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Notice that Gov. Brown only talked about repairs of guns in Nashville. The powder plant, as stated was very small, and of course wasn't necessary for development by the Union army after they occupied Nashville in 1862. The Tennessee River from Paducah, KY south to Clifton, TN and Waterloo, AL was used extensively by the Union for troop and material distribution and deserves at least an honorable mention here. The only break was a two-day affair at New Johnsonville, TN when Forrest provided an excellent fireworks exhibition in October, 1864! The shoals in Alabama "stopped" the traffic on the Tennessee, but alas Alabama was 'occupied' by mostly Confederates anyway until very late in the war. Yes, Sherman did raid through Mississippi in 1862, but when on back north where he belonged at least for a while. Gunpowder, after developement of the main Confederate production facility in Augusta by the Raines brothers mentioned earlier, was in abundance. The problem was still a lack of distribution and a lack of arms and manpower. Many guns never left the plant in Selma. The Confederacy had a tremendous logistical problem, one which they never really overcame. The powder plant in Nashville, a relatively small facility, just never got developed. The Union army somehow got in the way. It's interesting to note the intervention of the Du Pont family in the gunpowder business. They settled in Nashville (Old Hickory) and helped closed down the plant in Augusta after the war to quell any competition.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Notice that Gov. Brown only talked about repairs of guns in Nashville. The powder plant, as stated was very small, and of course wasn't necessary for development by the Union army after they occupied Nashville in 1862. The Tennessee River from Paducah, KY south to Clifton, TN and Waterloo, AL was used extensively by the Union for troop and material distribution and deserves at least an honorable mention here. The only break was a two-day affair at New Johnsonville, TN when Forrest provided an excellent fireworks exhibition in October, 1864! The shoals in Alabama "stopped" the traffic on the Tennessee, but alas Alabama was 'occupied' by mostly Confederates anyway until very late in the war. Yes, Sherman did raid through Mississippi in 1862, but when on back north where he belonged at least for a while. Gunpowder, after developement of the main Confederate production facility in Augusta by the Raines brothers mentioned earlier, was in abundance. The problem was still a lack of distribution and a lack of arms and manpower. Many guns never left the plant in Selma. The Confederacy had a tremendous logistical problem, one which they never really overcame. The powder plant in Nashville, a relatively small facility, just never got developed. The Union army somehow got in the way. It's interesting to note the intervention of the Du Pont family in the gunpowder business. They settled in Nashville (Old Hickory) and helped closed down the plant in Augusta after the war to quell any competition.
The problem was that the facilites at Nashville were too exposed because they were too far forward and near the frontier. If KY had seceded in 1861, the Confederacy could have based the defense further forward and had more strategic depth. As it was, any Rebel plan for a defense of TN required deployment into KY.
Nashville fell quickly of course. The industry that had been started there never reached its full potential -- but it was a substantial loss to the South in any case. If nothing else, it meant the loss of skilled workmen and their facilites in Nashville. It also inevitably made for delay and disorganization in the industrial effort.
But some sources would tell you that the longest-lasting industrial effect of the Henry & Donelson disaster was not the loss of Nashville, its' people and workshops. Instead it was the loss of the copper mines in that part of the state. For a while it was believed that the Confederacy would not be able to make percussion caps in quantity because of this (which would have ended the war very quickly). Immediate restrictions were made, and the casting of bronze guns (which had been made in Nashville as well) was prohibited. As a result, the Confederacy was able to meet their needs for percussion caps, but bronze guns were not made again, AFAIK.
In early 1862, when many of the facilities you speak of were not yet in production or just ramping up, the loss of Nashville was a major blow to the Confederacy. The loss of New Orleans was a worse one.
I think one part of Scott's Anaconda Plan that gets overlooked is the naval blockade of the Confederacy. It took two years for the North to build and deploy enough vessels to become fully effective. Once in place the Union naval blockade slowly strangled the South in goods and money earned through trade. The Anaconda Plan may not have exactly followed Scott's outline, but both parts, the capture of the Mississippi River and the Union Blockade, were eventually completed. The Union victory at Gettysburg, Sherman's victory at Atlanta, his March through Georgia and South Carolina, and Grant's Virginia Campaign all played a role in the South's defeat. Which part was the most crucial is debatable. Grant still had to defeat the Army of Northern Virginia in 1864-1865 to force Lee's surrender. However, the Anaconda plan along with the North's continuing supply of men and supplies allowed Grant to be in a position to finally finish off the South.
__________________ "Those who forget to remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.
It was the inability to make and match the U.S. Navy in ships and munitions, during the Civil War.
The Confederacy was a maritime nation without much maritime shipping and naval power.
Every one of the states represented in the Confederate Battle Flag was subject to Union amphibious operations. Every one. And the Confederacy could never build enough ironclads and steamboats to protect all these states.
By mid-1862, the time had passed for the Confederacy to protect and hold Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and New Orleans. Even in western Virginia, the best the Confederates could do was conduct raids. It never had the supplies to match Union control of the B&O Railroad out of Wheeling, and the Kanawha River, where steamboats could supply both troops and supplies, past Charleston and up to the Gauley Bridge.
The minute Virginia seceded, there were serious questions of how Virginia would retain its western counties, with U.S. dominance of the steamboat traffic on the Ohio Rivers?
It was the inability to make and match the U.S. Navy in ships and munitions, during the Civil War.
The Confederacy was a maritime nation without much maritime shipping and naval power.
Every one of the states represented in the Confederate Battle Flag was subject to Union amphibious operations. Every one. And the Confederacy could never build enough ironclads and steamboats to protect all these states.
By mid-1862, the time had passed for the Confederacy to protect and hold Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and New Orleans.
In situations like this, the defender must hold certain "choke points" to prevent the attacker from gaining unobstructed access to the interior of the country to be defended.
In 1861, for the Confederacy, those choke points are obvious enough:
1) Control of the Mississippi River at the mouth. Obvious enough, but harder to do than say. Once Farragut and Butler have pushed upriver past the forts, everything changes. The Confederacy now has at least one entire new front to worry about, while the Union has a secure base for further operations -- plus the sizable industrial/population loss involved with New Orleans.
2) Control of the Mississippi as far north as possible. Important points here are the entry points to the Cumberland, Missouri, Tennessee and Ohio rivers -- none of which the Confederacy was able to establish. If the Rebels can do this, then the war is fought on a very limited front, which is to their advantage. Without the Cumberland, the only real threat to Nashville must come from Bowling Green, dependent on the RR, again to the Confederate advantage.
I don't say they could have done those things, merely that it is what they must do to prevent what you are pointing out. Once the choke points open up, once they are in Union control, the potential threats multiply and the resource difference in men and material becomes more important.
In Virginia, the Confederacy did well, but still suffered from the area's accessability via water.
Quote:
Originally Posted by whitworth
Even in western Virginia, the best the Confederates could do was conduct raids. It never had the supplies to match Union control of the B&O Railroad out of Wheeling, and the Kanawha River, where steamboats could supply both troops and supplies, past Charleston and up to the Gauley Bridge.
The minute Virginia seceded, there were serious questions of how Virginia would retain its western counties, with U.S. dominance of the steamboat traffic on the Ohio Rivers?
Also serious questions concerning what interests Western Virginia had in common with the rest of the state. WV economic concerns ran to the Ohio River Valley and Pittsburgh far more than Richmond/the Tidewater. Even from Harpers Ferry, the best way to get to Richmond was to take the B&O RR to Baltimore, than board a steamer down the Chesapeake to the James River. Terrain, communications and economics virtually made them separate states.
Tim wrote: " Nashville fell quickly of course. The industry that had been started there never reached its full potential -- but it was a substantial loss to the South in any case. If nothing else, it meant the loss of skilled workmen and their facilites in Nashville. It also inevitably made for delay and disorganization in the industrial effort."
To some extent I think you give Nashville more credit than it deserved as far as it's 'industrial might'. It was a small river town at best with old wooden warehouses near the riverbank that afforded steamboats the ability to discharge loading planks on the muddy bank so that laborers could transport material up the bank to the structures along First Avenue. That was generally the limit of the flooding. What was important, as it played out, was, as you suggest, the river itself which did allow federal supplies to get south of Kentucky and beyond the plateau that generally follows the Kentucky-Tennessee state line. The unfortunate part of this for the Confederacy was no defense to speak of downriver at Dover nor at Nashville itself. Hence Union occupation and use of the water access and storage to supply the Union army to the east. How did all that occur? The southern states simply had no infrastructure nor industrial base to amount to being able to wage war against the other states. Agrarian economy. Interesting you should mention the copper mines. Again, they too were located in a remote region of the state with very poor access. Did the devastation wrought by the war hasten industrial development in Tennessee and Alabama? Perhaps so. If not the cotten gin might have had the same impact.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Last edited by larry_cockerham; 06-03-2007 at 08:01 PM.
Tim wrote: " Nashville fell quickly of course. The industry that had been started there never reached its full potential -- but it was a substantial loss to the South in any case. If nothing else, it meant the loss of skilled workmen and their facilites in Nashville. It also inevitably made for delay and disorganization in the industrial effort."
To some extent I think you give Nashville more credit than it deserved as far as it's 'industrial might'. It was a small river town at best with old wooden warehouses near the riverbank that afforded steamboats the ability to discharge loading planks on the muddy bank so that laborers could transport material up the bank to the structures along First Avenue. That was generally the limit of the flooding.
Nashville was an interesting place for such an important city. Before the RR reached it, there were a few months/year when it was isolated because the Cumberland was not navigable due to water conditions.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
What was important, as it played out, was, as you suggest, the river itself which did allow federal supplies to get south of Kentucky and beyond the plateau that generally follows the Kentucky-Tennessee state line.
The Nashville & Louisville reached Nashville in 1859. The Nashville & Chattanooga connected in 1858, giving access through Chattanooga to Atlanta and Savannah. The Memphis & Charleston was completed in 1857, connecting with the Nashville & Chattanooga. Three interconnecting RRs ot the southwest were completed on April 10, 1861 (just in time for the Civil War) connecting Memphis to Nashville more directly. By the time the ACW gets going, Nashville is actually a vital RR junction in the communication system, accessible from all directions. Like the road net at Gettysburg, the RR network alone would have ensured armies went through that area.
Steamers could get to Nashville on the Cumberland, just not during low-water periods. At the time of the Battle of Nashville, there is a flotilla of Union gunboats on that river, guarding Thomas flank by preventing a crossing without major preparations and bridgetrains.
The Union later completed the RR to the Tennessee River at Johnsonville as part of Sherman's 1864 supply line. Sherman then had three routes from the north to Nashville (one entirely via RR, one entirely waterborne on the Cumberland, and one partially water & RR on the Tennessee to Johnsonville). He had two RR routes from Nashville to Chattanooga. Nashville's isolation existed very much as you portray it -- but your picture is of the Nashville of 1857, not the Nashville of 1862.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
The unfortunate part of this for the Confederacy was no defense to speak of downriver at Dover nor at Nashville itself.
In addition to the shortage of weapons and equipment, one reason for the horrible condition of the defenses of Nashville was that the Nashvilleans themselves had not come forward to work on them, despite calls from A. S. Johnston to do so. It was more of the "King of Spades"-type remarks and ridicule that Lee faced in 1861 before his big success.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
Hence Union occupation and use of the water access and storage to supply the Union army to the east. How did all that occur? The southern states simply had no infrastructure nor industrial base to amount to being able to wage war against the other states.
Yes, they were well short on what was needed -- and unaccustomed to doing the work required to produce what they needed. However, in 1861 one of the few (perhaps the only?) plant in the Confederacy that had actually built a RR locomotive was the Nashville Manufacturing Company -- soon to be lost to the Rebel cause.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
Agrarian economy. Interesting you should mention the copper mines. Again, they too were located in a remote region of the state with very poor access. Did the devastation wrought by the war hasten industrial development in Tennessee and Alabama? Perhaps so. If not the cotten gin might have had the same impact.
Yes, the South was overwhelmingly an agricultural economy, and was that way by choice. Given the starting position, the South made amazing strides -- but they never came close to catching up and (with rare exceptions, such as gunpowder) were usually on the short end of the quality race, or no better than even. Hard to be even when you have to work on a shoestring.
But however we look at it, the Confederacy would have been much better off if they held onto Nashville (as well as New Orleans) longer. If nothing else, production there would have given a breathing space for the facilities further back to develop, and the loss of any production to a Confederacy so strapped was a serious loss.
Tim, I'm well familiar with the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad development since my gg grandfather Cockerham was stationed at Tullahoma in 1864 as a Union cavalryman under Robert Milroy before being transferred to Edward Hatch. Aside from the Louisville connection, I was not really aware of the other links you described as being there that early. That makes sense particularly the Johnsonville one which became a Union offload point of some significance until Forrest rearranged it in October 1864. By then, the war was essentially on a downward slope for the Confederacy. There was also apparently another major access point for Union troops to the Tennessee at Clifton. That was about the upstream limit on the Tennessee because of the shoals in Alabama and the limited Confederate presence there. Your continued description of much of this is quite interesting. I salute your knowledge!
Prior to the battle at Nashville, during the frozen period around December Col. D.C. Kelly dispatched from Belle Meade plantation by J.R. Chalmers caught five Union gunboats on the Cumberland about five miles down stream from Nashville and made some serious dents in their armor with his field artillery. The river at that point is only about 100 feet wide today and probably not much more in 1864 unless there was flooding. After three or four days of being a general nuisance, Kelly was forced to retire in preparation for the battle. We have a small park there commemorating that event: Brookmeade Park at Kelly's Point Battlefield.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
Ancestors in CSA Army: 48th VA; 63rd VA, 5th NC Cav; 37th NC
Wife and Grandson's CSA: 15th AL, 51st GA, 41st TN; 36th TN; GA Mil 1197 Dist
Tim, I'm well familiar with the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad development since my gg grandfather Cockerham was stationed at Tullahoma in 1864 as a Union cavalryman under Robert Milroy before being transferred to Edward Hatch. Aside from the Louisville connection, I was not really aware of the other links you described as being there that early.
Just another part of the problem in getting a good picture of those days: things were changing so rapidly it is easy to be completely right about a situation at one moment, and wrong about it a short time later.
So where up until 1857 or early 1858, Nashville was a very isolated place, only 3 years later it had numerous RR connections to the rest of the country. Sherman had the RR to what would be Johnsonville completed in 1864 just so he could have a third route from the Tennessee, although it started before the war. The USMRR put in some 60 miles of track for it IIRR.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
That makes sense particularly the Johnsonville one which became a Union offload point of some significance until Forrest rearranged it in October 1864. By then, the war was essentially on a downward slope for the Confederacy. There was also apparently another major access point for Union troops to the Tennessee at Clifton. That was about the upstream limit on the Tennessee because of the shoals in Alabama and the limited Confederate presence there. Your continued description of much of this is quite interesting. I salute your knowledge!
Shoals split the Tennesse into three sections those days, although it was apparently possible to pass them during major floods in some years.
Quote:
Originally Posted by larry_cockerham
Prior to the battle at Nashville, during the frozen period around December Col. D.C. Kelly dispatched from Belle Meade plantation by J.R. Chalmers caught five Union gunboats on the Cumberland about five miles down stream from Nashville and made some serious dents in their armor with his field artillery. The river at that point is only about 100 feet wide today and probably not much more in 1864 unless there was flooding. After three or four days of being a general nuisance, Kelly was forced to retire in preparation for the battle. We have a small park there commemorating that event: Brookmeade Park at Kelly's Point Battlefield.
I'll be out that way next year. Once for a tour of the Atlanta Campaign (well, from here it is "out that way" ), once for a wedding in Nashville. I'll have to see if I can free up a little time to look for it.
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), once for a wedding in Nashville. I'll have to see if I can free up a little time to look for it.
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