Logistics and the Anaconda Plan

[whitworth]

Any serious student of the Civil War has heard of General Winfield Scott and his Anaconda Plan, as it was called by the press.

But not enough detail was ever given, in my opinion, on why the plan eventually worked.

One reason, for success in the West, was the availability to the U.S., of steamboats, construction facilities to build steam engines, a good supply of iron for sheathing the boats, and boatbuilding facilities on the Ohio River and at St. Louis.

Because of its industrial shortcomings, the Confederacy could never equal the United States' ability to bring more naval forces to the point of battle on the navigable streams in the west.

Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Island # 10, Nashville, Memphis, were all captured by the Union army because of superior steamboat supply. Steamboats could supply troops and necessary supplies, near the point of attack. New Orleans would get captured because of superior Union naval strength. Eventually Vicksburg would fall because Union steamboats on the Mississippi could move troops and supplies to points near Vicksburg, leading to its eventual surrender.

The British government, knew naval power, and recognized early in the Civil War, that the Confederacy would have difficulty protecting Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and western Virginia, because all those areas were near navigable rivers, controllable by a fresh water navy. The Confederacy, never became a naval power.

Listed below is one obscure memoranda. It was not about a famous battle, but about what would enable the U.S. to reconquer the Mississippi valley.
***********************


Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, transportation steamers, gun-boats, dis.
tances, &.
[Memoranda for the use of Lieutenant-General Scott.]

JUNE 3, 1861.
After several conversations with intelligent and reliable persons on
the subjects embraced in the following memoranda, I have the honor
to snbmit the same as containing information of importance:

[Transporting Troops and Supplies]

"Passenger steamers.—Most of them now unemployed; 250 steamers on
the Ohio, rather more than less, that may carry an average of 300 men—
75,000 men; 150 steamers at Saint Louis, and thereabouts, that may
carry as many each, 45,000 men—120,000 men."

[Transporting Supplies to the Army]

"Freight barges on the Ohio, 100 in number, that will carry 2,500 bar-
rels each on the average—250,000 barrels. At and about Saint Louis
as many besides.

[Fuel for the Steamboats]

Coal barges on the Ohio, 200 in number, will carry an average load
of coal of 10,000 bushels—2,000,000 bushels. At and about Saint Louis
there are as inaiiy others.
One barge will carry coal enough for the largest steamer all the way
to New Orleans and more than enough (two barges to three large
steamers).
A steam-tug (of which there are many) would take down in tow
barges enough to supply a great many steamers.
Each passenger steamer would herself carry a large quantity of coal
in addition to troops, their baggage, and provisions.

[Logistic Supply Bases]

It is an important question whether the “June rise” may not advan-
tageously be availed of to send a good supply of coal to Cairo. The
nearest considerable coal supply above Cairo is at Caseyville, about 120
miles up the Ohio.

[New Boat Building]

Building-yards for boats.—The principal boat-building places on the
Ohio River are: (1) Pittsburg, Pa.; (2) Wheeling, Va.; (3) Cincin-
nati, Ohio; (4) Madison, Ind.; (5) New Albany, Ind.; (6) Mound
City, Ill.

[Steam Engine Building]
Steam-engine buiiding.—At the first five places named above all kinds
of engines are supplied and all other fittings. Steam gun-boats may
be perfectly fitted to receive armament, provisions, and men at each of
those places.

[New Gun-Boat Designs]

Gun.boats.—There is attached to this paper a draught made by John
Lenthall, esq., Chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and
Repairs of the Navy Department, of a gun-boat deemed to be well
adapted to operations on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Such a boat,
besides crew, provisions, ammunition, &c., will carry about four 8-inch
guns or other armament of about equal weight. The boat is planned
to draw not over five feet when full and to have the requisite speed.


[Amphibious Landing sites from Cincinati to New Orleans]

I hand in with this memorandum a table, giving all the landing places
for steamers between Cincinnati and Cairo and also between Cairo and
New Orleans, derived from Capt. J. S. Neal, of Madison, Ind., who has
been many years navigating those waters in command of a steamer.

...landings are not restricted
to the points mentioned in the list, but are easy and good everywhere.

JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Brevet Brigadier- General and Colonel of Engineers

[Freddy]

From my great-grandfather's diary on his way to Vicksburg.

June 12th. 1863
Our fleet of 11 steamers got underway at sunrise this morning. Just below Memphis passes wrecks of rebel gunboats sunk during the attack on the place a year or more ago. The scenery below Memphis nearly the same as above it. Here and there a plantation can be seen stretching along the rive bank. The dwellings of the planters seem a hundred years behind the age in style and convenience. They have little about them that is attractive. Many of them mere one-story buildings unpainted. Adjoining them could be seen the log cabins of the slaves standing in rows close together. The day has been quite warm-have made out to shelter ourselves somewhat from the sun by using our tents or blankets. Got asleep today in the sun, which is very weakening. Must be more cautious about this if I would keep my health. The scene of the starting of our fleet was novel and lively music by various bands on one steamer was provided with a “calliope” which added its melody to that of the bands. Each steamer was crowded with men and batteries and stores, each had its guard on the hurricane deck, or some a section of a battery ready as guard against guerrillas, whose reports say are ready to pounce upon any unarmed steamer. Card playing or novel reading the principle methods of spending the time among most of the men. Have found some good reading with which to pass the time. Hauled up opposite Napoleon, Arkansas for the night and sent a picket on shore for the night.

[larry_cockerham]

While all you've written about Union control of the rivers is obviously quite true, that ain't the reason the Confederacy lost the western theatre. It was lack of infrastructure on the part of Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama and the resultant inability to supply men and material in a timely and sustained manner. No railroad connected meant no supplies. Two many young and old Confederates bit the dust in the first two years of fighting; men that could not be replaced.

[trice]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

While all you've written about Union control of the rivers is obviously quite true, that ain't the reason the Confederacy lost the western theatre. It was lack of infrastructure on the part of Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama and the resultant inability to supply men and material in a timely and sustained manner. No railroad connected meant no supplies. Two many young and old Confederates bit the dust in the first two years of fighting; men that could not be replaced.

When the war began, the Confederacy organized around three major armament centers: Richmond (the Tredegar complex), Nashville, and New Orleans. That made a lot of sense from an infrastructure and communications sense. New Orleans was the biggest city in the Confederacy (and 5th biggest pre-war US), Nashville and Richmond had facilities and resources available.

But this led to quick industrial disaster in early 1862, as the Union sliced down the rivers to take New Orleans and Nashville.

The task of defending these posts was difficult. Nashville was close to the northern border, and would have been highly vulnerable to Buell's advance from KY in any case; Grant's triumph at Henry & Donelson just made it quicker. New Orleans could have been held (IMHO) if the resources to defend it were made available by the Confederate leadership -- but then many of them were pulled north to Memphis, Corinth and Shiloh, leaving New Orleans bare just as Farragut came up the Mississippi.

The Confederacy was in a tough place, with not enough weapons and men and leaders to cover everything. They were forced into a policy of robbing Peter to pay Paul in a situation where the Union thrusts from north and south were complementary. Trying to hold everything, they held nothing. With lousy leadership (mainly on the TN/KY line) and insufficient resources (New Orleans biggest difficulty) they ended up losing both cities, an almost crippling blow to their hopes.

As a result, they ended up moving their workshops and facilities back into north GA and AL. Better they should have started there and avoided the losses at New Orleans and Nashville.

Regards,
Tim

[larry_cockerham]

I don't believe Nashville was seriously nor extensively developed as an arms producing center, aside from a powder plant. The serious guns and such were made at Selma, AL as you mentioned. The problem with Selma was it's relative isolation and lack of finished wagon roads, canals (the Tombigbee was the main access) or railroad links completed with any kind of vitality for distribution. The yanks controlled the Nashville-Chattanooga line to Stevenson, AL from early in the war. That's part of the reality of your statements that the Cumberland was important. Still, the Confederate states were never really ready for serious competitive warfare long term.

[whitworth]

A good observation on the superiority of Union steamboats on the Mississippi River, by a soldier who was there.
The navigable rivers were a "railroad" , the Confederacy could not tear up or stop.

The Confederacy already lost many of their ironclads and steamboats, as your Union army ancestor indicated in his diary.

Many steamboats, of that time, could take the equivalent of ten railroad boxcars in supplies. Memphis and New Orleans both fell in 1862. By 1863, important supply bases were in Nashville and Memphis. Nashville had a railroad coming from the north, and the Cumberland River, to receive steamboat supplies, for most of the year.

The Confederates fought hard to retain Vicksburg. But time was running out. It would only take a general who with logistics superiority, knew how to use his troops.

[larry_cockerham]

Whitworth, you wrote: " The navigable rivers were a "railroad" , the Confederacy could not tear up or stop."

One of the more memorable trys was the effort of some Dickson County, TN farmboys who had two weeks practice with their new cannons before laying waste to yankee gunboats on the Cumberland at Dover. After that, aside from a brief stint by Col. D.C. Kelly with the same basic trick on the Cumberland in December 1864 and Forrest's capture of a few ships at Johnsonville prior to that, Confederate success was at a minimum or non-existant. Railroads were a bigger problem (or lack thereof) for the Confederacy. Losing control of the recently 1859 completed Nashville-Chattanooga IMHO was the most critical loss to the Confederates in the war.

[Texas2nd]

Whitworth,

There is no comparison between railroads and a river in the amount, speed and deliverability of goods and men.

Texas2nd

[trice]

Originally Posted by larry_cockerham

I don't believe Nashville was seriously nor extensively developed as an arms producing center, aside from a powder plant. The serious guns and such were made at Selma, AL as you mentioned. The problem with Selma was it's relative isolation and lack of finished wagon roads, canals (the Tombigbee was the main access) or railroad links completed with any kind of vitality for distribution. The yanks controlled the Nashville-Chattanooga line to Stevenson, AL from early in the war. That's part of the reality of your statements that the Cumberland was important. Still, the Confederate states were never really ready for serious competitive warfare long term.

Not what was needed, of course, but probably more than you might think. The TN state government had been hard at work in early 1861, and George W. Rains was sent out there to get things moving about July, 1861:

October 1, 1861:

REPORT.

To the GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE:

The undersigned, members of the Military and Financial Board, beg leave respectfully to report that they were organized under the act of May last, soon after its passage, and have been engaged ever since in the execution of the arduous and difficult trusts imposed upon them. Prior to their organization and in anticipation of the passage of the act of May, a preliminary and informal board was instituted at the instance of the Governor of the State, by whose agency large supplies of clothing, provisions, and material of war were purchased and shipped to Nashville. The sequel has shown the wisdom and forecast of this early movement, as it enabled the State to secure a large amount of articles of indispensable necessity that in a short time afterward could not be purchased at any price; and much of what was still attain able and important to the service soon rose to enormous rates. Contemporaneously with this original board, there were established by private citizens at Nashville, Knoxville, Memphis, and other places boards of supply that rendered efficient and valuable services as auxiliaries in the great work of preparation. And to the liberality and patriotism of the citizens of those and other localities the State is largely indebted for whatever has been achieved in organizing and fitting out the Provisional Army. The undersigned, of course, found many difficulties to encounter. A large army, such as Tennessee had never furnished before, had to be raised, organized, equipped, clothed, fed, and paid. The task was a new one, and the facilities in many respects not abundant. Arms and ammunition, the most important items in such an emergency, were the most difficult of attainment. The blockade then and still existing all around the Southern States rendered the importation of these articles almost impossible. At the time of the organization of this board there was not a cap factory in the whole South, nor a powder mill in operation, nor a manufactory of small-arms to any extent, and but one cannon foundry. In this state of things there was no appeal except to our own resources. Under the auspices of Samuel D. Morgan, esq., a manufactory of caps was established in this city, which from small beginnings has been made to produce within the last four months over 12,000,000 caps, and is now producing daily enough to sustain the waste of a great battle. Much credit is due Mr. Morgan for his aid in this and other matters connected with the public service. The capacity of this establishment is believed to be adequate to meet the demands of the whole Confederate States.

Cannon enough have been cast, both bronze and iron, to supply the whole Provisional Army of Tennessee for the present. This has been done principally in Nashville and Memphis, and to some extent in Chattanooga, and can now be carried on to any limit. The manufacture of small-arms, such as guns and sabers, has also been pressed with the utmost diligence. A large amount of capital and skill has been brought into requisition for this purpose in Nashville, Memphis, Knoxville, and other places, and while the production up to this time has not been great, the foundation has been laid by which, in a few months, there will have been more guns manufactured in the State than were to be found in the arsenal at the commencement of the present struggle. The skill employed in this important branch is rapidly improving, and the most confident hopes are indulged that the success will be complete. On the subject of powder, the undersigned have encountered the greatest difficulty. By timely action a large amount of sulphur was obtained by purchase at different points, but the supply of saltpeter was limited, and not to be had in the markets of the South. To supply this indispensable article, resort was had to the caves of Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Arkansas, and, at considerable expense and delay, contracts were made in all these localities which, with varied success, promise in the aggregate to afford a sufficient amount for the current demand. In many instances liberal advances had to be made to induce the investment of capital and labor in that uncertain and precarious business, and it has been impossible to procure the manufacture of the article at all, except at high prices. The undersigned also, by advances, procured one powder mill that had been out of use for some time to be refitted with increased capacity, and it has been in operation for several weeks past. They procured also in like manner to be erected a new mill, which is now about completed, with large capacity. These two mills, if they meet with no accident, it is believed will be able to furnish powder enough to meet the current demands of the whole Government during the war. The expenses of all these operations have been considerable and greatly enhanced by the increase in the price of materials and in certain branches of mechanical labor. Arms of every description soon rose to enormous rates, but the undersigned, while seeking to practice economy as far as possible, did not hesitate to pay high prices where it was necessary to arm and sustain the soldier and prepare for the impending struggle. Much of the expense incurred resulted from the failure of Confederate authorities promptly to muster our troops and to prepare for their support. The consequence was that the State has been compelled, until a recent date, to pay, clothe, and sustain her army, notwithstanding it was virtually turned over by the vote of the 8th of June and the proclamation of the Governor. This, however, can only prove a temporary inconvenience, as the Government has admitted its readiness to pay our troops from and after the 31st of July, the date of the Governor's proclamation, and such as have not been paid by the State since that period will be paid by the Confederate paymaster, and of course the advances by the State on this account refunded.

The undersigned present herewith a general and detailed statement of their expenditures, marked A and B, respectively, by which it will be seen that they amounted, on the 1st instant, to $4,637,198.77. And after paying some outstanding liabilities, the whole expenditure will fall little if any short of $5,000,000. Upon this, however, they expect soon to be able to credit the amount of supplies on hand, and which were turned over and transferred to the Confederate Government, to be paid for in cash. The inventory of these supplies, so far as it could be completed, has been forwarded to Richmond for payment, and one of the members of this board is now absent on that business. The amount of these supplies so far as ascertained is about $700,000, subject to be increased by future returns. To meet these expenditures bonds of the State were issued in the first instance, to the amount of $2,000,000, and it was hoped that by an early settlement with the Confederate Government any further issue could be avoided, and thus save considerable expense; but by the act of the last Congress, the claims of all the States have to be audited before payment can be made; and this being impossible until a settlement could be had with all the various military departments of the State, it was determined by the board to issue bonds to the full amount of the expenditure. That has been done to the extent of $1,000,000 in addition, and will be continued until the remainder is covered, unless for any reason your honorable body shall see proper to suspend it. The Bank of Tennessee is largely in advance to the State over and above the bonds received, and in this and in the whole negotiation with the State, has manifested through its officers a most liberal and patriotic policy. The same can with equal truth be said of the Union and Planters' Banks and their officers. They did not hesitate to advance what was desired by the board, and all seemed willing to share in the difficulties of the public emergency. The undersigned take pleasure in commending the conduct of these three institutions, and they are entitled for their liberality to the gratitude of the community.

The undersigned, besides transferring all the public supplies on hand, have also tutored over to the Confederate Government all their contracts for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, so that the State is no longer incumbered with that large source of expense. There remains on hand as a future charge the armory established at Nashville. It has been employed exclusively in repairing old guns, and has added considerably to the stock of arms. It can be made highly useful in this branch of business, as there are thousands of guns in the State now wholly useless that can be rendered available for the field. The machinery already acquired by this establishment and such as may be added will give it the capacity of manufacturing new arms of the first quality to a considerable extent. All that it can make will be received and paid for by the Confederate Government at liberal rates. It is not probable, from the investments made, that any loss can ensue. On the contrary, if it were desirable, its operations can be rendered profitable; but whether it shall be continued or what disposition shall be made of it is respectfully submitted to your judgment and discretion. The undersigned have had presented to them from time to time various claims for settlement, which they could not, under their sense of legal duty, allow, but which nevertheless were not without merit. These they will submit hereafter in a special communication. They ask an examination of their expenditures, and for this purpose their books and vouchers are subject to inspection. They are of opinion that as the Provisional Army has been turned over to the Confederate Government, together with all the supplies on hand, there is no longer any necessity for a military and financial board, and that it can and ought to be dispensed with for the future. They respectfully suggest that a commissioner be appointed without delay to settle with all the various officers who have been charged with the expenditure of the money. It is important that this be done speedily, in order to expedite a settlement with the Confederate Government and to reimburse the State. The books of the undersigned show to whom money was paid from time to time, and all that remains is for the persons to whom the sums were issued to furnish vouchers for the expenditure.

In conclusion, the undersigned cannot forbear to acknowledge the prompt and generous response made to their appeal by the people of the State in furnishing supplies of clothing and other necessaries to the soldiers in the field. Aside from the consideration of the timely and material aid to those who are fighting our battles and struggling with disease, it has inspired new courage and confidence in the hearts of all true friends of Southern independence. Who can doubt the success of a cause that finds such ardent and universal support among both sexes and in all conditions of life? When a free people can rise up to the sublime height of not only professing but practicing the motto of "All for the public and nothing for self," they can never be conquered. A continuation of this same spirit is respectfully and solemnly invoked during this momentous struggle. Let all our resources, physical, moral, and intellectual, be brought to bear by one mighty effort against the enemies of our rights and of American freedom, and it will require no gift of prophecy to predict a speedy and glorious termination to this unhappy conflict. The undersigned submit their action to your inspection and judgment, with the consciousness of having endeavored to do their duty to the utmost of their power, but with a regret that they could not be more useful in preparing and sustaining the State in her great hour of trial.
With high respect, your obedient servants,
NEILL S. BROWN.
W. G. HARDING.
JAMES E. BAILEY.

There was also a manufacturer in Nashville which had built several RR engines in the 1850s, and the Samuel Morgan mentioned above is the "Merchant Prince of Nashville", and also the uncle of John Hunt Morgan. One of the two powder mills was taken over by DuPont in 1865 and remained in production into the next century.

Regards,
Tim

[whitworth]

There is no comparison between railroads and a river in the amount, speed and deliverability of goods and men.

Texas2nd


That's rather too selective. Sometimes the "top" speed had nothing to do with supply. Supplies were shipped via the Mississippi River and steamboat, because their were no competing north-south railroads in the immediate area. Every area captured or forced withdrawal, such as Fort Henry,Fort Donelson,Columbus, Island #10, Fort Pillow, and Memphis were all adjacent to navigable rivers. It was the Union that controlled the rivers, resulting in continued supplies for the U.S. troops in the area.

I doubt Vickburg could become a sustained attack area, if Grant did not get a continued supply from Memphis and points north, via steamboat.

The Union moves towards Chattanooga and north Georgia, was where railroads rose to their supremacy in supply. But to discount one, in order to discount the other, minimizes the over-all importance of both, in particular areas for the Union Armies.

In the end, the entire Civil War showed the Confederacy could never match the United States in basic military supply; in steamboats and ironclads; and in railroads, railroad repair and construction.