Return to Seven Pines -Part 1

[Pvt. Sam Dile]

I will attempt to post this in two parts.
I apologize for the length but there was no way to short cut the documentation!
SD

A Reprieve for Wessell's Brigade and Casey's Division
A closer look at Casey's division and the first 3 1/2 hours of the battle.

Part One:

For 145 years the division of General Silas Casey has been much maligned. This division has bore the sole blame for the failure to hold the Confederate advance at Seven Pines.
They were disgraced in the Official Records and newspapers, and suffered the shame of being broken up and removed from the Army of the Potomac as punishment. The finger of accusation was pointed squarely at the Brigade of Henry Wessells which was part of Casey's Division.

This burden could not have been more undeserved by any unit anywhere. This dishonor was heaped upon Casey's Division, and utimately Wessells' Brigade, by one General in particular, Samuel P. Heintzelman, in a successful attempt to shift from himself the responsibility for not holding the advanced position at the twin houses known as Seven Pines on May 31, 1862. It was his orders that placed Casey's Division there and his failure to properly support Casey that lead to the initial outcome.

When the Army of the Potomac landed at Fortress Monroe Virginia in April of 1862 no troops in the Army were greener than those of Keyes' 4th Corps, Casey's Division and more especially those of Keim's -later Wessells' brigade. The Brigade was composed of the 85th, 101st & 103rd Pennsylvania and the 96th New York. This Brigade along with the rest of the Division were to become the manual labor force for the Army during the Campaign.

During the siege of Yorktown the Brigade was put to work building corduroy roads and bridges in all directions. when the Confederates evacuated Yorktown the Brigade was ordered to quick march to the front with blankets, overcoats and one days rations. On May 5th after sleeping on their arms in the rain all night they were once again ordered to the front at Williamsburg. The Brigade was held in an exposed position in an open field in front of ft. Magruder and was shelled by the fort for some time. On May 6th the Brigade was still in this position when they received their first rations in two days and were then pushed on in pursuit of the Cofederates who had evacuated Williamsburg.

On May 18th General Keim who had commanded the brigade died from exposure and an order from McClellan placed Wellels in command of the Brigade.

General Samuel P. Heintzelman was in command of the left wing of the Army and Casey's Division was the vanguard of the left wing. When they reached the Chickahominy River on May 22nd Casey's Division was immediately put to work digging rifle pits. The Division crossed the River on the 23rd at Bottoms Bridge and they were again immediately put to work making the bridges and approaches passable for the Artillery and Supply trains. Wessells' Brigade was again put to work building corduroy roads in all directions for the rest of the Army and were also slashing timber and digging rifle pits and breast works all while also maintaining a picket line several miles long.

When the Army again moved, Casey's Division relinquished control of the works thay had just constructed to General couch's division. when the Army stopped, construction began on new works again and so it continued for the next week.

The men of Wessells' Brigade and most of Casey's Division were without shelters up to and until they made camp at the twin houses in front of Seven Pines. The frequent rains kept them soaked to the skin and the ground coverd with water. Fresh water wells were not accessible during this time so the men were forced to use surface water for drinking and cooking. As a result of these conditions, dysentery and other illnesses ran rampant in Casey's Division.

On May 28th the effects of exposure, fatigue and the sickness associated with the drinking of surface water had so affected the Brigade that scarcely one-half of the men and officers were fit for duty. Also on the 28th General Casey was orderd to move forward of Seven Pines and to occupy and fortify a position near the twin houses.

The following is taken from General Wessells testimony before a joint congressional committee May 28, 1863. Part I pp. 597-614:

"I (General Wessells) expressed my objection several times and received this note from Gen. Heintzelman":

Head-Quars. Left Wing etc., May 29, 1862

General: The Brigadier general instructs me to say that he moves forward a brigade of General Kearny's Divisiopn this morning to a position not over two miles from Seven Pines. In case of an attack Gen. Kearny's Division could reenforce you in half an hour. The position occupied by your corps was selected by Gen. Barnard ond Lieut. Comstock, of the engineers and instructions to occupy it came from Maj.-Gen. McClellan. The Maj.-Gen. has also directed that the third corps shall not be moved forward, unless to prevent yours from being driven back.

Chauncy McKeever, Chief of Staff

(It is important to remember Heintzelmans words

He, as over all commander of the left wing of the Army takes the responsibility for the placement and support of all troops in that wing and to make changes in the disposition of these troops to meet situational changes.)


About daylight on May 29th, the pickets south of the Williamsburg Road in front of Seven Pines were attacked. The fatigue details were called in and the Division stood in line of battle for nearly two hours anticipating a general attack. The 100th NY was advanced to support the pickets but after a short time the Confederates withdrew back toward Richmond.

Also on the 29th, in compliance with Heintzelman's orders, after constructing new works and slashing timber for abates at Seven Pines, Casey's division advanced and nearly 3/4 of a mile to the twin houses where they began constructing works again. A division camp was established and fatigue details were again sent out to slash timber and dig rifle pits. The construction was under the direction of Lt. M.D. McAllister of the Engineer Corps. The new works would consist of a line of rifle pits running North and South across the Williamsburg Road with a pentangular redoubt in the center which would place it some 50 yards South of the road. While this was going on Casey also had to maintain a picket line 3 miles long 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile in front of his new line of works.

On May 30th, Casey's advanced picket line South of the Williamsburg Road was again attacked in the same place and driven in. Casey's work details were called in, and the Division once again formed into line of battle in advance of the rifle pits near the twin houses. The pickets were driven in to the edge of the slashings where the advance was held but the push enabled the Confederates to view the works being constructed. This attack was conducted by 300 men of the 23rd NC.

Just after the attack concluded a thunderstorm broke over the field with such ferocity that it was mentioned in the reports of both sides. The storm lasted from 5PM until midnight and completely flooded the surrounding countryside. All who witnessed it agreed that it was the worst storm that had ever seen. At daylight on the 31st the newly dug rifle pits were completely flooded. Once again large details of men were sent out to continue slashing timber and to work on the redoubt.

The redoubt, which would become the focal point for the Confederate attack on the 31st was unfinished when the attack came and was only a few feet high in many places. In some places the men could merely step over the walls. The rifle pits remained flooded and were unusable as a defensive work.

"The actual strength of the Brigade (Wessells') as appears in the morning reports was 2,061. Of these, 200 comprised the working party on the fortifications , a like number was detailed on picket. which, with the usual details and extra duty men made our actual strength in action less than 1,500 men."
(Gen. H.W. Wessells Comdg. 2nd Brigade Casey's Division, O.R. Ser. I, Vol. XI, part I, pp. 926-927.)


" My command, (Palmer's) consisting of the 81st, 92nd, 85th and 98th New York Vols., numbered in the aggregate about 1,200. Of this number 400 of the effective officer and men were at the commencement of the engagement on picket duty or on duty with working parties. A great portion of these did not rejoin their regiments as they should have done, but were permitted by the officer of them to ramble about, and of course doing but little service. The sick, or those reputed sick, in the brigade numbered some hundreds and in some companies there were no commissioned officers, in most of them not more than one and I estimate the whole fighting force on the ground at less than 1,000 officers and men." (Gen. Palmer Comdg. 3rd Brigade Casey's Division, O.R. Ser. I Vol. XI. pp. 929-930.)

At this time it has been difficult to ascertain an accurate effective strength for General Naglee's Brigade as his reports are missing, being one of the three brigades in Casey's Division and exposed to the same conditions as the other two Brigades it would have also been significantly affected by sickness and the detachment of fatigue details to a point where their effective was between 1,200 and 1,500. By using the larger number of 1,500 effective in the first brigade and combining it with the 2,100 from the other two brigades, General Casey had only 3, 600 men in line at his position on the Williamsburg road and these were divided into two lines of battle.

On Casey's right flank to the North was Fair Oaks Station. It was a full 3/4 of a mile from Casey's right flank regiment at the twin houses and there were only three regiments holding Fair Oaks Station and one of these was supporting the picket line. On Casey's left flank 3/4 of mile to the South lay the White Oak Swamp.
To Casey's rear 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile was the division of general Couch. To Casey's front lay the assembling division of General D.H. Hill with a force of 9,000 seasoned troops.

So now the stage is set. We find General Silas Casey with the greenest division in the army, much reduced and numbering approximately 3,600 men, stuck out by themselves within 9 miles of the Confederate Capitol with no support on either flank and opposed by a force outnumbering his own at better than two to one odds and with little or no reenforcements other than a promise of support from Gen. Heintzelman.

The attack on the 31st came just as the men of Casey's division were preparing to cook the first rations they had received in two days. At about 12:30 two guns from Capt. Thomas Carters Va. Battery fired in rapid succession sending their shells over and beyond Casey's camps. This was followed closely by the advance of the enemy on the pickets and firing was heard South of the Williamsburg road in the same two previous attacks. The firing quickly spread to the North side of the road. The details were called in and once again the Division fell into line of battle.

Gen. Wessells immediately ordered the 103rd PA out to reenforce the pickets. The regiment as marched out consisted of 430 men in 5 companies. The remaining 5 companies were on fatigue details and picket duty.