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General Nelson's official report, excerpt- "The enemy was greatly re-enforced in front of me, and at 7 a.m. my advance, which had been resumed by order of General Buell, was checked. At 7.30 my division began to give ground slowly. We were exposed to the fire of two of the enemy's batteries, and I had no artillery. You are aware that owing to the want of transportation I was compelled to leave the three batteries of my division at Savannah. I asked for artillery to support my infantry. General Buell sent to my aid the battery commanded by Captain Mendenhall, of the Regular Army, belonging to Crittenden's division, the well-directed fire of which gave my division most refreshing relief. After 8 the firing of the enemy was tremendous. They had been again largely re-enforced on this point. General Buell, who rode along the lines at this time, saw for himself the behavior of the Fourth Division. The style in which Colonel Am-men handled his brigade excited my admiration. Colonel Hazen commanded the right brigade of this division, carried it into action, and maintained it there most gallantly. The heavy loss of his brigade attests the fierceness of the conflict at this point. He drove the enemy and Captured the battery which so distressed us, but was forced back on his reserves. " {end of excerpt} Note-The Battery had to start in the wee hours of the morning as to get where they needed to be around the field for Nelson's use around 7AM - 8AM.
Another excerpt from General Nelson's official report- "The Nineteenth Ohio, Colonel Beatty, attached to Crittenden's division, also came to my support. This regiment was ably handled and rendered efficient service. At 1 o'clock, by direction of General Buell, I ordered the division to move, with arms trailed, at double-quick, on the rising ground in front, held by the enemy, which the enemy with much promptitude abandoned to our use. The firing now diminished much along the front of this division, but was at 2 p.m. renewed on my right, on Crittenden's and McCook's divisions, with great fury. The Fourth Division had no more trouble during the action, the attacks on it after 2 o'clock being feeble and easily repulsed, and ceased entirely at 4 p.m. [end of excerpt].
Crittenden's troops were doing all sorts of actions and some pieces independent of the main division belonging to Crittenden. But. to have had the Battery from Crittenden to support Brig. General Nelson, it had to have slugged its way through the mud and difficulties in order to set themselves up. Cannot do much but, to just admire the effort of those in Crittenden's Battery and others who participated in the second push.
Excerpt from Nelson's official report- "The men lay upon their arms. Lieutenant Gwin, of the Navy, commanding the gunboats in the river, sent to me and asked how he could be of service. I requested that he would throw an 8.inch shell into the camp of the enemy every ten minutes during the night, and thus prevent their sleeping, which he did very scientifically, and, according to the report of the prisoners, to their infinite annoyance. At 4 a.m. I roused up the men quietly by riding along the line, and when the line of battle was dressed and the skirmishers well out and the reserves in position, I sent an aide to notify the general that I was ready to commence the action." [End of excerpt] The darkness would still be in place at 4 AM and dawn barely breaking around 5:20 AM on the second day.
Generals;Sherman, McClernand and Hurlbut cross Tilghman Branch and join Wallace in fighting against Polk and Bragg on Confederate left. Causing, the reinforced, Nelson and Crittenden to advance, forcing Beauregard's right flank to retreat south to Hamburg/Purdy road.
This is the part I was talking about, M.E. Nelson and Crittenden didn't have much more than a brigade on dry ground when Beau's right flank gave it up and went back to sacking Yankee camps in the dark.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
On the subject of Shiloh, there is an interesting article in the January issue of Civil War Times entitles "Vindication at Last for Shilo's Scapegoat: General Lew Wallace didn't deserve his disgrace."
An interesting article defending Lew Wallace's performance at the Battle of Shiloh and his delay in reaching the field on the first day to reinforce Sherman's right flank, as ordered.
The question is, did Grant order Wallace to reinforce by marching down the River Road or did he simply order Wallace to reinforce and Wallace took the Shunpike which is the road he had reconoitered earlier?
Wallace was marching down the Shunpike when he was stopped and told that Sherman was not where he thought he was and he countermarched back along the route he had come. It is interesting to speculate if Wallace had continued along the route he was originally following. From the maps, it appears that if he had continued along the route, he would have come in on the Confederate left flank, accidentally doing what Stonewall Jackson was to do a little over a year later at Chancellorsville.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Wallace and alot of his men maintained throughout the war that if he had continued down the Shunpike he could have fallen on the Confederate rear unexpected and possibly thrown them into chaos. The problem as I see it, is that the union army being pressed against the river already had their hands full and would not have been able to help. Wallace would have fallen upon a strong rear of the enemy with no hope of reenforcement or help. Meanwhile the rebs could have detached groups from some of the lesser pressed areas to aid in dispatching the pesky unit in the rear. I don't think it would have worked out quite as optimistically as Wallace and his men seemed to think. However, I also do not think Wallace deserved to be reprimanded, as even Grant himself recognized his mistake in time. The first order was not specific as to the road. Wallace used the Shunpike to bring himself where the Union army right flank was the last time he had heard. He had no way of knowing until the couriers arrived that the army had been pushed back so far. And no reason to suspect that it would be.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Mostly what Dred said. Wallace showing up where he thought Sherman was would have left him high and dry with no support but what he would have arrived with. Maybe -- just maybe -- his appearance in the Confederate rear would have caused some massive repercussions.
On the plus side, he would have come upon some thoroughly fatigued Confederates who had been fighting fiercely since sunup. On the minus side, his division could expect no more than to fight without hope of any help if it got into trouble. It would be the kind of thing Lee would risk, or Hood, as the payoff could be great. Putting an entire division at risk? I don't think so.
So. Was Wallace derelict? I've seen excellent pros and cons on the subject. None have convinced me either way. I've consigned it to the SNAFU file. It was just one of those well-intentioned things that sometimes happen. If Wallace is to be faulted for anything, it would be for the delay in setting out. Grant and Sherman placed great faith in immediate response to an order. The surest way to earn their undying enmity is to respond with, "In a minute, I'm busy right now."
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I never thought Wallace should be held to blame anyways. First off, his division wasn't consolidated at Crump's landing where Grant thought. Once he heard the firing he consolidated at Stoney Lonesome. He would have every reason to do this. The army wasn't AT Pittsburg Landing.... it was about three miles or so inland from that. The Shunpike took him exactly where he thought he needed to be. Also, the first order he received was not even signed by Grant. The courier had lost the original order. and wrote it on a crumpled up piece of tobacco paper. HE moved his division very briskly, even if it was the wrong way. And once he realized his mistake they double timed it to the Pittsburg road.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
The battle of Shiloh is truly an interesting battle to look at. We truly see, for the first time, Grant's tenacity as a general and his reluctance to give up when he has all but lost the fight. I love the oft quoted statement he gave to Gen. W.T Sherman at the end of the first day, when Sherman said that if had been a bad day for them, and he replied "Yep. Lick 'em tomorrow though.
Grant surely did not intend to fight there, and mistakes were made, as the camps were spread out and the approach of the Confederates was largely ignored. If there was one fault to be stated, it was the fact that Grant did not make sure his force was well protected and he was not near them, being up river, waiting on Buell.
But, when Grant was put in a tough spot, he consolitdated and attacked with equal vigor. I do wonder, though, if he would have attacked if Buell's troops had not arrived. If Buell hadn't shown up, Grant would have only had one division that had not fought, and that was Wallace's. The others were pretty well played out. I think he would have, but it would have been another hard fought day for both sides, with the battle being bloodier than it was. I say this because Grant was aggressive and took the initiative whenever he could. What do others think? Would Grant have attacked without Buell?
__________________ "War is, at its best, barbarism." General W.T. Sherman
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it." General R.E. Lee
I would say yea, Grant would have attacked without Buell. The rebs were just as tired from victory as the yanks were form loss. I always thought Wallaces division would have been enough reinforcements to flank the rebs and send them on their merry little way!\
Well.. May 1st is here... any ideas? We've got Chancellorsville of course, and then there is several battles in Jackson's Shenandoah campaign, Front Royal, Winchester, Strasbourg... Somebody else pick this time =P
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Gettysburg gets the press, but there is a case to be made that Vicksburg was the high-water mark for the Confederacy.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Gettysburg gets the press, but there is a case to be made that Vicksburg was the high-water mark for the Confederacy.
ole
Vicksburg is my son's favorite. When we are riding in the car, he wants me to tell him about battles and asks quite often, "Dad, tell me about Grant's eight attempts to take Vicksburg."
Being the only Civil War battlefield I have visited, I am a Vicksburg buff.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)