Dana reports Meade to be relieved

[samgrant]

We all know that Charles Dana was planted under Grant's commands in order to report/spy to Stanton.

While looking in the OR's for some thing else, I found this interesting nugget (as so often seems to be the case):


Honorable EDWIN M. STANTON.

Secretary of War.

CITY POINT, VA., July 7, 1864-8 a.m.

(Received 6 p.m.)

A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac, now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which prevails among officers of every rank who come in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render success under his command so doubtful that Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that he must be relieved. The facts in the matter have come very slowly to my knowledged, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially toward his subordinate. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army. No man, no matter what his business or his service, approaches him without being insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers do not dare to speak to him, unless first spoken to, for fear of either sneers or curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently but he is said to apply the often without occasion and without reason. At the same time-as far as I am able to ascertain-his generals have lost their confidence in him as a commander. His order for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost 10,000 men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps commanders, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account and do the best he could by himself. Consequently each gained some advantage of position, but each exhausted his own strength in so doing, while for the want of a general purpose and a general commander to direct and concentrate the whole it all amounted to nothing but heavy loss to ourselves. Of course there are matters about which I cannot make inquiries, but what I have above reported is the general sense of what I have above reported is the general sense of what seems to be the opinion of fair-minded and zealous officers. For instance, I know that General Wright has said to a confidential friend that all of Meade's attacks have been made without brains and without generalship. The subject came to pretty full discussion at Grant's headquarters last night on occasion of a correspondence between Meade and Wilson. The Richmond Examiner charges Wilson with stealing not only negroes and horses, but silver plate and clothing on his raid, and Meade, taking the statement of the Examiner for truth, reads Wilson a lecture and calls on him for explanations. Wilson denies the charges of robing women and churches, and hopes Meade will not be ready to condemn his command because its operations have excited the ire of the public enemy. This started the conversation in which Grant expressed himself quite frankly as to the general trouble with Meade and his fear that it would become necessary to relieve him. In such event he said it would be necessary to put Hancock in command.

C. A. DANA.


What do you all make of this?

[5fish]

It is like Lincoln's wife no one realy like her except the one person that counted Pres. Lincoln. No like Gen. Meade except for the one person that counted Gen. Grant.

[OpnDownfall]

There was a lot of pressure on Meade. He knew that Washington and the War Dep't had no real confidence in in him (very unfairly, Meade felt). He saw that Lincoln and Stanton would do for Grant what he felt they would not do for him. Yet he was the official commander of the AoP and was ultimately responsible for its success or failure, even if only following the orders of Grant.
Lincoln and Grant had never been able to follow Burnsides (and Hookers, I believe) that the AoP officer corps needed a complete shakeup and reorganized, as a result many officers including some very senior corps and division commaners were not up to their jobs if not actually dangerously incompetent.
All that, added to his natural resentment of knowing that no matter how well he commanded or performed his duties, another would garner most of the glory of success with himself getting most of the blame for any failures.

[ewc]

This is a very chatty, gossipy missive from Dana. He did get the info from being an accepted feature of Grant's entourage and by speaking with various officers in the army, but it really does sound like one lady out hanging her clean sheets to dry poring out the latest word to the missus next door eagerly leaning against the fence to catch every word. Not that Dana himself is without substance- a bad report from him back to Washington about Grant in the days along the Mississippi may well have spelled the end for Grant's rise in the Army.

Poor old Meade, churlish and uppity at the best of times- in these trying days, having to talk with him must have felt like carrying dinner in to a hungry and unrestrained 25 foot-long crocidile. Open and fish made good points. Grant liked Meade and worked well with him and that counted for alot. But if the army would operate better under another, more amenable, commander, Grant was bound to consider it. But now the seige was going into operation; the Army was settling into trenched lines, and active campaigning was not going to be the order of the day like it had been up to that point. If it would be, then maybe a switch of commanders would have been made- Meade looked to be near breaking point. But in fact, so was the whole Army, now was a time to let the troops dig in and recuperate to a degree- management too. As tough as the campaigning had been on the rank and file, so too in the officers corps and high command. And the high comand structure, as Open points out,was designed for Meade to be the workhorse and not the showpiece, the glory, even recognition, of his position, was not readily visible. All in all, Grant realized as well as anyone that the time had come for rest, recuperation, restoration, even though it was done in a siege setting within range of the enemy guns. Still, it was a break that all needed, including high command.

So in the end, I say no, Meade was not in serious danger of losing his command. Some danger yes, but at this point I believe only had he completely melted down and Grant/ Lincoln had no choice but to make a move. Dana's wire shows it was more something Grant had to lend consideration to.

[OpnDownfall]

I agree, Meade's position was not in as much danger as Dana assumed. Although, it 'may' have been due more to the lack of any credible replacement.
Promoting up to Army Command is tricky business, especially during wartime.
As far as Grant was concerned Meade was a known quantity, as an Army Commander and did not doubt his competence. Grant tended to the logical conclusion that 'if it wasn't broke, don't fix it'

[ole]

Excellent observations, gentlemen! Special thanks, Sam, for recognizing this report as something worthy of posting.

ole

[samgrant]

I'll agree that Dana was a gossipy suckup to Stanton, but I wonder how seriously Stanton took those dispatches?

[samgrant]

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/...ge=436&dir=082


CITY POINT, VA., July 25, 1864.

President A. LINCOLN:

After the late raid into Maryland had expended itself, seeing the necessity of having the four departments of the Susquehanna, the Middle, West Virginia, and Washington, under one head, I recommended that they be merged into one, and named General Franklin as a suitable person to command the whole. I still think it highly essential that these four departments should be in one command. I do not insist that the departments should be broken up, nor do I insist upon General Franklin commanding. All A ask is that one general officer, in whom I and yourself have confidence, should command the whole. General Franklin was named because he was available and I know him to be capable and believe him to be trustworthy. It would suit me equally as well to call the four departments referred to a "Military Division," and to have placed in command of it General Meade. In this case I would suggest General Hancock for command of the Army of the Potomac, and General Gibbon for the command of the Second Corps. With General Meade in command of such a division I would have every confidence that all the troops within the military division would be used to the very best advantage from a personal examination of the ground, and [he] would adopt means of getting the earliest information of any advance of the enemy, and would prepare to meet it.

During the last raid the wires happened to be down between here and Fort Monroe and the cable broken between there and Cherrystone. This made it take from twelve to twenty-four hours each way for dispatches to pass. Under such circumstances it was difficult for me to give positive orders or directions, because I could not tell how the conditions might during the transit of dispatches. Many reasons might be assigned for the changes here suggested, some of which I would not care to commit to paper, but would not hesitate to give verbally. I send by Brigadier-General Rawlins, chief of staff, who will be able to give more information of the situation here than I could give you in a letter.
Hoping that you will see this matter in the light I do, I have the honor of subscribing myself, &c.,

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., July 25, 1864-10.30 p.m.
(Received 2.25 p.m. 26th.)

-

[samgrant]

Grant sent John Rawlins to Washington to see Lincoln about this idea. Grant met with Rawlins on July 26, but nothing became of the reorganization plan.

``Cypher'' Executive Mansion,
Lieut. Genl. Grant Washington,
City Point, Va. July 28, 1864.

Will meet you at Fort-Monroe at 8. P.M. on Saturday the 30th. unless you shall notify me that it will be inconvenient to you.

A. LINCOLN


On July 26, Stanton telegraphed Grant of the arrival of General John A. Rawlins with Grant's letter to Lincoln (July 25) proposing to combine the departments of Susquehanna, Washington, Middle Virginia, and West Virginia, under command of George G. Meade, and requesting Grant ``to name, if you can, a time when it would be convenient for you to meet him [Lincoln] in person at Fortress Monroe after Thursday morning.'' (OR, I, XXXVII, II, 444). Grant replied on the same day that he would meet Lincoln ``at any time that will suit his convenience after about next Friday.''

On July 27, Stanton wrote Halleck: ``Lieutenant-General Grant having signified that, owing to the difficulties and delay of communication between his headquarters and Washington, it is necessary that in the present emergency military orders must be issued directly from Washington, the President directs me to instruct you that all the military operations for the defense of the Middle Department, the Department of the Susquehanna, the Department of Washington, and the Department of West Virginia, and all the forces in those departments, are placed under your general command, and that you will be expected to take all military measures necessary for defense against any attack of the enemy and for his capture and destruction. You will issue from time to time such orders to the commanders of the respective departments and to the military authorities therein as may be proper.''

Grant's reply to Lincoln's telegram was written on the bottom of the page of the copy received at City Point:

`I think it will be improper for me to leave here before Monday next in consequence of present and prospective movements.''


Grant and Lincoln did not meet to dicuss the plan, and nothing came of it.

-

[ole]

At this point, Grant was running the show and Lincoln was quite amenable with the idea. Stanton notwithstanding, Grant and Lincoln had formed a bond wherein each seemed in synch with the other. And, herein, they generally (pun intended) agreed to punch Lee's lights out. Lincoln had found a general.

ole