"Battle of the Month" Club

[ole]

It would take me a while, and a book or two, to come up with all eight. And you can reel them off in the car? I'm impressed!

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

As far as the Battle of Vicksburg, in Mississippi; the first few attempts were; the Battle of Chickasaw Bluffs, the Yazoo Pass Expedition, and Steele's Bayou Expedition, in 1863. Grant then sought Naval support from
Rear Adm. David D. Porter's fleet north of Vicksburg. Porter's fleet ferried Grant's troops across the river, so that Grant could approach Vicksburg from the east. An offensive, northwest of Vicksburg at Milliken's Bend and Lake Providence. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks began his maneuvering along the Red River in Louisiana. General Hurlbut's corps was subsequently moved to New Orleans. During these moves; Grierson's Raid began led by Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson, Federal cavalry who had left for 16 days riding through central Mississippi to Baton Rouge, La., pulling away large units from Vicksburg's defense to pursue them. Much like 'look at the birdie' distracting and pulling away from Vicksburg, giving Grant more of an advantage; General Sherman's troops then in a last action along the Yazoo River, northeast of Vicksburg, making a 'demonstration,' against Confederate works at Haynes' Bluff and Drumgould's Bluffs, diverting more of General Pemberton's force. While this was taking place, Generals -McClernand's and McPherson's troops gathered near Hard Times, while General Porter's fleet assaulted Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf. With all this going on, it allowed Grant to use Bruinsburg as the focus for his invasion. McClernand's and McPherson's corps were ferried across the river, Sherman to follow these generals met and joined to participate in the Battle of Port Gibson. When Port Gibson was defeated; the action still continued; taking it to the 'engagement' at Raymond. This is when General Johnson took command and Grant engaged Johnson at 'Jackson, Mississippi.' While Grant won at Jackson; General Johnson and General Pemberton weren't done yet --Grant in pursuit, continued to the climax of the campaign;
Battle Of Champion's Hill. Still not having 'quit' in them, the Confederates retreated to Vicksburg, in a delaying battle of Big Black River Bridge. Meanwhile, General Sherman's, McClernand's, McPherson's forces pressed towards Vicksburg. Sherman took the Yazoo heights-thus supporting Grant's next move(s). There were two assaults on Vicksburg, the first a failure so, Grant extracted the thoughts of using a protracted siege. So, from May 22nd to July, Grant's shelling, supported by R. Adm. Porter's fleet shelling them as well --the seige of Petersburg continued until it was surrendered with General Pemberton in command. While the seige of Petersburg was taking place, General Johnson had managed to raise troops and pose a new threat. Sherman headed towards Johnson's location in Jackson and attacked, resulting in 'the seige of Jackson.' The affair tied up on July 4, 1863.
Battle: Killed Wounded Missing
Port Gibson 131 719 25
South Fork, Bayou Pierre 0 1 0
Skirmishes, May 3rd- 1 9 0
Fourteen Mile Creek- 6 24 0
Raymond 66 339 37
Jackson 42 25 7
Champion's Hill 410 1844 187
Big Black 39 237 3
Bridgeport 0 1 0
Total Killed-695 Wounded-3,425 Missing-259

With General Grant's ability to gather these commanders--as well as use of the Navy fleet; it was a long drawn out affair yet, noteworthy success.

I must assume that when Lincoln saw the 'technical planning' and 'coordination' of so many units-corps/navy; this was using 'all' of his resources and something Lincoln was looking for perhaps-- someone who would use Navy as much as he would use his Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery. Also, the advantage of having a fleet of naval vessels against Infantry on land; there was the natural water barrier--not likely subjected to infantry attack. The ability to deposit shells into town from sea and by land; shut off the food supply as well as support. Perhaps this experience and it's results gave seed to Sherman's march to the sea.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[timewalker]

The "first attempt" to take Vicksburg was actually Grant advance down from Tennessee toward Jackson. His supply line was broken by Forrest and his supply base at Holly Springs was captured and burned by Van Dorn. Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs was part of this attempt and ended up being a separate attack since Grant was no longer tying up Pemberton's forces in central Mississippi.

At least according to Foote in The Beleagered City, the seven failed attempts to take Vicskburg were:

1. Grant's advance through central Mississippi
2. Sherman's attack at Chickasaw Bluffs
3. Sherman's men re-starting digging on the "old canal" to cut across the base of the bend of the rover before Vicksburg
4. An attempt to use Lake Providence to bypass Vicksburg (a steamer was put on the lake resulting in a pleasant diversion for McPherson and his officers taking cruises around the lake)
5. The Yazoo Pass expedition seeking to cut over from the Mississippi to the Yazoo River just below Helena by blowing the levee
6. The Steel Bayou expedition (a great visual - the bayou was so crooked that at one point Porter's five gunboats on the bayou were steaming in five different directions
7. The "new canal" - another attempt at a canal which would have bypassed both Vickburg and the guns below Vicksburg

Thus leading to the eighth and final attempt, Porter running the guns and getting Grant's army across the river below Vicksburg.

This lead to my favorite quote from Grant's memoirs:

"When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy’s country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object."

I love that - a river and an enemy stronghold between me and my supplies, but "I was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy." Kind of sums up Grant, doesn't it?

See: http://www.bartleby.com/1011/33.html

P.S. - ole, I can't say that I do a great job recounting the 8 attempts from memory in the car, but Samuel's seven years old and he's not going to call me on it if I'm a little off as to the details of an attempt or two. As long as I list seven tries and use my "story-telling voice" he's happy. This morning on the way to school, we started the story of Gettysburg (which he's not quite as interested in as he is a huge Grant fan).

[Dred]

Interesting when you think about it. Vicksburg and all its campaigns were pretty much Grant in a nutshell throughout the war. all the logistics, the daring plans to dig canals, and the new ideas he was using and what did it come down to in the end? Run and gun it and force your way by. It's pretty much what he did when he came east as well. All the planning and careful movements of the ware had gotten the AoP no where, then Grant comes in and forces his way in. Sure he was a military genius (IMO) But he really understood that finesses was going to get him nowhere in Virginia. Perhaps a lesson he learned at Vicksburg? Certainly a lesson McClellan could have used a few years earlier! Pound away until they retreat or give up. He really understood what war takes, and wasn't afraid to use it. I think Vicksburg is where he learned that.

[ole]

I think Vicksburg is where he learned that.

I suspect that he learned it sometime before. Vicksburg was graduation.

Let's not forget that Vicksburg was not a cake walk. The plan -- get south of Vicksburg, cross the river, go north and invest Vicksburg -- worked. So many things could have gone wrong: Johnston was in Jackson, Pemberton had a large force deeply dug in at Vicksburg, and Forrest was just outside the arena waiting for a chance to pounce on some unsuspecting brigade. In the face of what we like to call living off the land, there was a supply line. You don't get ammo and powder and coffee and salt off the land.

What was masterful was not the plan itself, but in making it work with all the variables present -- in the "making it work" lies Grant's genius. Kinda like chess: make your moves and adapt to the countermoves. (Lee was pretty good at that game, too.) Hooker failed that final exam at Chancellorsville; Bragg failed it at Chickamauga.

And it might well be called an innate characteristic, rather than an education. that made Grant what he was. He was not one to wait or to backtrack -- if it needed doing, then he set off to do it. Period. He didn't wait for that last battery or brigade that he wanted. He didn't give the opposition time to set up a plan or gain the initiative.

Vicksburg is a classic example, although I may be forgiven if I overlook the fumbling of Johnston, Davis and Pemberton, of this technique. They knew that, sooner or later, Grant would be at the gates of Vicksburg. But they didn't know where or when. He kept all of them on the defensive which, if you watch most any sport, is what an aggressive commander does. Get them leaning back and watching what you are doing. Get them in that spot and you've taken away their ability to grab the initiative.

Bloviating now. Will quit here.

ole

[Dred]

Ole


Good call on that one.

Vicksburg could be considered the culmination of everything he had learned thus far. From Grade school in Ft Donelson up to High school at Shiloh. What a great graduation gift! A major city on a major river and the closing of the last port on the Mississippi River. Congratulations son, you did it!

[timewalker]

I have to disagree that the culmination of the Vicksburg campaign was simply "forcing his way through." Grant did not significantly outnumber the Confederates in total troops. He kept them off-balance by using maneuver, guile, Grierson's raid, and an incredible tenacity. Do not forget that everyone except Grant himself thought the last drive on Vicksburg was going to end in disaster. Sherman himself tried several times to talk Grant out of it and admitted that until they reached the gates of Vicksburg itself and reopenned the supply line, he was sure it would fail. The campaign was a boldly audacious move, not a simple slugfest. Grant out-thought and out-fought Pemberton and Johnston. He did not simply bully his way through. That was what had failed in the first attempt - the advance through central Mississippi.

Indeed, Grant learned his lessons well. He learned to live off the land, to coordinat ethe movements of his three corps beautifully (the strike at Jackson, with McLernand's Corp going from the lead corp to ending up guarding Grant's rear against Pemberton - brilliant).

I think Grant is rarely given proper credit. He was not simply a strong-arm commander - using superior force to beat down the enemy. In both the Vicksburg campaign and the final drive through the Wilderness through Petersburg, he used maneuver to continually outflank the enemy.

I think people underestimate Grant's victory in that final drive against Lee. He came close several times to ending the war in a stroke, stopped most often by either bad luck (Anderson not being able to stop to rest because of the fires from the Wilderness and thus reaching Spottsylvania ahead of Grant) or the inherent problems of the AoP and the command structure in the East. A better commander than Butler (who he was saddled with) would have driven up across Burmuda Hundred, cut off Petersburg and potentially trapped Lee. The move across the James River caught Lee flat-footed and it was the failure of his subordinate commanders that prevented this from being a brilliant coup in the capture of Petersburg.

To reiterate. Saying that Grant simply "forced his way in" does not give him nearly enough credit. I contend that he was hand-down the best strategist of the war. Not the best tactician perhaps, but clearly the best strategist.

[Dred]

When I referred to forcing his way through I was speaking more specifically of running the boats past the gantlet. Without achieving that goal first, nothing afterwards would have mattered, or even happened.

I agree with you about getting credit tho. He was not just a strong arm as you put it. Although he did have one, and that is what set him apart. Not only the means to get the job done, every general has that, but the guts do actually use it as it should be used.

[timewalker]

Sorry, Dred.

I misunderstood your post and, as you can tell, it touched on a matter near and dear to my heart.

The more I study Grant, the more I think he has been hopelessly mis-cast in popular imagination as a drunken butcher who won only because he was not afraid to heartlessly kill thousands of his own men and who through a complete lack of finesse and shear weight of numbers.

[ole]

That's one of the four pillars of the Lost Cause, Timewalker: "We only lost because you guys had the numbers and didn't mind killin' em." In the final analysis, a smaller percentage of Federals died under Grant's command than Confederates under Lee's.

ole