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Whoa! Lee hoped the war could be won in the East. He and his team (Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart and the ANV) were good enough that they might have been able to win it. But it is a long way from that to the conclusion that you are making.
It is just as easy to say that the Confederates made a big mistake by concentrating so much on the East. Poor Confederate leaders and strategy in the West, combined with insufficiant resource commitment, lost the war. Lee was a part of this decision making, as a chief advisor to Davis (1861-62) and a senior commander with close ties to the President (1862-1864) before he became the overall military commander. He shows little understanding or concern for the needs and problems of the West.
I think you should think of this:
1) the South almost did win a war of attrition in 1864. In August, Lincoln believed he would probably lose the election. Better performance by Confederate armies at Henry & Donelson, Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Vicksburg, New Orleans, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta Campaign could have easily led to Confederate victory.
2) Lee's failure to understand how the Confederates needed a cohesive overall strategy is a serious condemnation of Lee. Virginia did not exist in a vacumn: when Bragg fights at Murfreesboro at the New Year of 1863, the area of Middle Tennessee immediately behind his front is designated as part of the food supply of Lee's ANV in Virginia.
3) One criticism of Lee is that he took too many losses trying to win a "decisive battle" in the East. While that is the style I would like best, Lee's attempts may not have been the best choice. It is certainly easy enough to point to places out West where a better commander (like Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet) or more/better trained/better equipped troops could have led to a big success. Certainly major opportunites to crush Union armies were missed at Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga (all commanded by Bragg). Certainly a disaster like Ft. Donelson could have been handled better if Floyd and Pillow were not in command there.
That's too strong. Lee had a lot of influence in power in the decision-making process, although he was not the one making final decisions. For example, Lee is almost completely responsible for the decision not to send reinforcements from Virginia for the effort to save Vicksburg in May-June 1863. Why, because he wanted to retain Longstreet's Corps for the Gettysburg Campaign (which obviously failed). Part of his reasoning was a belief that Grant would be forced to abandon the siege by the onset of the season of sickness in Mississippi. No one can say if Longstreet and 15,000 troops could have reached Johnston in time or have enabled him to relieve the city -- but we can see that a shortage of troops prevented any realistic attempt.
By 1862, Washington was the most heavily fortified place on the continent. Other than by sheer luck in the aftermath of a battle, the city would never fall to Lee.
While Lee tried many times to destroy his opponent, and had some impressive results, he never really came close. If you look at all those battles, you'll find that, at the end, there was always a strong and cohesive resistance from Union forces going on, which saved the day for them. The Seven Days, 2nd Bull Run, and Chancellorsville were all impressive, but they fell far short of what Lee was looking for.
But if you look at the West, you'll find battle after battle where with some luck or a little better leadership, a Confederate army could have easily crushed a Union one: Shiloh on the 1st day, Murfreesboro on the 1st day, Chickamauga probably 3 or 4 times. It may be that Lee's goal was more easily accomplished in the West.
The problem with Davis, from a military standpoint, is that he tried to hold too much, was too loyal to people who weren't getting the job done, and was too controlling without being precise enough. He was also not well-served by a host of subordinates (Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Hood, Bragg, etc.) -- but also brought about many of his problems by his style.
I like the sort of battlefield victory you want here, and Lee/Jackson/Longstreet/Stuart are really the only command team the Confederacy had that ever deliered anything like it. But the East was not the only place for it, and in fact the West with its more wide-open territory and poorer communications might have been a better place to try for it.
In all this, there is little evidence that Lee was particularly well-suited to waging a continent-wide war. There is substantial evidence that Grant was -- he actually did so.
Regards,
Tim
Whoa!! If Lee in 1862 would have been made Commander of all Confederate forces, he would have brought more of the south's resource to the eastern theater.
In Lee's early victories, he made every effort to destroy the AoP but was always about 20,000 men short to achieve his goal. If he would have been the over all commander he would have had the resources to achieve his goal of destroying the AoP.
Lee may have had influence with Davis but it was Davis who control the wars strategic plan. Davis department system of the war did more harm then good for it cut the south up in little military districts making generals little warlords. By the end of the war these little military warlords were not sharing men or resources just adding to the south's woes.
Davis's attrition plan was not working for even if McClellan had won the election the war would have continued. I bet once McClellan saw victory was at hand. He would have continued the war so the south's hope in him was like grasping at straws.
He's delivering the coup de grace at that point....
And he lets the beaten gladiator live.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Whoa!! If Lee in 1862 would have been made Commander of all Confederate forces, he would have brought more of the south's resource to the eastern theater.
Here's the problem: Lee was the President's senior military advisor until Joe Johnston was wounded at Seven Pines at the end of May 1862. Do you see any evidence of him advising Davis to do such a thing? If not, what makes you so sure what he would have done?
Also, what makes you think the South would have been helped by this? The North has greater resources avaialble, and better means of moving them. At most, doing what you propose creates a small and short window to do something before it is countered -- and what happens elsewhere while all this is going on? Does vicksburg fall six months earlier as a result? Chattanooga? Atlanta?
There's a danger for every option chosen. Claiming X would have been done requires that you analyze the results of everything involved.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 5fish
In Lee's early victories, he made every effort to destroy the AoP but was always about 20,000 men short to achieve his goal. If he would have been the over all commander he would have had the resources to achieve his goal of destroying the AoP.
Southern logistics could not long support the type of concentration you are talking about. Supporting an extra 20,000 men in the field requires massive logistical support -- and it is unlikely the Confederacy could have supported an Army of that size very far from Richmond.
He might have been able to something with that -- or he might have had another near miss. Simple resources don't make Lee a winner, just as they did not make McClellan or Burnside or Pope or Hooker a winner.
And, of course, the Union will move to take advantage of this Rebel move. If Lee doesn't win the war at a blow, Union advances in the West will carve up the South very quickly.
[quote=5fish]Lee may have had influence with Davis but it was Davis who control the wars strategic plan. Davis department system of the war did more harm then good for it cut the south up in little military districts making generals little warlords. By the end of the war these little military warlords were not sharing men or resources just adding to the south's woes. [/quote[]
We might like the system, but it wasn't all that unusual. The biggest problem, really, was probably a shortage of talent in the Confederate governmental and military bureaucracy, exacerbated by all the industrial and resource shortages the Confederates had.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 5fish
Davis's attrition plan was not working for even if McClellan had won the election the war would have continued. I bet once McClellan saw victory was at hand. He would have continued the war so the south's hope in him was like grasping at straws.
Hmm, actually McClellan did come out for that AFTER Atlanta fell and the tide of Union victory became clear. In August, when things looked grim for the Union, McClellan said no such thing -- and the Democratic Party platform was in direct conflict with what you say.
The truth is that better Confederate military performance in the West probably would have secured McClellan's election and a possible/probably negotiated truce. But the disaster of the loss of Atlanta, followed by Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay and Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah (3rd Winchester, etc.) turned the tide.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
[quote=trice]Here's the problem: Lee was the President's senior military advisor until Joe Johnston was wounded at Seven Pines at the end of May 1862. Do you see any evidence of him advising Davis to do such a thing? If not, what makes you so sure what he would have done?
Also, what makes you think the South would have been helped by this? The North has greater resources avaialble, and better means of moving them. At most, doing what you propose creates a small and short window to do something before it is countered -- and what happens elsewhere while all this is going on? Does vicksburg fall six months earlier as a result? Chattanooga? Atlanta?
There's a danger for every option chosen. Claiming X would have been done requires that you analyze the results of everything involved.
Southern logistics could not long support the type of concentration you are talking about. Supporting an extra 20,000 men in the field requires massive logistical support -- and it is unlikely the Confederacy could have supported an Army of that size very far from Richmond.
He might have been able to something with that -- or he might have had another near miss. Simple resources don't make Lee a winner, just as they did not make McClellan or Burnside or Pope or Hooker a winner.
And, of course, the Union will move to take advantage of this Rebel move. If Lee doesn't win the war at a blow, Union advances in the West will carve up the South very quickly.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 5fish
Lee may have had influence with Davis but it was Davis who control the wars strategic plan. Davis department system of the war did more harm then good for it cut the south up in little military districts making generals little warlords. By the end of the war these little military warlords were not sharing men or resources just adding to the south's woes. [/quote[]
We might like the system, but it wasn't all that unusual. The biggest problem, really, was probably a shortage of talent in the Confederate governmental and military bureaucracy, exacerbated by all the industrial and resource shortages the Confederates had.
Hmm, actually McClellan did come out for that AFTER Atlanta fell and the tide of Union victory became clear. In August, when things looked grim for the Union, McClellan said no such thing -- and the Democratic Party platform was in direct conflict with what you say.
The truth is that better Confederate military performance in the West probably would have secured McClellan's election and a possible/probably negotiated truce. But the disaster of the loss of Atlanta, followed by Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay and Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah (3rd Winchester, etc.) turned the tide.
Regards,
Tim
How did this post get so screwed up with quotes inside of quotes???? 5fish is lost??
This post starts here!! 5fish!
I will make this short and simple. I believe I have argue that Lee's strategic plan was to destroy the AoP and force a negotiated peace.
Davis's strategic plan was to fight a war of attrition and break the resolve of the union and negotiate peace.
I can argue that Lee's gave lip service to Davis's plan while constantly maneuvering to implement his plan. He knew by just watching his army struggle to survive on the resources being provided by the Confederate government. He knew by reading the northern papers that the north's resolve was not waning faster then his army was dissolving.
Lee was force to go for the knock out punch everytime he fought the AoP because he knew time was not on his side. Again, if Lee would have 20,000 more men at any of his great victories he could have destroyed the AoP.
Trice, you belong to the group who think Lee should have held back, conserved his forces. If he did that his forces still would have melted away anyway. He choose his only option the KNOCK OUT BLOW!!
Trice here a theory I been thinking over. The civil war was basically a race between how fast the union cut off supplies and resources to the confederacy and when or if Lee could destroy the AoP and force a negotiated peace. Think it over??
McClellan is just a "lost cause myth". The west was already lost before 1864.