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Lincoln ain't Leonidas nor Xerxes and neither is Lee.
Lee wasn't invading Maryland to conqure the United States and McCllellan was just bumbling along trying to keep pace with him.
That fight at the bridge was a friggin' fiasco. FUBAR! Dumbassed Burnside wanted to march across the bridge in column formation. If your's truly had been at the head of that Division, he would've put them Yankee boys in line formation and charged across the creek like it wasn't even there. We would've set them Rebs to flight six hours earlier and it wouldn't have cost hardly any lives.
You're right... Xerxes and Leonidas they aint. I'm comparing this on a purley tactical level, no insinuations as to the mistakes that may or may not have been made. Stay tuned for lesson 3 tonight
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
OI John, I agree with you about the bridge, Forget it and press on boys. I guess Burnside wanted his boys to stay clean and not get muddy. So Dred what lesson are you going to teach? I don't mind learning as long as I can quote Ya!
If memory serves downstream a hundred yards the stream was less than 3 feet deep and the corps could have crossed much easier.
two miles through cross lots, fences, and thickets all the while under reb sniper fire. Hardly an easy undertaking.
The ford that was 2/3 miles away, while it was indeed 3 feet deep or so, also had a steep bluff on the yank side 160 feet from the waters edge and steep banks. Also exposed to reb fire and a harder crossing then Snavely's ford was.
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
It is a near certainty that Leonidas could not have held on at the pass indefinitely. While Xerxes could throw fresh troops into each successive assault, Leonidas was fighting without reinforcements, and because of the tight pass and constant fighting, could not channel new men to the front line. Unfortunately, we will never know how long he might have held out under these circumstances. On the third night, a traitorous Spartan sought out Xerxes and informed him of a goat path that ran through the mountains and around the pass. With this knowledge, Xerxes could now flank the Greeks and attack them on both sides.(this is the reason all but 2000 left on the third night, Leonidas had found out he was betrayed.)
While Leonidus had knowledge of this pass, there was nothing he could do. He was already spread too thin and could not afford to send troops to guard the path. All the Greeks could do was wait for the final assault they knew would come at daybreak. Xerxes never sent a single scout, contenting himself with beating his head against the Spartan wall. If he had sent scouts , it is likely he could have found the path immediately, saved 4 days fo fighting, and saved the lives of thousands of his men. Men were little concern to a "god king", however, but the 4 extra days were to cost him dearly.
At daybreak, the Thebans deserted, but the rest of the Greek army was slain to the man. Thus ended Leonidas' stand, undone by a simple goat path only a few feet wide.
The coaling at Port Republic, VA was a major nuisance to the Confederates on June 9, 1862. Not a confederate at the field could but note the massive firepower belching forth from the dominating hill on the Union right. From this elevation, the union was able to command the entire field with long range artillery, inflicting massive damage to the confederate armies under Jackson.
Caught between two armies, Jackson's movements at Cross Keyes and Port Republic were the culminating events of his stunning Shenandoah Valley campaign in the summer of 1862. Jackson had already defeated the Union at Cross Keyes the day before, and now turned his attention to the strip of land nestled between the Shenandoah River's south fork and the Blue Ridge Mountains. The coaling that was giving him such a hard time was lying just along the foot of the mountains dominating the scenery. Jackson knew that as long as the Union had their cannon on the Coaling, the Confederate's could not win the day, and Fremont was fast approaching from the west.
The sadly lacking Confederate artillery was no match for these huge guns, and so an artillery duel was out of the question. Jackson knew if this position was to be taken, it must be by a flanking maneuver. He sent the 2nd and 4th VA, the 6th, 9th, and 8th LA, and Wheat's BN to execute this flanking maneuver. Being right at the foot of the mountains, the going was very rough. It took hours for the forces to get into place to launch their assault. During these hours, the Confederate army on the main battlefield was being ripped to shreds by the dominating artillery and the much larger Union army.
When the rebs finally assaulted the Coaling, the cannon changed hands 3 times in rapid succession. Finally the cannons were silenced. All in thanks to the 6th, 9th, and 8th LA, and Wheats BN, as the 2nd and 4th VA had gotten lost, wound up directly in front of the Coaling, and never continued the push forward. The LA regiments were sent a couple hours after the VA regiments when Jackson realized nothing was happening. Along the way a path was pointed out by a cavalry man that had grown up in the area. The LA Tigers had a much easier going, and ended up more on the flank of the Coaling then VA had.
Many of the men fighting at Port Republic that day had grown up in Port Republic. If time had been taken to find one of these men and ask about a path, they would have been able to point it out easily. The lack of a path in the beginning cost hundreds of Confederate lives and costly hours while Fremont drew closer. Time and lives the Confederate's could not spare. If the path had been found, the VA regiments could have flanked the Coaling much sooner and sent the Yankee army running. Time was also pressing. Just as the Confederate Army was chasing the final remnants of the Yankees off the field and starting burial parties, Fremont showed up. Only half an hour longer and the Rebs would have been in real trouble. As it was, Fremont in what seems a burst of anger over missing the action, lined up his artillery and opened fire on the cold battlefield, scattering the burial details and inflicting more suffering on the wounded strewn about.
Once the Coaling was lost and the Yankees had retreated, this allowed Jackson to slip away to the east through Brown's Gap, safely extricating his army from the Shenandoah Valley, and able to reinforce Lee at Richmond. The Yankees in the Valley, after nearly capturing Jackson 3 days earlier, were undone by a simple game path, only a few feet wide.
Scout the area! Know where you are going to fight! And know it better than your foe!
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Scout the area! Know where you are going to fight! And know it better than your foe!
If you are going to go down this path Dred, I suggest Jackson's slip to the west around Hooker at Chancellorsville. The Southern Army had been south of the Rappahannock for months yet they did not know where Hooker would cross and when he did cross they did not know how to get around him. Jackson was forced to rely on country roads and wood paths to slip around Hooker's right. It worked. By the skin of their teeth. If Stonewall Jackson had survived the attack to press forward the next morning instead of Stuart, we might all be talkin' a bit differently today.
Last edited by Ozark Iron John; 08-08-2007 at 10:10 PM.
I had thougth about it, but I really wanted to use a battle that wasn't as widley known, especialy since my last two lessons were about one of the most famouse battles in the war. I figured this way you could relate the two tactics and similarities, while also learning something new
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
Another fight with a non descript path is Elk Horn Tavern. The Yankees call it Pea Ridge.
Sterling Price pulled a fast one that morning and caught the Dutch lookin' south and west. Old Pap and his Missouri boys showed up north and east. It was a hard fight from daylight to dusk. Artillery changed hands more'n a few times that day.
Last edited by Ozark Iron John; 08-08-2007 at 10:29 PM.
Ahh Pea ridge.. of the Western Campaigns... I haven't had much chance to explore these so I am not very knowledgable about them.. I do intend on pickng up some good books tho once I'm caught up with what I have Pea Ridge is on the list. I think my reenactment unit does this battle.. pretty sure the 77th PA was there.
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
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