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I've lately heard mention by one or two of our members of the battles for Forts Henry and Donelson, and their importance in the effort to begin winning the war in the west. I live pretty close to these forts, and having grown up in close proximity to them, really never gave them much thought, other than what I've learned through general reading about the Civil War.
I found this article and am posting it up with attribution. It reinforces what I've been hearing here lately about the heretofore under-emphasized battles for Forts Henry and Donelson, and the impact of their capture on the outcome of the rebelllion.
Two battles that made a difference
January 6, 2007 12:50 am
A PREVIOUS COLUMN discussed a "cordon defense," which is an everywhere defense of a nation or battlefield. Experts agree that a defense everywhere is a defense nowhere. When the South at the start of the Civil War was forced by political necessity to defend all parts of the Confederate nation, it was only a matter of time before a Union commander found a soft spot and crashed through it.
In listing the campaigns of the Civil War in order of their importance, I now add the campaigns that included the battles of Forts Henry and Donelson as the fourth most important. This campaign took place in early 1862 and reversed what had been a string of Southern victories. Consider how the Confederacy had outfought Union forces at First Bull Run in July 1861 and Wilson's Creek, Mo., in August of the same year. At Ball's Bluff in Virginia, in October 1861, the South again forced a Union retreat.
It appeared that the Federal forces had little stomach for preserving the Union, and in the South, visions of nationhood were clear and unmistakable. But things were stirring for the Union and nowhere more so than in the west, where a little-known former army officer had volunteered his services to the army in Washington and had been ignored. So Ulysses S. Grant got a commission as a colonel in the Illinois Volunteers.
Soon promoted to general, his first command in early November of 1861 almost ended in disaster at Belmont, Mo., when routed Confederate soldiers regrouped and almost defeated Northern soldiers who had paused in their fighting to loot the Southern camp.
When Grant looked at maps, he saw that only two small forts in far western Tennessee, Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River guarded access to the entire Confederate northwest--and nobody was paying much attention to either location.
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, 1826 graduate of West Point, (he was there at the same time as President Jefferson Davis, class of 1828; and Gen. Robert E. Lee, class of 1829) had resigned his Federal commission and accepted Confederate command of the 500-mile front from Island No. 10 on the Mississippi to the Cumberland Gap, a natural mountain pass near where Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee meet.
Johnston's orders to defend this frontier included the two forts, but the Confederate high command seemed not to appreciate the importance of the forts; he was given little to back up his responsibility.
Grant saw the possibilities. Capture the forts guarding the rivers meant taking control of the rivers themselves; flowing south and east, this would open the entire Confederate heartland to invasion. (This was one of the early military campaigns to benefit from the industrial revolution: Boats were now powered by steam, not by sails, and thus could steam up- river; Grant could sail from his base at Cairo, Ill., up the Ohio and then into the mouth of the Tennessee going upstream to attack Fort Henry.)
Grant took Henry fairly easily in early February, 1862, with the aid of Adm. Andrew Foote and his river gunboat fleet. Foote then withdrew down the Tennessee, steamed east into the mouth of the Cumberland and then prepared to support Grant in his attack on Fort Donelson.
By mid-February, Grant had marched his men the dozen miles cross-country to attack Fort Donelson. This was a harder nut to crack; it took Grant three days of siege warfare, but by Feb. 16, Grant had given Confederate Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner his terms: "No terms except immediate and unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner was not pleased with these terms; he and Grant knew each other since Buckner was a year behind Grant at West Point. In this case he had no choice but to accept the terms.
By taking the two forts, Grant accomplished the following: the Cumberland River flowed to Nashville, which fell to Union troops a week later. This was a major loss to the South: Nashville was a major manufacturing and rail center.
The Tennessee River flowed south to Shiloh, which fell in early April; by the end of May, the North had also captured Corinth, Miss., cutting vital Southern rail connections.
Union forces also captured Island No. 10 on the Mississippi in April, and Memphis in June, 1862. This activity, coupled with the capture of New Orleans in late April meant that the entire Confederate northwest, an area of some 50,000 square miles, including Kentucky and western Tennessee, was now in Union hands.
But the rivers were the key: the Union had gained control of 1,000 miles of navigable waterways, all avenues of attack. The North now had the ability to attack the last remaining route across the Mississippi: Vicksburg.
The campaign begun with Forts Henry and Donelson would take until July 1863. But these first victories in the campaign were major events, important to Northern morale. The North had in Grant a winning commander with whom they could identify and with whom they felt comfortable. (Much the same thing happened in World War II with Gen. George Patton. America embraced him as uniquely qualified--he won with flair.)
Grant's initials, U.S., now stood for "unconditional surrender" in the minds of the North, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the Army's commander in chief, Abraham Lincoln. ***
NED HARRISON is a Greensboro, N.C., writer who specializes in military history. His columns about the Civil War appear regularly in North Carolina, Maryland and Virginia newspapers. If your ancestors were part of the war years, either as soldiers or on the home front, and you know their stories, he wants to hear from you. Write Ned Harrison, News & Record/T&C, Box 20848, Greensboro, N.C.27420. E-mail him at n-b-h@mind spring.com.
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
As Lincon surmised, the confederacy was too big and its resources in materiale and manpower, was too small. It could not be defended everywhere, at the same time. But it took almost 4 years before he could get his generals to understand, except Grant.
As Lincon surmised, the confederacy was too big and its resources in materiale and manpower, was too small. It could not be defended everywhere, at the same time. But it took almost 4 years before he could get his generals to understand, except Grant.
Yes, Grant understood the "Total" picture and he gave us "TOTAL WAR".
Hate to disagree with a historian whose credentials are way better than mine, but the column is an elementary abridgement of history.
Were the forts Grant's idea? Or Halleck's? Or any other of several proposed seriously by other historians? Foote took Ft. Henry with Grant's Grunts arriving in time to take prisoners. Foote was driven away from Donelson leaving the infantry to wrestle it away.
Fourth in the line of importance? That's like saying the first in a line of a complex domino arrangement is not as important as those that set off multiple changes of direction. Taking the rivers played a large role in persuading A.S. Johnston to leave Kentucky and subsequently Nashville.
Bailing from Nashville exposed the Confederacy's second-most important source of essential minerals and furnaces.
Polk was getting shaky over there in Columbus and had to leave there to combine with Beauregard and A.S. Johnston near Corinth when the Federals started moving up river. This opened the way for Pope to move on Island No. Ten and New Madrid. It also drew defensive forces from New Orleans and Florida, and motivated the Confederates to give up Memphis. Appears to me that the forts deserve better than a "Fourth Most Important."
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It's my impression that it was Grant's idea to take Henry and Donelson and Foote was fully cooperative with him. Halleck was a bit paranoid and jealous of any subordinate who could outperform him. Halleck would have been content to status-quo-ante without any progress that wasn't under his control.
Like Ole, I wonder about the "fourth in line of importance" that is attributed to Henry and Donelson. I can see campaign to capture New Orleans taking precedent, but what's #2 and #3? Why only fourth?
By Ole:
Hate to disagree with a historian whose credentials are way better than mine, but the column is an elementary abridgement of history.
Please do, Ole. Your analysis is a different, more thorough take on the subject than Ned's seems to be. You present the case of the forts being more than "fourth important" pretty well. The events after the fall of the forts were very significant, at the very least.
Terry
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
I think what is happening here is that historians are now focusing upon the "other" battles of the war and in doing so, are realizing that the "big" battles were not as pivotal as once thought. Shiloh certainly was a "big" battle but I don't think it was nearly as pivotal as Corinth or Donelson in terms of military gains and subsequent strategy. The Eastern Theater has pretty much received most of the attention until recently and I am not sure if there are "lesser" battles/campaigns that have the impact that the Western Theater is now being discovered. I think it was Ole that mentioned (in another forum) that the Eastern Theater was more a war of politics than strategy and in this light it would be the big battles that dominate that political scene and not necessary the strategy. In fact, it seems in the ET it was the capture of the capitals that fueled most strategy there....until Grant arrived.
In any case William42, make sure you get to Donelson. There wasn't much there ten yrs ago or so, but now it is really a nice battlefield to visit and I hope to get back there soon.
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'If you don't read the newspaper you are uninformed,
if you do read the newspaper you are misinformed.'
Mark Twain
30th, yes I plan on it. My wife and I are moving to Madisonville, Kentucky in April, which will put us even closer to those historic places than we currently are. I'm looking forward to going and getting a boat-load of digital pics, too.
Terry
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
It's my impression that it was Grant's idea to take Henry and Donelson and Foote was fully cooperative with him.
It was always my impression as well, Gary. These days, there are enough disputing the idea to bring it into question.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I don't think Henry and Donelson were as important as the fact that they represented the movement of the US Army into the Confederate States in a big and permanent way. Forrest knew the gig was up and left. The others at Fort Donelson apparently felt much the same way, but didn't have the gumption to get out of the way. Nashville was the key to middle Tennessee and ultimate victory in the south. The rest is history. The one thing that no one has or can deny is the fact that Ulysses Simpson Grant meant business when he finally decided to enter the war. (After watching my historical expertise and fading memory for a while, Ole should feel better?)
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Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
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