Gettsyburg or Vicksburg: Which was more important?

[richard]

It is interesting to me that of the three major defeats of the Confederacy in July 1863, everyone seems to talk about the importance of Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Not too many people even consider the Army of the Cumberland' s defeat of Bragg's army in Middle Tennessee as important. Yet the loss of two major rail lines, a very large farming area called the "Bread Basket" of the south and other resources seem IMHO much more important than Gettysburg or Vicksburg.

I guess that because there was no great loss of life for either side, that this campaign is ignored. But one must look at it really gained.

[johan_steele]

Richard brings up a good point, Tennessee was lost to the Cs w/ very little bloodshed through Rosecrans manuevering.


To me Vicksburg was the strategic death blow of the CS; for all practical purposes the CS was cut in half. The CS lost 30,000 men w/ their arms and guns. The men were almost immedietly returned to service (violating their paroles leading to the abandonment of that system) but they were returned to service minus those guns and small arms all of which had to be replaced. Something the CS could not readily do.

I'm not a victim of the V.D. Mr Bearrs speaks of, in fact I believe the war was nearly lost by the AoP in Virginia by the presses concentration and fixation w/ that army. The western theatre is where the war was decided IMO. It was there that the CS was crushed and its armies broken. It's evident to me just from the territory covered by those armies. The Western Armies stripped the CS of Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi and for all practical purposes Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina by carrying the war to the enemy. The AoP... stayed w/in 100 miles of Washington DC for its entire career.

[30th_il]

There is a book called, "Where the South Lost the War" by Kendall Gott in which he writes that the south lost the war at Ft Donelson and after reading it, I tend to agree with him. Ft D was the first of the domino effect and without that Union victory, nearly all the other battles would've been much different if they happened at all. It opened up nearly all of KY and western TN rerouting many of the Confederate plans. Corinth would be my next choice. That battle (s) pretty much stripped the south of any railroads rendering any major deployments by the south. Vicksburg and Gettysburg were crucial by their sheer involvement of personnel but I if I had to pick between the two....Vburg was much more decisive and a better victory strategically; Gburg gave us a speech, which I think rallied more Union soldiers than any battle.

[gary]

Matt, you've made good points about Donelson. If you haven't had a chance, read Grant's memoirs. After the fall of Fort Donelson, Grant knew the South was vulnerable and could be destroyed. Logically, to Grant, they should have surrendered to avoid being devastated and he was surprised when they continued to fight. Southern Leadership (Davis) just wasn't as adept as Grant. Albert S. Johnson tried to adjust the balance at Shiloh, but that didn't work out as planned.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by richard

It is interesting to me that of the three major defeats of the Confederacy in July 1863, everyone seems to talk about the importance of Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Not too many people even consider the Army of the Cumberland' s defeat of Bragg's army in Middle Tennessee as important. Yet the loss of two major rail lines, a very large farming area called the "Bread Basket" of the south and other resources seem IMHO much more important than Gettysburg or Vicksburg.

I guess that because there was no great loss of life for either side, that this campaign is ignored. But one must look at it really gained.

I'm assuming you are refering to the Tullahoma Campaign here. Well that did put Bragg back somewhat, but was hardly a victory to be excited about.

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[blue_zouave]

Originally Posted by samgrant

I'm assuming you are refering to the Tullahoma Campaign here. Well that did put Bragg back somewhat, but was hardly a victory to be excited about.

-

Sam... that much ground gained with such a (comparatively) small loss of life... not as exciting as bloody battles, I'll grant you, but a great Union success.

I continue to maintain that if Rosecrans had died on the first day of Chickamauga, his name would be up there with Grant and Sherman. But he didn't, nor was there Paxil to calm his overwrought nerves, and my flawed hero continues to be a target.

Zou

[SerjeantWildgoose]

I am new to this forum and perhaps by way of introduction and presenting my credentials should say that I am an officer in the Royal Irish Regiment and have for some years now been an avid student of the Irish in America’s Civil War. Along the way I have studied Gettysburg from a strategic and tactical view. I am intrigued by the views that have been posted here.

The 21 months of hard fighting that followed July 1863 is compelling evidence that neither Vicksburg nor Gettysburg was the key event in the eventual defeat of the Confederacy’s bid for independence. Contemporary reports suggest that in the late summer of 1863 the South regarded Vicksburg as a disaster, while the escape of Lee’s army after his repulse in Pennsylvania took much of the sting out of defeat at Gettysburg. However, I am inclined to believe that Gettysburg was of greater significance to the ultimate demise of the Confederacy than the opening of the Mississippi by Grant.

From the very outset, a Southern strategy that sought to hold everything could not hope to succeed. On the other hand, as long as the South could keep an army in the field, the ‘rebellion’ would remain undefeated – even if this came at the cost of giving up vast swathes of territory. Davis recognised this (As did Lincoln) but he was tethered by the desire and demands of the independent Southern states to protect their territorial integrity. In May 1863 after calls for the ANV to be cannibalised in order to reinforce efforts to relieve Vicksburg, Lee argued that while the war might well be lost on the Mississippi, it would just as surely be lost in Virginia if his army were depleted. He rightly viewed Chancellorsville as the latest in a long line of strategically hollow victories and yet he also saw it as a spring board from which to strike against northern public opinion, public opinion that was fuelled by a Northern press fixated on the Eastern theatre. This was probably the North’s only vulnerability in the early summer of 1863 and if he could deliver a comprehensive beating to the AoP within marching distance of Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia it might just tip the political balance in favour of the Peace Democrats.

Bragg could not hope to have the same impact with a victory in Tennessee, which would at best, merely balance out Northern success at Vicksburg. Given Joe Johnson’s record, I think it highly unlikely that he – even if reinforced with Longstreet’s corps – would have managed to generate a viable relieving counter-stroke against Grant. Therefore Lee represented the Confederacy’s best chance to ‘win’ independence and consequently, his failure to secure victory at Gettysburg was, in my opinion, more significant than the fall of Vicksburg.

The loss of the trans-Mississippi and all of its resources was not as critical to the Confederacy’s ability to continue the fight as some Westerners would argue. The South did, after all, manage to fight on for another 2 years. The decisive point occurred when Lee finally lost the ability to manoeuvre as a consequence of the campaigns of 1864, which finally bottled the ANV up in the Richmond defences. (It is no accident that Lee’s surrender at Appomatox is afforded greater significance in most people’s understanding of the war, than Johnson’s at Bentonville.) That Grant was the architect of this campaign is not in question and it is clear that he was called to the highest command as a consequence of his victories in the west, including Vicksburg.

But this begs the question, if Meade had managed to successfully engage Lee before he had re-crossed in to Virginia in July 1863, would there have been a need for the Overland Campaign at all? And if Lee had escaped with only a mauled fraction of his army, might it have been Meade, rather than Grant who was elevated to command its final destruction?

[OpnDownfall]

The two were intertwined because they both, concerned a common element; Grant.
The denouement of both, occurred on 'almost' the same day. They both led directly to Grants taking over of the Union's military war effort (with a slight detour to Chattanooga).
IMO, if both had not been Union victories, it is not clear that Grant would have assumed command of the Union Armies under as auspicious circumstances as he did in reality, because of the 'successes' at 'Both' Gettysburg and Vicksburg.


P.S. On a personal level, I do tend to believe that Gettysburg May have been a little more important, with Vicksburg a close second. But not necessarily, when if studying the historical record; as so often with the human condition, my head does not always agree with my heart.

[FSPowers]

IMHO, while Gettysburg turned back a major threat to the US both militarily and politically, Vicksburg led to the reopening of the Mississippi, a major war aim.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by SerjeantWildgoose

I am new to this forum and perhaps by way of introduction and presenting my credentials should say that I am an officer in the Royal Irish Regiment and have for some years now been an avid student of the Irish in America’s Civil War. Along the way I have studied Gettysburg from a strategic and tactical view. I am intrigued by the views that have been posted here.

The 21 months of hard fighting that followed July 1863 is compelling evidence that neither Vicksburg nor Gettysburg was the key event in the eventual defeat of the Confederacy’s bid for independence. Contemporary reports suggest that in the late summer of 1863 the South regarded Vicksburg as a disaster, while the escape of Lee’s army after his repulse in Pennsylvania took much of the sting out of defeat at Gettysburg. However, I am inclined to believe that Gettysburg was of greater significance to the ultimate demise of the Confederacy than the opening of the Mississippi by Grant.

From the very outset, a Southern strategy that sought to hold everything could not hope to succeed. On the other hand, as long as the South could keep an army in the field, the ‘rebellion’ would remain undefeated – even if this came at the cost of giving up vast swathes of territory. Davis recognised this (As did Lincoln) but he was tethered by the desire and demands of the independent Southern states to protect their territorial integrity. In May 1863 after calls for the ANV to be cannibalised in order to reinforce efforts to relieve Vicksburg, Lee argued that while the war might well be lost on the Mississippi, it would just as surely be lost in Virginia if his army were depleted. He rightly viewed Chancellorsville as the latest in a long line of strategically hollow victories and yet he also saw it as a spring board from which to strike against northern public opinion, public opinion that was fuelled by a Northern press fixated on the Eastern theatre. This was probably the North’s only vulnerability in the early summer of 1863 and if he could deliver a comprehensive beating to the AoP within marching distance of Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia it might just tip the political balance in favour of the Peace Democrats.

Bragg could not hope to have the same impact with a victory in Tennessee, which would at best, merely balance out Northern success at Vicksburg. Given Joe Johnson’s record, I think it highly unlikely that he – even if reinforced with Longstreet’s corps – would have managed to generate a viable relieving counter-stroke against Grant. Therefore Lee represented the Confederacy’s best chance to ‘win’ independence and consequently, his failure to secure victory at Gettysburg was, in my opinion, more significant than the fall of Vicksburg.

The loss of the trans-Mississippi and all of its resources was not as critical to the Confederacy’s ability to continue the fight as some Westerners would argue. The South did, after all, manage to fight on for another 2 years. The decisive point occurred when Lee finally lost the ability to manoeuvre as a consequence of the campaigns of 1864, which finally bottled the ANV up in the Richmond defences. (It is no accident that Lee’s surrender at Appomatox is afforded greater significance in most people’s understanding of the war, than Johnson’s at Bentonville.) That Grant was the architect of this campaign is not in question and it is clear that he was called to the highest command as a consequence of his victories in the west, including Vicksburg.

But this begs the question, if Meade had managed to successfully engage Lee before he had re-crossed in to Virginia in July 1863, would there have been a need for the Overland Campaign at all? And if Lee had escaped with only a mauled fraction of his army, might it have been Meade, rather than Grant who was elevated to command its final destruction?

Nice analysis, Sarge. Why don't you introduce yourself in the "Meet and Greet" section near the bottom of the Dispatch Depot main page. (And post a pin in the member's map!)

sam