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The more I study Gettysburg and and this board, the more I am becoming convinced that the seminal event, from which the battle and Lee's defeat can be traced (with some historical accuracy), was Stuart's being blocked out of effective action at the very beginning of Lee's campaign into Pa.
At the time of Gettysburg, Lee's cavalry was located at the head of the ANV or at it's rear, with Stuart out of immediate contact with either force or with Lee, himself.
If Stuart's lateness in re-establishing contact with Lee was the hinge, on which southern success at Gettysburg swung, then, perhaps, it was the slowness of Stuart (for whatever reason) rather than Longstreet's that cost Lee the battle.
And that, opn, is Lee's problem. He sent Stuart out to be his eyes and ears and Stuart was unable to perform that mission. (The yanks had something to do with that.) In any event, Lee ought to have been able to manage without Stuart's intelligence. He apparently could not, so Stuart gets the heat, pushing closely up against Longstreet's "slows."
Lee was not without other resources for intelligence. He didn't use them. He seriously bungled, time and again, during the entire invasion. But in every case it was the fault of someone else. I'm reasonably certain that if he could be watching this discussion he'd be puzzled. He knew he'd screwed up. And I'll bet he'd have owned up if questioned about it.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I agree, Ole, the campaign And the battle were, both, Lee's babies and any failures are his. After all if the Campaign and/or Gettysburg had been successful any and all of his mistakes would have been used to prove 'his' genius, not the necessity of superior subordinates.
I am not so sure, hom much responsibility for failure, Lee would have assumed. Very humanly he, like most people in responsible position, tended to pay lip service to the 'one in charge, being responsible' yet some how the 'blame' trickling down to their subordinates.
Lee was very conscious of his place in the history books to be written after him and it would have taken a saint not to look after his rear in moments of crisis (or after) and Lee may or maynot have been a genius, but he was certainly no saint.
I think if Lee actually listened to Longstreet about fighting on terrain of their choosing, they would of won Gettysburg. Lincoln would have either rode Meade's *** or replaced him with someone else. I have a question though. On the second day of the battle, Lee wanted Ewell to attack the north end of the union line and Longstreet to attack the south. Supposedly it was Longstreets fault, or some say, because the attacks were not coordinated. From what I understand, the south end of the line just got lucky repelling the repeated attacks. I mean Chamberlains charge was great, but they won that by the skin of their teeth. My question is, why was it so important that those two ends be attacked at the same time? It didn't seem like the south end got much reinforcing. Was it to divide the forces? I often wondered if they took Ewells units to the south side, maybe the Union flank would have crumbled. If anybody has any insight, do tell. I am not very schooled in the CW as of yet, but I think about this sometimes.
Attacking both ends at the same time keeps both ends busy. Neither end is able to go help the other. You'll recall that when Grant set out on his Overland Campaign, he had Sherman start on the Atlanta Campaign on the same day. Lee couldn't help JE Johnston and Johnston couldn't re-enforce Lee. With a coordinated offense, you fix other troops in place as well -- they'll not abandon their defenses for fear that some troops will be coming for them, too.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Don't forget Ben Butlers movement of the Army of the James before Petersburg, coordinated with Grant's and Sherman's advances. Butler might have shortened the war (if not won it, outright) if not for his invincible incompetence as a military leader.
It is my understanding, of the interview of the Civil War Historians at the section of "Making of Gettysburg" - Within the movie Gettysburg--That General Longstreet was slightly deaf. He would appear a bit slow in response. In addition, General Longstreet was not pleased with the ground to which General Lee insisted on remaining on. The campaign was, to my understanding' to be a defensive plan.
I personally feel, based on reading CSA -Priv. Company C-17 VA Cav. Reg. Jas. H. Hodam's accounts [Reference: Under Both Flags-A Panorama of the Great Civil War published 1896; wrote that Cavalry of Gen. A. G. Jenkins formed the advance of Gen. Elwell's Corps. His Company was commanded by Col. Wm. H. French who reported to General Early. General Early was in Greenville--destroying the Iron Works there. Private Hodam further related that his Company C was commmanded by Captain Waldorept and was ordered by General John H. Gordon through Major Smith; to form in 4's [Fours] to head to Gettysburg. This action drove General Howard's troops through the town of Gettysburg and took many prisoners. Prvt. Hodam said he guarded prisoners from 11 Corps.
General William Mahone [Ref. Under Both Flags -A Panorama of the Great Civil War -1896 relates; that he was the Commander of 2nd Brigade of General Anderson's Division - Gen. Hill's Corps. He wrote that Cemetery Hill was essential. Captain Robert H. Fitzhugh of General Hood's staff stated; "No troops ever formed a line of battle that could cross the plain of fire to which the attacking force would be subject to enemy's works on Cemetery Hill."
I believe it didn't help having to pull the ammunition supply trains further back; to which Colonel Edward Porter Alexander [Artillery on July3 Commanding Officer] soon found himself unable to complete the task that Longstreet wished--by battering/destroying the center. I believe General Longstreet knew this task of Lee's was going to fail. He was a soldier following orders--to do otherwise would be less than honorable in this period of time/history. The domino affect began with General Heth's troops running into a tit-for-tat exchange with General Buford and his men.
I believe that this 'tit-for-tat' pushed General Lee, General Longstreet and the tactics recklessly forward. I also believe that General A. P. Hill should have lead his troops; even though General Lee reassigned to General Longstreet--only General Pickett was under his Corps. This may have lead to a disjointed communication system; as Aide-de-Camps, couriers and such would not be as familiar with the sudden change in officers and their staff. In summary--each General has their style; their staff is comfortable and what throws things off--is a sudden change and suddenly asked to be obedient in a crisp manner under a different commander.
It is my opinion based on what these veterans said--to which I put more weight on than those who write of the Civil War and never participated; I believe that General Lee was impatient. His entire Army was stretched out thin. You have General JEB Stuart who is very far North and clearly wasn't giving intelligence back to Lee's 'council of war;' to include Longstreet. I also believe, not listening to General Longstreet's desire to redeploy was also a mistake. I also feel that General Hood's assessment and desire to go differently --also played into the defeat. Seeing that General Meade wasn't going to chase--keeping the ground that General Buford picked--General Meade's "council of war" with Major General Butterfield taking the notes; being that he was Meade's Chief of Staff [CoS] these Generals, to include General Warren who saved Round Top; agreed to correct a weakened position in the line. Remain on the field (as they had heavy casulties in three of Meade's Corps); agreed to wait for General Lee to attack. General Slocum's last of the Generals asked for their comments--said; "Stay and fight it out!" General Gibbon was the last to leave and is reported to have been in conversation with General Meade; to which General Meade predicted that Lee would attack the center. General Lee had already attacked the flanks to no avail. I would have come to that conclusion also.
Personally, I think General Longstreet was made a 'scape goat.' General Lee was the Confederate General who held things together while the Union were going through top level Generals constantly; until General Grant and a non-nonsense focus on a larger picture took charge. But, as it has been reported--General Lee had accepted responsibilities for the Battle of Gettysburg's loss. And, like Ken Burns said in his remarks in 'The making of Gettysburg the 1993 movie--General Lee made it 'h__ll' for the Union forces for two more years.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I just need to mention something about communications. I know the telegraph systems were largely connected to the railroad stations. This is how they dispatched trains and time tables. The service was helpful in urgent messages and national news of which messages would be given to the local 'news paper' editors and the like.
Telegraph is not private. Everybody is on a 'party line' per se. Several of General Lee's transmissions to his field Generals were intercepted. I would think General Lee being in a more careful mode--would not trust the wires for all of his cryptic messages using the telegraph. This would have to be done via mounted carriers and or their signal corps.
The Federals would have the same problems. Trusting the communication lines in regard to their 'telegraph system.'
It is understood that; A. Harper Caldwell, cipher operator (left Gettysburg for the Westminister supply base on July 3; thereafter Meade was handicapped by not being able to decipher communications). I am sure with the hostilities remaining active at Gettysburg until the dawn of July 5th; until General Lee withdrew --all communications were carefully handled, to include receipts for 'orders and communications' had to be signed for--this way nobody could deny they got their orders.
I believe the Signal Corps on both sides did much to advance communications. I am sure both sides 'learned' by association what the flag motions meant. Just like the tunes on a bugler would speak volumes.
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Longstreet and the "slows" 
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