Lee-Aimlessly enters PA.??

[OpnDownfall]

Military Logic would indicate that Lee's thoughts on the matter of continued any, offensive operations, much less a major invasion of the North,were entirely correct' that the reinforcements required was Army size not smaller unit size.
That Lee had a firm grasp of what was actually needed for a successful offensive is obvious, So if we take him at his word concerning his stated reasons justifying the Pa. operation and Not a desperate last throw of the dice to end the war successfully, how can we reconcile Lee's words on what was required for the ANV to be successful in any offensive, with his words of what he hoped to achieve by invading Pa.?

[whitworth]

It just didn't include Gettysburg, in the original plan.

Lee would never attack Philadelphia and Washington. Lee couldn't have reached Philadelphia, because of the high water of the Susquehanna River and the few undefended bridges crossing that river. Without pontoon bridges, Lee couldn't get his artillery and wagons over the river.

Lee lacked a resupply line and he had enough ammunition for one good battle. In fact, the ANV ran out of long-range artillery ammunition within three days at Gettysburg.

Lee had ordered Ewell to capture Harrisburg. It was an important railroad junction and supply point.

If one studies historians who only mention the Battle of Gettysburg from the day before the first battle, then one misses what Lee intended to do.

Lee's great problem was forage for the horses and mules. He split his army, because its size was too great to forage in close proximity.

[OpnDownfall]

So, Lee's intention was taking Harrisburg? While Lee is marching thru Pa. the south is, literally, in the process of losing Vicksburg And the Mississippi River.
A plan with no primary goal but instead a series of minor goals that might, hopefully, yield good results, if all goes well, is not a confident plan. A chief executive looking over such a plan, should have seen red flags all over it.

[timewalker]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

So, Lee's intention was taking Harrisburg? While Lee is marching thru Pa. the south is, literally, in the process of losing Vicksburg And the Mississippi River.
A plan with no primary goal but instead a series of minor goals that might, hopefully, yield good results, if all goes well, is not a confident plan. A chief executive looking over such a plan, should have seen red flags all over it.

Thus touching on what was, to my mind, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Confederacy, of not the greatest weakness - the lack of a coherent strategic vision. In reading Catton's Grant Moves South and Grant Takes Command, you see Grant thinking strategically, even while making tactical plans. When he was finally placed in overall command, he was able to act strategically and even though all of those plans did not come to fruition, once he started the Confederacy was doomed.

While Davis saw apparently himself as a military genius, he did not have the power or ability to craft a comprehensive strategic vision. Lee, while a brilliant tactician, was in my opinion a failure as a strategist. The only exception being the seven days battle which worked strategically because he was able to gauge McClellan's reaction. With another general in charge - someone of the Grant or Meade mold, the seven days would probably have been a disaster for Lee.

Lee's two strategic offensives both came to disaster - the Maryland and Pennsylvania Campaigns. Both appear to have been ill-considered from the start and both almost led to complete disaster.

Lee had blinders which forced him to think of the entire war in terms of Virginia and Davis was, it appears, so enamored of Lee he could not or would not force Lee to think in broader strategic terms.

Even Lee's last gasp strategic gasp - sending Ewell to attack in the Shenandoah was a strategic failure. Lee believed that by sending Ewell to attack in the valley he would compel Grant to attack him in the Petersburg defenses rather than voluntarily give up a portion of his army to chase Ewell (which is, of course, exactly what Grant did). Was this a case of Lee projecting? Is that was Lee would have done - launched an ill-considered attack rather than give up a portion of his army? Is this not what his PA invasion was?

[trice]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

So, Lee's intention was taking Harrisburg? While Lee is marching thru Pa. the south is, literally, in the process of losing Vicksburg And the Mississippi River.
A plan with no primary goal but instead a series of minor goals that might, hopefully, yield good results, if all goes well, is not a confident plan. A chief executive looking over such a plan, should have seen red flags all over it.

Lee in Harrisburg is a major danger to the North. If he can establish himself there, the Union Army must come after him; it cannot allow him to remain there.

This is Meade's first goal in moving north quickly. By hustling well above the Potomac, he forces Lee to concentrate against him, pulling Ewell back from Harrisburg. By June 30, Meade feels he has already accomplished this goal, and writes of it to Halleck.

My feeling has always been that Lee's intent was to get into PA, apply pressure, force the AoP to come after him, and look for an opportunity. It is a good plan. Lee would have been justly confident of his army and ability to fight a mobile battle. It is workable, and based on a solid reasoning. But like all war plans, it only goes so far. No plan survives contact with the enemy intact. Lee understood this, and depended on his team. The problem at Gettysburg was that Lee's team was not quite what he thought it was, Meade was not Hooker, and the AoP fought perhaps the best it ever did.

What I assume Lee believed was that he needed a big victory, and I believe he was right in that. There is no way to plan such a thing beyond what Lee did. The commander can set his plan in motion, but at some point the success of his plan is simply in the wind, dependent on fate, the actions of his commanders, and the courage of strong men armed.

Tim

[trice]

Originally Posted by whitworth

It just didn't include Gettysburg, in the original plan.

Right. Merely a matter of the road-net and geography. But any armies maneuvering on that side of the mountain will almost inevitably move through there. No soldier looking at a map would miss it.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Lee would never attack Philadelphia and Washington. Lee couldn't have reached Philadelphia, because of the high water of the Susquehanna River and the few undefended bridges crossing that river. Without pontoon bridges, Lee couldn't get his artillery and wagons over the river.

All relative. Ewell was in the midst of preparing to cross the Susquehanna (a broad but shallow river) when he received Lee's recall. Troops like those crossed wide rivers with regularity, and would have done this one soon enough. Forrest's men could improvise a bridge to cross the Tennessee; Lee's men could improvise a bridge to cross the flooded Potomac, even after losing their bridge train. What makes it tough is a strong and veteran force on the opposite bank; there wasn't one at Harrisburg.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Lee lacked a resupply line and he had enough ammunition for one good battle. In fact, the ANV ran out of long-range artillery ammunition within three days at Gettysburg.

Not quite out. They had ammo for one more day in the wagons, but that's not a position any general wants to be in.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Lee had ordered Ewell to capture Harrisburg. It was an important railroad junction and supply point.

Yes, and it may have been just as important for the RR construction shops there. But in Lee's mind this was not his end object. Instead it was a target that would force the enemy to come after him, because of the importance.

Originally Posted by whitworth

If one studies historians who only mention the Battle of Gettysburg from the day before the first battle, then one misses what Lee intended to do.

Right.

Originally Posted by whitworth

Lee's great problem was forage for the horses and mules. He split his army, because its size was too great to forage in close proximity.

Very true. But this was the normal situation for an army on the move in hostile territory. Only RR technology changed it.

[OpnDownfall]

Obviously, the only logical inference to be drawn from Lee's stated plan and objectives he hoped for the invasion, is that he has to defeat the AoP first. Yet, even though Lee should have expected that the Federal Army must pursue and confront him, his actions, in fact, indicates a lack of appreciation for the inherent danger of the AoP.
Obviously Lee did not want to stumble into a major engagement without the ANV concentrated. Yet, Lee stumbles into a major battle at Gettysburg.
In previous posts, I have noted that according to Lee's own estimation, he has neither the necessary manpower or supplies necessary for a realistice chance to successfully, invade the north.
Although, in retrospect, it can be accepted that the Gettysburg Campaign was (in fact, if not intent) a desperate do-or-die effort to the win the war, Was that Lee's Real intent for being in Pa.?
I can accept that Lee did not intend for his plan to be inept and uncoordinated, but it does seem that for such an important and dangerous campaign, it became such almost from the very beginning of the campaign itself.

[trice]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Obviously, the only logical inference to be drawn from Lee's stated plan and objectives he hoped for the invasion, is that he has to defeat the AoP first.

Agreed, with only the quibble that I don't necessarily agree with the word "first". If Meade/Hooker is a day or two later in getting up to the Big Pipe Creek area, Lee's plan starts to look pretty good and Harrisburg probably falls. That would change everything -- including a linkup with Stuart -- and put Lee in much better shape for a "second" objective of beating the AoP.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Yet, even though Lee should have expected that the Federal Army must pursue and confront him, his actions, in fact, indicates a lack of appreciation for the inherent danger of the AoP.

Here I disagree. He was overconfident about his ability to beat it, IMHO, but I don't think he was in any way unaware of the risks he was taking. I also think he probably felt Lincoln would leave Hooker in charge longer, and that a new man would not move as fast as Meade did (and probably that Meade would not be the choice). His comment about Meade when he heard the news shows the respect Lee had for Meade's soundness as a commander -- not a feeling he seems to have had about Hooker.

But part of this is reasonable -- the Anv had always shown itself more capable in maneuver than the AoP. Lee had a good basis for his confidence, and we surely should not expect Lee to feel he could not win.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Obviously Lee did not want to stumble into a major engagement without the ANV concentrated. Yet, Lee stumbles into a major battle at Gettysburg.

That's a dilemma that faces all commanders in a campaign of maneuver. Lee faces it squarely when he hears of the fighting on July 1: he rides forward immediately to see for himself what the situation is, and makes his decisions on the battlefield.

On June 30, Lee was already calling his troops in, with the question being which side of the montain to concentrate on. Forward at Gettysburg is very aggressive; behind the mountain is more defensive. When the shooting starts, the question is about which course to take, and that can only be based on guesswork.

As things developed, Lee almost smashed a major chunk of Meade's army that day. Lee's Corps and division commanders almost led as well as he could have hoped. Change a few things here and Lee might have had a victory on the order of 2nd Manassas, with the AoP once again reeeling backwards.

To appreciate this, you need to look at a part of history rarely looked at: the view from Meade's HQ around 1-2PM on July 1. News from the front is bad. Reynolds is dead, the untried Howard is in command on the field, and Slocum not playing an active part. Meade has his own dilemma: concentrate forward aggressively at Gettysburg or pull back defensively to concentrate at Big Pipe Creek. Like Lee, there are risks and opportunities both ways. For example, if Lee is more concentrated than expected and Howard gets shattered, Meade might see a thrust right over Cemetery Hill and out the Taneytown Road, splitting his AoP into pieces Lee could turn on one at a time: much like Chancellorsville.

We know that didn't happen. But around mid-day of July 1, it looked very worrisome from where Meade was. If Lee had been in the midst of pulling off some trap or miracle (if Stuart was there, say, or maybe a divison of Longstreet, or if the Dutchmen of XI Corps had actually cracked and run), it might have. Lee rode forward to judge the risks and seize the opportunities. It isn't clear to this day what they might have been, or whether or not someone failed or succeeded here.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

In previous posts, I have noted that according to Lee's own estimation, he has neither the necessary manpower or supplies necessary for a realistice chance to successfully, invade the north.

I think Lee had no belief he could move into PA and remain there for months (unless he truly smashed Meade's Army). I suspect he believed he could remain there throughout July if the AoP did not come after him, and think that reasonable. I doubt the Union administration could have allowed that, so one way or another Lee must have expected to find the AoP on his doorstep in the first 10 days of July.

But a victory over the AoP north of the Potomac would have been very important to the South, even if Vicksburg fell. Lee wasn't wrong about that. What would happen in the aftermath is very much up in the air -- and depends on just how big and dramatic that victory would be, and how Lee could follow it up.

To really "win the war", Lee would have needed something bigger than he ever achieved: bigger than Seven Days and 2nd Manassas and Chancellorsville, and in particular the sort of battle he could turn into an aggressive pursuit. But if he could have come up with a battle like that, he could have maintained his Army north of the Potomac quite a while, doing important damage and gaining much political value. That might have been enough to change the course of the next year -- and that might have made a political settlement possible.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Although, in retrospect, it can be accepted that the Gettysburg Campaign was (in fact, if not intent) a desperate do-or-die effort to the win the war, Was that Lee's Real intent for being in Pa.?

Hmm, I think Lee intended it to make a major change in the course of the war. "Desperate" and "do-or-die" are too strong in my view for mid-1863. I don't think either Lee or the Confederacy saw themselves as back-to-the-wall just yet; I do think Lee saw a very bad long-term trend overall and wanted to reverse it. I just don't think he saw mid-1863 as the "last gasp" option.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

I can accept that Lee did not intend for his plan to be inept and uncoordinated, but it does seem that for such an important and dangerous campaign, it became such almost from the very beginning of the campaign itself.

Lee's plan is actually pretty co-ordinated up to about June 30. The problems come down to:

1) bad luck for Stuart in his movement and (closely related) the painful decision to leave that dolt Robertson commanding the cavalry Stuart left behind.

2) The stark realization on July 1-3 that A. P. Hill and Dick Ewell combined didn't measure up to one Stonewall Jackson.

3) A general disjointed effort by subordinate commanders that could have been prevented with some extra time to settle into the new organization.

#1 is mainly bad luck and unexpected Union performance for Stuart, plus the stupid political mess between commanders (Lee, D. H. Hill, Stuart, Beverly Robertson, Governor Vance, President Davis) that put matters of protocol and rank ahead of the good of the Army and the nation

The issue with #2 is that the South had not developed anyone as capable as Stonewall Jackson, let alone two in that range. Luck of the draw, fortunes of war.

#3 could have been resolved with more time(hah! As Napoleon said, ask me for anything but time!) and a weeding out process (who needs Jeff Davis' nephew as a brigade commander?) and better command and control out of Richmond over people like D. H. Hill down in NC (telling him what to do instead of *****-footing around).

But if you look at the entire movement (from Brandy Station through Ewell's victory at Winchester to the crossing of the Potomac and the advance in MD-PA up to June 29, you'd have to conclude it was unusually well-run and organized. The move towards a concentration on June 30 is also pretty well done. It's when you come to contact with the enemy that plans get fouled up, for the most part, and that's just war.

The big exceptions to the above are that dolt Robertson and the attitude that Lee's HQ was somehow not responsible for the cavalry co-ordination while Stuart was out of touch.

Tim

[OpnDownfall]

Stuart disappears from the face of the earth at the very beginning of the invasion and Lee loses his bridging train at almost the same time.
Unlike Lee, on June 29 and 1 July, Meade was receiving a steady stream of reports from his cavalry and knows very approximately who and what he is facing, it is his timidity that keeps him assuming command early on the 1st day of battle. Meade had already made up his mind to make Gettysburg, his concentration point, even before Reynolds report, recommending such a decision. Already Lee's plans are faltering, he is meeting the AoP much further West than apparently planned and as close (if not a little bit closer) to Gettysburg than the ANV
A near-run battle (or dealy bought victory), is precisely what Lee should have been trying to avoid. Which I am sure he was. Yet at first contact Lee's carefully planned campaign, devolved into to a headon clash between to hard fighting armies, on terrain where the rewards for sheer numbers and superior firepower would be maximized.
Looking at the record of events and a map, it is not evident that even if Lee had captured Harrisburg and met the advancing AoP nearer the Susquehanna, that Lee strategic outlook was any better than at Gettysburg. Except Lee would be furtheir North and Meade probably directly between him and Va. making an overwhelming victory by Lee a vital necessity. A near run battle or dearly bought victory, would not be a viable option for Lee. Such a battle would literally be do or die. To get back to Va. Lee would have to fight his way through the AoP.

[trice]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Stuart disappears from the face of the earth at the very beginning of the invasion and Lee loses his bridging train at almost the same time.

Stuart starts on his ride at 1 AM on June 25th; despite opposition and pursuit from Union forces, he and his force are arrriving outside Gettysburg by Noon on July 2 (exhausted, I grant, but there). He clearly had an understanding with Lee about the ride, and Longstreet was in on the plan as well. Lee knew in advance that Stuart would be out of contact for days, and the hoo-rah about Stuart is often overdone. If Lee expected to hear from Stuart, it could only have been after he joined up with Ewell as planned, and that could not have been much before July 1 in any case.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Unlike Lee, on June 29 and 1 July, Meade was receiving a steady stream of reports from his cavalry and knows very approximately who and what he is facing, it is his timidity that keeps him assuming command early on the 1st day of battle.

Hmm, Meade was not a timid man. His record before Gettysburg proves that. If he had been in command more than a few days, I think he would have ridden forward himself rather than sending Hancock. But his reports were not that good at 1 PM; it was only late in the day that he had that kind of information. In any case, it is unlikely that Meade himself could have been on the field much earlier than Hancock was there.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Meade had already made up his mind to make Gettysburg, his concentration point, even before Reynolds report, recommending such a decision.

I don't think that is correct. Leaning towards it, perhaps, but still reserving a decision until further information is received. Meade sends Hancock forward early in the afternoon to evaluate the battlefield. Events will determine which it is: fight there, or concentrate at Big Pipe Creek.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Already Lee's plans are faltering, he is meeting the AoP much further West than apparently planned and as close (if not a little bit closer) to Gettysburg than the ANV

This is certainly closer than Lee expected them at the time. Whether it is good or bad news is determined by the events of June 30-July 2. In some ways, the problem is that the situation is unclear. Had Meade been even further forward, Lee would certainly have concentrated behind the mountain. Had he been slower in arriving, perhaps Lee would have completed a concentration at Gettysburg before Meade arrived and struck his corps one by one as they moved. Luck and timing, more than anything else.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

A near-run battle (or dealy bought victory), is precisely what Lee should have been trying to avoid. Which I am sure he was. Yet at first contact Lee's carefully planned campaign, devolved into to a headon clash between to hard fighting armies, on terrain where the rewards for sheer numbers and superior firepower would be maximized.

Well, this would be Longstreet's view, and it might well have been a better thing to do. But it was not Lee's. I can't say you are wrong; it is certainly prudent. But prudence is not always a military virtue. Sometimes it is a positive fault. Allowing the Union the initiative with the Army dfeep in Union territory does not strike me as wise, nor likely to lead to victory.

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Looking at the record of events and a map, it is not evident that even if Lee had captured Harrisburg and met the advancing AoP nearer the Susquehanna, that Lee strategic outlook was any better than at Gettysburg. Except Lee would be furtheir North and Meade probably directly between him and Va. making an overwhelming victory by Lee a vital necessity. A near run battle or dearly bought victory, would not be a viable option for Lee. Such a battle would literally be do or die. To get back to Va. Lee would have to fight his way through the AoP.

Yet Meade saw the situation differently.

The Union cannot allow Lee to remain at Harrisburg; it must advance against him. To do so in strength it must concentrate east of the mountain, which allows Lee a protected route to the West of it. Splitting the Army allows Lee to strike one portion or the other at his choice. Putting too much force west of the mountain allows Lee to fall on the eastern AoP in isolation, beating or driving it back until Lee is between the portions of it. Too little will lead to another Winchester.

If Lee is on one side of the mountian and Meade on the other, lee's route home is secure, for the gaps are few and can be easily defended. (Granted, all of this gets a lot easier if Beauregard is in northern VA with 10,000+ troops as Lee wanted.)

In those situations, if Lee has his army well in hand and Stuart with him, the most likely result is a slow herding of the ANV back below the Potomac at a rate Lee can slow or speed as necessary. Or a quick strike to slap Union troops back.

Another opinion of mine is that Lee was never truly open about all this with Lee or his advisors. The bits about relieving the northern VA countryside and gathering supplies are all true enough; they just are not what Lee was really after.

Tim