Union cavalry prevented Forrest from turning Schofield's left flank and cutting his line of retreat.
In the battle of Nashville, which followed (December 15-16, 1864), Wilson's dismounted cavalry gallantly stormed the strong Confederate earthworks side by side with their comrades of the infantry. General Thomas mentions the part taken by this cavalry as follows:

Whilst slightly swinging to the left, [the cavalry] came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault, at 1 p.m., by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that carried the first position, taking four more guns and about three hundred prisoners. The infantry, McArthur's division, on the left of the cavalry, . . . participated in both of the assaults; and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.


But the gallant part taken by Wilson's cavalry in these operations is best exemplified by the spoils of war. During and after the battle of Nashville, and including prisoners taken in the hospitals at Franklin, the Union cavalry captured 2 strong redoubts, 32 field guns, 11 caissons, 12 colors, 3,232 prisoners (including 1 general officer), 1 bridge train of 80 pontoons, and 125 wagons. Its own losses were 122 officers and men killed, 1 field-gun, 521 wounded, and 259 missing.
The following spring, while Wilson and his horsemen were sapping the very life blood of the Confederacy, Sheridan and his cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had been playing a most important part in the grand operations of that remarkable army, now under the direction of the inexorable Grant.
After joining Grant in front of Petersburg on March 27, 1865, Sheridan received instruction from his chief to move with his three cavalry divisions of nine thousand men near or through Dinwiddie, reaching the right and rear of the Confederate army, without attempting to attack the Confederates in position. Should the latter remain entrenched, Sheridan was to destroy the Danville and South Side railroads, Lee's only avenues of supply; and then either return to the Army of the Potomac, or to join Sherman in North Carolina. History shows that two of the Confederate infantry divisions and all of Lee's cavalry failed to push back five brigades of Sheridan's cavalry, fighting dismounted, in an effort to cut off the Confederate retreat.
In the desperate fighting which took place in the days following, it was the same splendid cavalry at Five Forks, which dashed dismounted over the Southern entrenchments, carrying all before them.
And finally, on April 6th, at Sailor's Creek, after desperate and exhausting fighting by Custer's and Devin's divisions, it was Crook with his cavalry which intercepted the Confederate line of retreat, cut off three of Lee's hard-pressed infantry divisions, and made possible the surrender at Appomattox of the gallant but exhausted Army of Northern Virginia.


Just wanted to share, its worth reading after all.

[diddyriddick]

Nice post, Hanny! Thanks for sharing it.

[PvtClewell]

Mr. Hanny,

I agree. Nice post.

And, if I may add one more segment from Schiller's N & S article as a supplement to your posts:

"1862, then, was a year where Federal cavalry gained fighting skills and began to experiment with tactics. This learning process was materially aided in the east by Pope, who recognized the need to put the cavalry into larger commands under competent leaders. His actions were reinforced by Major General Joseph Hooker, who, in command of the Army of the Potomac in the Spring of 1863, created the cavalry corps and took control of the mounted arm out of the hands of infantry brigadiers. In the West, it was Major General William Rosecrans who saw the need for concentrating cavalry. Replacing Buell in the Fall of 1862 as the Commander of the renamed Army if the Cumberland, he recognized how the cavalry had been used up. He ordered Brigadier General David Stanley to detach the the cavalry from the infantry and begin the process of refitting and concentration. Once concentration was achieved in both theatres of war, the cavalry became more effective. The benefits of these actions soon became apparent."

[PvtClewell]

"this caught my eye yesterday, so i flicked through Attack and Die and fullers Grant and Lee which are the 2 statistical works on this point, its not dead (KIA) but casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA/POW that the numbers show.

They also show Grant lost more men dead and in a shorter time period than Lee, or any other Union commander, but that lees losses are at best estimates.

AoP in the 40 days was loseing men faster than did the SU in the initail phase of the German invasion, which was why grant got the press of a butcher."

I know this is off topic, but I couldn't resist. Forgive me.

For the life of me, I cannot find KIA figures for the individual battles that composed the Overland Campaign, but having said that, it doesn't surprise me in the least that Grant sustained a higher KIA rate. He was on the offensive and, for the most part, battling a Confederate army that was mostly fighting behind fortifications. You would expect Grant to suffer more KIAs. The real question might be why Lee lost as many men as he did while fighting behind fortified works.

Comparing the opening 40 days of the Overland Campaign to the opening of Operation Barbarossa, to me anyway, is comparing apples and oranges. Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union initially pitted 5.6 million Germans against 2.9 million Soviets over a front 1,800 miles long. That's about 3,111 Germans per mile against 1,666 Soviets per mile. The combat box is vast and of various terrain, it generally offers freedom of movement to both sides, Germany has the element of surprise and has a veteran army that knows how to employ the blitzkrieg against an unprepared opponent. When the Soviets don't offer resistance, they're usually running, trying not to become casualties.

At the Wilderness, in the opening phase of the Overland Campaign, there are about 175,000 men (combined both sides) in a front about 3.5 miles long. That's 32,000 Feds per mile against 17,700 Rebs per mile. Although both armies are veteran, Grant is basically caught by surprise in unforgiving terrain in a combat box that is incredibly compact and violent. But unlike the Soviets, Grant doesn't fall back, so his casualty rate is intense. Does that make Grant a butcher? I don't know. His men, the ones who are becoming the casualties, cheer him when he continues south to Spotsylvania instead of turning back after another pummeling by Lee, like in the old days with McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, et al.

I think I remember reading somewhere that one of the first references to Grant as a butcher, ironically, came from Mary Todd Lincoln, sometime around Cold Harbor. I will gladly stand corrected or duly informed if someone can verify or deny this. It could be just a fairy tale, for all I know. I do know that MTL did not like the Grants and she wanted Lincoln to fire him.

Operation Barbarossa, by the way, also began in June (June 22, 1941), so maybe this is not so off topic after all.

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

Been reading the Official Reports of the Rebellion and hope to insert interesting excerpts in this 'battle of the month.' In some cases, I am deeply emotionally moved and see how the blood paid grew even higher--sad. Very sad. And, some very informative about the type of artillery used and odd-ball facts.

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DECEMBER 4,1861.

Memorandum to Major Blair

.

Say to Major Blair that he should at once take steps in case the enemy should get possession of Loudoun County to drive his cattle off as they make their advance. The general understands that the major depends upon that county for his supply of cattle, If the enemy should land in large force about Leesburg, it would be impossible for the army to remain at Centreville. He would then fall back to the Rappahannock, about Brandy Station--in that vicinity. Wants to know where Mr. Buck-ner is; understands that the major has a packing establishment at Thoroughfare, on the Manassas road; wants him to consider if Brandy Station, Orange and Alexandria Railroad, would not be better. The major should determine this himself. Wants information about the 6,000 cattle mentioned in his letter; should always keep five days' supply on hand; he thinks should be as much beef as bread; says that a large supply of beef, looking to all possible contingencies, should be under the major's control inside of our lines, and with such steps taken as would enable them to be driven off at a moment's notice.
E. J. HARVIE,
Captain, Acting Inspector-General
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O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 344. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg,

U.S. Army, commanding Second Division.

HDQRS. SECOND AND THIRD CAVALRY DIVISIONS,
June 12, 1863
[excerpt]-->
The country about Brandy Station is open, and on the south side extensive level fields, particularly suitable for a cavalry engagement. Coming thus upon the enemy, and having at hand only the Third Division (total strength 2,400), I either had to decline the fight in the face of the enemy or throw upon him at once the entire division. Not doubting but that the Second Division was near, and delay not being admissible, I directed the commanders of my advance brigade to charge the enemy, formed in columns about Brandy House. The whole brigade charged with drawn sabers, fell upon the masses of the enemy, and, after a brief but severe contest, drove them back, killing and wounding many and taking a large number of prisoners. Other columns of the enemy coming up, charged this brigade before it could reform, and it was driven back. Seeing this, I ordered the First Brigade to charge the enemy upon the right. This brigade came forward <ar43_951> gallantly through the open fields, dashed upon the enemy, drove him away, and occupied the hill. Now that my entire division was engaged, the fight was everywhere most fierce. Fresh columns of the enemy arriving upon the ground received the vigorous charges of my regiments, and, under the heavy blows of our sabers, were in every instance driven back. Martin's battery of horse artillery, divided between the two brigades, poured load after load of canister upon the rebel regiments. Assailed on all sides, the men stood to the guns nobly. Thus for an hour and a half was the contest continued, not in skirmishing, but in determined charges. The contest was too unequal to be longer continued. The Second Division had not come up; there was no support at hand, and the enemy's numbers were three times my own. I ordered the withdrawal of my brigades. In good order they left the field, the enemy not choosing to follow.
Retiring about 1 mile south of the station, I again formed my brigades, and discovered the Second Division some distance in the rear. Hearing that General Russell had gotten up to General Buford's left with his infantry, I moved my command in the direction of Rappahannock Bridge, and soon united with General Buford's left. On the hills near Brandy Station the enemy had artillery posted, the fire of which they directed upon my line in this new position. A few guns well served were sufficient to prevent any advance in that direction. When engaged with the enemy at Brandy Station, cars loaded with infantry were brought there from Culpeper. Before they could quite get to the station, I sent a party to obstruct the rails. Finding a switch above the station, they reversed it, and thus prevented the cars from running into my command. The field having been well contested and the enemy being re-enforced with infantry, which could be thrown in any force upon us from Culpeper, I received orders from Brigadier-General Pleasonton to recross my command at Rappahannock Ford. The Second Brigade, Second Division, covered my crossing. I got my command entirely over without being molested by the enemy. When the last man had crossed, the enemy displayed a regiment in front of the ford. I directed a regiment of the Second Brigade, Second Division, to re-cross and offer them fight. This they declined, and the regiment quietly returned to this side.
The Third Division behaved nobly, and where every officer and man did his duty it is difficult to particularize. I would, however, mention Col. P. Wyndham, First New Jersey Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, and Col. J. Kilpatrick, Second New York, commanding First Brigade, who gallantly led their brigades to the charge, and throughout the entire engagement handled them with consummate skill. Colonel Wyndham, although wounded, remained on the field, and covered with a portion of his command the withdrawal of the division. Capt. J. W. Martin, commanding Sixth New York Battery <ar43_952> of Horse Artillery, did most excellent service. His sections were charged by the enemy's regiments on all sides. Two of his pieces disabled and one serviceable fell into the hands of the enemy, but not until 21 of his men were cut down, fighting stubbornly, and nearly all of the horses killed.
Although the loss of these pieces is to be regretted, still, the magnificent defense of them establishes in the highest degree the soldierly character of the officers and men of the battery. The serviceable gun was spiked before the enemy got it. All the regiments of the Third Division were engaged, viz: First Brigade, Col. J. Kilpatrick commanding--Tenth New York Cavalry, Lieut. Col. William Irvine commanding; Second New York Cavalry, Lieut. Col. H. E Davies, jr., commanding; First Maine Cavalry, Col. C. S. Douty commanding. Second Brigade, Col. P. Wyndham commanding-First New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel Brodrick commanding; First Pennsylvania, Col. J. P. Taylor commanding; First Maryland, Lieut. Col. J. M. Deems commanding
Colonel Duffié reports that his division met a regiment of the enemy at Stevensburg; that his advance engaged and defeated it, capturing 1 officer and 57 men, and that his advance was thus engaged at the time he received my order to follow the Third Division, and hence was unavoidably delayed in coming to my support. Colonel Duffié reports the good conduct of his troops when engaged during the day. The loss in the Second Division was: Enlisted men killed, 4; wounded, 12; missing, 13.
I cannot close this report without favorably mentioning my division staff officers. Surgeon Phillips; Major Gaston, First Pennsylvania Cavalry; Capt. H. C. Weir, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. J. W. Kester, First New Jersey Cavalry; Capt. E. A. Tobes, acting commissary of subsistence; Lieuts. W. Phillips and T. J. Gregg, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, employed in transmitting my orders, proved their efficiency in the highest degree.
Major Gaston and Captain Tobes were captured, but the former escaped his captors.
D. McM. GREGG,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. Col. A. J. ALEXANDER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Corps.

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HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
September 19, 1863
[Excerpt]-->
In these engagements--at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville--the brigades of this division displayed the very greatest gallantry. The battle of Brandy Station had demonstrated to the men their superior strength, and in these subsequent operations they felt they had but to encounter the enemy to defeat him.
D. McM. GREGG,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Comdg. Second Division.

Capt. C. C. SUYDAM,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Corps.
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DUMFRIES, June 15, 1863--10.20 a.m.

General HALLECK:

Two of our best scouts returned from the interior, above Fredericksburg, yesterday (Sunday) morning. They report A. P. Hill, with sixty guns and 20,000 men, left on the heights about Fredericksburg. On Saturday p.m. 4,000 of this force moved toward Culpeper. On the same day, General Lee's headquarters were on the Lacy farm, between Brandy Station and Culpeper Court-House. Citizens say that the cavalry expedition was intended for Alexandria, while Lee was to go up the Valley. They believe that a great cavalry raid is now given up, as the cavalry is divided, a considerable part being still near Brandy Station. The passage of the infantry is traced across the Hazel River.
The Richmond papers of the 13th blame Stuart much for allowing himself to be surprised in his camp by Pleasonton, and call upon him to do something to retrieve his reputation. Anxiety expressed concerning the movements on the Peninsula. Will send the papers to you.
DANL. BUTTERFIELD,

Major-General, Chief of Staff.

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JUNE 18,1863--10.07 a.m. (Received 10.15 a.m.)

Major-General HALLECK:
GENERAL: I have to request that Brigadier-General Pleasonton, for his gallant conduct at Chancellorsville, his services there, and his attack and surprise of Stuart's force, superior in numbers, on the Rappahannock, June 9, may be made major-general, and assigned to command the cavalry corps.
JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General.

(Copy to the President and Secretary of War.)

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O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 347. -- Report of Col. Percy Wyndham,

First New Jersey Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division.(*)

As a brief summary, I may add that six distinct regimental charges were made, besides a number of smaller ones. We took one battle-flag, captured 128 of the enemy, among whom were General Stuart's adjutant-general, and several other officers whose rank was not learned.
The section of artillery attached to my command was well handled and did good execution. One piece burst while firing, and was left; the other was brought off.
My loss is 1 officer killed and 14 wounded or missing; 14 men killed and 120 wounded or missing.(*) A list of the casualties accounted for by name will accompany this report.
[P. WYNDHAM, Colonel,

Commanding.]

The above report was furnished by Colonel Wyndham's assistant <ar43_967> adjutant-general, and prepared under the direction of the colonel before he left for Washington, to which I can certify as correct.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. P. TAYLOR,
Capt. H. C. WEIR,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division, Cavalry Corps.

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Continued!

[M E Wolf]

Continued from post of bits #1

O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 370. -- Report of Capt. Joseph W. Martin,
Sixth New York Battery.

NEAR FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, VA., June 20, 1863.

LIEUTENANT: I beg leave to submit herewith the report of the part taken by my battery (the Sixth Independent New York) in the late movements of the Cavalry Corps of this army.
In accordance with orders, dated headquarters First Brigade, Horse Artillery, June 6, I reported with my battery to Col. Thomas C. Devin, commanding First Cavalry Division, at Brooke's Station, and marched with Col. B. F. Davis' brigade, of that division, to Hartwood Church, arriving there at 3.15 o'clock on the evening of the 7th instant.
At 6.30 o'clock the march was resumed, and at 4 p.m. I arrived at Warrenton Junction, and, in accordance with orders from headquarters Cavalry Corps, reported for duty to Brig. Gen. D. McM. Gregg, commanding Third Cavalry Division.
On the 8th instant, at 1.30 p.m., I marched in rear of Colonel Kilpatrick's brigade to Kelly's Ford, and went into park at 8.30 p.m.
At 3.30 a.m. 9th instant, the battery was harnessed, and at 6 a.m. commenced crossing the ford, under the following assignment of pieces: The right section, without caissons, commanded by First Lieut. M. P. Clark, in advance, following the lead regiment of Colonel <ar43_1024> Wyndham's brigade; the left section, under command of Second Lieut. J. Wade Wilson (also without caissons), in front of the rear regiment of Colonel Kilpatrick's brigade, and the two guns of the center section, with the column of caissons, marching between the two brigades.
The march from the ford to Brandy Station was pursued without extraordinary incident until we reached a point a few hundred yards distant from the station, when a shot from the advance section and an order from General Gregg to form at once in position was sufficient notice that we had come upon the foe. The enemy had a battery in position on an eminence close to a house which was occupied by their commanding general as headquarters, and from this battery poured a heavy fire on the section under Lieutenant Clark. They made no reply to the section under my own immediate command, and did not withstand the combined fire of the two sections more than a quarter of an hour. The distance from the advanced section to the enemy's battery was about 800 yards, and from the center section about 1,000 yards.
While the guns were engaged, an aide-de-camp from Colonel Wyndham, commanding the advance, reached me with an order to report to him immediately with the two guns I was commanding. I told the officer that I had been posted in the position I occupied by General Gregg's orders, was firing under his immediate directions, and I should consequently remain there until I received other orders from him or his superior in authority.
A few minutes after this, an order from General Gregg reached me to cease firing, and report with the two guns to Colonel Wyndham without delay. I did this as soon as I could, urged to a greater rapidity in the execution of the movement by the fact of receiving three separate messages from Colonel Wyndham to "hurry up." The aide who brought me the order to report to Colonel Wyndham told me that I would receive my support from him, but seeing none of our troops on the advanced position, which Lieutenant Clark already occupied with one piece (the remaining one of his section being temporarily disabled), I sent two separate messages for my support, and in reply received word that they were already on the way and would be at the position before my guns were. During the entire time, however, that I occupied this position I saw no supporting force, and had I not been so hotly pressed by the enemy I should have taken the responsibility of withdrawing my guns to where their safety would have been insured, nor would I have ever allowed the guns to be so much exposed had I for a moment supposed that they would be sent there unsupported. I understand that the support was ordered, but it is certain that it never took the position assigned it. Immediately on arriving at the position where Lieutenant Clark was engaged with his remaining piece, I formed the section on his right, and immediately commenced firing at the house which I before mentioned as having been occupied by General Stuart as his headquarters, and which was completely surrounded by a dense mass of the enemy's cavalry. Almost simultaneously the enemy commenced their attack by repeated charges on the guns, but it was not until they had been twice repulsed that their efforts were successful, and I am confident that even then they would have been discomfited had their final charge not been made almost simultaneously front and rear. It took but one round of canister shot from each piece to repulse their charges, and could I have reversed my <ar43_1025> pieces in sufficient time on their last effort to have given them a round before they were in the battery, they should never have taken the guns--there, at least. Once in the battery, it became a hand-to-hand fight with pistol and saber between the enemy and my cannoneers and drivers, and never did men act with more coolness and bravery, and show more of a stern purpose to do their duty unflinchingly, and, above all, to save their guns; and while the loss of them is a matter of great regret to me, it is a consolation and a great satisfaction to know that I can point with pride to the fact that of that little band who defended the battery not one of them flinched for a moment from his duty.
Of the 36 men that I took into the engagement, but 6 came out safely, and of these 30, 21 are either killed, wounded, or missing, and scarcely one of them but will carry the honorable mark of the saber or bullet to his grave.
The three guns lost were so disabled by bursting, wedging, and spiking that their possession was of no benefit to the enemy for the remainder of the engagement, and the ammunition (fuse shell and case shot) which they took with the guns was rendered useless by the destruction of the fuses belonging to them. All this was accomplished in less time than it takes to write it, but it was complete and effectual.
Finding that it was futile to do more than had been done, I made my way to where I hoped to find the general commanding the division, my object being, if possible, to secure sufficient force to recapture the guns (and I believe, from the character of the enemy's fighting, that it could have been done with little loss), and to assist in their recapture I intended to take up three of the caisson limbers to bring off the guns with (the horses belonging to the guns having all been either killed or wounded) if the effort was successful, and, if it was attended with no success, I felt assured that I could fall back with the limbers as safely as could the assisting force. After fifteen minutes' unsuccessful search, I returned and found that our forces were falling back on the road leading to Berry's Hill, and I accordingly moved my caissons and the remaining portions of the two sections to that point, and left them under the charge of Lieutenant Clark, while I went to the headquarters of the corps to report my disaster to Captain Robertson, corps chief of artillery.
The operations of the left section were conducted solely by its chief, Lieutenant Wilson, and from all sides I hear nothing but high encomiums on his excellent management of his command and of the gallantry of himself and his men. The reports of his operations and of those of Lieutenant Clark(*) from the time he took the advance until I joined him on the field, are herewith inclosed.
At 3 p.m., in accordance with orders from the general commanding the division, I crossed the Rappahannock at the station ford, and remained in camp until 7 a.m. on the 10th, when I marched with the division to Warrenton Junction, remaining, under the order of the general commanding the division, until the 13th instant, when I reported to your headquarters for duty with the brigade.
I have the honor to report the following casualties: 8 wounded and 13 missing. None known to be killed.
Amount of ammunition expended: 122 rounds Schenkl percussion shell. 126 rounds Hotchkiss case shot, and 15 rounds Hotchkiss canister. «65RR--VOL XXVII, PT I»<ar43_1026> The working of the ammunition used was excellent. The only fault to be found was in the paper fuses used with the case shot, and their inaccuracy, it seems, cannot be remedied. The percussion shell was in this case, as I have always found it, true to its reputation. I want no better projectile in my chests. The loss in matériel, I regret to say, is great, and consists, in part, as follows: Three 3-inch rifled guns, carriages, and equipments complete, 3 sets double lead harness, 2 sets double wheel harness, 24 lead traces, 15 wheel traces, 16 sets horse equipments, and 20 artillery horses.
I beg leave to tender my sincere thanks to the general commanding the Third Cavalry Division for the uniform kindness and forbearance with which he treated myself and my command during the short time I was acting under his orders; and to Captain Weir and his entire staff, and to Lieutenant Thomson, aide-de-camp to the general commanding Cavalry Corps, who accompanied the left wing of the advance, I am also sincerely grateful.
Of the conduct of my chiefs of sections--Lieutenants Clark and Wilson and First Sergeant [James E.] Tileston (acting)--I am deservedly proud. They are well fitted to command men of the caliber and stamina such as those who fought so nobly and so heroically at Brandy Station on the memorable June 9.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. W. MARTIN,

Captain, Comdg. Sixth Independent New York Battery.

First Lieut. J. H. BELL,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

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O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
No. 375. -- Report of Lieut. William D. Fuller,
Battery C, Third U. S. Artillery.

We captured from the battery which engaged us one iron rifled gun (Blakely's patent), limber, and caisson. The gun was turned over by the battery to the quartermaster at Fairfax Station for transportation to Washington, D. C., as a trophy. This gun threw a projectile weighing 16 or 17 pounds with great force and precision. It was stamped with the date 1862, and was made in Liverpool, England. It is superior to our 3-inch ordnance gun in every respect.
Excerpt
Two of their guns were smoothbores, and their shells all burst short of us. The rifle shells were, as usual, of superior caliber and quality to our 3-inch ammunition. Shortly after the firing ceased, the whole command marched for Boonsborough, arriving there just before daybreak on the 6th.
The services of this battery have been fatiguing in the extreme. The chiefs of sections have been on all occasions in positions demanding decision and judgment, and often receiving contradictory and <ar43_1037> perplexing orders from cavalry officers of inferior rank. First Lieut. H. C. Meinell, First Lieut. J. R. Kelly, and Second Lieut. James Lancaster, commanding the sections of this battery, have in most of the engagements fought their sections necessarily as independent commands, and with the skill and gallantry they have always displayed throughout the war. I beg to call your attention to the efficient services in action of First Sergt. Daniel Munger and Sergeants [William. H.] Miller and [George A.] Niforth, all cool and valuable men in battle.
I am, captain, very respectfully,
WILLIAM D. FULLER,

First Lieutenant Third U. S. Artillery,
Comdg. Battery.

Capt. J. C. TIDBALL,
Commanding Second Brigade, Horse Artillery.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[diddyriddick]

"Major-General HALLECK:
GENERAL: I have to request that Brigadier-General Pleasonton, for his gallant conduct at Chancellorsville, his services there, and his attack and surprise of Stuart's force, superior in numbers, on the Rappahannock, June 9, may be made major-general, and assigned to command the cavalry corps.
JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General"

As always an excellent post, M. E. But I'm confused. Didn't Hooker blame Pleasonton for the loss at C'ville, or am I losing my mind?

[Dred]

You are confused. Pleasonton's acts were right in the thick of the battle at Chancellorsville. The general of Cavalry who did not fulfill a single aspect of his mission was Stoneham, who was supposed to severe communications behind the Rebel line along with a bunch of other stuff. If I'm not mistaken , Stoneham failed as a cavalry leader in the western theatre as well. I hop[e I have his name right... it sounds right but can't find my book right now.

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

These "bits" are very interesting to me--hopefully to those who read them also.

It takes 500 beef to feed a regiment a day. The Confederate correspondence in regard to a 5 day's supply of beef for rations; may give an estimate of the size of the CSA in that area, per that time and or year.
The other interesting 'tid bit' was the mention of the Railroad--Alexandria & Orange Railroad which extends from Alexandria, through the southwestern direction; connecting with "Brandy Station." For more modern times--CSX trains still travel the same road bed around through Catlett[Rt. 28], Brandy Station[Rt 28 which merges into Rt. 29] towards Culpeper. [Rt. 29 between Rt. 17 and Rt. 3]. [Rt. 28 is the clear path to Manassas, Centerville and Leesburg (which connects to Rt 7]Thoroughfare, is Thoroughfare Gap--a means to cross the moutains. The Virginia & Tennessee Railroad connection; as well as connecting to the Roanoke railroad lines. Central Railroad, Virginia RR, etc.; so the importance of hauling beef in quantity via rail is evidently of great notice; as to feed the army quickly. This 'station' as well as the beef collection point would be important for the Union Army as well.

The rest is self explained - ground especially.

I find the numbers in the reports interesting also; always something new to learn in the official reports.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf