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RETURN TO SEVEN PINES - Part 3 of 3+ A Reprieve for Wessell's Brigade and Casey's Division A closer look at Casey's division and the first 3 1/2 hours of the battle.
Part 3 - "The Battle concludes"
The 101st Pa,85 NY and 85th PA standing in line behind the flooded rifle pits were now coming under heavy fire from the confederate artillery and rapidly advancing infantry. The 104th Pa fell back to Nine Mile rd and then moved toward Couch's position. The 11th Me hooked up with the 56th NY and held their position in a ravine South of the railroad and East of Nine Mile rd. The 81st NY fell back beyond Casey's camps and then reformed near the woods South and East of Casey's camps. The 98th NY reformed a little further to the rear and to the right of the 81st NY and the 96th reformed in line with the 98th NY but along the Williamsburg rd. The rest of the first line regiments fell back through the second line of abatis to Couch's position at Seven Pines.
By 3:45 PM D.H Hill's lines were closing on and around Casey's second line at the twin houses and the three regiments that were still holding this line. The 85th NY South of the redoubt was the first to feel the weight of this onslaught. By this time the 85th NY and the rest of Casey's main line had already been raked for almost an hour by the guns of Thomas Carter on their flank. Rains' right regiments were on the left flank and the rear of the 85th NY causing that regiment to fall back to it's right. The commander of the 85th stopped his men near the twin houses, reformed and pushed back toward the position they had just left. They had only stayed 15 minutes when the pressure on their front and flanks and rear forced them to fall back through the camps beyond the trees and they reformed on the left of the 81st NY.
Col Bailey had just ordered the guns in the redoubt to be spiked when he was killed. The battery in the redoubt was unable to withdraw their guns because they had lost most of their men and officers and all of their horses. Fitch's battery was falling back and Regan's battery was already in position at the second line of abatis on the road to the rear of Casey's camps. Shortly after taking this position Maj. Van Valkenburgh, Casey's chief of artillery was shot dead. At about the same time Anderson's men had closed the distance on Casey's remaining two regiments the 85th PA and the 101st PA.
The commanding officer of the 4th NC, Maj Bryan Grimes, advancing in front of the 85th and 101st PA said "We were advancing on the redoubt when I saw two enemy regiments in line on our left partially protected by and extending into the woods. I faced my men to the left and double quicked them to reach the cover of these same woods when I saw another regiment attack these troops." What he saw was likely the 27th Ga. attacking the 101st PA on their front while the 28th Ga attacked their flank. The 101st Pa suffered heavy casualties losing 129 men or 1/3 of their total strength holding this position.
Lt. Col Morris commanding the 101st was severely wounded after directing Lt. Sheaffer of Co. A to drop the right two companies back and refuse the flank. Regardless of this effort the 85th and 101st PA were overwhelmed and fled to the rear. Most of them reformed near the second line of abatis but again some did not stop until they reached Couch's line.
Only the 55th NY and some time later the 10th Mass of Couch's division were sent forward. They did not arrive until the situation was hopeless and most of Casey's line had been broken by D.H. Hill's Division. The 55th NY and the 10th Mass were both shot up and almost surrounded and captured before they too were forced to retreat from the field.
Fox's history of Regimental Losses states that the 4th NC and the 6th Ala. had the greatest numerical loss of any confederate regiments in any single battle of the war at Seven Pines in front of Casey's Division, save one the 26th NC at Gettysburg. How is this possible if as Heintzelman's report states "Casey's Division broke unaccountably and was of little use"?
The returns of the casualties for Casey's Division for this battle are as follows: 177 killed, 927 wounded and 325 captured or missing. a total of 1,429 casualties and fully 1/3 of the men Casey had to fight with. General Casey in his after action report lists his casualties as 73 officers, 1,360 enlisted men for a total of 1, 433. Gen Heintzelman went out of his way to disgrace even the dead of Casey's division in his official reports by implying that they were cowards. (O.R., Ser. I Vol. XI, Part I)
This review of the initial actions at Seven Pines is not as complete as some would argue it should be. But it contains much more information than most any other writer has related in their reviews of the battle by parroting Heintzelman's statement that "Casey's Division broke and was of no use." I do not claim to be an expert on this battle but I have tried to give a better understanding of why this Division could not hold. I would hope that this reexamination has shed more light on this battle for the average historian/reenactor, for both sides. I would also hope that readers see as I do that Casey's Division was scapegoated to cover for the negligence of Samuel P. Heintzelman who used every opportunity after casey's fight to cover his own butt by slamming Casey's Division in his never ending dispatches to McClellan.
(Do these sound like someone who is stating fact or someone who is trying to shift blame?)
May 31, 1862 6PM Gen. McClellan: Our troops on the road have given way********* S. P. Heintzelman
May 31, 1862 6:20 PM Col. Colburn: General Casey's division is being rallied by ****** of the General's staff. Gen. Casey is dead. ************************ C. McKeever, chief of Staff
May 31, 1862 8:45 PM Gen. Marcy, chief of staff: *********** when I got to the front the most of Casey's division had dispersed. ********* The rout of Gen. Casey's men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops. ***************************** S.P. Heintzelman
May 31, 1862 9:15 PM Gen. McClellan: ************** I got the information of the attack about 2 PM and sent reinforcements at once. ******** I soon met the fugitives of Casey's Division and I learned that most of them had given way. ****************** the stragglers of Casey's Division had a most dispiriting effect ************** S.P. Heintzelman
May 31st, 1862 10PM Gen: McClellan: ***************** Gen. Casey's Division cannot, however be relied upon for any purpose what ever. ************************* S. P. Heintzelman
June 1, 1862 9AM Gen. McClellan: ************* I need reinforcements as Casey's Division is not of any use. *************************** S.P. Heintzelman
Why would the commanding general of a wing of the army and the one ultimately responsible for the placement and support of a part of that wing find it necessary to vilify a Division of that command that he did not even witness in action nor was he on the field during the action? why would a commanding officer report rumor or second and third hand information without first checking the validity of the information?
You can only conclude that this commanding officer making the accusations was trying to shift the blame for an adverse action he was responsible for onto someone else.
While I do agree that discipline in the division was not the best and there were some who did behave badly how could you possibly conclude reading the previous three parts that the men of Casey's division were cowards? But if the actions of this under strength green division, who held the enemy for 3 1/2 hours, was flanked on both flanks, out numbered by better than two to one odds, and suffered almost 35 per cent casualties before they withdrew are to be defined as the actions of cowards, then you must also conclude the every soldier who fell back to cemetery hill on the first day at Gettysburg is also a coward.
Prepared from a paper I started writing several years ago to be published but never finished it. Hope I didn't bore anyone? I also have color maps to go with the text showing regimental troop movements in 15 minute increments if you are interested? It is just too much to try and post here. ______________________________________________
-Official records of the war of the rebellion Ser. I Vol. I, Part I
-Official records of the war of the rebellion ser. I Vol. LI. Part I
-Official records of the war of the rebellion ser. I Vol. XI, part I
-Histories of the several regiments and battalions from north Carolina in the great war 1861-1865. Vol I, and II State of NC
-Report of the joint congressional committee on the conduct of the war, May 1863, part I Testimony of Generals - McClellan, Heintzelman, Keyes, Casey, Hooker.
-Regimental losses in the American civil war, 1861-1865, Wm. F. Fox 1889.
-History of the 101st PA Regt. Pa Vet. Vol. Inf. John A. Reed Chicago 1910
-Southern historical papers, Vol 14
-fifty years observation of men and events, Erasmus D. Keys, New York 1885
-New York tribune articles by Samuel wilkeson, June 2,5,10 1862
-History of the southern rebellion, Orville J. wilkeson
-Battles and leaders of the civil war, vol. II
-To the gates of Richmond, Stephen w. sears new york 1992
-the battle of seven pines, g. w. smith new york 1891
-the peninsula campaign, Joseph p. cullen, Harrisburg pa. 1973
-History of the 85th regiment of Pa vol Inf. Luther s. dickey 1915
-Forward to Richmond, time life books inc. 1983
-letters of qm. sgt Edward n. boots 101st pa. vol. inf.
-letters of wm. hall co. f 101st regt pa vol inf.
-History of the 56th NY 10th legion Joel Fisk and William H.D. Blake, published 1906
-History of the 103rd Pa vol inf. luther dickey 1910
- History of the 85th NY vol Inf, Wayne Mahood 1991
__________________ Sammy D Chief Cook & Bottle Washer
Last edited by Pvt. Sam Dile : 08-04-2007 at 10:54 AM.
Thanks CW for your vote of confidence but I'm just passing along what I found. With all this silence on the subject I must have either put eveyone to sleep, overwhelmed their thought boxes or they are still reading it?
Just as a side note there was a meeting in Chicago after the war, I think it was an expo or something where McClellan was invited to speak. During this event several former members of Wessells' brigade confronted Lil' Mac about Seven Pines.......he ignored them and would not address their questions. If I can find the details on that I'll post it.
I know it's a little hard to follow the battle without drawing it out on paper. I am curious to see if others agree with my acessment of the situation? Was Heintzelman negligent? I think so!
Thanks again
__________________ Sammy D Chief Cook & Bottle Washer
There seems to be a lot of 'buck passing' during the Civil War. You would read quite often about Union generals saying that they would go along with the plan but wanted their objection on record as being against their advice. You see it on the Southern side too.
Well CW,
I guess there is a fourth reason for the silence, nobody cares. I suppose this battle just isn't important enough for the readers to spend any time on it!
I guess I'll have to come up with a more popular topic like: "Gourmet Civil War Field Rations", Union Gunboat found intact" or "Confederate Gold found in DC".
I'll bet we'd get over a hundred views in the first hour!
__________________ Sammy D Chief Cook & Bottle Washer
Problem here is that Heintzelman, while he appears to be shifting blame down, is actually outnumbered. Essentially his subordinates are letting him know that he is being attacked and he appeals up the chain of command for reinforcements. Sedwick comes and basically the Confederate plan of defeating the Southern wing of the Army of the Potomac, in detail, is thwarted.
Ultimately the question I have about this battle is about the dispositions of the Army of the Potomac in general.
Sorry about the silence, Sam. I don't know enough about the battle to comment. Was just enjoying your posts in solitude. Have downloaded them for later reference.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Well, I don't know what your reading but Heintzelclown didn't appeal for anything until the Confederates were threatening Couch's position at seven Pines which was about 3 hours after Casey asked for reinforcements.
McClellan ordered the position at the twin houses to be occupied and fortified. It was up to Heintzelclown to make dispositions of his wing as over all commander for the most part and especially Keyes Corps.
The closest reinforcements were Abercrombies' Brigade, Devin's Brigade and Peck's Brigade at seven pines at the intersection of Nine Mile rd. and the Williamsburg Rd. 1/2 mile to the rear of Casey's Division. The 56th NY, 31st PA, 8 companies of the 52nd PA and the 61st were in the area of Fair Oaks Station 3/4 of a mile North of Casey's right flank. He had no one supporting his left flank.
Richardson's Division was 6 miles to the North East, Sedgwicks Division was also 6 miles to the North East, Kerny's Division was 6 miles East and Hookers Division was 5 miles to the South East. "After the attack comes, Sedwick does indeed cross", No sir he didn't!
Not during the first 4 hours of the battle and/or in no way affected Casey's fight.
and don't get all hung up on reports of all the troops fleeing to the rear at the start of the fight.. Remember the numbers of sick I gave in my postings? These were the sick going to the rear which were reported as stragglers and those breaking to the rear without putting up a fight
I have to dig through all my file folder of documentation on the facts that I had collected for years and get it back in order again but books like Steven Sears' book "to the gates of Richmond " are just plain wrong, for instance he states Casey had 6,200 men on duty on the 31st WRONG! All he needed to do was check the O.R.'s and do a little more digging for the correct numbers and you cannot include the troops at Fair Oaks and those posted at seven Pines in this fight.
If I remember correctly I found where Heintzelman wasn't even in his headquarters for several hours during this fight as he hadn't returned from a dinner party that McClellan had held at his HQ the night before. I must dig all this up again and start posting it. It was a real eye opener to me and I guess why I was fighting for the under dogs. Coward is a strong word for soldiers of this period or any for that matter. But to apply it to a whole Division??? Something doesn't smell right. Please do not rely on the narration you will find on line. They aren't even close.
__________________ Sammy D Chief Cook & Bottle Washer
Last edited by Pvt. Sam Dile : 08-07-2007 at 10:44 AM.
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I think so!
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