"Battle of the Month" Club

[ole]

The snub of the professional to the amateur?

A highly reasonable assumption, timewalker. I might digress to a little supporting assumption: The western commanders did not hold the same low opinion of farmers and mechanics. Although there wasn't (until late, at least) a Union equivalent to a Stuart or Hampton in the western ranks, the men were there.

Just a thought.

ole

[PvtClewell]

In addition to the very helpful posts of Mr. Wolf and Mr. Timewalker and maybe Mr. Ole, I found this in an article written by Laurence D. Schiller for North & South magazine (January 1999, Vol. 2, No. 2, it's 'Cavalry Special' issue) titled, 'A Taste of Northern Steel.'

Schiller writes in his summation that:
"By the Spring of 1863, the (Union) men had developed into cavalrymen (or perhaps more accurately dragoons) who now had the skills necessary to ride, shoot, and to a degree, wield a sabre. They also began to get army commanders who were willing to put the cavalry back together as regiments, brigades and divisions, thus allowing their more efficient use in protecting the flanks of the army and locating and developing the enemy. 1863 also saw the beginning of the mounted raid as a Federal strategy, especially in the East."

Schiller points out that by the time of Fort Sumter, the Union had but five mounted regiments and they were posted all over the West in an entirely different geography than in the East. Also, Gen. Winfield Scott had no use for cavalry in the East, figuring there was too much "uneven ground, fences and woods" for effective cavalry use.

Also, at the beginning of the war, the Union had to decide how to use its cavalry: "Shock attacks? Raids? Pickett duty?" And did the north need light cavalry? Heavy cavalry? Mounted infantry? Dragoons? Add to that, it took about a year-and-a-half to effectively train a cavalryman. Apparently, the Federal cavalry had a lot to overcome both strategically and philosophically, right out of the gate, as it were.

So I'm guessing that the evolution of the Union cavalry was not really sudden at all, but very gradual, hit, miss and learn, until it finally manifested itself as competent by the time of Brandy Station.

Durn. It's a lot more dramatic to suggest they were consistenly horrible until one day when they suddenly became forever brilliant for the rest of the war.

[ole]

A reality check, Enlisted Man. Thanks.

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear Timewalker, Ole and List Members,

I do believe you are correct in saying McClellan was the sort to snub the volunteer upstarts in the 'Cavalry.' Thus giving premium duties, such as escorting the President and other officials to the US Regular Cavalry but, that said--many of the officers and men of the Voluntary Cavalry were ex-US Army regulars or ones who transfered by order/rank promotion and assigned to Volunteer Cavalry Corps; e.g. Buford--who had no break in service; was promoted to Brig. Gen., after his excellent cavalry tactics that covered everybody's hind parts. You have Gamble, who was a Colonel for the longest time who was not only from the British Dragoon system but, immigrated and served in the US Military during the Mexican and Seminole War-- It makes no rythmn or reason to me why McClellan was so determined to thwart cavalry use.

If you look at the Civil War mounts, like Lee's famous charger Traveller--he didn't have his beginnings as a war horse. Lee trained him as he rode him. The same for all of them, Buford's Grey Eagle might have had more mileage as he took him from the frontier duty into battle, even at Gettysburg and followed his casket at his funeral-- JEB Stuart no doubt brought his mounts from US Army service, etc.; so they would have had varying degrees of experienced war horses; especially those who defected to the Cavalry and those who immediately jumped into service for the US Army-"Lincoln's Army." General Kearny, McClellan, Sumner, Winfield Scott Hancock, Couch, George A. Custer, Stoneman, Milroy,etc. So, even if trying to justify the 'men' riding in the cavalry; it doesn't swim with me; nor the need for five years in order to be an accomplished cavalry rider and or an accomplished war steed.

Spending around 12 hours in the saddle per se; does teach you how to ride and survive. The McClellan saddles were rather comfortable, having a slit in the seat allowed air to flow to the rider and horse; as well as allowing male 'goodies' to float per se. Closed saddles, like the Jenifer (if you have the movie Gettysburg; the saddle that is used by Chamberlain is a "Jenifer" saddle; which was more Confederate than Union. The "Jenifer" saddle though was excellent for lancers, saber charges as it wasn't that much different than the 'knight' saddle which held him in per se. The high piece in front, a man could brace his groin/hip into it and hold him as well as handy for going down hill to keep him over the place of balance on the horse. McClellan saddle is what Lt. Tom Chamberlain's horse is wearing; easier to see when Tom dismounts in a hurry to tell brother about the 2nd Maine picking up the rifle.

Oh, while on this 'Gettysburg' reference; the grey horse that Colonel Devin is riding--wouldn't be allowed on a field or out of the remount depot; a rider doesn't need a uncontroled horse and it did fine alone but not with a batch of riders, e.g. Buford's entry scene with cavalry regiment behind him tailing; or the scene around the Lutheran Seminary-- the actor was a good rider so its not the rider--the horse was spastic (maybe due to cameras or just new)--but, you saw the other horses were well behaved. Jerking the head or flinching is acceptable. Not hopping about and unseating the rider or distracting him from his focus. Especially for an officer.)

Since I am unable to explain the logic of McClellan yet, still poking through the Official Records of the Rebellion to extract some personally transmitting through McClellan's Chief-of-Staff and or Aide-de-Camps; but--in regard to General Pope, it is sooooooooo obvious that McClellan was being sarcastic and making Pope 'pay'/'suffer' --but, I am seeing Pope is a whiner and know it all--so, I don't mind others giving Pope some 'humble pie.' So far cavalry is alluding me, in regard to McClellan's lack of use of cavalry.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[M E Wolf]

Dear Private Clewell and List Members;

I do agree with your post Private Clewell; as the entire US Army before the outbreak of the rebellion; the cavalry was best used in the west, frontier where speed in moving troops and or artillery was needed do to territory having to cover.

I can understand McClellan's judicious use of the Cavalry in 1861 due to the lack of quality Cavalry/Dragoons and to precious few experienced officers to train those who would join "Lincoln's Army." However by 1862--there should have been adequate cavalry forces to use in the eastern theater. The Native American Indian's Home Guard Cavalry fought in the western theater quite well.

One need be reminded that 'then' Major Winfield Scott Hancock was a lone 'Quartermaster-general' with no 'real' staff until there was a threat to the arsenal; when he requested infantry support. Just the amount of active men in service at that time would swell at the call for volunteers by President Lincoln; swallowing the numbers of regular troops immediately. Those who lead troops into battle as Captains or such; shot up through the ranks; as McClellan did with Hancock--the same for the Confederacy-- Lee took most his life to reach Colonel and when the Confederacy was formed he was shot forward into general; his aide- Lt. Walter H. Taylor would be shot forward into Major as well as Major Charles Marshall.

But, in my humble opinion - numbers does not make an army--it takes discipline, training and first hand experience. And, this was done with time...like fine wine; seasoned and aged with time. Plus, the Union Cavalry had to contend with six commanders who all had different ideas on how to use the Cavalry.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

Post Script -- We all need to remember that McClellan had two phases as Commanding General with Pope being the break in between the two phases of McClellan.

[Dred]

I think its more likely that Brandy Station was the culmination of training and experience, than that Jeb was tired from drill. These men were hardened veterans, already suffered through months and months of hard riding, hard fighting, and hard living. Having drill two days in a row would be far less strenuous than making a 150 mile march over 3 days and fighting for 3 days strait, then marching back. The men probably had some sort of drill just about every day anyways. Need to keep the men in the camps busy, or bad things start to happen. Was this a turning point for the US calvary tho? I know they still had some problems even as late as 1863 at Chancellorsville. That one could have been more the generals fault.. Stoneham I think?

[PvtClewell]

Mr. Wolf (in response to your 10:46 p.m. post),

I found this in the same North & South article written by Schiller that I referred to earlier. It might apply here about McClellan:

"Aside from the logistical and training problems, the development of the Union cavalry was further slowed by the disagreement within the army leadership as to how to use it. Early army commanders, such as McClellan, Buell and Fremont, did not conceive of cavalry as an independent fighting force, but rather as only having use in escort, orderly or picket and provost duty. McClellan had written that the value of cavalry lay in its shock value, the 'spurs and sabre', but as Commander of the Army of the Potomac, he broke them up into small detachments. Rather than fight them as a unit where the mass charge would have had an effect, McClellan attached the cavalry in small groups to infantry brigades and divisions, thus putting the cavalry in the hands of generals without any mounted experience and with little interest in the use of the arm as any kind of striking force. The 8th Illinois was one of ten and one-half cavalry regiments sent to the Peninsula in the Spring of 1862, none of which was ever used as an integral unit. While Jeb Stuart used his Confederate cavalry as a striking force, the Federal cavalry mostly scouted, picketed, delivered messages, and escorted infantry officers.

"In spite of McClellan's inability to understand what the mission of the cavalry might be, the 8th and other eastern regiments began to get a dose of combat as 'Little Mac' moved slowly up the Peninsula towards Richmond. Inevitably, when on picket duty or patrol, they ran into Confederate infantry and cavalry. The terrain was wooded and swampy, inappropriate for mounted action, so they often dismounted to fight with their carbines. If nothing else, it gave them experience, if few casualties..."

Stephen Sears, in his biography of McClellan, said Little Mac had a "military character flaw." That works for me.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Private Clewell,

I am very sure McClellan was not cooperative when it came to more insightful/visionary generals in using the Cavalry. But, what did shake out through both leadership phases; that McClellan for all his brilliance in 'organizing' and 'administration' he was not the correct commanding general for the field.

That was one of his 'military character flaw for sure.

Again, the interesting value of seeing the 1862 US Cavalry Tactics -Intructions, Formations and Manouvers by General Philip St.George Cooke; I think is the pivot point; which carries on more 'Dragoon' and old Cavalry tactics ammended. Not a 'lance' to be seen in it. [Smiles]
Weapon tactics is the 'change' per se.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[Hanny]

In the final analysis, a smaller percentage of Federals died under Grant's command than Confederates under Lee's.

this caught my eye yesterday, so i flicked through Attack and Die and fullers Grant and Lee which are the 2 statistical works on this point, its not dead (KIA) but casualties (KIA/WIA/MIA/POW that the numbers show.

They also show Grant lost more men dead and in a shorter time period than Lee, or any other Union commander, but that lees losses are at best estimates.

AoP in the 40 days was loseing men faster than did the SU in the initail phase of the German invasion, which was why grant got the press of a butcher.

Off topic, but interesting. ole

[Hanny]

Civil War Cavalry Battles and Charges

During the first two years of the Civil War, the Federal cavalry was subordinated in every way to its true role, and one of the common mistakes in those early days of the war was to use cavalry with infantry support, so that the latter used to shout derisively: "There's going to be a fight, boys! The cavalry's coming back!"
One of the early cavalry actions which excited attention, took place during the Peninsula campaign, at the close of the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, 1862. General Fitz John Porter with his Fifth Corps was covering the communications of the Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy line with the base at White House Landing on the Pamunkey. The Confederate army had made four desperate assaults on the Union lines, and every available infantryman had been brought into action, so that there was not a single reserve in rear of the line of battle, save the cavalry and some artillery.
The day was fast drawing to a close, when the Confederates made a final effort to force Porter's left flank and cut it off from the bridge. The cavalry commander, General P. St. George Cooke, directed the artillery to hold its precarious position, add ordered Captain Whiting, commanding the Fifth United States Cavalry, to charge the advancing infantry.
Numbering but two hundred and twenty sabers, the little force moved out under heavy fire, and striking the foe intact with a portion of its line, the charging troopers were only stopped by the woods at the bottom of the slope. The casualties of the charging force were fifty-five, with twenty-four horses killed--a sacrifice well worth the results attained. Of this action, the Comte de Paris wrote fifteen years later: "The sacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainly saved a part of the artillery, as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa."
General Wesley Merritt, the ablest cavalry officers of his time, who was present at Gaines' Mill as an aide-de-camp to General Cooke, thus described this affair: *

During the early part of this battle the Union army held its ground and gained from time to time some material success. But it was only temporary. In the afternoon the writer of this, by General Cooke's direction, reported at the headquarters of the commanding general on the field, Fitz John Porter, and during his attendance there heard read a despatch from General McClellan congratulating Porter on his success. It closed with directions to drive the rebels off the field, and to take from them their artillery. At the time this despatch was being read, the enemy were forcing our troops to the rear. Hasty preparations were made for the retreat of the headquarters, and everything was in the most wretched confusion. No orders could be obtained, and I returned to my chief reporting the condition of affairs. It was apparent from movements in our front that the Confederates would make a supreme effort to force the left flank of Fitz John Porter's command, and cutting it off from the bridge over the Chickahominy, sever it from McClellan's army, and capture or disperse it.
It was growing late. Both armies were exhausted by the exertions of the day. But the prize at hand was well worth the effort, and the Confederates with renewed strength were fighting to make their victory complete. The Union cavalry commander seized the situation at a glance. The cavalry had been posted behind a plateau on the left bank of the Chickahominy, with ground to its front free of obstacles and suitable for cavalry action. To the right front of the cavalry the batteries of the reserve artillery were stationed ....
The events of that day at Gaines' Mill are pictured on the mind of the writer of this imperfect sketch as on a never fading photograph. The details of the battle are as vivid as if they bad occurred yesterday. As the Confederates came rushing across the open in front of the batteries, bent on their capture, one battery nearest our position was seen to limber up with a view to retreating I rode hurriedly, by direction of General Cooke, to its captain, Robinson, and ordered him to unlimber and commence firing at short range, canister. He complied willingly, and said, as if in extenuation of his intended withdrawal, that he had no support. I told him the cavalry were there, and would support his and the other batteries. The rapid fire at short range of the artillery, and the daring charge of the cavalry in the face of an exhausted foe, prevented, without doubt, the enemy seizing the Chickahominy bridge and the capture or dispersion of Fitz John Porter's command. No ****her advance was made by the Confederates, and the tired and beaten forces of Porter withdrew to the ****her side of the Chickahominy and joined the Army of the Potomac in front of Richmond. The cavalry withdrew last as a rear guard, after having furnished torch and litter bearers to the surgeons of our army, who did what was possible to care for our wounded left on the field.
* Journal United States Cavalry Association, March, 1895.


But it was not until a year later (March 17, 1863), at Kelly's Ford on the Rappahannock, that the Union cavalry first gained real confidence in itself and in its leaders.
In this engagement, following the forcing of the river crossing, two regiments of cavalry dismounted, with a section of artillery, and held the foe in front, while mounted regiments rolled up the Confederate flanks; their entire line was thrown into confusion and finally driven from the field.
The decisive cavalry battle at Brandy Station, or Beverly Ford, on June 9th, following, having for its object a reconnaissance in force of the Confederate troops on the Culpeper-Fredericksburg road, was the first great cavalry combat of the war. It virtually "made" the Union cavalry.
Buford's division of the Federal cavalry corps accompanied by Ames' infantry brigade, had been directed to cross the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford, and move by way of St. James' Church to Brandy Station. A second column composed of Gregg's and Duffie's divisions, with Russell's infantry brigade, was to cross the river at Kelly's Ford--Gregg to push on by way of Mount Dumpling to Brandy Station, and Duffie to proceed to Stevensburg. By a strange coincidence, that brilliant cavalry leader, Stuart, planned on the same day to cross the Rappahannock at Beverly and the upper fords, for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Army of the Potomac from General Lee's northward dash into Maryland.
Under cover of a heavy fog, Buford's column crossed the river at four o'clock in the morning, surprising the Southern outposts and nearly capturing the Confederate artillery. Here, in spite of superior numbers, the Union commander, General Pleasonton, formed his cavalry in line of battle, covering the ford in less than an hour, but he could make no perceptible movement forward until Gregg's guns on the extreme left had made a general advance possible.
The Confederates fell rapidly back, and the headquarters of Stuart's chief of artillery, with all his papers and Lee's order for the intended movement, were captured. A junction was soon formed with Gregg, and with heavy losses on both sides, the foe was pushed back to Fleetwood Ridge. Of this part of the action General Stuart's biographer says:


A part of the First New Jersey Cavalry came thundering down the narrow ridge, striking McGregor's and Hart's unsupported batteries in the flank, and riding through and between guns and caissons from right to left, but were met by a determined hand-to-hand contest from the cannoneers with pistols, sponge-staffs, and whatever else came handy to fight with The charge was repulsed by artillerists alone, not a single friendly trooper being within reach of us.

On Fleetwood Ridge the Confederate infantry rallied to the support of Stuart's cavalry, and the object of the reconnaissance having been gained, a general withdrawal of the Union cavalry was ordered, Gregg by way of the ford at Rappahannock Bridge, and Buford by Beverly Ford. But as the order was about to be executed, the Confederates fiercely attacked the Union right, and the most serious fighting of the day resulted. At four o'clock in the afternoon, a large Confederate infantry force being reported at Brandy Station, General Pleasonton began a general withdrawal of the Union cavalry, a movement which was executed in good order and completed by seven o'clock in the evening without molestation by the Confederates.
This great cavalry battle lasted for over ten hours, and was preeminently a mounted combat, the charges and countercharges of the opposing horsemen being of the most desperate character. During the day, the First New Jersey Cavalry, alone, made six regimental charges, besides a number of smaller ones; the fighting and charging of the regular and Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry was kept up for over twelve hours; and the other regiments were almost equally engaged through the eventful day.
Commenting on this defeat of the Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station, the Richmond Examiner of that period said:

The surprise of this occasion was the most complete that has occurred. the Confederate cavalry was carelessly strewn over the country, with the Rappahannock only between it and an enemy who has already proven his enterprise to our cost. It is said that their camp was supposed to be secure because the Rappahannock was not supposed to be fordable at the point where it actually was forded. What! Do the Yankees then know more about this river than our own soldiers, who have done nothing but ride up and down its banks for the past six months?

Brandy Station was really the turning-point in the evolution of the Federal cavalry, which had heretofore been dominated by a sense of its own inferiority to Stuart's bold horsemen. Even the Confederate writer, McClellan, has this to say of Brandy Station and its effect on the morale of the Union cavalry:

Up to this time, confessedly inferior to the Southern horsemen, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves and their commanders which enabled them to contest so fiercely the subsequent battlefields of June, July, and October.

Passing by without comment the splendid stand of Buford's dismounted troops covering the approaches to the town of Gettysburg, in which less than three thousand cavalrymen and Calef's battery made possible the occupation by the delayed Union army of the dominating position along Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops, the desperate battles of the cavalry on the right and left flanks at Gettysburg, are history.
On the Union left flank, Pleasonton had ordered Kilpatrick to move from Emmittsburg with his entire force to prevent a Confederate turning movement on the Round Tops, and, if practicable, to attack the Confederate flank and rear. Late on July 3, 1863, the reserve cavalry brigade under Merritt moved up and took position to the left of Kilpatrick. Custer's brigade had been detached to report to Gregg on the Union right. The fight which ensued on this third and last day of the great battle, was severe in the extreme.
Merritt's position on the left caused the Confederate general, Law, to detach a large force from his main line to protect his flank and rear. This so weakened the Confederate line in front of General Farnsworth, that Kilpatrick ordered the latter to charge the center of Law's line of infantry. The ground was most unfavorable for a mounted charge, being broken, covered with stone, and intersected by fences and stone walls.
Writing of this charge in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Captain H.C. Parsons of the First Vermont Cavalry, says: