Lee/Grant- What Debate?

[Dred]

I can't argue about the one campaign two campaigns anymore, its just silly. Back to the topic at hand I would have to say :

Grant, like Lee, forced the enemy to react to HIS movements, instead of chasing them around. He had a goal in mind, a destination, and everything he did was aimed at that destination. Armies in the way? Brush them aside. So if they are so much the same why does Grant come out on top? Because in the end he got Lee to react to HIM. His destination was Petersburg and Richmond, and he forced Lee to stay put, giving up his last advantage in his daring dash and slash tactics. There is a definite point where you can see Lee forced to react to Grant instead of the other way around, keeping the initiative, somewhere between Wilderness and Spotsylvania.

[ole]

And in that, Dred, you've captured the essence of Grant's success. He did not want his opponent to have the option of the first move. He blew it once or thrice, but he would not wait for Lee or any other to make the first move. I think that's spelled initiative.

ole

[trice]

Originally Posted by ole

And in that, Dred, you've captured the essence of Grant's success. He did not want his opponent to have the option of the first move. He blew it once or thrice, but he would not wait for Lee or any other to make the first move. I think that's spelled initiative.

ole

Grant's most-defining characteristic is that he never stops, that any campaign he starts continually leads to something else. This is very different than the McClellans, Hookers, Burnsides and Meades of the war.

So when Grant takes Ft. Henry, he immediately moves on Ft. Donelson; when Ft. Donelson falls, he immediately moves on Nashville.

Battered at Shiloh, barely surviving before throwing the enemy back, he immediately wants to drive on Corinth. But he is in disgrace, "kicked upstairs" into a useless second-in-command spot to Halleck and ignored. Halleck advances at a snail's pace, Beauregard retreats, Grant wants an aggressive pursuit, and is ignored. Grant wants that massive force at Corinth used for a single co-ordinated drive to wreck the Confederacy, Halleck (with an eye on Washington and supreme command) scatters the force from the Mississippi to the Appalachians and allows the Confederates to recover and counterattack.

Left to hold a backwater while Bragg invades Kentucky, Grant concentrates on eliminating Price and Van Dorn if he can and preparing for the next move on Vicksburg. His efforts that fall almost trap them, but they escape to his frustration. Immediately afterward, Grant is moving on Vicksburg, the start of his 8 month campaign against that city.

Frustrated in December by the Forrest/Van Dorn strikes on his LOC and Sherman's bloody disaster at the Chickasaw Bluffs, he moves to continue the campaign. The politics of command (McClernand) require him to be down the river in person, so he shifts there. The nature of geography and weather make an active campaign difficult to impossible from January to April along the Mississippi. But where the McClellan's of the world would have sat in camp and drilled and waited, Grant keeps making efforts, attempting to cut a canal to bypass Vicksburg on the West bank, seeking a route through the bayous on the East bank, etc. Pemberton blocks them all, to great praise in the Southern press. To Grant, I think they were just his normal policy, to keep pressing forward, to try this and try that, to make the enemy keep reacting to him. None of these holds great hope of success, but any might have worked if the Confederates did not counter them. Meanwhile, Grant prepares for the main effort.

All of these attempts on Vicksburg need to be regarded as rounds in a boxing match. Does it matter if it ends in a 1-round knockout? Pemberton and the Confederates were doing well on points, showing some decent footwork, when the weather cleared in April, the ground dried, he got across the Mississippi below them and cut them off. From that point on (call it about the sixth round), we see Grant cutting down the ring size and pinning Pemberton against the ropes at Vicksburg. He closes in, pounding his ribs with a series of blows, and long about the eighth round Pemberton throws in the towel. This Vicksburg Campaign is one fight and Grant won it outright. Carping about how he could have done better in the early rounds might be useful analysis to improve future performance, but it does not change the end result: Grant won completely, and the Confederate's lost in devastating fashion.

Move to Chattanooga and we see the same. Grant clears the supply line, brings in reinforcements, hammers away, continues despite rebuffs (Sherman again) and drives to success. Not pretty, but effective. If anyone doubts it, imagine what the Confederates would give to drop Grant's mind and will into Braxton Bragg's body on the 2nd day at Chickamauga in September.

Grant moves to the East and takes on Lee. As far as the fight in Virginia is concerned, Lee and the ANV are better than anything Grant has faced before. But Lee himself comes close to disaster in that campaign, even as early as the Wilderness when Hancock's attack nearly wrecks him. Only luck thwarts Grant's move to Spottslyvania (burning forest forcing Anderson to keep marching), and in the harsh fighting there, Grant's attack at the Mule Shoe almost splits and destroys Lee's army. The original plan at Cold Harbor should have swept into Richmond, but delay allowed Lee to find Breckinridge and get him into position just in time and just long enough to stave off disaster -- then the final attack should have been cancelled, leading to the fiasco we recall.

Even in the aftermath of that, Grant comes up with a move that should have won the war, the move to Petersburg. Bad Union luck and troop-leading let it slip through their fingers and Lee (despite Beauregard) managed to retrieve the situation and hold on another nine months or so. Then we have the campaigns that follow, with Early and Sheridan. But through it all we can see the pattern: Grant has brought Lee to the edge of defeat, diminished his power, limited him and made it possible for the Union to win the war. Is Grant to be blamed for facing Lee and the ANV? Or should we recognize that his talent was only re-affirmed by beating such a tough foe?

Beyond that, Grant directed the entire war in 1864-65. He shows more talent for such a task than Lee ever did.

Regards,
Tim

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by trice

Grant's most-defining characteristic is that he never stops, that any campaign he starts continually leads to something else. This is very different than the McClellans, Hookers, Burnsides and Meades of the war.

So when Grant takes Ft. Henry, he immediately moves on Ft. Donelson; when Ft. Donelson falls, he immediately moves on Nashville.

Battered at Shiloh, barely surviving before throwing the enemy back, he immediately wants to drive on Corinth. But he is in disgrace, "kicked upstairs" into a useless second-in-command spot to Halleck and ignored. Halleck advances at a snail's pace, Beauregard retreats, Grant wants an aggressive pursuit, and is ignored. Grant wants that massive force at Corinth used for a single co-ordinated drive to wreck the Confederacy, Halleck (with an eye on Washington and supreme command) scatters the force from the Mississippi to the Appalachians and allows the Confederates to recover and counterattack.

Left to hold a backwater while Bragg invades Kentucky, Grant concentrates on eliminating Price and Van Dorn if he can and preparing for the next move on Vicksburg. His efforts that fall almost trap them, but they escape to his frustration. Immediately afterward, Grant is moving on Vicksburg, the start of his 8 month campaign against that city.

Frustrated in December by the Forrest/Van Dorn strikes on his LOC and Sherman's bloody disaster at the Chickasaw Bluffs, he moves to continue the campaign. The politics of command (McClernand) require him to be down the river in person, so he shifts there. The nature of geography and weather make an active campaign difficult to impossible from January to April along the Mississippi. But where the McClellan's of the world would have sat in camp and drilled and waited, Grant keeps making efforts, attempting to cut a canal to bypass Vicksburg on the West bank, seeking a route through the bayous on the East bank, etc. Pemberton blocks them all, to great praise in the Southern press. To Grant, I think they were just his normal policy, to keep pressing forward, to try this and try that, to make the enemy keep reacting to him. None of these holds great hope of success, but any might have worked if the Confederates did not counter them. Meanwhile, Grant prepares for the main effort.

All of these attempts on Vicksburg need to be regarded as rounds in a boxing match. Does it matter if it ends in a 1-round knockout? Pemberton and the Confederates were doing well on points, showing some decent footwork, when the weather cleared in April, the ground dried, he got across the Mississippi below them and cut them off. From that point on (call it about the sixth round), we see Grant cutting down the ring size and pinning Pemberton against the ropes at Vicksburg. He closes in, pounding his ribs with a series of blows, and long about the eighth round Pemberton throws in the towel. This Vicksburg Campaign is one fight and Grant won it outright. Carping about how he could have done better in the early rounds might be useful analysis to improve future performance, but it does not change the end result: Grant won completely, and the Confederate's lost in devastating fashion.

Move to Chattanooga and we see the same. Grant clears the supply line, brings in reinforcements, hammers away, continues despite rebuffs (Sherman again) and drives to success. Not pretty, but effective. If anyone doubts it, imagine what the Confederates would give to drop Grant's mind and will into Braxton Bragg's body on the 2nd day at Chickamauga in September.

Grant moves to the East and takes on Lee. As far as the fight in Virginia is concerned, Lee and the ANV are better than anything Grant has faced before. But Lee himself comes close to disaster in that campaign, even as early as the Wilderness when Hancock's attack nearly wrecks him. Only luck thwarts Grant's move to Spottslyvania (burning forest forcing Anderson to keep marching), and in the harsh fighting there, Grant's attack at the Mule Shoe almost splits and destroys Lee's army. The original plan at Cold Harbor should have swept into Richmond, but delay allowed Lee to find Breckinridge and get him into position just in time and just long enough to stave off disaster -- then the final attack should have been cancelled, leading to the fiasco we recall.

Even in the aftermath of that, Grant comes up with a move that should have won the war, the move to Petersburg. Bad Union luck and troop-leading let it slip through their fingers and Lee (despite Beauregard) managed to retrieve the situation and hold on another nine months or so. Then we have the campaigns that follow, with Early and Sheridan. But through it all we can see the pattern: Grant has brought Lee to the edge of defeat, diminished his power, limited him and made it possible for the Union to win the war. Is Grant to be blamed for facing Lee and the ANV? Or should we recognize that his talent was only re-affirmed by beating such a tough foe?

Beyond that, Grant directed the entire war in 1864-65. He shows more talent for such a task than Lee ever did.

Regards,
Tim

A very well written post, as usual.

Don't forget that Lee was too short to see over the mountains, had Davis "helping" him and was sorely lacking reserve manpower and supplies. Grant held the upper hand after 1862, no question.

[trice]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

A very well written post, as usual.

Don't forget that Lee was too short to see over the mountains, had Davis "helping" him and was sorely lacking reserve manpower and supplies. Grant held the upper hand after 1862, no question.

But then, in 1861 McClellan refused to see Grant when our man was looking to get back in the Army -- and the War Department managed to lose his letter looking for a post. In early 1862, Halleck tried to serve Grant up as a sacrifice as part of his maneuvering to get advancement. Later on, the political general McClernand tried to raise an independent army and wage a campaign inside Grant's department. Sheridan deserted him to seek promotion and advancement under Buell, thinking serving under Grant was a dead-end. Rosecrans -- whatever the reason -- was a subordinate not to be relied on in 1862 and a non-supportive fellow commander during the Vicksburg Campaign. Grant comes East and is saddled with political hack generals like Sigel and Butler who wreck his Spring Campaign plans, and he had to use Banks down in New Orleans.

All commanders have problems to overcome. Men like Lee and Grant usually find ways over or around them.

Regards,
Tim

[5fish]

[ Grant directed the entire war in 1864-65. He shows more talent for such a task than Lee ever did.

Regards,
Tim[/quote]

I disagree in total. You must have forgotten two things. The first, Lee was not given command of all the confederate forces until it little to late for him to make the most of it.

The second, the year 1862. When Lee emerges during the Union's Peninsula Campaign to take command of the confederate army. In June he leads the successful Seven Days Campaign and drives McClellan back to the James river.
In Aug 1862, Lee starts his successful Northern VA. Campaign and drives Pope back to Washington.
In Sept. 1862, Lee starts his less then stellar Maryland Campaign.

My point is Lee's campaigns 1862 were just pugnacious and tenacious as Grant's Vicksburg and Overland Campaign. Lee and Grant both knew the taking the initiative and continuously striking your opponent was the keys to success.

The problem for Lee was the confederate government could not give him the resources he needed to maintain an effective army. In time, it limited Lee in what he could do with his army.

In truth, Lee and Grant were very similar in the way they wage war if they have the resources.

[trice]

Originally Posted by trice

Grant directed the entire war in 1864-65. He shows more talent for such a task than Lee ever did.

Originally Posted by 5fish

I disagree in total. You must have forgotten two things.

Nope. I have been looking at the issues involved in this for 40 years or so. I forgot nothing that you introduced here, so let's look at them.

Originally Posted by 5fish

The first, Lee was not given command of all the confederate forces until it little to late for him to make the most of it.

It is true that Lee was not given command of the entire CS Army until late in the war, far too late to expect that it would make much difference. No controversy there.

But Lee had a strong influence on Jefferson Davis, was consulted often, and was frequently in a position to give advice about areas other than Virginia. His record from 1861-1864 consistently shows that his focus was on Virginia and Virginia only. His advice about other areas shows little concern for their needs, little understanding of their importance in the overall strategy of the war, and a very weak grasp of the conditions applying to Confederate armies in those areas.

There may be many reasons for that. One may be that Lee was rarely out of Virginia during the war and never after he came to command, AFAIK. Another may be the natural reasoning that makes a local commander think his area the most crucial, and views with suspicion all attempts to weaken him in favor of other areas. But it is very strange that Lee as a senior commander seems to have had so little concern for other areas, and so small a grasp of their difficulties. If you think not, let me know where Lee shows a concern for and an understanding of the war as a whole in 1862-64, the crucial period of the war.

Grant does. If you look at his record you will find frequent references to Grant subordinating himself to the overall plan, seeing his actions as integral to the war as a whole, and suggestions of far-reaching strategic plans for the war as a whole. You can find them in 1862-63, when Grant is in Mississippi and Tennessee. When he comes to full command in 1864, he already has in mind a co-ordinated effort to win the war, and sticks to that idea until the end.

That's a big difference. I do not doubt Lee was as capable as Grant of working out the details involved -- he just does not seem to have had the initiative to do it, concerning himself totally with a narrower area.

Originally Posted by 5fish

The second, the year 1862. When Lee emerges during the Union's Peninsula Campaign to take command of the confederate army. In June he leads the successful Seven Days Campaign and drives McClellan back to the James river.
In Aug 1862, Lee starts his successful Northern VA. Campaign and drives Pope back to Washington.
In Sept. 1862, Lee starts his less then stellar Maryland Campaign.

My point is Lee's campaigns 1862 were just pugnacious and tenacious as Grant's Vicksburg and Overland Campaign. Lee and Grant both knew the taking the initiative and continuously striking your opponent was the keys to success.

No problem with pugnacious or tenacious, and if you look back you'll see I made no claim at all that Lee was less of a fighter than Grant. In fact, I specifically pointed out that Grant had never faced a foe as tough as Lee and the ANV before he came East.

Grant himself recognized this at the Wilderness. He thought of Joe Johnston as the top general he had met. After the fighting at the Wilderness he looks out across the smouldering no-man's land and sees that Lee's army is dug in and waiting for him to come on again. He says to his staff: "After two such days, Joe Johnston would have retreated." Early May, and Grant already knows.

But at the same time, Lee looked out and wondered. Grant was the first commander he faced he didn't know. He recalled being once at a party in Mexico City where Grant was, but could not place him, even recall his face. Lee wondered and studied his campaigns. He consulted Longstreet, who had been in Grant's wedding party. Longstreet told all who asked him that Grant would fight them every day without stop, because that was the sort he was.

So Lee tested him at Wilderness. He hit him as hard as he ever hit anyone; he may have actually damaged the AoP more than he smashed it at Chancellorsville. He hoped for the sort of reaction he got from Hooker and Pope and McClellan. In that day after the Wilderness he hoped Grant would retreat on Fredricksburg to lick his wounds -- and began to suspect this one would be different. That's why he has Anderson start for Spotsylvania -- and as luck would have it Anderson marched on through the night and arrived in the nick of time.

When someone tells you the 1864 Overland Campaign was one of butchery, they aren't looking deep enough. Lee's performance in 1864 is a virtuoso; only a top notch force like Lee and the ANV could have staved Grant off so long. At the same time, Grant's performance looks so dull and unimaginative, he is so often called a "butcher" in error, because Lee countered so many moves that would have destroyed another. What you have here is two top commanders at the top of their game, doing everything they can, fighting it out with every trick and advantage they can find. Is it a bad campaign because they play at such a high level?

Think of it as a championship boxing match. Was the "Thrilla in Manila" a bad fight because Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier could not put the other away early?

Originally Posted by 5fish

The problem for Lee was the confederate government could not give him the resources he needed to maintain an effective army. In time, it limited Lee in what he could do with his army.

Sure. But that had been the problem in 1862 and 1863 as well. But McClellan and Pope and Burnside and Hooker and even Meade could not beat him with all those advantages. Grant could.

Originally Posted by 5fish

In truth, Lee and Grant were very similar in the way they wage war if they have the resources.

Actually, Lee never showed much sense that he wanted to do the staffwork or have the staff organization needed to fight a long, large war. I am sure he was capable of handling the details; he simply focussed much more on combat officers and kept small -- probably too small -- staffs.

Regards,
Tim

[5fish]

But Lee had a strong influence on Jefferson Davis, was consulted often, and was frequently in a position to give advice about areas other than Virginia. His record from 1861-1864 consistently shows that his focus was on Virginia and Virginia only. His advice about other areas shows little concern for their needs, little understanding of their importance in the overall strategy of the war, and a very weak grasp of the conditions applying to Confederate armies in those areas.[quote from trice]

There may be many reasons for that. One may be that Lee was rarely out of Virginia during the war and never after he came to command, AFAIK. Another may be the natural reasoning that makes a local commander think his area the most crucial, and views with suspicion all attempts to weaken him in favor of other areas. But it is very strange that Lee as a senior commander seems to have had so little concern for other areas, and so small a grasp of their difficulties. If you think not, let me know where Lee shows a concern for and an understanding of the war as a whole in 1862-64, the crucial period of the war.[ quote from trice]


I will give you that Lee seemed Va. center in his views because he knew the war could not be won in the west. He understood the war would be won in the east.

Davis thought they could win a war of attrition but Lee knew better. He always went for the knock out blow with the AoP but never got it. He knew the south needed a knock out punch to win the war and only in the east was that opportunity.

His hands were tied with the system Davis put in place on how to manage the war. Remember, Lee was only in charge of the area from Richmond north.

You know if Lee would have been the Commander of all the Confederate armies from 1862 on. He would have concentrated his forces in Va. and try decapitated the union government and destroyed the AoP.

The south needed a knock out punch to ever win the Civil war and Lee knew it. Davis was the fool!!

[trice]

Originally Posted by 5fish

I will give you that Lee seemed Va. center in his views because he knew the war could not be won in the west. He understood the war would be won in the east.

Whoa! Lee hoped the war could be won in the East. He and his team (Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart and the ANV) were good enough that they might have been able to win it. But it is a long way from that to the conclusion that you are making.

It is just as easy to say that the Confederates made a big mistake by concentrating so much on the East. Poor Confederate leaders and strategy in the West, combined with insufficiant resource commitment, lost the war. Lee was a part of this decision making, as a chief advisor to Davis (1861-62) and a senior commander with close ties to the President (1862-1864) before he became the overall military commander. He shows little understanding or concern for the needs and problems of the West.

Originally Posted by 5fish

Davis thought they could win a war of attrition but Lee knew better. He always went for the knock out blow with the AoP but never got it. He knew the south needed a knock out punch to win the war and only in the east was that opportunity.

I think you should think of this:
1) the South almost did win a war of attrition in 1864. In August, Lincoln believed he would probably lose the election. Better performance by Confederate armies at Henry & Donelson, Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Vicksburg, New Orleans, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and in the Atlanta Campaign could have easily led to Confederate victory.

2) Lee's failure to understand how the Confederates needed a cohesive overall strategy is a serious condemnation of Lee. Virginia did not exist in a vacumn: when Bragg fights at Murfreesboro at the New Year of 1863, the area of Middle Tennessee immediately behind his front is designated as part of the food supply of Lee's ANV in Virginia.

3) One criticism of Lee is that he took too many losses trying to win a "decisive battle" in the East. While that is the style I would like best, Lee's attempts may not have been the best choice. It is certainly easy enough to point to places out West where a better commander (like Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet) or more/better trained/better equipped troops could have led to a big success. Certainly major opportunites to crush Union armies were missed at Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga (all commanded by Bragg). Certainly a disaster like Ft. Donelson could have been handled better if Floyd and Pillow were not in command there.

Originally Posted by 5fish

His hands were tied with the system Davis put in place on how to manage the war. Remember, Lee was only in charge of the area from Richmond north.

That's too strong. Lee had a lot of influence in power in the decision-making process, although he was not the one making final decisions. For example, Lee is almost completely responsible for the decision not to send reinforcements from Virginia for the effort to save Vicksburg in May-June 1863. Why, because he wanted to retain Longstreet's Corps for the Gettysburg Campaign (which obviously failed). Part of his reasoning was a belief that Grant would be forced to abandon the siege by the onset of the season of sickness in Mississippi. No one can say if Longstreet and 15,000 troops could have reached Johnston in time or have enabled him to relieve the city -- but we can see that a shortage of troops prevented any realistic attempt.

Originally Posted by 5fish

You know if Lee would have been the Commander of all the Confederate armies from 1862 on. He would have concentrated his forces in Va. and try decapitated the union government and destroyed the AoP.

By 1862, Washington was the most heavily fortified place on the continent. Other than by sheer luck in the aftermath of a battle, the city would never fall to Lee.

While Lee tried many times to destroy his opponent, and had some impressive results, he never really came close. If you look at all those battles, you'll find that, at the end, there was always a strong and cohesive resistance from Union forces going on, which saved the day for them. The Seven Days, 2nd Bull Run, and Chancellorsville were all impressive, but they fell far short of what Lee was looking for.

But if you look at the West, you'll find battle after battle where with some luck or a little better leadership, a Confederate army could have easily crushed a Union one: Shiloh on the 1st day, Murfreesboro on the 1st day, Chickamauga probably 3 or 4 times. It may be that Lee's goal was more easily accomplished in the West.

Originally Posted by 5fish

The south needed a knock out punch to ever win the Civil war and Lee knew it. Davis was the fool!!

The problem with Davis, from a military standpoint, is that he tried to hold too much, was too loyal to people who weren't getting the job done, and was too controlling without being precise enough. He was also not well-served by a host of subordinates (Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Hood, Bragg, etc.) -- but also brought about many of his problems by his style.

I like the sort of battlefield victory you want here, and Lee/Jackson/Longstreet/Stuart are really the only command team the Confederacy had that ever deliered anything like it. But the East was not the only place for it, and in fact the West with its more wide-open territory and poorer communications might have been a better place to try for it.

In all this, there is little evidence that Lee was particularly well-suited to waging a continent-wide war. There is substantial evidence that Grant was -- he actually did so.

Regards,
Tim

[larry_cockerham]

A very informative discussion gentlemen; makes for enjoyable reading. Question: How do the two of you relate Sherman as a necessary facit or perhaps tandem component of Grant's success? Seems to me he should get a piece of the credit for the ultimate close of the war.