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The battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC has long stood as the premier example of defending against a force that largley outnumbers the defenders. Fought in a small pass in the northern province of Greece, Analyzing this battle can teach many aspects of tactical planning and development that can be used even in military applications today.
A total force of some 7000 Greek and Spartan allies were able to hold off an invading force of perhaps millions. (Xerexe's Persias army consisted of a little over 5 million, but not all were present at Thermopylae. Estimates range from anywhere from 300,000-800,000 actuallly took part in this battle.)
Through use of a mountain pass, Leonidas was able to narrow the battlefront between two cliffs. He was then able to spread out his 7,000 man army into tighter formations, ensuring that they could not be surrounded at the same time. By doing this, he decreased Xerxes army from hundreds of thousands, to only a few thousand effectives at any single time, a number much easier to handle. After 3 days, all but 2000 of the Allied Greek fighting force were dismissed. Even so, after 4 days of fighting, the vastly outnumberd forces were defeated at a terrible cost. 7000 Defenders had inflicted 25,000 casualties on the invading force.
Throughout the Civil War, many battles and skirmishes can be used as examples of different aspects of what can be learned from the Spartans at Thermopylae, but first I would adress the most vital lesson to be learned and analyze effective use of a choke point to increase defensive capabilities. Burnside's Bridge at the battle of Antietem, proves a very good example for employing this tactic.
Brig. General Toombs had only 520 men from the 2nd, 20th and 50th GA at his disposal to hold off what was supposed to be an entire corps. Knowing he could not hold off a full scale attack, he positioned 400 men from the 2nd and 20th at the mouth of the bridge. He also used 120 men from the 50th GA in a skirmish line opposite the Union approach. Using the bridge as a natural choke point, Toombs ensured that Burnside could not attack with more than a few hundred at any one time. And he also ensured that any of those who were to attack, would be harrassed before they ever got across the bridge. It is also important to note that the Union troops could not cross this bridge in line of battle, but would have to cross in line of columns. Once on the bridge, the Line of Columns formation would not permit the union to stop and fire to fight there way across. They would only be able to cross 4 or 8 wide and so tightly packed that no man past the second row would be able to fire to the front. This left only a dozen or so men at any one time vulnerable to the fire from across the bridge from a force of 400. Roughly 3000 Union troops attempted to take the bridge over a 3 hour period.
Like the battle of Thermopylae, the defenders could not possibly hold forever. As the Spartan's were betrayed, the Georgians , after 3 hours of constant assaults, began running out of ammunition. The Georgians retreated, and the 51st Ny and PA advanced across the bridge, but like the Persians, victory had come at a terrible price for the Union. the 11th CT lost 33% casualties, the 2nd MD 44%. 500 men all together suffered on the Union side, while, as a testament to their execllent tactical advantage, the Confederate forces only lost 120.
Many more lessons from Thermopylae can be applied to the Civil War, and there were other advantages to losing Burnisde,s Bridge and Thermopylae that I will contest to at a later date. For now, just take this in and let me know what you all think.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
yes.. and I think it will keep me out of trouble, unlike some of those other forums of late...
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Its an excellent analysis. Burnside absolutely positively must have a bridge to cross even the most minor body of water. He'll do the same thing at Fredericksburg, he won't go across the Rappahannock (as if its the English Channel), to take Marye's Heights until Lee is already there. Burnside and his bridges just absolutely infuriates me.
"yes.. and I think it will keep me out of trouble, unlike some of those other forums of late..."
Hmmm? I can't help feeling that some of this was directed toward my posts?
Is this possible?
Not a problem. Right now I have to leave for SC. my youngest son is graduating from Parris island.
To help out when I get back I'll clean up my postings and delete all of them.
__________________ Sammy D Chief Cook & Bottle Washer
Last edited by Pvt. Sam Dile : 08-07-2007 at 03:56 PM.
no sam, I was actually referring to my recent outburst directed to OIJ, and it was pretty much entirley my fault not anything he did specifically to me to get me going.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
One of the reasons there were only 300 Spartan's at the battle of Thermopylae was that the king could not win support of his consituants to go to war, and so took his own "bodygaurd" of 300 off for a stroll. Apart from winning support for the war at home, Leonidis actions gave time for the rest of the Greek city states to react.
Xerxes knew that in order to gain control of Greece, the capitol state of Athens must fall. Athens was his primary goal. Once the Athenians finally believed that Xerxes could not be stopped, they needed time to react. They cold not let Xerxes with his army of 5 million just walk into Athen's, and they were powerless to stop them. An overall evacuation of Athens was ordered, and the citizens and Armies of Greece assembled on the small Island of Salamis, just west of Athens. It was close enough that they could watch as the Persains looted and pillaged their city across the water.
Now, the only way Xerxes could truly defeat the Greeks, was to land his army on the island and try to take it by force. But first he had to destroy the Greek navy. The Greeks seemingly had already learned from Leonidas and his Spartans at Thermopylae, and arranged their much smaller fleet in such a way that it narrowed the fighting area, choking the Persain Fleet between two juttes of land, and defeating them in detail.
Evacutaion of the entirety of lower Greece, and assembly of the fleet off of Salamis, could not happen overnight. If Leonidas had failed to delay Xerexes at Thermopylae, Athen's would surely have been overrun before they could evacuate, and forced into servitude, (which is exactly how Xerxes had such a large army in the first place.)
Fast forward again to Burnsides ****able bridge. An entire corps on the confederate right would have caught the Confederate army in a vice, and squeezed them together against the already attacking corps north of Sharpsburg. The entire Confederate army would have no choice buit to flee to Sharpsburg, and be caught against the river much like Hooker at Chancelorsville. The inevitable outcome would have been utter destruction, or surrender of, the entire Confederate army.
Gen. Toombs, in delaying the fight at the bridge for three hours, allowed Jackson to come up with his forces from Harper's Ferry just in time to stimmy the attack at a crucial moment. (the Union stopping for lunch did not help matters much). All tho Antietam itself was a marginal Union victroy (more like a stalemate), if Toombs had not been able to hold his position as long as he had, it is quite possible that the majority of the Confederate forces would have been lost that day. A small victory, snatched from almost certain defeat.
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"In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
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Lessons of Thermopylae 
Lesson 2 
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