Civil War History - General DiscussionFor Discussions on Civil War Era Personalities, Politics, Issues, Campaigns, Battles, and more. Serious Civil War Discussions Only Please! All other posts will be deleted.
North and South Magazine interviewed a group of historians as to their opinion of what were the greatest successes, by both the Union and Confederate sides. It was a very interesting discussion. I'm going to give it a go and invite others to add or criticize my list.
THREE GREAT CONFEDERATE SUCCESSES
1. Josiah Gorgias, the Confederate Ordinance Chief. Saddled with poor transportation system, limited funds, a small industrial base, he performed wonders in equipping Confederate armies with small arms, artillery and ammunition. Through ceaseless work, good planning, improvisation, and creativity, he could boast that no CS force ever lost a battle simply because they lacked weapons and ammunition.
2. Lee creates the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee made over the Confederate army of the east into a mobile, flexible hardhitting force that was simply the best CSA army. His victories weren't accidents or luck, but the result of his organization of the army into big corps, and the creation of a culture of quick thinking, aggressive commanders.
3. Confederate Commerce destroyers, like the Alabama.
For a small investment, the CSA managed to build and launch these raiders under the noses of the United States and they wreaked havoc with Union shipping, forcing the Union to commit significant resources to contain them.
Last edited by matthew mckeon : 07-22-2007 at 10:17 PM.
GREATEST UNION SUCCESSES
1. The Emancipation Proclaimation. Lincoln finally grasped the root of secession and began to pull it out, ending realistic hopes of European recognition for the CSA, adding 170,000+ troops to Union ranks, and dealing American slavery a mortal blow.
2. The Army of the Potomac wins Gettysburg. The AoP suffered a solid year of defeats in the hands of Lee and the ANV. Their commander was fired a few days before the battle. Yet the officers and men of the AoP fought a furious battle for three days, and while men like Pleasanton and Sickles blundered, Meade, Buford, Warren, Hancock and a host of others performed magnificently. I think Pickett, after listening to the umpteeth rehash of why the CSA lost Gettysburg, was the one to say, "I think General Meade had something to do with it."
3. Lincoln hangs on to the border states. Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri all remained Union territory, despite significant Southern sympathy. Lincoln political manuvering retained these vital regions for the Union, and denied them to the fledgling CSA.
North and South Magazine interviewed a group of historians as to their opinion of what were the greatest successes, by both the Union and Confederate sides. It was a very interesting discussion. I'm going to give it a go and invite others to add or criticize my list.
THREE GREAT CONFEDERATE SUCCESSES
...
2. Lee creates the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee made over the Confederate army of the east into a mobile, flexible hardhitting force that was simply the best CSA army. His victories weren't accidents or luck, but the result of his organization of the army into big corps, and the creation of a culture of quick thinking, aggressive commanders.
...
From a military standpoint, this really is very impressive.
While a lot of the pieces are in place when Lee takes over from Johnston after the Battle of Seven Pines, there isn't the slightest indication Johnston would have made this Army into the instrument Lee did.
Johnston just didn't seem to be capable of getting that sort of performance out of the troops that became the Army of Northern Virginia, and had no strong vision that was driving the organization of the force. Lee inherits a force with some poor and inspid commanders, very loosely organized, brave but sloppy in operations. Within three and a half months, he's turned it into the swift-moving, tightly controlled, hard-fighting instrument we know as the Army of Northern Virginia. The force we see blundering through Seven Pines simply is not the glittering ANV we see at 2nd Manassas and Antietam. The materials Lee forged are all there in early June, but it was Lee who produced the sword from the iron.
Anyone interested in seeing the underside of the ANV would do well to start with Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History by Richard M. McMurry. This book compares the Army of Northern Virginia to the Army of Tennessee, looking in great detail at differences in the high command, the organization, the background of the officers, the influence of VMI, the arms and equipment, etc. Particularly important is what Lee did with the differences, IMHO.
Anyone interested in the difference between Johnston and Lee should also note that -- no matter where he went -- Johnston never produced a force like the ANV. Not in Virginia with essentially the same troops. Not in Mississippi, not in Georgia, not in North Carolina. He had a lot of skill and talent, he was unflappable in a crisis, he did certain things very well -- but he also had some unfathomable weaknesses in his preparation and management of his armies. He was good, but he was not Robert E. Lee.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Those are three good choices, but I think it misses something.
IMHO, one of the most important aspects was the development of the Union Army organization and command structure, and particularly the commanders. By the end of the war, the Confederate armies were outclassed on that.
Lee was great, Johnston very good. Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart were as well. Taylor, Forrest, Hampton and Gordon showed great talent and ability. But by the end of the war the depth and breadth of the talent on the Union side far exceeded what the Confederates had developed.
Atop it all was Grant -- as dangerous a commander as the United States ever has had, capable of brilliant maneuver and absolutely determined to fight to a finish. Sprinkled below him were some men of genius (Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan, Hancock, etc.) and a whole raft of talented and competent commanders. Supporting that were staffs and organizations the Confederates rarely approached, tied together far better, beginning to be used with a single purpose across the entire continent in 1864.
While Lee's ANV gave as good as it got to the end of the war, the Union Army overall essentially whipped the Confederate Army. Part of that was the difference in resources; part was the commanders; part was poor overall direction (Lincoln vs. Davis and everything below that). But it appears to me that little attention is given to how important the superiority of the entire Union force over the entire Confederate force was once it came into the hands of Grant.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
I chose my "successes" partly to avoid repeating the ones in the N and S article in which the Union Army of Tennessee was mentioned a couple of times!
I think Lee, by reorganizing the Confederate Army from several corps to two or three large corps made his force more responsive. The AoP had seven corps in 1863, and although they were often grouped in wings, or grand divisions, its a weaker structure.
I think Lee, by reorganizing the Confederate Army from several corps to two or three large corps made his force more responsive. The AoP had seven corps in 1863, and although they were often grouped in wings, or grand divisions, its a weaker structure.
There is no Corps structure in place in early June, 1862, when Lee takes over from Joe Johnston. Lee creates it, dividing the Army between Jackson and Longstreet, in the Summer of 1862.
Regards,
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
"Josiah Gorgias, the Confederate Ordinance Chief. Saddled with poor transportation system, limited funds, a small industrial base, he performed wonders in equipping Confederate armies with small arms, artillery and ammunition. Through ceaseless work, good planning, improvisation, and creativity, he could boast that no CS force ever lost a battle simply because they lacked weapons and ammunition"
********
While the Confederacy did the best they could, I would disagree slightly with "no CS force ever lost a battle simply because they lacked weapons and ammunition." I believe it skirts the probability, that ammunition shortages severely limited General Lee's strategy.
The truth is the Confederacy ran out of long-range ammunition on July 3, for their artillery at Gettysburg, and this meant that the ANV could never hold any captured part of Cemetery Ridge. The U.S. Reserve artillery had over 4,000 rounds of ammunition after Pickett's Charge failed.
Plus we'll never quite know, if the Confederates were unable to continue battle, at other locations, the next day, during the war, particularly in Virginia, because of an ammunition shortages. E.P. Alexander noted that supplies of artillery ammunition were so tight, the batteries only used ammunition, when engaged with the enemy. Alexander noted that they fired in combat, never in practice.
Practice is essential to good artillery accuracy. The records of Gettysburg on July 3, showed the accuracy of the ANV batteries, was generally very poor. Both General Hunt and General Gibbon, experienced artillerists, said the Confederate barrage on July 3, prior to Pickett's Charge was poor.
Clearly there was poor management control by Confederate artillery. Apparently they had little data on what the beginning inventory of artillery ammunition was at dawn on July 3; how much ammunition they planned to expend; how much ammunition General Lee wanted to have in inventory at the end of the day.
The simple fact is General Lee did not have sufficient amounts of artillery ammunition at the end of the battle on July 3.
The last thing any historian should do is intimate that ANV artillery was an efficient operation, when it wasn't. The Confederacy, when they went to Gettysburg had a limited amount of ammunition and none to waste. They were severely short of forage in their wagons and ran out of horseshoes for their mules and horses.
Logistics was never a hall mark of the Army of Northern Virginia. A lack of good supply helped kill that army. "no cs force ever lost a battle simply lost a battle because they lacked weapons and ammunition" seems to lead us to the conclusion, the ANV didn't have serious problems of supply, throughout the war. The previous quote also ignores how poorly, Confederate artillery ammunition was
manufactured during the war. The quote is also much too optimistic. A quote with too little reality.
Your point is well taken Whitworth, although on July 3rd, the issue was the CSA artillery was missing the enemy, not how many shells they fired.
Your other points about lack of target practice, inventory control etcs. are very valid.
Your statement about mounts, fodder, food, etc. are all true, but to but fair to Gorgias, that wasn't his department. In fact, compared to the relative failure to supply CSA armies with food and other supplies, his achievement shines all the brighter.